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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyses the development of Western relations with the 
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the Front for 
the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) from 1956 to 1976.
It concludes that nationalist attitudes were influenced by 
eleven factors, of which only one--perception of Western policies--was 
consistently present in every time period. Even when a movement was 
becoming increasingly hostile to the West due to other factors, 
perception of a friendly Western attitude was capable of producing a 
positive nationalist response.
Although seven factors shaped Western policies, in general 
governments reacted in accord with the impact of nationalist policies 
on interests deemed important. For cold war-focussed countries, a 
movement's policies were only examined to determine their influence on 
that international competition. Because both nationalist groups had 
ties with the socialist world, and because Portugal threatened to deny 
Western access to the Azores base if the West courted the nationalists, 
cold war-focussed states such as the United States avoided co-optation 
initiatives.
Those states with wider ties to the area tended to evaluate the 
impact of the whole spectrum of nationalist policies on regional 
interests when determining strategies. Countries with broad ties to the 
region, such as Britain, were capable of overlooking a movement's 
socialist alliances and adopting co-optation policies if the group was 
deemed willing and able to further the Western state's interests in the 
region.
The thesis also concludes that co-optation policies would have 
better protected Western interests than the coercion or neglect 
strategies so often selected and that such an approach would have 
produced stronger results in FRELIMO than in the MPLA. However, due to 
the interplay of other factors, even if subjected to consistently 
positive Western policies neither movement would have become a close 
Western ally.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis analyses the development of Western relations with two 
movements that fought for their territories' independence from 
Portugal--the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento 
Popular de Libertaqao de Angola--MPLA) and the Front for the Liberation 
of Mozambique (Frente de Libertaqao de Mozambique--FRELIMO). The time 
frame extends from the 1956 founding of the oldest movement up to and 
including the 1974 to 1975 independence processes and their immediate 
aftermaths. Within the Western community, U.S. policy is given 
particular attention and European policy is discussed in detail only in 
the second half of the period under consideration, when it became 
activist. The policies of southern Africa's minority-ruled states,
South Africa and Rhodesia (now known as Zimbabwe), are analysed only 
when they became relevant to the interaction between the nationalists 
and Western governments, again primarily in the later period.
This work focuses on the question of motivations. Why did 
Western governments sometimes seek to co-opt the nationalist movements 
and at other times try to coerce them? Why did the nationalists at 
times reach out to the West and appear willing to be co-opted, and at 
other times move to consolidate their relations with the Eastern bloc? 
Had the nationalists appeared more respectful of Western interests, 
would the West have been more supportive? Conversely, if the West had 
been more sympathetic towards the nationalists, would those groups have 
become more willing to be co-opted?
DEFINITION OF TERMS
This thesis uses some standard English-language terms in a specific 
way. It also employ? several invented terms that are not standard 
written English. For the purpose of this work, the terms coercion 
strategy, co-optation strategy, "co-optable", and "level of co- 
optability" are intended to convey the following meanings:
• Coercion strategy; A strategy designed to use military or 
diplomatic means, or to help others do so, to force a 
political actor to adopt certain courses of action.
• Co-optation strategy: A strategy designed to entice a 
political actor, directly or indirectly, into pursuing 
certain courses of action.
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• "Co-optable": A term invented by the author to indicate that 
an entity is predisposed to be enticed by friendly gestures 
into pursuing policies favourable to Western interests.
• "Level of co-optabilitv": Another term invented by the author 
to describe the level of predisposition of a political actor 
to be enticed by friendly gestures into pursuing policies 
favourable to Western interests.
For the purposes of this paper, the terms derived from the root 
word "co-opt" should be viewed without the pejorative connotation of 
"manipulate". Furthermore, even though the latter two terms are 
invented, for ease of reading they will henceforth be used without the 
standard quotation marks.
DEFINITION OF WESTERN INTERESTS
In this work the word "interest" is used in the sense defined by 
Webster's dictionary. It can variously mean "a right, title or legal 
share in something", an "advantage or benefit", or "a feeling that 
accompanies or causes special attention to an object or a class of 
objects".1 When used in conjunction with the world "Western", the phrase 
is intended to convey a Western stake in a development, a Western 
concern that certain events will benefit it and others will be 
detrimental.
Western states considered a range of interests as they 
formulated policy regarding Mozambique and Angola. They generally 
wished to:
• encourage Western orientation of states
• discourage establishment of communist/socialist systems
• block alliances with the Soviet Union, and on occasion those 
with other communist states
• placate domestic critics
• retain traditional alliances (trans-Atlantic and other)
• gain foreign support for nation-specific international 
agendas
• ensure access to markets
• ensure access to strategically located bases and ports
1 Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, (Springfield, 
Massachusetts: Merriam-Webster Inc, 1986).
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• protect economic, cultural and political ties in African 
states neighbouring Mozambique and Angola, when extant
FACTORS INVOLVED
The research reported in this thesis identifies eleven factors that 
affected the co-optability of the nationalist movements and seven that 
influenced the decisions of Western governments to pursue coercion or 
co-optation policies. The impact of the factors is analysed over four 
chronological phases: Early nationalist struggle and initial Western 
response from 1956 to 1963 (described in Part I), hardening of 
nationalist and Western policies from 1964 to 1969 (Part II), further 
growth of mutual antipathy from 1970 to spring 1974 (Part III), and the 
crisis associated with the final days of the independence processes 
from spring 1974 through 1975 (Part IV).
The following is a list of the factors found to influence 
nationalist co-optability:
• background of the nationalist leadership
• source of the movement's ideological orientation
• formation as an artificial versus genuine front
• degree and nature of internal factional rivalry
• rivalry with other nationalist movements
• nature and actions of the movement's direct enemy
• relations with the movement's non-Western allies
• conditions of armed struggle
• attitudes of regional powers
• economic and geographic structure of the territory in 
question
• perception of Western policies
The factors found to influence Western governments1 decisions to 
pursue co-optation or coercion policies are the following:
• relationship with a rival power
• related security, military, and strategic issues
• internal politics
• economic, cultural, and historical ties with the region
• policies of tacit and open allies in the region
• perception of nationalist divisions
• perception of the nationalists' policies
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CONCLUSIONS
Overall, the study pointed to the following conclusions:
1. The co-optability of the nationalist movements was influenced 
by all of the factors discussed, with the weight of each varying 
according to circumstance. Some factors played a heavy role in one 
phase, and then had no role whatsoever in other periods. Throughout the 
historical period, however, nationalist co-optability was consistently 
influenced by the leadership's perception of Western policies. Even 
when a movement was becoming increasingly hostile to the West due to 
the interplay of other factors, perception of a positive Western 
attitude was capable of producing an increase in co-optability. At 
times, the role of other factors was so strong that the likely shift 
would have been quite modest, but the historical record nonetheless 
strongly suggests that co-optation policies consistently would have had 
some discernable impact.
2. Western governments reacted to the nationalists in accord 
with the impact of nationalist policies on interests deemed important.
2a. States Focussed on the Cold War. For the countries that 
narrowly focussed on the rivalry with the Soviet Union, nationalist 
policies were only examined to determine their impact on the cold war 
competition. Because during most of the period under examination 
Portugal threatened to retaliate against any Western effort to co-opt 
the nationalists by barring the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) from its Azores military base, and since Azores access was 
deemed essential to successful competition with the Soviet Union, cold 
war-focussed states chose policies of either neglect or coercion. The 
United States, and for much of the period West Germany, fell into this 
category. These governments, and the United States in particular, 
ignored all other aspects of the nationalists' policies. Even pro- 
Western groups in the region were held at arm's length to avoid 
alienating Lisbon. There was little the nationalists could have done, 
other than ceasing to call for their territories' independence, to 
obtain favour from cold war-focussed states.
2b. States with a Wider Range of Interests. Those European 
states with a wider range of economic, cultural, and historical ties to 
the geographic region tended to pay greater attention to the 
nationalists' policies. They examined the impact of such policies on 
those broader regional interests and adopted coercion or co-optation
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policies in response. With these countries the nationalists were in a 
position to influence policy, at least to some extent.
3. For a co-optation strategy to work well, there had to be 
favourable factors in both the subject movement and in the Western 
government concerned.
3a. FRELIMO was reasonably co-optable for much of the period, 
but anti-co-optation factors influencing all but a few Western 
governments prevented a full co-optation campaign from being tested. On 
the few occasions when certain Western states did briefly pursue co­
optation, they received a cautious but positive FRELIMO response. If a 
full co-optation campaign had been implemented, FRELIMO would not have 
become fully pro-Western, but would have been willing to accommodate a 
wide range of Western interests.
3b. The MPLA was consistently less co-optable than FRELIMO, and 
Western governments placed even less effort into co-opting it than the 
Mozambican movement. If co-optation had been attempted, it would not 
have worked as well as with FRELIMO, but would have better protected 
Western interests than the neglect/coercion policies in fact adopted.
ACADEMIC CONTEXT
Before moving on, it is useful to identify this work's relationship 
with the existing literature in the field. This thesis builds upon, and 
yet is different from, the existing body of research. The works of the 
Ottaways,2 Somerville,3 Wolfers and Bergerol,4 the Isaacmans,5 Hanlon,6
2 David Ottaway and Marina Ottaway, Afrocommunism (New York: Holmes 
and Meier, 1981) .
3 Keith Somerville, Angola: Politics. Economics and Society (London: 
Francis Pinter, 1986
4 Michael Wolfers and Jane Bergerol, Angola in the Front Line 
(London: Zed Press, 1983).
5 Allen Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman, Mozambique: From Colonialism 
to Revolution (London: Westview Press, 1983).
6 Joseph Hanlon, Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire (London: Zed 
Books, 1984).
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Munslow,7 Hall and Young,8 Cahen,9 Messiant10 and Heimer11 all provide 
valuable insights, albeit from varying political perspectives, into the 
evolution of the nationalist movements' ideological orientation and 
attitudes towards the West. They contain relatively little information, 
however, about Western policies from 1956 to 1976 or the interaction 
between those policies and the views of the nationalists. Marcum's 
extremely valuable two-volume work12 does address this interaction, but 
only with respect to Angola, and in 1978, when his concluding volume 
was published, some important events were too recent to permit 
dispassionate interviewing of the major protagonists. For example, at 
that time it was virtually impossible to find sources in South Africa 
and the United States willing to talk about their governments' 
decision-making processes regarding the 1975 Angola operations.
7 Barry Munslow, Mozambique: The Revolution and its Origins (Harlow, 
United Kingdom: Longman Group, 1983).
8 Margaret Hall and Tom Young, Confronting Leviathan: Mozambique 
since Independence. (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1997).
9 Michel Cahen, "Corporatisme et colonialisme: Approche du cas 
mozambicain, 1933-1979. I”, Cahiers d'Etudes. 92, XXIII-4 (1983).
_______________, "Corporatisme et colonialisme: Approche du cas
mozambicain,1933-1979. II", Cahiers d'Etudes. 93, XXIV-1 (1984).
_______________, "Le Portugal et l'Afrique", Afrique Contemporaine,
(Jan-Mar 1986).
_______________, "Check on Socialism in Mozambique:What Check? What
Socialism?", Review of African Political Economy, no. 57 (July 1993).
_______________, Mozambique: La Revolution Implosee (Paris:
L'Harmattan, 1987).
10 Christine Messiant, "Angola, Les Voies de 1'Ethnisation et de la 
Decomposition", Lusotqpie, no. 1-2 (1994).
11 Franz Wilhelm Heimer, The Decolonization Conflict in Angola: 1974- 
76 (Geneva: Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, 
1979).
12 John A. Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, vol. 1, The Anatomy of an 
Explosion (1950-1962) (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1969) and 
vol. 2, Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (1962-1976) (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1978).
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The works by El-Khawas,13 Stockwell,14 and Wright15 detail various 
aspects of U.S. policy towards Angola, but do not touch on Mozambique, 
and again the interaction element is missing. Noer16 provides an 
excellent documentation and analysis of U.S. policy regarding southern 
Africa until 1968, but stops short of the independence process. 
Mahoney17 enhances understanding of the declassified documents from the 
Kennedy White House with information from interviews of individuals 
involved in policy making during Kennedy's presidency. However, he 
makes little reference to the nationalists' perceptions and decisions 
or to the impact of U.S. actions on nationalist thinking. Recent works 
by Antunes18 provide a wealth of new information concerning U.S. policy 
during the Kennedy and Nixon administrations, but like Mahoney do not 
touch on the nationalists' evolution or the interaction element.
Much of the available literature includes references to South 
African and Rhodesian policy, but does not provide much detail. 
Frankel19 and Geldenhuys20 fill this gap by describing South African
13 U.S. Interdepartmental Group for Africa, The Kissinger Study of 
Southern Africa: National Security Study Memorandum 39 (Secret), ed. 
Mohamed A. El-Khawas and Barry Cohen (Westport, Connecticut: Lawrence 
Hill and Co., 1976). This is a reprint, with a new introduction and 
appendices, of the 1969 edition of a classified national security 
study entitled Southern Africa.
14 John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story (London: First 
Futura Publications, 1978).
15 George Wright, The Destruction of a Nation (London: Pluto Press, 
1997).
16 Thomas J. Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States 
and White Rule in Africa. 1948-1968 (Columbia, Missouri: University 
of Missouri Press, 1985).
17 Richard D. Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal In Africa (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1983).
18 Jose Freire Antunes, Kennedy e Salazar: 0 Leao e a Raposa (Lisbon: 
Difusao Cultural, 1991).
______________________ , Nixon e Caetano: Promesas e Abandono (Lisbon:
Difusao Cultural, 1992).
19 Philip H. Frankel, Pretoria's Praetorians: Civil-Militarv Relations 
in South Africa (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University 
Press, 1984) .
20 Deon Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign 
Policy Making (Johannesburg: Macmillan South Africa, 1984) .
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decision making, and Flower21 and Martin and Johnson22 are useful 
regarding Rhodesia, but these authors do not address the specific 
manner in which those governments' policies influenced the development 
of Western relations with the nationalists. Minter provides useful 
insights regarding South African policy in the region, and UNITA's 
connections with both the Portuguese and Pretoria, but has little 
information concerning Western decision making during the period under 
consideration.23 While Clarence-Smith24 and Pitcher25 provide detailed 
information concerning Portuguese decision making, relatively few facts 
regarding the policies of other Western European countries are 
available from the major published studies. (That is why the chapters 
on European policy in this work draw heavily on press reports and the 
author's interviews.)
Perhaps most significantly, existing work is not generally 
comparative and does not make a systematic attempt to work out 
conclusions regarding interaction between nationalists and Western 
governments that might be transferable to other geographic areas and 
time periods.
NOTES CONCERNING METHODOLOGY AND STYLE
All of the interviews with Mozambican and Angolan sources were 
conducted in Portuguese. In addition, most of the MPLA and FRELIMO 
documents cited were originally in Portuguese, as were all books cited 
that feature Portuguese titles. Books and articles with French titles 
were originally in French. All translations from both Portuguese and 
French are the work of the author.
21 Ken Flower, Serving Secretly; An Intelligence Chief on Record. 
Rhodesia into Zimbabwe 1964 to 1981 (London: John Murray, 1987).
22 David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The 
Chimurenga War (Harare, Zimbabwe: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1981).
23 William Minter, Apartheid's Contras (London: Zed Books, 1994) . 
_______________, ed., Operation Timber: Pages from the Savimbi
Dossier (Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, 1988) .
24 Gervase Clarence-Smith, The Third Portuguese Empire. 1825-1875: A 
Study in Economic Imperialism (Manchester, United Kingdom: University 
of Manchester, 1985).
25 M. Anne Pitcher, Politics in the Portuguese Empire: The State. 
Industry and Cotton. 1926-1974 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).
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PART I
EARLY NATIONALISM AND INITIAL WESTERN RESPONSE: 
1956 TO 1963
INTRODUCTION TO PART I
The circumstances in which the MPLA and FRELIMO were founded, in 1956 
and 1962 respectively, the events that occurred in Angola and 
Mozambique shortly thereafter, and the reaction of the West to these 
developments all had a critical impact upon the co-optability of the 
nationalists and the predilection of the West to pursue a co-optation 
strategy in this early period. These events also conditioned the 
nationalists' interaction with the West over the following three 
decades. Therefore, this early period merits careful analysis.
The MPLA exhibited a relatively low level of co-optability 
during these early years. It began with an already formed, if still 
undeveloped and flexible, Marxist conception of the world. The enemy 
was not merely Portuguese colonialism. It was capitalism in general. 
FRELIMO, in contrast, demonstrated a relatively high level of co- 
optability. It started with a fairly non-ideological nationalistic 
desire simply to expel the Portuguese, and Marxist terminology did not 
enter its vocabulary until much later. Despite the differences in the 
movements' overall attitudes towards the West, however, both 
experienced a rise in their co-optability levels simultaneously in the 
middle of the period.
The Western country that showed the most interest in the 
nationalists in this period, the United States, followed an 
inconsistent course. It first viewed the emerging nationalists through 
a cold war prism, saw their rebellion as the product of Soviet 
subversion, and considered the movements worthy only of neglect or 
opposition. Washington then shifted to a co-optation approach, decided
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the movements were reacting to Portuguese repression rather than Soviet 
expansionism, and adopted an anti-colonial strategy designed to 
eliminate the cause of the unrest. The co-optation policy lasted only 
two years, however, and was then abandoned.
The three chapters in Part I, on the MPLA, FRELIMO, and the 
United States respectively, will seek to answer the following 
questions: What factors were the most important in determining the 
level of co-optability of FRELIMO and the MPLA? How important was the 
nationalists' perception of Western policies in determining their level 
of co-optability? What accounted for the differences between the two 
movements? Why did the co-optability of both simultaneously rise in the 
middle of the period? If the West had pursued co-optation more 
vigorously, would the nationalists have become more co-optable? What 
factors most influenced the U.S. decision first to adopt and then to 
abandon a co-optation strategy? How important was the West's perception 
of nationalist policies in its deliberations? If the nationalists had 
appeared more co-optable, would the West have showed greater interest 
in co-optation? How did the events of this period condition future 
nationalist relations with the West?
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CHAPTER 1 
MPLA: RADICAL ROOTS
The MPLA displayed modest evidence of co-optability during its early 
years, particularly from late 1962 to mid-1963. However, Marxist 
philosophy was already the reference point for analysis and the 
movement defined the enemy not only as colonialism, but as capitalism 
in general. It was clearly interested in obtaining Western support, but
it had already defined its principles in a manner that reduced,
although did not eliminate, its ability to accommodate Western 
concerns.
Three interrelated factors were primarily responsible for this 
initial low level of co-optability: the background of the leadership; 
the movement's founding as an artificial front; and the influence of
the movement's non-Western allies, specifically the Portuguese
Communist Party (PCP) and the Soviet Union. The first factor, the 
background of the nationalists, in turn was influenced both by the 
actions of the direct enemy, Portugal, and by Angola's economic 
structure.
The MPLA's co-optability nonetheless did rise modestly in late 
1962, mainly due to the movement's perception that the United States 
was adopting friendlier policies. It then fell again in mid-1963 
following disappointment with the U.S. position. Rivalry with other 
nationalists, although not a factor in itself influencing co- 
optability, affected the MPLA's perception of U.S. policies and 
therefore played a secondary but important role.
This pattern suggests that a more sympathetic Western attitude 
might have sustained the modest 1962-1963 co-optability increase, but 
as the underlying forces initially limiting co-optability were already 
in place, even a maximum co-optation effort would not have produced a 
dramatic increase in the MPLA's willingness to accommodate Western 
concerns.
ANGOLAN CONTEXT
Before exploring the formation of the MPLA, it is useful to review the 
economic and cultural context in which the organisation arose.
As Heimer has pointed out, in contrast with the rest of Africa, 
in the 16th and 17th centuries the Angolan port cities of Luanda and 
Benguela and their immediate environs "constituted Portuguese
18
bridgeheads on the coast" and therefore when the European "scramble for
Africa" began Angola had "two micro-societies of a 'creole' type" with
long traditions of interaction with African society. This interaction
was geographically quite restricted, however, and the African
population elsewhere in the colony had very limited or no contact with
the Portuguese. Therefore, "one could say that colonial occupation led
to the constitution of a cluster of societies, where the 'modern' one
was the central society, and the African ones the tributary
societies".26 Race relations also had special characteristics. Because
Portugal lacked capital and know how, and permitted only limited
foreign capital, it was impractical for Lisbon to do what France and
Britain did--have a limited number of whites perform central roles and
train blacks to execute most other tasks. Portugal instead drew on "the
only other 'development resource' available, i.e. relatively important
quantities of metropolitan manpower".27 Whites therefore performed many
of the less skilled jobs performed by Africans in other societies, such
as "office boy" and waiter tasks. This meant that African opportunities
for upward mobility "were more restricted than in other colonies".28
According to Heimer, a consequence was
...the particularly clear cut delimitation between the central 
society and the tributary societies; through the reinforcement 
of economic boundaries by ideological (racial, cultural) 
cleavages. In the perspective of most tributary societies, the 
central society thus constituted a completely different world.29
Messiant analyses Angola's history from a slightly different,
but complementary, angle. She divides the Angolan elite from which the
nationalist leaders emerged into three groups: the anciens assimiles.
the evolues and the nouveaux assimiles. Anciens assimiles were urban
mestico (mixed race) and black individuals who had achieved
"assimilated" status by acquiring Portuguese cultural characteristics.
From the turn of the 20th century assimilados enjoyed higher status than
the mass of "indigena" blacks. The anciens assimiles. in Messiant's
view, are descendants of the multiracial colonial bourgeoisie that
26 Heimer, op. cit., p. 9.
27 Ibid., p . 11.
28 Ibid., p. 12.
29 Ibid., p . 11.
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existed until the 19th century.30 The group spoke Portuguese as its first
language, was largely Catholic, and lived among and on occasion married
whites. Though they were later somewhat marginalised by the increase in
white migration and the "racial social and matrimonial closing of
colonial society",31 the anciens assimiles remained the elite of the
non-white population and had a strong group identity. Within this
black/mestico community, socialization was markedly multiracial, and
tribal origin was not a primary reference for an individual's identity.
The evolues in Messiant's model were an equally self-aware group
that emerged among black Angolans in the neighbouring colony of the
Belgian Congo, around Leopoldville. Primarily from the Bakongo ethnic
group, the evolues were exposed to a much more racially segregated form
of (Belgian) colonialism than the anciens assimiles. The evolues
exalted the black race and the Bakongo people in particular. The
group's leadership featured members of the aristocracy of the royal
Kongo kingdom, was uneasy with people of Portuguese origin, and
resented the imposition of European culture.32
The nouveaux assimiles in Messiant's model were not descended
from the old colonial bourgeoisie but from African society and the
indicrenas who were their social milieu. Their first language was
African, and they acquired assimilated status only in the 20th century,
largely due to the efforts of foreign (Protestant) missionaries after
World War II. Like the anciens assimiles. the nouveaux were not an
ethnic or neo-traditional elite, and they were largely in salaried
jobs. However, as Messiant notes,
...the assimilated status which they gained at great cost did 
not open the doors to promotion. This brake, which became 
stronger after World War II with the hardening of social and 
racial divisions, meant they not only could not compete with 
whites, but they also could not compete with the anciens 
assimiles who lived above them and kept them at a distance.33
The nouveaux assimiles perceived their differences from the descendants 
of the old bourgeoisie and mesticos "in terms that were simultaneously
30 Messiant, op. cit., p. 161.
31 Ibid. , p. 162.
32 Ibid., pp. 161-163.
33 Ibid. , p . 164 .
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racial and social".34 In the face of the "superiority" of those who 
presented themselves as an aristocracy, the nouveaux assimiles tried to 
value their own characteristics, resulting from the connection they 
maintained with traditional African society and their colour.
Heimer's central/tributary society model and Messiant's anciens 
assimi16s/evolues/nouveaux assimi1es analytical framework are quite 
complimentary, and help one understand the origins of both the MPLA and 
its rivals.
FORMATION OF THE MPLA
The MPLA's leaders emerged primarily from the anciens assimiles group, 
in Messiant's terms, and had close ties with "central society", in 
Heimer's terms. Their families' relatively privileged status, made 
possible in part by Angola's rich natural resource base which provided 
economic prosperity for some, permitted many future MPLA leaders to 
study in Europe where they were exposed to Marxist ideology. Nouveaux 
assimiles formed part of the MPLA's rank and file. Essentially, as 
Heimer has asserted, the MPLA "primarily express[ed] the aspirations of 
the African and mestico petty bourgeoisie, and secondarily of the 
African proletariat".35
Another factor which influenced the MPLA's leaders was Angola's 
moderately strong (at least in comparison to Mozambique's) economic and 
cultural integration with Portugal, which caused the PCP to take 
considerable interest in the territory.
The roots of the MPLA can be traced back to 1948 and the 
formation of the Federal Angolan Committee of the Portuguese Communist 
Party (Comite Federal Angolano do Partido Comunista Portugues-CFA) in 
Luanda. Essentially a branch of the then-secret PCP, the CFA had a 
significant influence on the capital's intellectuals, who included some 
black youth organisations. Several nationalists who subsequently played 
leading roles in the MPLA were members of the CFA. As the Soviet 
historian A. M. Khazanov has noted, this ensured the emergence of a 
"firm, Marxist Leninist core" within the MPLA.36
34 Ibid.
35 Heimer, op. cit., p. 28.
36 A. M. Khazanov, Aqostinho Neto (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986), 
p. 52.
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According to Mario de Andrade, a leading MPLA figure, when the 
police clamped down in 1950 a group of young Angolans "dedicated to 
Marxist thought" decided to organise political action towards "the 
interest of the popular masses" through a "clandestine political 
organisation of revolutionary character" designed to win independence. 
Andrade remarked, "It was in this context that the Angolan Communist 
Party (Partido Comunista de Angola--PCA) was born in October 1955, 
[spread] the fundamental principles of Marxist doctrine", and 
established clandestine schools in the African quarters of Luanda.37 
Although the PCA was influenced by African youth, it did not spring 
from an African base itself. The leading scholar of Angolan history, 
John Marcum, characterises the PCA as essentially an overseas cell of 
the PCP.38
Early the next year (1956), the PCA leaders helped create a 
nationalist front, the Party of Struggle of African Angolans (Partido 
da Luta dos Africanos de Angola--PLUA), which adopted an action 
programme similar to that of the PCA.39 Subsequently other nationalist 
groups formed. According to Andrade, as control over them became 
difficult, the young Marxists of the Angolan Communist Party, the 
leaders of the PLUA, and "other patriots" formed the MPLA in December 
1956.40
The initial membership of the MPLA was urban-oriented, came from 
the Mbundu people concentrated in the capital, and was led mostly by 
mesticos and assimilados. As Messiant has noted, the MPLA founders 
broke, in Angola or in Europe, with their situation of elite privilege 
and denounced racial domination. They adopted a "progressive and 
socialist nationalism...founded on typical 'creole'
values,...universalist,...multiracial, strongly influenced by European 
ideologies, Christian humanism and above all Marxism".41
There are various views as to why the MPLA was so attracted to 
the latter ideology. The Ottoways argue that it provided the urban,
37 Mario de Andrade, "Et les colonies des Salazar?", Democratie 
Nouvelle 4, no. 9 (September 1960).
38 Marcum, vol. 1, op. cit.,Andrade, op. cit., p. 27.
39 Andrade, op. cit., p. 35.
40 Ibid.
41 Messiant, op. cit, p. 162.
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multi-racial leadership with an ideology that stood above race and
allowed co-operation with black workers and the less educated.42 Heimer,
using his central/tributary society dichotomy, notes that during the
late colonial period "the central society had become the exclusive or
predominant frame of reference for the mesticos and the growing number
of urban Africans".43
[They] internalized the ideology of the colonizers... [and 
accepted] the existence of a 'modern', 'civilized' and 
'developing' central society, having a 'pre-eminence' over a 
number of 'backward rural societies'. Consequently their main 
grievance against colonial domination was not the exploitation 
of the periphery of the cluster by its centre, but the 
contradictions within the centre.44
This created "a predisposition for 'nationalist' ideologies, i.e. 
political ideologies legitimating the existing social formation, 
produced by colonialism, in terms other than colonial".45 Although 
Heimer does not explicitly say so, he implies that a Marxist style 
nationalism suited the MPLA because it legitimated the dominance of the 
"central society" from which the MPLA arose over the "tributary 
society" in terms that resonated with the group's European oriented, 
multi-racial outlook, yet challenged Portugal's right to dominate 
Angola and couched central society's domination in social justice and 
wealth redistribution terms capable of appealing to the less 
privileged.
Whatever explanation for the MPLA's Marxism one finds 
convincing, it is clear that the movement was designed as a broad front 
capable of encompassing divergent parties and groups, but was 
nonetheless founded by individuals who had already adopted a 
philosophical framework sympathetic towards Marxist thought. In short, 
it was an artificial front. This contradiction between the ideology of 
the organisers and the desire to create a broad front was evident in 
the MPLA's first manifesto, published in 1956. It called for the 
overthrow of Portuguese rule and the establishment of an independent 
Angolan state governed by a democratic "coalition of all the forces
that fought Portuguese colonialism". It argued for a "revolutionary
42 Ottaway and Ottaway, op. cit., p. 101.
43 Heimer, op. cit., p. 20.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid. , p. 22.
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struggle" by means of a "single front of all the anti-imperialist 
forces of Angola".46 It "set aside" considerations of political opinion, 
social status, religious belief, and philosophical view in an effort to 
appeal to a wide base. However, the same founding document called for 
"planned economic development, the establishment of producers' 
cooperatives, state control over all foreign trade, and an agrarian 
reform "to liquidate private monopoly' as well as to redistribute land 
to the poorest peasants".47
So, while all nationalists were invited to join this new front, 
the post-independence society for which that front was fighting was 
already defined in broadly socialist terms.
This is not to say that the MPLA was in complete agreement with 
conventional communist analysis. In particular, the MPLA opposed the 
idea that Angola had to pass through capitalism before it could 
establish a socialist society. This theory, propounded by both the PCP 
and the PCA, was discussed at great length by the MPLA's founders and 
rejected. However, the very fact that the issue absorbed so much energy 
indicates that Marxist philosophy was already the reference point for 
analysis.
Portuguese policies in the late 1950s subsequently strengthened 
the Marxist strand in MPLA thought. The Portuguese secret police 
institution was established in 1957 and promptly sought to eliminate 
the nationalist organisations in Angolan territory. The waves of 
arrests in Luanda, which began in March 1958, forced the MPLA to shift 
to exile politics.48 This meant that the MPLA's leadership increasingly 
came from the student elite developing in Europe. In line with the 
Portuguese government's official policy of promoting the assimilation 
of Africans into Portuguese culture, a small number of African Angolans 
had been studying in Portuguese universities since the 1940s. They were 
generally the sons of civil servants and came from relatively 
privileged assimilado or mestico families. In Europe they absorbed the 
radicalism prevalent in the student communities. In 1949 they 
established "Africa House" as a forum for exchanging ideas with other 
African nationalists, and in 1951 they participated in the founding of
46 Andrade, op. cit., p. 30.
47 Ottaway and Ottaway, op. cit., p. 102.
48 Andrade, quoted in Marcum, vol. 1, op. cit., p. 37.
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the Centre of African Studies. The organisations were generally closed 
down by the Portuguese authorities, the latter lasting only six 
months.49 Therefore, the Angolan nationalists gradually shifted to 
France, where they were exposed to still more Marxist thought.
Among the intellectuals prominent in the exile Angolan community 
was the previously mentioned Andrade. Of mixed race, he studied in 
Portugal for six years and then moved to Paris in 1954, where he 
studied under Roger Bastide, a critic of Portuguese colonial policy, 
and became the MPLA's acting president. Viriato da Cruz, the first 
secretary general of the MPLA, fled Angola when a warrant for his 
arrest was issued in 1957, going first to Portugal and then to Paris.
In the latter city he worked with Andrade and Lucio Lara, the mestico 
son of a wealthy sugar plantation owner who eventually became the 
MPLA's chief Marxist ideologist, and together they ran the MPLA in 
exile.
Another important MPLA figure radicalised in Europe was 
Agostinho Neto, the leader of the MPLA from 1962 until his death in 
1979. However, his history was slightly different from that of his 
colleagues, because U.S. Methodist missionaries had an early impact on 
his development.
Neto was the son of a Methodist pastor from Catete district near 
Luanda. The Protestant church was competing with the government- 
sanctioned Catholic church in Angola, and because it took a negative 
view of Portuguese colonialism it was attractive to pro-independence 
Africans. Neto earned some of his secondary-school expenses by working 
as secretary to the Methodist Bishop Ralph Dodge, an American.50 Through 
this connection Neto obtained a grant in 1947 from the Methodist 
missions of New York. Although his main love was poetry, Neto chose to 
use the grant to study medicine in Portugal.51 There he joined the 
various anti-colonial African organisations, and was exposed to Marxist 
political literature.52 He initially was attracted to the necrritude 
ideas propounded by Leopold Senghor, but in the mid-1950s he began to
49 Khazanov, op. cit., pp. 26-27.
50 Ibid. , p . 16 .
51 Ibid. , p. 20.
52 Ibid., p. 30.
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work closely with the PCP.53 Following a three-month imprisonment in 
1951, he became a member of the Central Committee of the Movement of 
Democratic Unity-Youth, which had been established by the PCP to 
organise "colonial students who had decided to oppose fascism".54 Neto 
later wrote, "The energy and heroism of the Portuguese Communists 
inspired and gave confidence to those who were fighting for their 
freedom in the colonies".55 Neto sided with the Communist Party in the 
argument over whether African nationalists should devote their energies 
solely to independence efforts or whether they also had a duty to help 
the Portuguese communists oust the Portuguese government.56
By the time Neto was imprisoned again in 1955, his poetry was 
earning him an international reputation. He continued to write while in 
prison, and his fame grew. His release in 1957 was partly attributed to 
a protest campaign mounted by writers around the world on his behalf.57
Neto joined the MPLA in 1957 after release from prison, while 
still in Portugal. The following year he finished his medical studies 
and married a white Portuguese woman, Maria Eugenia. In 1959, he 
returned to Angola and did clandestine MPLA work while maintaining a 
medical practise as a "cover". In June 1960, he was again arrested.
Shortly after being detained, Neto was named honorary president 
of the MPLA and a campaign for his release was mounted. A group of 
British liberals and intellectuals, including Anthony Wedgewood Benn, 
Basil Davidson, Iris Murdoch, Julian Huxley, and John Osborne agitated 
for Neto's release.58 Numerous letters were written to the London Times. 
and in the United States his former mentor Ralph Dodge organised a 
similar campaign.59 The effort was effective, and in March 1962 Neto was 
released, although ordered to remain in Portugal.
53 Ibid., pp. 32-35.
54 Ibid., pp. 37-43.
55 Agostinho Neto, "Relatorio do Comit§ Central ao 1 Congresso do 
MPLA", p. 48. Quoted in Khazanov, op. cit., p. 44.
56 Khazanov, op. cit., p. 25.
57 Ibid., pp. 33-39.
58 Ibid., pp. 115, 117.
59 Ibid., p. 116.
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Neto's early experiences had a contradictory effect upon his 
character. On the one hand, the personal and financial support of the 
U.S. Methodist church and the lobbying of European intellectuals for 
his release from prison made him appreciate the role of Western 
liberals in the independence effort. On the other hand, his exposure to 
Marxism in Portugal, his friendship with PCP leaders, and his 
membership in PCP-organised student groups pushed him towards a radical 
left position.
Although Neto had a critical impact upon the MPLA's character, 
the first military action for which the movement took credit occurred 
while he was still in prison. On 4 February 1961 a crowd of 3,000 
attacked Luanda's central prison and other strategic points in the 
capital. The Portuguese retaliated against the African population, 
killing hundreds. The MPLA immediately announced the attack had been 
executed by its supporters. However, Portuguese author Jose Freire 
Antunes asserts in his 1991 work that the MPLA took credit for the 
event "after the fact". He cites an interview with Joaquim Pinto de 
Andrade, a high ranking MPLA figure in the 1960s, who told Antunes, "In 
reality the MPLA had nothing to do with 4 February".60 Antunes believes 
the attack was a spontaneous, unorganised revolt against the 
arbitrariness of the Portuguese security and prison officials over the 
previous two years.
Whatever the accuracy of Antunes' conclusion, in 1961 the attack 
was widely accepted as the work of the MPLA. It shocked Luanda's white 
population, and Portugal told U.S. officials Czechoslovakian arms were 
used in the attack, which Lisbon characterized as "part of an 
international plot to push Portugal out of the colonies".61
By the time the MPLA appeared in newspaper headlines, it had a 
high proportion of European-educated, left-inclined mestico and 
assimilado exiles in its leadership and was using Marxism as a 
philosophical frame of reference. It was thus well disposed towards the 
socialist world and suspicious of, though not yet overtly hostile 
towards, the West. It also had a leader in waiting who, while 
increasingly committed to Marxist ideology and close to the PCP, was 
also well aware that liberal Western leaders could be valuable allies 
in the struggle against Portugal.
60Antunes, Kennedy e Salazar, op. cit., p. 150.
61 Ibid., pp. 148-149.
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EMERGENCE OF THE RIVAL
Shortly after the MPLA was formed, a rival nationalist movement, Holden
Roberto' s Union of the People of Angola (Uniao das Populates de
Angola--UPA) emerged. When the UPA began to build a cordial
relationship with Washington, the MPLA had a contradictory reaction. It
was suspicious that the United States would help the UPA dominate the
MPLA, but it also hoped that U.S. sympathy for the cause of Angolan
independence could be shaped into support for the MPLA as well.
The UPA, which was the precursor to the more widely known Front
for the National Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional de Liberta^ao de
Angola--FNLA), was formed in 1958. It grew out of the Union of the
People of Northern Angola (Uniao das Populates do Norte de Angola--
UPNA), which had called for the independence of the old Kongo kingdom
of Angola as a separate country. The UPA was formed when the UPNA
decided to extend its independence efforts to all of Angola, but its
leaders retained their original ethnic orientation.62 The UPA's ideology
was nationalist without a significant socialist component. Not
surprisingly, its main support came from Bakongo people in the northern
rural areas that had previously comprised the Kongo kingdom.
In Messiant's terms, the FNLA's leaders emerged from the evolues
group, while its membership came from the "tributary society" in
Heimer's model. The leadership was largely Baptist rather than
Catholic, did not speak Portuguese as a first language, and was opposed
not only to Portuguese colonialism but to the imposition of European
culture. As Messiant has noted, the FNLA and MPLA were
...two elites that were urban and Western educated, but 
everything else separated them. Neither was prepared to accept 
the domination of the other. The anciens assimiles who led the 
MPLA considered the leadership of the FNLA to be composed of 
foreigners, emigres, racists, tribalists and reactionaries who 
were culturally non-Angolan. The FNLA saw the MPLA as a 
culturally non-African elite which was assimilated and therefore 
alien, dominated by mesticos who were seen as "sons of colon" 
who wanted independence in order to take the place of whites.63
While the nouveaux assimiles of the capital were largely drawn to the 
MPLA, their counterparts in the countryside were more drawn to the 
FNLA.
62 Somerville, op. cit., p. 25.
63 Messiant, op. cit., pp. 163-164.
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Heimer asserts that the leadership of the FNLA maintained close 
ties with the Bakongo "tributary society", but was culturally 
integrated into the "central society" of Congo-Leopoldville. He 
characterizes the FNLA as a "non-revolutionary nationalist movement" 
which reflected "primarily the aspirations/interests of a petty 
bourgeoisie, and secondarily those of some peasant tributary 
societies....1,64
Roberto tended to regard whites and Portuguese colonialism as 
the sole enemy, and though he occasionally made overtures to the Soviet 
Union, he placed his main faith with the West. He first visited the 
United States in 1959 and gradually developed relationships with 
liberal members of Congress. He had cordial discussions with then- 
Senator John F. Kennedy and while in Washington painted the MPLA as a 
Soviet-controlled communist organisation.65
In March 1961, five weeks after the Luanda prison raid 
attributed to the MPLA, Roberto organised a bloody uprising in the 
north among the Bakongo people. Approximately three hundred Europeans 
and many mesticos and assimilados. whom the UPA regarded as allied with 
the Europeans, were killed. According to Antunes, by the time the UPA 
uprising occurred in northern Angola, the CIA had already infiltrated 
the organisation. On 4 March, eleven days before violence broke out, 
the chief of the CIA post in Lisbon informed his Portuguese 
counterparts that the UPA was preparing an offensive in the Congo 
district to call attention to the Angolan situation in the United 
Nations, and specifically commented, "We have a CIA man in the UPA 
Central Committee".66 The Portuguese, however, did not take the warning 
seriously.
A month after the uprising, in April 1961, the U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) began paying Roberto a modest retainer 
estimated at $6,000 a month.67 Rumours about the connection circulated 
in Africa.68 When the Portuguese complained the U.S. replied that the
64Heimer, op. cit., pp 26-27.
65 Marcum, vol. 1, op. cit., p. 15; Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 182.
66Antunes, Kennedy e Salazar, op. cit., p. 174.
67 Wright, op. cit., p. 36.
68 Mahoney, op. cit., p. 204.
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funds were merely for "intelligence gathering".69 In July 1961 the U.S. 
also began to offer scholarships for Angolan students who had left 
Portugal after the March uprising and asked for asylum in France and 
Switzerland.70 This was done indirectly through the CIA, but the U.S. 
connection was not kept secret for long. Roberto's increasingly public 
Washington ties accelerated the MPLA's growing apprehension and 
curiosity about U.S. intentions. When U.S. humanitarian assistance for 
Angolan refugees in Congo-Leopoldville, largely UPA supporters, began 
to arrive in mid-1961, this trend was further reinforced.71
The MPLA/FNLA conflict has traditionally been described as an 
ethnic struggle (Mbundu versus Bakongo) and as a conventional 
ideological competition (communist versus capitalist). While thee 
elements clearly were present, the works of Heimer and Messiant suggest 
a third layer of conflict. There was a "reciprocal and very radical" 
rejection based on "social and cultural" differences between anciens 
assimiles and evolues.72 In Heimer's model, which is compatible with and 
complimentary to Messiant's, the conflict was between elites of two 
different "central societies", with an element of tributary/central 
society conflict as a result of the Bakongo non-elite support for the 
FNLA.
THE ROLE OF SOVIET INFLUENCE
While the MPLA's was reacting with a combination of apprehension and 
curiosity at the sight of Washington's openness to Roberto, Soviet 
policy in the early 1960s was reinforcing the MPLA's existing 
predisposition towards radical Marxism. In the early 1960s, Khrushchev 
turned towards southern Africa with high expectations that Soviet aid 
would induce the national liberation movements to embark upon direct 
transition to socialism. Moscow was particularly interested in Angola 
for the following reasons: (1) unlike Mozambique, it had the potential 
to become an economically independent unit; (2) it could become a 
springboard for operations in South West Africa (renamed Namibia by the
69 Wright, op. cit., p. 37.
70 Antunes, Kennedy e Salazar, op. cit., p. 263.
71 Mahoney, op. cit., p. 205 and Antunes, Kennedy e Salazar, op. cit., 
p. 264.
72 Messiant, pp. 161, 164.
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United Nations in 1968); and (3) it had harbours of potential strategic 
value. Marcum notes, "Portuguese sources indicate that as early as 1952 
an effort was made by a Soviet agent, one Feld Matvin, to unite [the 
nationalist movements in Angola]".73
The Soviet Union provided the MPLA with various services, 
including publication of propaganda leaflets, supportive articles in 
Prayda, and training for trade union organisers linked with the 
National Union of Angolan Workers (Uniao Nacional dos Trabalhadores de 
Angola--UNTA), a pro-MPLA labour organisation. In the United Nations 
the Soviet Union also consistently supported criticism of Portuguese 
colonialism. Moscow further sought to influence the MPLA through the 
PCP, with which it had close links.
CO-OPTABILITY RISES
Despite the MPLA leaders' Marxist background, the movement's unease 
about its rival's relationship with Washington, and the influence of 
the Soviet Union, for a brief period from late 1962 to mid-1963 the 
MPLA demonstrated rising co-optability, made overtures to the West, and 
moderated its rhetoric. This was due in part to the MPLA's perception 
that the United States was increasingly supportive of the nationalist 
cause and, if properly courted, might be convinced to provide the same 
assistance to the MPLA as that apparently on offer to Roberto's 
movement, renamed the FNLA in March 1962 .74 It was also partly due to 
the coincidental escape of the relatively pragmatic Agostinho Neto from 
Portugal, and his increased influence over MPLA policy. A final 
consideration was the MPLA's hope that the United States would exert 
pressure on the FNLA to form a united front on the MPLA's terms. 
Disappointment with the U.S. response to its overture ended the phase 
of higher co-optability by late 1963.
An incident in mid-1962 undoubtedly played an important role in 
MPLA thinking. A group of sixty MPLA activists under threat of imminent 
arrest in Portugal tried to flee to France in two groups. An MPLA 
activist who was in the first group recounted the following story in 
1985 :
We travelled in a convoy of cars. My car was driven by a young,
well-muscled American who took us through Spain to France, and
73 Marcum, vol. 1, op. cit., p. 29.
74 Somerville, op. cit., p. 32.
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we arrived safely in Paris. We had false documents that the 
American provided. I assumed he was CIA. The second group was 
arrested by Franco's police in Spain, but the U.S. ambassador in 
Madrid managed to get them released, and they eventually joined 
us in Paris.75
Paulo Jorge, a top MPLA leader who served an extended term as Angola's 
foreign minister after independence, confirmed the story, and added 
that the U.S. Methodist church helped convince the U.S. ambassador to 
intervene.76 We now know that the CIA had been secretly facilitating the 
travel of Angola students out of Portugal into France and Switzerland 
since mid 1961, so its perfectly possible that these MPLA activists did 
enjoy CIA assistance.
Consequently, when Neto escaped from Portugal in mid-1962 and 
fled first to Morocco and then to Congo-Leopoldville, there was already 
firm evidence that the United States was willing to provide some 
assistance. Neto's prison release had also given him firsthand 
knowledge of the power of Western liberals. When he was made president 
of the MPLA at the movement's First National Conference in December 
1962, replacing the more radical Acting President Andrade, these 
experiences began to be reflected in MPLA policy.
At the conference, the movement articulated a new tactic 
regarding relations with the West. It described Portugal's NATO allies 
as "the true rulers of important sectors in the economy of Angola" 
because of their large economic investments.77 Therefore, one of the 
goals of MPLA diplomatic activity would be to deepen economic 
"contradictions" inherent in Lisbon's relations with "imperialist 
countries in the Western Alliance".78 The MPLA believed that the West 
supported the status quo in Angola in general, but also thought that 
the West hoped for modernisation of the colonial relationship so as to 
lessen the chance of eventual revolution. The MPLA believed that this 
difference between Portugal and the West could be turned to the 
nationalists' advantage.
75 Source three, confidential interviews by author, April and May 
1985.
76 Paulo Jorge, interview by author, Luanda, Angola, 30 May 1985.
77 The MPLA was perhaps overstating the case, because major Western 
investment in Angola did not begin until Portugal introduced new 
foreign investment legislation in 1965.
78 MPLA First National Congress (December 1962), pp. 13-14.
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The concrete policy manifestation of this new co-optability was 
the December 1962 MPLA conference's call for a "widening" of the range 
of MPLA representatives abroad and Neto's decision to undertake a 
foreign tour to New York, Washington, Rabat, Tunisia, Bonn, London, 
Paris, Switzerland, and Italy.79
The policy shift and Neto's appointment as president were both 
resented by MPLA Secretary General da Cruz. He advocated a Maoist 
strategy, said that the MPLA should rely on its own resources without 
courting foreign assistance, and questioned the role of whites and 
mesticos in the movement. He labelled Neto a "rightist" and accused him 
of being an agent of the Portuguese secret police. Da Cruz was removed 
from the secretary general post and was eventually expelled from the 
movement.80
Meanwhile, Neto implemented the new policy. In a speech to the 
Fourth Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations in New 
York, Neto hailed the "positive role" of that organisation and the 
virtues of non-alignment. "No country or organisation... [can claim] a 
monopoly" on aid to the Angolan struggle, he said, seeking to 
demonstrate independence from the Soviet Union.81 Perhaps remembering 
the role of Western liberals in obtaining his prison release, he 
lobbied at U.S. universities, re-invigorating the previous lukewarm 
policy of encouraging MPLA-oriented student groups in the West. While 
in Washington, Neto highlighted the movement's expulsion of the da Cruz 
faction, presenting that faction as extremist and its removal as a move 
towards moderation. In both New York and Washington, Neto met with 
representatives of Methodist organisations, renewed his acquaintance 
with Ralph Dodge, and obtained some promises of Methodist assistance 
for Angolan refugees.82
Though the Methodist church was moderately supportive, U.S. 
government officials were unresponsive. As explained in more detail in 
chapter 3, the U.S. administration was in the midst of an internal 
debate about its co-optation policy, which the anti-co-optation group
79 Ibid.
80 Khazanov, op. cit., pp. 137-138.
81 United Nations, General Assembly, Fourth Committee, "Declaration 
faite par M. Agostinho Neto du Mouvement Populairede Liberation de 
1 'Angola (MPLA)", 1427 session, 17 December 1962.
82 Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 14.
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was gradually winning. What will there was among the embattled pro-co­
optation element to intercede on Neto's behalf was perhaps undermined 
by his past association with "pro-communist" student groups and Radio 
Moscow's preference for Neto over Roberto. At the time of the visit, a 
Baltimore Sun article said, "[T]here [is] some doubt whether Neto 
[will] get much American support for the medical clinics his 
organization maintains in the Congo as a means of drawing support from 
Angolan refugees".83 The press forecast was largely accurate.
Neto's effort to convince the United States to pressure the FNLA 
to form a common front was equally ineffective. Roberto had 
consistently resisted MPLA overtures for unity, and the MPLA suspected 
that Washington might be behind his obstinacy. For example, the MPLA 
believed that Roberto's support from the American Committee on Africa 
(ACOA) was provided on the condition that he not ally with the MPLA, 
though this was never proved and was denied by ACOA.84 Neto's efforts 
had no effect, and in fact a mid-1963 Department of State cable said 
that the United States was not "in a position to exert much pressure on 
rival parties to coalesce".85
In sum, the MPLA came away from its first overture to the West 
with little to show for its efforts. It received neutral to negative 
press coverage, little aid, and no diplomatic assistance for the 
united-front strategy.
Neto was under internal MPLA pressure to produce rapid results. 
The Western trip had been criticised by radical colleagues, 
particularly Andrade, who distrusted Washington and thought that 
Kennedy's apparent liberalism merely reflected a U.S. desire to replace 
Portuguese rule in Angola with its own neo-colonial control. When 
Neto's initiative produced few tangible results, the radical group's 
hand was strengthened, and this particular period of heightened MPLA 
co-optability came to an end. Perception of Western policy was clearly 
the primary, though not the only, cause of both the rise and fall of 
MPLA co-optability at this time.
83 Baltimore Sun. 21 December 1962.
84 Source three, interview.
85 U.S. Department of State, "Circular 92" (telegram to embassies in 
Africa), 16 July 1963.
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NATIONALIST RIVALRY
The MPLA's rivalry with the FNLA became more intense and violent in 
1963 and early 1964. This had a negative effect upon the MPLA's already 
waning co-optability. Because the movement's leadership perceived the 
United States to be allied with Roberto, the increasingly acrimonious 
rivalry exacerbated MPLA irritation with Washington. The conflict also 
damaged the MPLA's relationship with a key regional power, Congo- 
Leopoldville, and as that power was growing closer to Washington, this 
reinforced MPLA disillusionment with the West. The nationalist rivalry 
also caused factional problems within the MPLA that weakened its 
international credibility and had a long-term impact upon the 
conditions of armed struggle that subsequently damaged the movement's. 
co-optability.
At the heart of the 1963 to 1964 rivalry was competition for 
access to Congo-Leopoldville, which both movements considered the best 
base for launching guerrilla operations into Angola. Before Congo- 
Leopoldville ' s independence from Belgium in June 1960 this issue had 
been irrelevant, because the colonial authorities had been hostile to 
both Angolan nationalist movements.
Initially the MPLA was better positioned than the FNLA to gain 
access to the Congo-Leopoldville border. It had good relations with the 
neighbouring country's first leader, Patrice Lumumba, who shared some 
of the MPLA's philosophical views and was also sympathetically regarded 
by the Soviet Union. The MPLA's fortunes then declined with those of 
Lumumba, who was assassinated in January 1961, apparently by rivals, 
though the CIA had planned an unsuccessful assassination attempt months 
earlier.86 Congo-Leopoldville was then run by the government of Premier 
Cyrille Adoula, with the support of the United States, while the United 
Nations tried to bring an end to the country's civil war. The MPLA's 
past association with Lumumba's supporters, who were pursuing a 
guerrilla war against the new regime, did little to improve MPLA 
relations with Adoula. In addition, Holden Roberto had lived in Congo- 
Leopoldville for a long period and had close personal ties with Adoula. 
Although the Congo-Leopoldville government officially aided both 
Angolan organisations, the FNLA was increasingly able to prevent the 
MPLA from using the neighbouring territory to launch operations.
86 Mahoney, op. cit., pp. 59-88.
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In April 1963, the tensions between the two guerrilla 
organisations broke into the open and the FNLA attacked an MPLA 
contingent that had recently crossed over into Angolan territory from 
Congo-Leopoldville. Ten MPLA guerrillas died, and the organisation's 
operations inside Angola declined.87 They only continued in Angola's 
Cabinda enclave, and there at a reduced level.
The tensions between the MPLA, the FNLA, and Adoula eventually 
damaged the MPLA's relationship with the United States. On 29 June 
1963, Adoula officially recognised the FNLA's exile "government", the 
Revolutionary Angolan Government in Exile (Governo Revolucionario de 
Angola no Exilio--GRAE). U.S. financial aid for the Adoula government, 
and the fact that U.S. Assistant Secretary of State G. Mennen Williams 
met Adoula a few days before the announcement, strengthened suspicion 
of U.S. involvement in the decision.88 Indeed, the MPLA's Lucio Lara 
claimed that the move was "inspired by American imperialists" to 
prevent the development of a "revolutionary nationalist" option in 
Angola.89 What inclination the MPLA had to pursue closer ties with the 
United States was clearly further eroded.
MPLA fury at Adoula and the United States was probably inflamed 
by the knowledge that lack of access to the Congo-Leopoldville border 
would damage its relationship with the newly formed Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU). The OAU was formed in May 1963 in Addis Ababa and 
a special fund and "liberation committee" were established to aid 
nationalist movements. The OAU was determined to try to bring unity to 
the Angolan liberation struggle, and sent a goodwill mission to 
Leopoldville, which arrived on 14 July. In discussions with the mission 
the FNLA was able to stress its military accomplishments, made possible 
by Adoula's friendly attitude, and invited the OAU representatives to
visit its bases within Angola. Neto had to concede that the MPLA did
not have an organisational structure within Angola, and that the Congo- 
Leopoldville frontier was under Roberto's control. The MPLA 
presentation was further damaged by an internal split. A faction led by 
the previously expelled da Cruz insisted that the MPLA would have to 
come to terms with the FNLA so as to gain access to the border
87 Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 45.
88 Ibid. , p. 79.
89 Interview with Lara in Robert Davies, Les Anaolais (Paris: Editions 
de Minuit, 1965), p. 203.
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facilities. On 7 July that faction had broken up a meeting of the Neto 
group and the Congo-Leopoldville police had intervened. During the OAU 
mission's deliberations later in the month, da Cruz was given an 
opportunity to testify and attacked Neto's policies.90
On 18 July 1963, the OAU committee presented its findings to an 
open session of the entire OAU organisation. Because the FNLA's 
"fighting force" was "far larger than any other", the committee 
reported, it controlled "the only real fighting front in Angola". 
Referring to the MPLA's small operation in the Cabinda enclave, the 
committee found that the "continued presence of another minor front 
would hinder the rapid achievement of independence". Therefore, the 
mission concluded it was "necessary for the FNLA to continue the 
leadership that has so far proven effective".91
The committee made the following recommendations: (1) all
external aid to the Angolan rebels should be channelled through the 
Congo-Leopoldville government and earmarked for the FNLA; (2) the 
"fighting force of the MPLA" should seek admission into the FNLA;
(3) African governments should not give support to any group except the 
FNLA; and (4) the OAU Council of Ministers at its next meeting should 
recommend that all African governments recognise Roberto's government 
in exile, the GRAE.92
Neto reacted bitterly, and later attributed the MPLA defeat in 
the OAU to "American imperialism" and "its agents" combined with 
African "concessions to reaction".93
Clearly, the Adoula recognition of the GRAE and the decision to 
allow Roberto exclusive access to the Congo-Leopoldville border with 
Angola had severe repercussions for the MPLA's relationship with the 
neighbouring state. To the extent that the MPLA thought that Adoula was 
acting on U.S. instructions, MPLA relations with Washington were 
damaged.
Following the OAU decision, the MPLA was obliged to move out of 
Congo-Leopoldville and was accepted in Congo-Brazzaville. Almost
90 "General Report of the Goodwill Mission", quoted in Marcum, vol. 2, 
op. cit., pp. 94-96.
91 Ibid., pp. 97-98.
92 Ibid.
93 "Discours de Agostinho Neto", CONCP Second Conference (Dar es 
Salaam, October 1965, mimeo).
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immediately, a coup brought down the government of Congo-Brazzaville's
President Fulbert Youlou, who had been in the midst of friendly
discussions with the Portuguese and probably would not have offered the
MPLA much assistance. He was replaced by a new radical regime, led by
Alphonse Massamba-Debat. The new government was restricted by the OAU's
order that all aid go to Roberto, but nonetheless was ideologically
compatible with the MPLA.
The decline in MPLA co-optability caused by the above
developments was clearly evident when the movement held a Cadres
Conference in Brazzaville from 3 to 10 January 1964. The meeting
criticised the movement's leadership, implicitly targeting Neto, and
produced a new party programme. Its introduction reflected the MPLA's
disillusionment with the West:
In reality, the Portuguese colonialists, the imperialists, and 
their agents are the main enemies of the Angolan people. They 
use all methods in order to maintain Portuguese sovereignty in 
Angola and to continue to oppress and exploit the Angolan 
people....94
The rest of the document confirmed the revolutionary character 
of the MPLA, and called for "the abolition of all privileges conceded 
to Portugal and other foreigners", land reform under the slogan of "The 
Land Belongs to Those Who Work It", and "nationalisation of the land of 
the enemies". The party pledged itself to defend "the interests of 
comrade peasants and workers, the two most important groups in the 
country". Furthermore, the programme proclaimed that the MPLA would be 
"allied to all the progressive forces of the world".95
The voice of moderation was not entirely absent from the 
programme, however. The MPLA still said that sovereignty would belong 
to "all the Angolan people, without regard to ethnicity, class, race, 
sex, age, political tendencies, religious beliefs, or philosophical 
convictions". It promised to encourage "private industry and commerce 
useful for the economy of the state and the life of the people" and to 
protect "economic enterprises exploited by foreigners that are useful 
to the life, progress, and reinforcement of the total independence of 
the Angolan people". Finally, it called for "non-adherence to a
94 Proarama Politico--Aprovado na Conferencia de Ouadros (Luanda: 
Edigoes DIP/MPLA, January 1964).
95 Ibid.
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military bloc" and promised that the party would "forbid foreign 
military bases on national territory".96
In other words, the MPLA was annoyed with the West, blamed it 
for the slow pace of the liberation struggle and for Roberto's victory 
in the OAU, and still envisioned a socialist post-independence Angola. 
At the same time, the MPLA could see the advantages of maintaining at 
least some foreign investment and looked towards a non-aligned foreign 
policy, albeit one allied with the world's "progressive forces".
SUMMARY
The MPLA's modest level of co-optability during its first eight years 
of existence was due in part to the background of its leaders. Angola's 
economic structure, specifically its relative prosperity and 
integration with Portugal, created opportunities for a small number of 
nationalists to study in Europe. Portuguese repression in Angola made 
those opportunities even more attractive. The Marxist thought absorbed 
by the early leaders in Europe was then reinforced by the support and 
advice supplied by the PCP. The MPLA's Marxist orientation, combined 
with the ambition of its leaders, also contributed to the decision to 
form the MPLA as an artificial front that defined the post-independence 
society for which it was fighting in quasi-socialist terms, though 
insisting that nationalists of all ideologies were welcome. Once the 
movement was formed, Soviet largesse further consolidated its leftist 
orientation.
The anti-Western forces were not powerful enough, however, to 
prevent the MPLA from adopting a more open attitude towards the West 
from late 1962 to early 1963, primarily in response to its perception 
of a pro-nationalist shift in the United States. The emergence of a new 
leader who had firsthand experience of the assistance that Western 
liberals could provide also motivated this adjustment. The MPLA was 
slow to react to U.S. policy, however, and by the time it approached 
Washington the United States was returning to a pro-Portugal stance. 
Disillusionment with U.S. policy, together with growing rivalry with 
the FNLA, which was perceived as U.S.-backed, not only ended the brief 
period of rising co-optability, but caused the movement to become even 
more hostile to the West than it had been before the overture.
96 Ibid.
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Because the MPLA's initial low level of co-optability was not 
primarily due to its perception of Western policies, it seems unlikely 
that friendlier Western actions would have converted the movement into 
a pro-Western organisation. However, if the West had pursued a co­
optation strategy, the modest 1962-1963 rise in co-optability probably 
could have been sustained.
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CHAPTER 2 
FRELIMO: EARLY CO-OPTABILITY
FRELIMO was highly co-optable during the two years following its 1962 
founding. Its platform was nationalistic, calling for complete 
Mozambican independence, but the ideological content of its founding 
documents was largely compatible with classic liberal democratic 
principles. Furthermore, the FRELIMO leadership appeared anxious to 
establish good relations with the West.
Three main factors contributed to FRELIMO's high level of co- 
optability: the background of the FRELIMO leadership; the movement's 
formation as a relatively genuine, rather than an artificial, front; 
and the influence of the movement's non-Western allies. As in the case 
of the MPLA, the first factor was influenced by the territory's 
economic structure and the actions of the direct enemy, Portugal. 
Another subsidiary factor, the movement's perception of Western 
policies, reinforced FRELIMO's high co-optability once the organisation 
was formed, but was not the original stimulus for the movement's open 
attitude towards the West.
A final dynamic that subsequently became important, internal 
factionalism, was present at a low level in this early phase. It was 
most evident in the internal debate about guerrilla strategy. That 
debate subsequently resulted in decisions that militated against co- 
optability. So, even though FRELIMO was highly co-optable during this 
period, dynamics that would later push it towards a more hard-line 
position were already evident.
BACKGROUND OF THE NATIONALISTS
For a variety of reasons, only a few of the nationalists who later 
formed FRELIMO's leadership were initially exposed to Marxist ideas.
Mozambique's early colonial history played an important role. 
Unlike in Angola, where the slave trade had led to a small but 
sustained white presence in two coastal cities, creating a creole 
anciens assimiles elite, the slave trade was "less sustained and 
pervasive along Mozambique's coast".97 Mozambique had served the 
Portuguese as a resupply point for travel to the Portuguese holdings in 
Asia, and when Spain took over Portugal in 1580, Lisbon lost its Asian
97 Minter, Apartheid's Contras. op. cit., p. 47.
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empire. "...[W]hites in Mozambique were cut off from contact with the 
mother country [and]...[t]heir communities degenerated into isolated, 
decadent fiefdoms".98 In the 19th century the old creole elite resided in 
the north of the country, in the Zambezi valley, in Zambezia, in the 
Island of Mocambique, and in the Island of Ibo. However, developments 
in the 20th century marginalised these elites socially and politically. 
The old creole centres were neglected and the two main cities of Beira 
and Lourengo Marques were "created out of nothing to serve the needs of 
the British hinterland".99 Michel Cahen explains that " [a]s a result, 
the urban African elite had nothing on which to depend, no tradition.
It was to be a Creole formation of the 20th century, entirely 
subordinated by the dynamics of modern Portuguese colonialism".100 
Therefore, borrowing Messiant's terminology from the Angola context, 
there were very few anciens assimiles with access to European 
education, where they might encounter Marxist thought. As Cahen has 
noted, "...[c]ontrary to Angola, there was no rapport between the 
communist pockets that had existed in Mozambique and...Frelimo. These 
pockets had been exclusively white and even weaker than in Angola".101
The nature of Mozambique1s economy was also partially 
responsible for sheltering the nationalists from radical political 
theories. Unlike Angola, which was economically fairly self-sufficient 
with considerable mineral and agricultural resources, Mozambique was a 
service economy based on the provision of transport facilities to South 
Africa and Rhodesia and the export of labour. Workers from northern 
Mozambique were sent to neighbouring Anglophone territories as contract 
workers or fled to those territories to avoid Portugal's forced-labour 
requirements. In the British colonies, Mozambican migrants were allowed 
to join trade unions, experiencing organised political activity for the 
first time. They learned English, tuned into the British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC) World Service, and heard of the independence 
campaigns under way in other countries.102
98 Noer, op. cit., pp. 3-4.
99 Cahen, "Check on Socialism in Mozambique", op. cit., p. 49.
100 Ibid.
101 Cahen, Mozambique. op. cit., p. 156.
102 Munslow, op. cit., pp. 76-79.
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These migrants subsequently played a major role in the founding 
of the parties that were to join together to become FRELIMO. The 
National Democratic Union of Mozambique (Uniao Democratica Nacional de 
Mozambique--UDENAMO) was influenced by Joshua Nkomo's nationalist 
movement in Rhodesia. Among FRELIMO's precursors, UDENAMO had the most 
radical programme. Its founding document used the term "vanguard", 
criticised "imperialistic exploitation", and pledged the organisation 
to defend all the people, "particularly the claims made by peasant and 
worker masses".103 UDENAMO's rhetoric was not, however, explicitly 
Marxist.
The Mozambique African National Union (MANU) was founded in 
Kenya. It was modelled on that country's leading nationalist 
organisation, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) , and actually 
used English in its title. MANU was dominated by the Makonde ethnic 
group of northern Mozambique.
Finally, the National African Union of Independent Mozambique 
(Uniao Nacional Africana de Mozambique Independente--UNAMI) was founded 
in Malawi. It derived its support primarily from the people of Tete 
province. Both MANU and UNAMI had fairly non-ideological platforms.104
If Mozambique had possessed a different economic structure, with 
more links to Europe, larger numbers of the early leaders might have 
been exposed to a more ideological brand of nationalism.
The background of the early nationalists was also influenced by 
Portuguese policies, particularly Lisbon's neglect of Africans' 
educational needs, which was even more acute in Mozambique than in 
Angola.105 In the mid-1950s, only ten of the six million Africans in 
Mozambique were in academic high schools.106 This lack of educational 
access militated against exposure to Marxist ideology. Much of 
FRELIMO's middle-level leadership subsequently came from the pool of 
poorly educated youths resident inside Mozambique. This meant that the
103 Edward A. Alpers, "The Struggle for Socialism in Mozambique, 1960- 
1972", in Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Assessment, ed. Carl 
G. Rosberg and Thomas M. Callaghy (Berkeley: Institute of 
International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1979), p. 
270.
104 Munslow, op. cit., pp. 79-80.
105 Isaacman and Isaacman, op. cit., p. 50.
106 John A. Marcum, "A Martyr for Mozambique", Africa Report. March- 
April 1969, p. 6.
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middle-level leaders were most concerned about independence and gave 
little thought to the applicability of Marxism to post-independence 
Mozambican society.
FRELIMO's first leader, Eduardo Mondlane, was one of the very 
few Mozambicans to study abroad. However, he also happened to receive 
most of his education in the United States and to be heavily influenced 
by Christian rather than Marxist philosophy. Mondlane had such an 
impact upon the movement's character that it is worthwhile tracing his 
background in detail.
Born in 1920, this son of a Tonga chief was the first member of 
his family to receive education. His early experiences were in 
Protestant institutions run by missionaries. He attended a Swiss 
primary school, a Methodist agricultural school, and then travelled to 
South Africa to attend a Swiss secondary school in the Transvaal. In 
1948, he became the first Mozambican African to enter the Witwatersrand 
University in Johannesburg. In 1949, the South African government 
declared him an "unwanted foreign student" and cancelled his student 
permit, probably in response to his founding of the Nucleus of 
Mozambican Students (Nucleo dos Estudantes de Mogambique-NEM), an 
organisation for local Mozambican students that criticised Portugal.107
Upon his return to the Mozambican capital, Lourenqo Marques 
(renamed Maputo after independence), Mondlane was arrested by the 
Portuguese and interrogated concerning NEM. Apparently hoping to cure 
Mondlane's radicalism with a dose of Portuguese education, in 1950 the 
authorities permitted him to take up a scholarship in Lisbon arranged 
through Protestant channels and the Phelps Stokes Fund in New York. 
Harassed by the Portuguese security police, Mondlane subsequently 
requested that his scholarship be transferred to the United States, and 
he entered Oberlin College in September 1951 at the age of thirty-one. 
He obtained his Bachelor of Arts degree in 1953 and went on to do 
graduate work in sociology and anthropology at Northwestern University, 
obtaining a master's degree and a doctorate.108 In 1957, Mondlane went 
to work for the United Nations. When Tanganyika (now part of Tanzania) 
gained independence in December 1961, making physical access to
107 Herbert Shore, "Resistance and Revolution in the Life of Eduardo 
Mondlane", introductory chapter in The Struggle for Mozambique, by 
Eduardo Mondlane (London: Penguin Books, 1969), p. xix.
108 Ibid.
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northern Mozambique possible, Mondlane resigned his United Nations job, 
which restricted his political activity, and took up a more permissive 
teaching post at Syracuse University. In June 1962, Mondlane finally 
arrived in the Tanganyikan capital, Dar es Salaam, and was named 
president of the newly formed FRELIMO.
According to one of Mondlane's biographers, Herbert Shore, 
Mondlane came to the United States a dedicated Christian, "firm in the 
belief that the principles and teachings of Christianity applied to the 
political and social world could form the basis for the ultimate 
liberation of his people".109 Mondlane was active in Christian movements 
in the United States, and indeed it was at such a workshop that he met 
the American woman he was eventually to marry, Janet Rae Johnson. The 
connection between Mondlane's Christianity and his politics was clearly 
evident in one of his first letters to Janet. He wrote in 1951, "I am 
one of those who believes that, unless Christian ideals are put into 
practise, they are of no use".110
Mondlane was exposed to Marxist literature while abroad. He 
became familiar with the thinking of Mao Tse-tung, Fidel Castro, and Ho 
Chi Minh, and studied both the Yugoslav and Russian revolutions. 
Although clearly perceiving considerable overlap between his own 
Christian nationalist ideas and the socialist-style nationalism 
espoused by these leaders, he believed that none of their strategies 
were directly applicable to Mozambique.111
Mondlane was also open to cordial relations with the West. This 
was illustrated by his friendly relations with officials in the U.S. 
Department of State, especially in the early months of 1961 when the 
new Kennedy administration took office. He apparently "found a 
particularly sympathetic listener in Attorney General Robert F.
Kennedy".112
The other important FRELIMO leader with a high level of 
education was Marcelino dos Santos. Of mixed race, he studied in 
Portugal and Paris, and was influenced by the same radical ideological 
environment that affected the MPLA leaders. However, the ethnic
109 Shore, op. cit., p. xxi.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid., p. xxix.
112 Marcum, "A Martyr for Mozambique", op. cit., p. 8.
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background of dos Santos was a handicap that prevented him from being 
considered for the top post, and his ideological influence was 
therefore muted.
The rest of FRELIMO's initial leadership consisted of two types 
of people. A rural, commercial petty bourgeois group, and a collection 
of urban Africans who had occupied some of the very few jobs open to 
non-whites.113 Cahen has noted that the sectors from which FRELIMO grew 
had tenuous links with production. There were "just lowly office 
workers, commercial sector employees and health auxiliaries".114 At the 
time FRELIMO was formed, Mozambique had fewer than 5,000 assimilados 
and the mestico population was very small. Both groups were dependent 
on salaries. The situation did change somewhat in the 1960s, with 
better access to education and the growth of black merchants, "but the 
elite who created Frelimo were those who were ten years old around 1940 
and 1950",115 well before reforms opened some additional doors to 
Africans.
THE FORMATION OF FRELIMO
FRELIMO was officially founded in 1962 when the three major Mozambican 
nationalist groups--UDENAMO, MANU, and UNAMI-moved their headquarters 
to Dar es Salaam and agreed to form a united front. Significantly, the 
members of each organisation entered the front individually, rather 
than as part of their original party grouping. Thus, FRELIMO was a true 
joining together of separate movements that pledged to give up their 
identity in favour of the new organisation.
The pressure for formation of a genuine front came not from the 
exile organisations but from activists within Mozambique. As a FRELIMO 
publication later remarked, "The existing, externally based 
organisations which joined hands to form FRELIMO... did so reluctantly, 
and largely at the urging of younger, unattached militants [from] 
inside Mozambique itself".116 Only four of those elected to the 
leadership came from exile. Because the bulk of the mid-level
113 Cahen, Mozambique. op. cit., p. 157.
114 Cahen, "Check on Socialism in Mozambique", op. cit., p. 49.
115 Ibid., pp. 49-50.
116 FRELIMO, Editorial, Mozambique Revolution, no. 61 (April-June 
1972), p. 1.
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leadership was affiliated with none of the exile organisations, and 
neither Mondlane nor Marcelino dos Santos (president and vice president 
respectively) were so affiliated, the tendency to favour one 
organisation over another in the process of forming the front was 
reduced.
Because FRELIMO formed as a genuine front, its policies had to 
accommodate the views of all three constituent parts, the bourgeois 
nationalist MANU and UNAMI and the more radical UDENAMO. Though the 
UDENAMO constitution formed the basis for FRELIMO1s, the former's 
language was toned down sufficiently to accommodate more conservative 
views and permit genuine unity. For example, the word "vanguard" was 
dropped, as was the reference to the need for "particular" attention to 
be given to "the claims made by peasant and worker masses".117 The 
movement's First Congress, held in September 1962, called for 
"installation of a democratic regime based on total independence", 
declared that all Mozambicans would be equal, and promised to bring 
"economic reconstruction and development of production so as to 
transform Mozambique from a colonial and underdeveloped country into an 
economically independent country, industrial, developed, modern, 
prosperous, and strong".118 There was no reference to socialism or to 
re-distribution of wealth, and Marxist terminology was completely 
absent.
Most of the party's initial foreign policy pronouncements were 
similarly neutral. The platform promised that FRELIMO would collaborate 
with all countries "on the basis of mutual respect for national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference 
in internal affairs, equality and reciprocity of benefits, and pacific 
co-existence". Equally importantly, it committed FRELIMO to "forbid 
foreign military bases on the national territory" and to "non-adhesion 
to a military bloc".119
There were a few emotive phrases, but their tone was generally 
nationalistic and anti-racist rather than socialist. The Congress's 
"General Declaration" referred to Patrice Lumumba as an "African hero", 
condemned South African policies in South West Africa, and attacked the
117 Alpers, op. cit., p. 270.
118 FRELIMO, "Estatutos e Programa--1962", in Documentos Base da 
FRELIMO (Maputo: Tempografica, 1977), p. 33.
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"retrograde policy of authorities in Southern Rhodesia",120 while the 
platform called for the "abolition of the emigration accords between 
Mozambique and South Africa, and other colonial countries".121 All these 
points were compatible with liberal democratic values.
Of all the foreign policy statements, just one, the 
Declaration's announcement that FRELIMO "expresses the most energetic 
indignation... against all countries that supply Portugal and help 
maintain its regime", could be construed as criticising the West.122 It 
is noteworthy that FRELIMO's one anti-Western comment was based on 
operational rather than ideological concerns. FRELIMO did not criticise 
Western countries for being capitalist or exploitative, but merely for 
supplying Portugal. FRELIMO's founding documents also never referred to 
the Eastern bloc directly. The closest the movement came to such a 
reference was the Declaration's affirmation of solidarity with 
undefined "anti-imperialist forces in the world".123
In a series of works, Cahen argues that FRELIMO never did become 
truly socialist, that it really represented an elite's desire to 
construct a modern cohesive state with a national consciousness, and 
that the Marxism it later espoused was not genuine.124 Similarly, Hall 
and Young argue that FRELIMO later acquired Marxist trappings because 
it was psychologically appealing (for reasons discussed in chapter 5), 
not because it responded to their concrete experience or class 
interests.125 While one may dispute these conclusions regarding later 
periods in FRELIMO's development, the authors are absolutely correct 
about the state of the movement in its early days. Its documents
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espoused very little that was incompatible with bourgeois liberal 
democracy.
In sum, during its early years FRELIMO could have been enticed 
into a close relationship with the West relatively easily. If the 
movement had not perceived certain Western countries to be supporting 
Portugal, the documentary record implies, FRELIMO would have had no 
quarrel with the West whatsoever.
PERCEPTION OF WESTERN POLICY
Immediately after FRELIMO's founding, its openness towards the West was 
reinforced by the leadership's perception that one important Western 
country, the United States, supported its goals. As FRELIMO did not 
immediately turn against the West when it perceived the United States 
to be reducing that support, however, perception of Western policy was 
not a primary motivation for FRELIMO's co-optability, but rather was a 
reinforcing, secondary factor.
After FRELIMO's First Congress, Mondlane returned to the United 
States to fulfill his contract with Syracuse University and used the 
opportunity to canvass for U.S. assistance. In particular, he wanted 
funds for the new Mozambique Institute being established in Dar es 
Salaam to educate young FRELIMO members. He eventually convinced the 
Ford Foundation to provide $100,000 for the Institute's expenses. 
Initial FRELIMO relations with Washington also were friendly. Mondlane 
said that during the early days of Kennedy's presidency, the United 
States went through "a period of equivocation and seemed to be moving 
toward support for us".126 The U.S. press returned the compliment, 
labelling Mondlane "a staunchly pro-American "moderate'".127 In early 
1962, the New York-based African-American Institute, with CIA funding 
according to Mahoney, provided university training for pro-independence 
Mozambican exiles.128 Indeed, the level of U.S. assistance to Mozambican 
students accelerated so fast in 1961 that in August of that year the 
U.S. consul in Lourengo Marques warned Washington that the program 
could not stay secret for very long, and fretted about potential
126 Helen Kitchen, "Conversation with Eduardo Mondlane", Africa 
Report, November 1967, p. 51.
127 Marcum, "A Martyr for Mozambique", op. cit., p. 8.
128 Mahoney, op. cit., p. 205.
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Portuguese reaction.129 In May 1963, Mondlane met with Robert F.
Kennedy, and asked for direct military aid to FRELIMO. While Kennedy 
did apparently arrange a CIA subsidy for the Mondlane's travel costs, 
the request for military aid received no answer.130 It is now known that 
just three days before the Mondlane/Kennedy meeting the CIA issued a 
memo concluding that FRELIMO was "weak" and not likely to attract "an 
effective political following". The CIA concluded that the Angolan 
conflict was more important, and the outcome there would determine the 
settlement in Mozambique.131 This may have accounted for Kennedy's non­
response to Mondlane's request.
Towards the end of 1963, FRELIMO’s relationship with the United 
States deteriorated. For various reasons (see chapter 3), the United 
States began to respond to Portuguese pressure to reduce its already 
modest support. Mondlane’s disappointment was clear. He told President 
Kennedy:
The needs of the liberation forces are many, but none so great 
as a change in United States policy towards Portuguese 
colonialism. Friends of freedom and democracy cannot comprehend 
why the United States does not move to the forefront in this 
struggle for freedom. It is inconceivable to us that the United 
States must remain silent and secretive to placate Portugal.132
Mondlane’s language showed that he still perceived no inherent
incompatibility between the interests of Western capitalism and
FRELIMO. He was disappointed, but no less open to Western overtures
than previously.
ROLE OF NON-WESTERN ALLIES
During its first two years, FRELIMO obtained support from a wide range 
of non-Western states, often receiving assistance from rivals 
simultaneously. Middle Eastern enemies Egypt and Israel133 provided 
training facilities, as did Algeria. Tanzania's close relationship with 
Beijing meant that FRELIMO was well placed to appeal for Chinese 
assistance. Mondlane thought that the Chinese guerrilla experience was
129 Antunes, Kennedy e Salazar, op. cit., pp. 265-266.
130 Mahoney, op. cit., p. 237. See also Noer, op. cit., p. 98.
131 Noer, op. cit., pp. 98-99.
132 Marcum, "A Martyr for Mozambique", op. cit., p. 8.
133 Joao Reis and Armando Pedro Muiuane, eds., Datas e Documentos da
Historia da FRELIMO (Imprensa Nacional: Maputo, 1975), p. 55.
50
applicable to Mozambique, because Mao Tse-tung stressed the importance 
of peasant support. The Beijing connection did not discourage FRELIMO 
from courting the Soviet Union, however, which also provided some 
training facilities.134
Clearly, FRELIMO took help wherever it could find it, without 
regard to the donors' ideology, and perceived no contradiction in 
simultaneously maintaining good relations with countries barely on 
speaking terms with each other. Whether by design or accident, this 
guaranteed that there was no possibility of allies joining forces to 
pressure FRELIMO to adopt a certain policy, regarding relations with 
the West or other matters.
ABSENCE OF A CREDIBLE RIVAL
FRELIMO suffered from some factionalism immediately after its 
formation. However, the splits did not result in the formation of a 
credible rival party and had no impact upon the organisation's co- 
optability at that time.
The first split occurred when FRELIMO's secretary general, David 
Mabunda, sought to block the participation of another Central Committee 
member and was then himself expelled.135 He went to Cairo, together with 
his supporters Paulo Gumane and Joao Mungwambe, and sought to recreate 
UDENAMO. They later renamed their organisation the Revolutionary 
Committee of Mozambique (Comissao Revolucionario de Mozambique-- 
COREMO) ,136 The motivation for the split appeared to be power rivalry 
rather than ideology.
Shortly afterwards, former MANU activists Mateus Mole and 
Milinga Malinga were accused of using FRELIMO "as a method of enriching 
themselves at the expense of the struggle for national liberation" and 
were removed from the Central Committee.137
Disruptive though the splits were, they did not tear the 
organisation apart. Unlike the situation in Angola, the defectors were
134 Warren Weinstein and Thomas H. Henriksen, eds., Soviet and Chinese 
Aid to African Nations (New York: Praeger, 1980), pp. 61-62.
135 FRELIMO, "Segundo Congresso da FRELIMO: Discurso Oficial do Comite 
Central", in Documentos Base da FRELIMO (Maputo: Tempografica, 1977), 
p. 55.
136 Ibid. , p. 55-56.
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not able to launch significant rival organisations. This fact was 
confirmed by FRELIMO's 1963 recognition by the OAU as the sole 
legitimate liberation movement in Mozambique.
CONDITIONS OF ARMED STRUGGLE
FRELIMO did not launch armed struggle during the 1962 to 1963 period, 
but it did decide that such struggle should be undertaken soon. It 
began a debate about the character of the future struggle that was to 
have an important impact upon the organisation's subsequent co- 
optability.
The decision to launch armed struggle was related to FRELIMO's
evaluation of the character of the direct enemy, Portugal. A 1960
massacre at Mueda in northern Mozambique, in which five hundred
Africans staging a peaceful protest were killed by the Portuguese, had
convinced most of the new FRELIMO members that negotiation would be
futile. FRELIMO therefore decided to establish a secret military
programme, to be activated, in Mondlane's words, after "a clandestine
political force within Mozambique [had] prepar[ed] the people for the
very difficult task of liberating the country".138
But while the party was unified on the necessity of armed
struggle, there were divergent views regarding how that struggle should
be waged. Some leaders wanted a sudden insurrection, similar to
Roberto's uprising in Angola. An overlapping group favoured urban-based
operations. Still others, including Mondlane, believed a long guerrilla
war would be necessary. In addition, Mondlane argued that the struggle
would have to make its base in the countryside:
Both the agitation of the intellectuals and the strikes of the 
labour force were doomed to failure because in both cases it was 
the action of only a tiny isolated group.... The urban 
population of Mozambique amounts to altogether less than half a 
million. A nationalist movement without firm roots in the 
countryside would never hope to succeed.139
At the First Congress, military strategy differences were
glossed over in the interest of unity, and the meeting decided to send
young men to Algeria for training without a firm idea what to do with
them afterwards. By January 1963, the first fifty trainees arrived in
North Africa.
130 Kitchen, op. cit., p. 32.
139 Eduardo Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique (London: Penguin 
Books, 1969), p. 116.
52
During 1963, FRELIMO also started the previously planned
politicisation campaign in northern Mozambique, preparing the ground
for armed struggle. The strategy was to befriend local chiefs, thereby
gaining an audience with the peasantry, and explain the goals for which
FRELIMO would be fighting. A 1966 article in the FRELIMO publication A
Voz da Revolucao explained:
Political mobilisation consists of explaining to the people WHY 
IT IS that they are fighting and FOR WHAT IT IS that they are 
fighting. The people must know that we are fighting for the 
expulsion of the Portuguese colonialists and for the liberation 
of Mozambique, so that Progress, Liberty and Equality should 
return to our country.140
It is noteworthy that FRELIMO's aims, as outlined to the peasants, were
still those of liberal democracy.
The politicisation campaign showed that one option, urban
insurrection, had already been disregarded. The choice between
prolonged rural struggle and a quick uprising was still not made,
though Mondlane was vigorously pushing for the former. The debate had
no impact upon FRELIMO1s co-optability in the period under discussion,
but was to play a crucial role during the following years.
SUMMARY
FRELIMO's high degree of co-optability in the 1962 to 1963 period was 
not due to its perception of Western policy. FRELIMO was co-optable 
because of three factors over which the West had little control. First, 
the background of most of FRELIMO's future leaders did not predispose 
them to embrace Marxist philosophy. The activists inside Mozambique had 
a low level of education, and those in neighbouring African territories 
were primarily exposed to bourgeois nationalist rather than Marxist 
nationalist influences. The most important FRELIMO leader who was 
exposed to Marxism, Eduardo Mondlane, did not incorporate it 
uncritically into his philosophy and was equally influenced by 
Christian values. Second, the eventual formation of FRELIMO as a 
genuine front, in which all three constituent parts subsumed themselves 
in the new organisation, required the movement's platform to be broad 
enough to encompass a variety of views, including openness to Western 
governments. Third, the fact that FRELIMO sought and obtained support
140 A Voz da Revolucao. April 1966, quoted in Alpers, op. cit., p. 
277. Emphasis in original.
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from a heterogeneous group of non-Western allies meant that there was 
little coordinated anti-Western pressure on the movement.
Initial FRELIMO perception of U.S. sympathy was not the driving 
force behind its co-optability. The relatively modest role of the 
perception-of-Western-policy factor was clearly illustrated by 
Mondlane's reaction to the cooling of relations with the United States 
towards the end of the period. He was disappointed, but no less open to 
Western overtures than previously.
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CHAPTER 3 
ABORTED U.S. CO-OPTATION
Among the Western countries, the United States was the most active 
during this early period of the nationalist struggle and will therefore 
be the focus of analysis.
Shortly after Kennedy's inauguration, the United States began to 
pursue a co-optation policy. The administration voted against Portugal 
when the colonial question arose in the United Nations, was anxious to 
meet with leaders of the nationalist movements to exchange views, and 
indeed financially assisted some nationalists. The policy then abruptly 
shifted from co-optation to neglect. The United States began to support 
Portugal in United Nations votes, and dialogue with the nationalists 
was curtailed.
The most important factor that influenced the decision to pursue 
co-optation was internal U.S. politics, though relations with the 
Soviet Union also played a significant role. The decision to abandon 
co-optation stemmed primarily from strategic considerations, though 
internal U.S. politics and relations with the Soviet Union were again 
relevant.
In neither decision did U.S. perception of the nationalists' 
policies play a crucial role. It did not motivate the decision to try 
to co-opt the movements, nor did it prompt that policy to be abandoned. 
(It did influence the vigour with which the administration pursued the 
respective nationalist groups during the pro-co-optation policy phase, 
but this related to the fine-tuning of an already decided grand 
strategy, rather than to the design of the overall policy direction 
itself.) These facts suggest that even if the nationalists had 
displayed a higher level of co-optability, the U.S. movement first 
towards and then away from a co-optation strategy would have been no 
different.
Finally, as the U.S. sought to find a solution to the Portuguese 
colonial question, several of its officials drew conclusions regarding 
the links between economic and political structures that were later to 
play an important role in the eventual decolonisation of the 
territories.
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THE CO-OPTATION INITIATIVE
When John F. Kennedy became president in January 1961, he inherited a
policy respectful of Portugal's colonial position in Africa. The
approach under his predecessor, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, was
best illustrated by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
John C. Satterwaite's congressional testimony. In early 1960, he told
the U.S. Senate:
One of the criticisms of U.S. foreign policy... is that the 
United States is too considerate of its NATO allies with respect 
to their African territories. Now... the United states cannot 
carry out foreign relations in a vacuum... [I]t is evident and 
well known that Portugal has for many years now maintained the 
position that its overseas territories are an integral part of 
Portugal and... there is no evidence that they intend to change 
this policy. I should also point out that this is a country with 
which we have important base agreements.141
Satterwaite voiced doubts about the hope expressed by other witnesses
that the emerging African nations would be "neutral", saying, "[I]n
this day and age there is little that happens in the world which does
not have a cold war aspect".142
President Eisenhower's actions reflected similar assumptions. In
May 1960, he visited Lisbon and praised the "real progress" Portuguese
Premier Antonio de Oliveira Salazar was making in Africa.143 In December
of the same year, the U.S. continued past policy and abstained in a
United Nations General Assembly vote on a resolution dealing with
Portugal's obligation to provide information on its overseas
territories.
In July 1957, while a Senator in the U.S. Congress, Kennedy 
criticised U.S. opposition to the Algerian nationalists' efforts to 
obtain independence from France, and condemned Washington's reluctance 
to support global self determination. Kennedy labeled Eisenhower's 
attitude towards decolonisation as "a head in the sand policy" that and
141 Testimony of John C. Satterwaite, U.S. assistant secretary of 
state, United States Foreign Policy, hearings before the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, I960, pp. 
134-135.
142 Ibid., p. 136.
143 Marcum, vol. 1, op. cit., p. 181.
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"earned the suspicion of all".144 While a Senator, Kennedy also met with 
Holden Roberto.145
It is not surprising, then, that one of Kennedy's early moves as 
president was to replace Eisenhower's pro-Portugal bureaucrats with his 
own personnel. He encouraged the recruitment and promotion of analysts 
with regionalist/long-term rather than globalist/short-term 
perspectives. His proteges tended to view Africa's conflicts as the 
result of local conditions rather than primarily the result of Soviet 
machinations. He believed that U.S. interests would be better served by 
supporting the nationalists' independence goals (and thereby reducing 
the chances for protracted struggle and radical revolution) than by 
supporting Portugal's colonial claims.
One of the new president's first personnel decisions was to make 
G. Mennen Williams assistant secretary of state for African affairs. 
During his Senate confirmation hearings, Williams advocated a pro­
nationalist posture:
...[W]e are trying to help the African countries find what they
call their African personality, to get their own freedom of
actions.... We would like to see... that these countries have a 
strong enough political foundation to make their own 
determination as to what seems best to them and a strong enough 
economic basis to carry this out, and I think that we have 
enough confidence in the appropriateness of our free system and 
also of the causes that we in the West espouse that if they are
really independent that we are not going to come off second
best.146
Former governor of Connecticut Chester Bowles echoed the same
sentiments during his confirmation as under secretary of state. After
listing African desire for freedom, economic growth, better education,
and health, he remarked:
...[I]n other words, what we want for them is precisely what 
they want for themselves.... This underscores the enormous, 
universal, potentially close relationships that we have with 
these undeveloped peoples.147
144 Noer, op. cit., pp. 50-51.
145 Mahoney, op. cit., pp. 19-25.
146 Testimony of G. Mennen Williams, Nomination of Murat W. Williams. 
George W. Ball. Roger W. Jones and G. Mennen Williams, hearings 
before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 87th 
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147 Testimony of Chester Bowles, Nomination of Chester Bowles. Under 
Secretary of State-Designate, hearing before the Committee on Foreign 
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The open-minded attitude of many of Kennedy's appointees was
facilitated by the relatively non-confrontational relationship with the
Soviet Union at this time. Though there was unease about Soviet
intentions in various regions, Moscow was not involved in any high-
profile initiatives that directly threatened U.S. interests when
Kennedy came into office. The cold war was still being waged, but
Kennedy did not rule out "the possibility of accommodation with the
Soviet Union in the interests of peace".148 Indeed, Adlai Stevenson, the
new U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, advised the president to
seek an early meeting with the Soviet leader, noting, "I think we will
not find anyone easier to deal with than Khrushchev is".149
While the appointments to the Africa posts and the
undersecretary position went to idealistic individuals who strongly
identified with the U.S. civil rights movement, the entire foreign
policy establishment was not homogenous. Kennedy appointed a number of
young ambassadors who
were in tune with the administration's emphasis on power 
politics and view of diplomacy as a weapon in the global contest 
with communism. To the "new crew"... Africa was important 
because it was an area of potential communist infiltration and 
this offered a chance for American victories. These diplomats 
were not "idealists"... but were considered "practical" and 
"tough" .150
Furthermore, the administration had a large group of "Europeanists" who
questioned pro-African policies and lobbied for "continued subjugation
of African issues to European priorities".151 Noer affirms that Kennedy
was partial to Africa and opposed to racism
but he never allowed these to interfere with his view of 
international politics as a continuing struggle between America 
and Russia. Anti-communism was at the heart of Kennedy's 
diplomacy, and he viewed Africa primarily as an area of East- 
West competition. His support of decolonization was as much for 
strategic as for idealistic reasons.152
148 Madeleine Kalb, The Congo Cables (New York: MacMillan, 1982), p. 
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Once in office, Kennedy initially implemented a pro-Africa 
policy. According to Salazar's then-foreign minister, Franco Nogueira, 
the U.S. ambassador in Lisbon, C. Burke Elbrick, gave Salazar a 
lecture:
The United States is worried about Africa and about the dangers 
of Communist penetration of the continent, which the free world 
is anxious to avoid; President Kennedy thinks that self- 
determination and independence for the African countries 
constitute the most effective method for blocking the Soviet 
path. Furthermore, African nationalism is overpowering and de­
colonisation is an inevitable phenomenon, and moreover 
corresponds to the ideas of liberty and human rights.153
According to Nogueira, Elbrick added that Kennedy was particularly
worried about the situation in Angola, and that if developments in the
United Nations eventually embarrassed Portugal, Lisbon could not count
on U.S. support. Elbrick advised Portugal to make a formal and public
statement announcing acceptance of the principles of self-determination
and independence. If Portugal did not do so, it would have to expect a
crisis in relations with Washington. Adding a carrot to this stick,
Elbrick continued that the United States was willing to study, along
with other NATO countries, ways to financially compensate Portugal for
the economic difficulties African independence would cause in the
metropole.154
A week later, on 13 March, debates on Portuguese colonial policy 
began in the United Nations. Portugal had not made the statement 
requested by Kennedy. Adlai Stevenson therefore attacked Lisbon's 
African policies and voted in favour of an Afro-Asian resolution 
demanding an enquiry into conditions in Angola. (The motion failed due 
to abstentions from the United Kingdom, France, Nationalist China, 
Chile, and Ecuador.)
The Portuguese response to the United Nations vote was prompt.
At the next NATO meeting, Portugal's representative remarked, "The 
intrinsic contradiction in American policy [if not altered] would 
require us to revise our attitude to the United States".155 This was the 
first veiled hint that Portugal might deny the United States access to
153 Franco Nogueira, Salazar, vol. 5, A Resistencia (1958-1964) 
(Porto, Portugal: Livraria Civiliza^ao Editora, 1984), p. 210.
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the Azores base, off the coast of north Africa, but it rang no alarm 
bells in Washington.
Other Western countries failed to support the U.S. line. The 
West German chancellor expressed sympathy with Portugal, and visits 
from representatives of Britain's Conservative government were 
reassuring.156 French and British officials responded to U.S. requests 
that they put more pressure on Portugal by saying that they agreed in 
principle with Washington but did not believe that Portugal could be 
forced to change.
Kennedy was not deterred, and on 20 April the United States 
voted in favour of a General Assembly resolution calling on Portugal to 
prepare Angola for independence and establishing a five-member 
committee to investigate the Angolan situation in more depth. The 
United States found itself voting with the Afro-Asian bloc and the 
Soviet Union, and against Portugal, Brazil, France, the United Kingdom, 
and Belgium.157
Again, Lisbon retaliated. At the next NATO meeting, held in Oslo 
on 8 May 1961, Portugal threatened to leave NATO and announced that it 
would delay what limited reforms were already under way in Africa. 
Lisbon also claimed the right to use those Portuguese soldiers who made 
up part of the NATO force for its war in Africa, and the right to send 
NATO equipment with them.
In this period, Kennedy did not restrict his support for African 
nationalists to overt diplomacy. He also used the CIA and the 
humanitarian aid programme. In late April 1961, the National Security 
Council Special Group authorised a covert $6,000 annual payment to 
Holden Roberto, who had impressed Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy 
during a March 1961 visit to New York. Shortly thereafter, the CIA 
began to provide funding for university training of Mozambican 
nationalists in exile in Tanzania, many of whom were active in 
FRELIMO's precursors.158 Mondlane may have encouraged this aid decision 
when he met with Robert F. Kennedy in early 1961.159 The United States 
also extended humanitarian assistance to Angolan refugees (largely
156 Ibid., p. 222.
157 Marcum, vol. 1# op. cit., p. 181.
158 Mahoney, op. cit., p. 205.
159 Marcum, "A Martyr for Mozambique", op. cit., p. 8.
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Roberto supporters) in Congo-Leopoldville, and scholarship offers were 
made by U.S. embassies in Africa to refugee students from Portuguese 
territories.160 Twelve students from Portuguese Africa who had been 
studying in Ghana were convinced to go to the United States, and the 
U.S. Information Agency was instructed to translate 550 American books 
to be freely distributed to Angolan students.161
The decision to favour FRELIMO's precursors and the UPA over the 
MPLA was not primarily due to a judgement that the former were pro-West 
and the latter anti-West. A CIA report on Angola noted that Roberto's 
group had the strongest military force of the Angolan movements, but 
the MPLA had more sophisticated leadership. It presented Neto as a 
leader of a moderate faction in the MPLA and predicted he would 
eventually win out over his rivals. The report said that both rebel 
groups had received offers of help from the Soviet Union, but that both 
would prefer assistance from the West.162 This suggests that, while 
perception of the nationalists' policies played a role, equally or more 
significant considerations were the fact that Mondlane and Roberto were 
already on good terms with the Kennedy brothers, the CIA was more 
familiar with Roberto than with Neto, and the UPA appeared the more 
militarily competent of the Angolan movements.
Rumours of U.S. aid to the nationalists only made Salazar more 
stubborn. On 30 June 1961, he said that recent modest reforms in 
colonial policy had "nothing to do with the Constitutional 
structure.... [The reforms] are only related to the natural and solid 
ties that link various parts of the whole nation".163 At approximately 
the same time, Washington was informed by Elbrick that Portugal was 
sending was sending to Africa both soldiers and U.S.-supplied equipment 
that should have stayed in the metropole under the NATO agreement. The 
latter development put the United States in a particularly delicate 
position. While the main text of the 1951 Azores agreement prohibited 
use of U.S.-provided equipment in African territories without previous 
U.S. consent, a secret note adjusted guaranteed that there was "no 
doubt" that this authorization would be given in an emergency
160 Mahoney, op. cit., pp. 204-205.
161 Antunes, Kennedy e Salazar, op. cit., p. 264.
162 Nogueira, op. cit., pp. 465-466.
163 Ibid., pp. 286-288.
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situation. Elbrick reminded Rusk that Salazar could publicly invoke the 
secret clause and seriously embarrass Washington.164
The Department of State Working Group on Angola, staffed by pro­
co-optation regionalists, submitted a report on 4 July. The report 
said:
Angola is becoming, for the major part of the world, as Berlin 
is for Europe, the center of a great battle between liberty and
oppression. It constitutes an important part of the world
struggle between liberty and communism for the conquest of the 
spirit and the hearts of men. In this struggle, the United 
States can take only one position. We support liberty. Our 
obligation is indivisible, in Angola, in Berlin, in Laos. We 
believe that communism defends oppression. The field of battle 
is the world. For these reasons, through the eyes of the major 
part of the world, Angola is a case where the U.S. can fulfill 
its obligation to defend liberty.165
The Working Group recommended that if Salazar did not change his
approach the United States should recognise Roberto's provisional
government, deny Portugal arms, help refugees from Angola, and
establish a programme for educating Portuguese Africans in the United
States.166
SECOND THOUGHTS
From the middle of 1961 through 1962, an intense debate raged within
the U.S. administration regarding the advisability of continuing the
co-optation strategy. The Department of Defence opposed it, and the
Department of State was increasingly divided. It is noteworthy that the
policies of the nationalists did not play a role in the debate, which
focussed on the issue of the threat to the Azores base rights posed by
the new initiative, and was intensified by increased perception of
Soviet threat that could make the base more crucial.
The first sign of major trouble was the Pentagon's negative
response to the above-mentioned 4 July 1961 Department of State report,
which advocated intensification of the co-optation effort. The
Department of Defence reaction read:
Defense is worried because the precipitous and excessively 
aggressive execution of policy may produce reactions on the part 
of Portugal, and eventually of Spain, which could result in an 
unacceptable decrease in the capacity of the United States to
164 Antunes, Kennedy e Salazar, op. cit., pp. 269-270.
165 Nogueira, op. cit., p. 290.
166 Ibid., pp. 293-4.
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support military missions which might be required in Berlin, 
Western Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.167
The Department of State's pro-co-optation regionalists replied,
"The continuation of this policy is absolutely necessary if the United
States is to have good relations with the Afro-Asian states, and with
many others in the free world".168
The Department of Defence again reacted negatively:
[T] he maintenance of the military facilities which the United 
States has in the Azores and in Spain is vital to the execution 
of the military missions which would be necessary in time of 
war, or in an emergency situation. Therefore whatever line of 
action which would seriously prejudice the maintenance of the 
Azores and the bases in Spain would be unacceptable from the 
military point of view for the foreseeable future.169
Despite this opposition, the Department of State pro-co-optation
diplomats still had the upper hand. The U.S. military assistance
programme was reviewed and a planned 1961 delivery to Portugal worth
about $25 million was pruned to $3 million. In mid-July, the Department
of State's Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs was instructed to
organise a formal scholarship programme for African refugee students
from the Portuguese territories.170
The Department of State then acted upon a Working Group
suggestion that the United States demand the return of U.S. arms
provided to Portugal and sent to Angola. When Portugal refused,
President Kennedy approved (on 21 August) the prohibition of the supply
of military equipment for use in Africa. Secretary of Defence Robert
McNamara was dismayed and wrote to Kennedy that in light of the need to
renew the Azores base agreement with Portugal in 1962, "whatever public
pressure on the Portuguese in regard to the use of military material in
Angola should be avoided".171 Curiously, Portugal did not choose to
publicly reveal the 1951 secret clause to the Azores agreement.
In September, Portugal announced modest reforms in colonial
administration and explained them at the next NATO meeting in Paris.
167 Ibid., p. 288. Note: When the word "defence" is in a quote from a 
U.S. source, or in the title of a U.S. publication, it is spelled in 
the American manner, "defense".
168 Ibid., p. 289.
169 Ibid.
170 Marcum, vol. 1, op. cit., p. 184.
171 Nogueira, op. cit., p. 320.
63
The U.S. representatives were critical, but, according to Nogueira,
"now in moderated terms".172 Canada and Norway took positions similar to 
Washington's, while France and West Germany were sympathetic to 
Portugal. Nogueira described the attitude of the United Kingdom and 
Belgium as that of "discreet understanding".173 Britain had indefinitely 
suspended all licenses for export of military equipment to Portugal on 
27 June, just ten days after supplying two major frigates to the 
Portuguese Navy. But Britain's Conservative government still considered 
the Angolan uprising a problem within the domestic jurisdiction of 
Portugal and said that it should not be permitted to weaken Portugal's 
role in NATO. Belgium was entangled in the attempted secession of 
Katanga from Congo-Leopoldville at this time and depended on the 
Benguela railroad through Angola for access. Consequently, the Belgian 
government was reluctant to annoy Portugal.
A new element then entered the deliberations in November, when 
the Lajes air base on Terceira Island in the Azores was extensively 
used in the transport of U.S. troops to Berlin. (Construction of the 
Berlin wall began on 13 August 1961.)The Azores airfields handled a 
total of fourteen thousand plane departures in fiscal 1961. This 
prompted Kennedy's military adviser, General Maxwell Taylor, to 
conclude that the administration had no choice but to give in to 
Salazar.174 Under growing pressure, Assistant Secretary of State for 
African Affairs Mennen Williams finally accepted the necessity of 
moderating U.S. rhetoric, but still insisted that it would be 
"unthinkable" to abandon the overall policy of supporting the 
nationalists against Portugal.175
In January 1962, the United States again voted with the Afro- 
Asian bloc in support of a resolution affirming Angola's right to self- 
determination. But shortly afterwards Kennedy declared that, in 
Nogueira's paraphrasing, "he considered the use of the Azores base to 
be important, and expressed the hope that Portugal would continue to 
permit its use".176 Late in January, Secretary of State Rusk visited
172 Ibid., p. 338.
173 Ibid., p. 329.
174 Mahoney, op. cit., p. 209.
175 Nogueira, op. cit., p. 378.
176 Ibid., pp. 393-394.
64
Lisbon to repair relations with Salazar, and $4.5 million of pending 
military aid was released.177
An important memo was also written in January 1962 which 
influenced future policy. In late 1961 Paul Sakwa was assigned the task 
of writing a "think piece" on Africa by Richard Bissel, head of the 
CIA's clandestine services. Delivered on 17 January 1962, the memo 
recommended a nine point plan to obtain the independence of Angola and 
Mozambique by 1970. Under the plan Roberto would be given a salaried 
consultative status and "groomed for the premiership of Angola". 
Mondlane "would be offered a similar post in Mozambique". Portugal 
would be offered sufficient aid to double per capita income within five 
years. Sakwa recommended that the economic incentive "be so large as to 
capture the imagination of the average literate Portuguese to whom it 
would be leaked if turned down by Salazar".178 If Salazar rejected the 
proposal, Sakwa recommended Washington engineer his overthrow. The cost 
of the programme was estimated at $500 million per year for five years. 
The administration accepted Sakwa's carrot idea, but rejected the use 
of the stick. In March 1962, the National Security Council adopted a 
modified version of Sakwa's plan, and Elbrick told Salazar the United 
States was prepared to increase aid to Portugal and explore the 
possibility of multilateral aid from NATO in order to minimise the 
economic impact of African independence. The aid figure, however, was 
reduced to $70 million per year.179 Portugal never gave a clear reply.
On 18 June 1962, Elbrick finally brought Salazar the United 
States' formal request for an extension of the Azores agreement. When 
Portugal made no formal answer, Rusk travelled to Lisbon. This time, 
Nogueira reported, Rusk's attitude "did not reflect... the policy 
advocated by the Department of State. It was moderated...."180 Rusk said 
that the United States did not want to destroy Portuguese influence in 
Africa and suggested that a respected international figure be appointed 
to study the problem for the United Nations. He criticised the newly 
formed Organisation of African Unity, calling it irresponsible and
177 Marcum, vol. 1, op. cit., p. 273.
178 Paul Sakwa, "U.S. Policy towards Portugal", 17 January 1962, NSF: 
Portugal, box 154, Kennedy Library. Quoted in Noer, op. cit., p. 87.
179 Noer, op. cit., pp. 87-88.
180 Nogueira, op. cit., p. 415.
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intolerant.181 Rusk agreed that the Azores issue would be negotiated 
only after a complete review of U.S. bilateral relations with Portugal. 
On his way back to the United States, he visited the base.182
Immediately after the Rusk meeting, Salazar reportedly commented 
to Nogueira, "If they want to renew the accord, the Americans will have 
to pay all the cost of the war in Africa. All of it".183
In July, Portugal began negotiations for a $20 million long-term 
loan from U.S. banks, which was successfully concluded. The United 
States went ahead with the controversial purchase of $37 million worth 
of Angolan coffee. Perhaps more important, in September 1962 Rusk 
instructed the Department of State's Africa Bureau and the U.S. mission 
at the United Nations to cease all contact with African nationalists.184
Meanwhile, the United States' attention was being absorbed by 
growing fears of Soviet threats in the Third World. The Vietnam 
conflict was intensifying, and in October 1962 the missile crisis 
abruptly exacerbated the cold war. Kennedy announced that Soviet 
missiles had been discovered in Cuba, demanded their removal, and 
started a blockade of the island. Portugal supported the United States 
in an emergency NATO meeting on the subject, and the situation was 
defused by Khrushchev's agreement to dismantle the missiles.
The Cuban missile crisis reshaped the prism through which the 
Kennedy administration viewed the world. Khrushchev was no longer 
perceived as "one of the easiest people to deal with", as he had been 
characterised by Stevenson back in early 1961. Washington no longer 
believed that it merely had to compete for Third World hearts and minds 
in a long-term strategy to decrease communism's appeal to the emerging 
nations. Rather, the Kennedy administration now believed that it was 
facing a determined, expansionist Soviet Union, which had to be 
confronted and stopped. The African problem was again defined as the 
expansionist ambitions of the Soviet Union rather than the social 
conditions that sowed the seeds of indigenous, spontaneous sympathy 
with communist philosophy.
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As a result of this new perception, the Department of Defence 
was treated more respectfully when it called for moderation of policy 
on Portugal, and within the Department of State anti-co-optation 
Portugal specialists were able to assert their control over the younger 
and less experienced pro-co-optation officials in the Africa section.185
By the closing weeks of 1962, it was clear that the co-optation 
effort was in jeopardy and that the policies of the nationalists had 
nothing to do with its fate. Portuguese pressure on the Azores base 
issue, combined with increased anxiety about base access in light of 
deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union and the undermining of 
pro-co-optation officials caused by that anxiety, were the motivating 
factors. The MPLA and FRELIMO could have declared themselves pro- 
Western capitalists. It would have made no difference to Washington's 
retreat from co-optation.
"DESCENDING TO THE VALLEY"
In December 1962, the U.S. anti-co-optation forces decisively won the 
bureaucratic battle. Salazar told Washington that he would only agree 
to extension of the Azores base agreement if the United States voted 
for Portugal in the United Nations. The United States capitulated on 14 
December. A United Nations resolution was under consideration that 
condemned Portugal's role in Africa and proposed that the United 
Nations member states halt the supply and sale of arms and other 
military equipment to Lisbon. The United States, along with Spain,
South Africa, and five other NATO members, voted against the measure. 
Washington was back where it had been in the closing days of the 
Eisenhower administration, voting with Portugal and against the Afro- 
Asian bloc.186 Portugal responded by agreeing the United States could 
use the Azores facility while the base negotiations continued, but not 
for more than one year without a formal agreement.187
The capitulation continued. The MPLA delegation that arrived in 
Washington in December 1962 in search of aid could not have selected a
185 Mahoney, op. cit., p. 218.
186 Marcum, vol. 1, op. cit., p. 274. See also M. A. Fernandes de 
Oliveira et al., A Descolonizacao Portuauesa; Aproximacao ao seu 
Estudo, vol. 1 (Lisbon: Instituto Democracia e Liberdade, 1979), p. 
186.
187 Nogueira, op. cit., p. 458.
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worse moment for its visit, and was given a cold shoulder. On 21 May 
1963, Ambassador Elbrick was withdrawn from Lisbon and replaced by 
Admiral George Andersen, an opponent of co-optation from the Pentagon. 
In June 1963 Senate hearings on foreign assistance, Defence Secretary 
McNamara emphasised that the Azores base was "important to the defense 
of Western Europe as well as the United States". He defended Portugal 
against accusations of misuse of NATO funds, remarking, "There has been 
no diversion of MAP [military assistance program] material from the 
NATO purposes since 1961".188 Over the summer of 1963 Kennedy was also 
concerned about the fate of the pending nuclear test ban treaty in 
Congress. He feared that if the United States lost the Azores base the 
balance in Congress would tip against the treaty, one of his most 
important initiatives to date.189
In July 1963, the United States, along with the United Kingdom 
and France, abstained in a United Nations Security Council vote 
condemning Portuguese colonialism. Kennedy met the Portuguese United 
Nations representative in Washington, and Portugal noted a "distinct 
change in the U.S. position".190 Kennedy said that the U.S. decision in 
1961 had been precipitous and added, "But don't ask me, after having 
climbed to the top of the mountain, to descend to the valley within a 
short period. I need at least two years".191 Kennedy then promised to 
send a personal representative to Lisbon for a detailed discussion.
At the end of August, Kennedy's promised representative, George 
Ball, arrived in Lisbon. According to Nogueira, Ball's letter of 
instruction from the president said that he should make it clear that 
while the United States reaffirmed its support for the principle of 
self-determination, Washington "would not... support any nationalist 
movement or nationalist leader".192 Ball then proposed to Salazar a ten- 
year, two-stage "Eurafrican" transition. First, Portugal would have to
188 Testimony of Robert S. McNamara, Foreign Assistance Act of 1963. 
hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 88th 
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be brought into the European Free Trade Association, then being formed.
European partners would subsequently provide Portugal, in Ball's words:
...with the capital required to raise the standard of living in 
the metropole to the point where the overseas territories were 
no longer needed as dumping grounds for landless peasants or as 
happy hunting grounds for commercial interests.193
(This was, essentially, a version of the Sakwa carrot, again without
the stick.) In the second phase, Angola and Mozambique would be brought
into the community's "preferential trading system", following which
"measures towards self-determination could be taken in a calm
atmosphere quite unlike the frantic concern that had so far surrounded
the question".194
Shortly after Ball's meetings with Salazar, the Kennedy
administration told the African countries in the United Nations that
"independence is not the only alternative to be considered in the
process of self-determination".195
The process of Portuguese-U.S. detente was then disrupted by the
assassination of President Kennedy on 22 November 1963. Portugal was
dismayed by his death so shortly after his reluctant conversion to
their cause. "After a long and difficult journey", remarked Nogueira,
"the President was starting to show an understanding of the
implications of Portuguese policy in Africa, and the possibility of a
Luso-American accord was real and promising. And now?"196 But as the
following months illustrated, Portugal had little to fear from Lyndon
B. Johnson, Kennedy's vice president who succeeded him after the
assassination.
THE UNITED STATES ANTICIPATES CABRAL
Ball's proposal for a "Eurafrican transition", while unpopular with 
nationalists because it fell short of immediate independence, did 
reveal the U.S. understanding of Portuguese reluctance to decolonise. 
Ball's analysis of Portugal's position, in fact, coincided with that
193 George W. Ball, The Discipline of Power: Essentials of a Modern 
Structure (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), p. 251.
194 Ibid.
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adopted by leading nationalists and their Western supporters a decade 
later.
In 1971, the leader of Guinea-Bissau's nationalist movement,
Amilcar Cabral, remarked:
The reason that Portugal is not decolonising now is because 
Portugal is not an imperialist country, and cannot neo-colonise. 
The economic infrastructure of Portugal is such that she cannot 
compete with other capitalist powers.197
Ball was proposing that other capitalist powers help Portugal develop
so that it could become economically strong enough to compete with
other capitalist powers.
Ball's proposal also coincided with what pro-nationalist
academic Gary Wasserman termed "consensual decolonisation".198 In a 1975
article, Wasserman argued that peaceful decolonisation can occur only
when the metropole has sufficient economic leverage over the colony to
influence post-independence policies in a manner that protects the
metropole's interests. In such a circumstance, Wasserman claimed, the
metropole retains economic benefits even as the political tie is
dissolved and therefore has little reason to resist decolonisation.
However, because Portugal had relatively weak economic ties with the
colonies, and made profits primarily by renting out labour and
resources to foreign firms via concessions, Lisbon could not
"consensually decolonise". Wasserman asserted that profits flowed from
the title to land and administrative control over manpower. Once the
political tie was broken via decolonisation, Portugal would become
irrelevant to the economic equation. Unlike Britain's relationship with
its former colonies, which Wasserman presented as the quintessential
"consensual decolonisation", the end of Portugal's colonial ties to
Africa would also mean a vast reduction in economic benefit. Wasserman
concluded:
One can argue, then, that the very weakness of the Portuguese 
colonizers left them only with the response of forcibly 
suppressing nationalist movements.... Portugal was not
197 Amilcar Cabral, "Speech at Central Hall Westminster, 25 October 
1971", Guerrilheiro, Bulletin of the Committee for Freedom in 
Mozambique. Angola and Guinea (United Kingdom), November-December 
1971.
198 Gary Wasserman, "The Politics of Consensual Decolonization", 
African Review. 5, no. 1 (1975), p. 1.
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economically (and politically) developed enough to maintain its 
favorable colonial relationships without formal authority.199
Once again, Ball's "Eurafrican transition" would have addressed
that problem by integrating Portugal into the European economy and
rendering Lisbon strong enough to forge structural economic links with
its colonies capable of withstanding decolonisation.
Recent work by several scholars has cast doubt on the validity
of the assumptions inherent in Ball's, Cabral's and Wasserman's
analysis. In their 1997 book Hall and Young assert that "the fragility
of the [Portuguese] dictatorship's own political legitimacy, rather
than economic weakness, underpinned the tenacity of its fight to retain
its African empire against the forces of nationalism".200 Cahen's and
Clarence-Smith's works substantiate Hall and Young's assertion, for
they show that Portugal was obtaining less and less economic benefits
from its colonies as the 1960s and 1970s progressed.201 Pitcher's work
helps reconcile the two opposing views, however. She asserts that "if
the colonies did not bring general economic prosperity to the
Portuguese people as a whole, some sectors of Portuguese business and
finance clearly prospered from cheap supplies of raw materials,
guaranteed markets, and protected investment".202 Clarence Smith Also
makes a useful contribution to this debate, for he notes that the
colonies played a dual role. They played an ideological role for the
buttressed nationalism which kept together "the uneasy alliance pf
class and political forces which had placed...[Salazar] in power".
There was simultaneously an effort to "maximise the utility of the
empire to Portugal in economic terms".203
For the purpose of this work it is not necessary to come to a
definitive judgement regarding the reasons underlying Portugal's
reluctance to decolonise. Our focus is on U.S.-nationalist relations,
and considers Portuguese-nationalist relations only as they relate to
that central topic. What is notable, however, is that the U.S.
199 Ibid., p. 9.
200 Hall and Young, op. cit., p. 5.
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government, the Guinea-Bissau nationalist leader Cabral, and a pro­
nationalist Western analyst all came to the same conclusion. U.S. 
policy was partially based on the assumption, erroneous or accurate, 
shared by many nationalists. It failed, perhaps because the ideological 
need for colonies was indeed greater than the economic benefits they 
provided. In that case, the nationalists, their supporters and the 
United States were all equally mistaken.
SUMMARY
Kennedy's brief effort to co-opt nationalist movements in Angola and 
Mozambique was one of the most noteworthy events in the history of U.S. 
foreign policy. Never before or since has the United States made such a 
concerted effort to co-opt nationalist guerrillas fighting a valued 
ally. However, the historical record suggests that the policies of the 
nationalists had little to do with the decision to pursue the co­
optation strategy. The decision occurred because a variety of domestic 
political forces produced a president who analysed U.S. competition 
with the Soviet Union from a new perspective. The fact that relations 
with Moscow were sufficiently non-confrontational to permit a long-term 
perspective contributed to the co-optation decision. The policies of 
the nationalists were relevant primarily to the extent that they 
determined which nationalist leaders courted the Kennedy brothers first 
and were able to secure aid while pro-co-optation officials controlled 
policy.
The abandonment of co-optation was equally unrelated to 
Washington's perception of nationalist policies. It was motivated by 
the combination of Portuguese blackmail over base access, growing 
tensions with the Soviet Union which made that blackmail more 
effective, and the rightward drift in U.S. domestic politics, partly 
caused by the mounting East-West tension. Neto was treated to a cool 
reception when he visited Washington in December 1962 not so much 
because he was considered a leftist but because he had terrible timing. 
He arrived just as the co-optation effort was abandoned.
In short, both pro- and anti-co-optation factions in the United 
States sought to protect the same set of interests. They simply 
advocated different tactics, and changing circumstances outside Africa 
caused the former's approach to be abandoned for that of the latter. 
Both groups wanted to defend a selection of the interests mentioned in 
the introduction. Both desired that potential future leaders of Angola
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and Mozambique be Western oriented, reject establishment of socialism 
and avoid alliances with the Soviet Union. However, policies designed 
to co-opt nationalists into respecting these interests were 
increasingly perceived as jeopardizing other interests deemed more 
pressing. Co-optation tactics were damaging a critical trans-Atlantic 
alliance (that with Portugal), potentially eroding support for 
Washington's international agenda (specifically Portuguese support 
during the missile crisis and the Berlin airlift), and threatening 
access to a strategically located base (the Azores facility). Placating 
domestic critics, ensuring access to markets and protecting ties with 
states neighbouring the subject territories, the other interests listed 
in the introduction, did not play a significant role in shaping U.S. 
interests at this time.
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PART II
POSITIONS HARDEN: 1964 TO 1969
INTRODUCTION TO PART II
Between 1964 and 1969 the positions of the nationalists and most 
Western governments significantly hardened. The MPLA, starting from an 
already low level of co-optability, began explicitly to label 
capitalism as the enemy, increased contacts with the socialist 
countries, and expended little energy communicating with Western 
leaders. FRELIMO, which began the period disappointed with the West 
though still somewhat co-optable, became progressively more hostile 
towards the United States and Europe. At the end of the period, it also 
added an ideological element to its criticism of the Western political 
system. FRELIMO never entirely rejected the idea that its interests 
could overlap with those of at least some sectors of Western society, 
however, and retained communication with an assortment of Western 
liberal organisations.
The United States not only continued to move away from the co­
optation effort initiated in the early 1960s by Kennedy, but began 
actively to court Portugal. Contacts with the nationalists declined 
still further, U.S. arms again began to find their way to the 
Portuguese colonial wars, and Washington's language became even more 
respectful of Lisbon's concerns. With the exception of Sweden, European 
governments made little effort to initiate their own co-optation 
efforts and in some cases joined in placating Lisbon.
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 seek not only to describe in detail the 
shifting positions of the nationalists and the Western governments, but 
also again to identify the factors that influenced their decisions. How 
significant was the initiation of armed struggle to the evolution of 
nationalist policies? What accounted for the differences between the
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two movements' approaches? Was the decline in the co-optability of both 
primarily a reaction to perceived Western hostility or a result of 
other factors? Similarly, was the West's further shift away from co­
optation motivated by perception of the nationalists' policies or by 
other concerns?
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CHAPTER 4 
MPLA: SUSPICION SHIFTS TO ENMITY
From 1964 to 1969 the MPLA's co-optability continued to decline from 
the relatively low level it had reached in 1963. The movement began 
explicitly to equate the struggle for independence with the struggle 
against capitalism, and to claim it was impossible to have one without 
the other. Movement documents also started openly to endorse Marxism- 
Leninism, and Neto eventually announced plans to form a "vanguard 
party" in the future. When other leftist movements felt compelled to 
condemn the Soviet Union's 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia, the 
MPLA sided with Moscow. MPLA officials became frequent guests in Havana 
and Moscow, and were scarcely visible in Western capitals. Perhaps even 
more important, the MPLA re-evaluated Washington's earlier co-optation 
attempt, and came to conclusions that ensured a cynical response to any 
subsequent co-optation effort.
Two main factors were responsible for this further decline in 
MPLA co-optability: the movement's perception of Western policy and the 
influence of non-Western allies, specifically Cuba and the Soviet 
Union. A third factor, conditions of armed struggle, may have had a 
very small, marginal role, though there is insufficient research data 
to confirm this possibility.
The emergence of a third nationalist group in the 1964 to 1969 
period had little direct effect upon MPLA co-optability at this time. 
Because that third movement was formed in a way that delegitimised the 
MPLA's main rival, however, its arrival on the scene ensured the 
survival of the MPLA as a credible movement. The enhanced credibility, 
in turn, may have contributed to the socialist countries' decision to 
increase aid to the MPLA, a decision that did influence the movement's 
co-optability.
This analysis suggests that the West could have influenced MPLA 
policy in this period, albeit only modestly. If the West had adopted a 
cordial, respectful approach, it certainly would not have obtained a 
pro-Western shift in MPLA policy, but the movement's co-optability 
probably would have declined less precipitously. Even with ongoing 
Eastern bloc influence, the MPLA could well have remained closer to a 
non-aligned position, for example by refraining from endorsing Soviet 
actions in Czechoslovakia.
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THE RIVAL SPLITS
In the early 1960s, GRAE Foreign Minister Jonas Savimbi became restless 
under Holden Roberto's autocratic leadership and began organising his 
own base of support, mainly among southerners of the Ovimbundu tribe. 
Matters came to a head at the Cairo OAU conference in July 1964.
Savimbi found the GRAE foreign minister position occupied by a rival 
and promptly resigned. He charged that the GRAE, "far from intensifying 
military action and regrouping the popular masses,... had limit[ed] 
itself to empty speeches". Savimbi called for a reconsideration of the 
OAU recognition of the GRAE, and accused Roberto of collusion with 
"American imperialism".204
Both Neto and Mondlane wanted the OAU to withdraw its exclusive 
recognition of the GRAE, the former for obvious reasons, and Mondlane 
because of fraternal ties with the MPLA. Therefore, according to an 
observer who participated in the negotiations, Neto, with FRELIMO 
encouragement, offered Savimbi a high MPLA post if he would inform the 
OAU about Roberto's past misconduct. Savimbi reportedly agreed, and 
under confidential conditions told the OAU heads of state that Roberto 
had been involved in the 1961 assassination of Patrice Lumumba and had 
embezzled OAU-sourced funds for personal luxuries.205
The manoeuvre had the desired effect. The OAU did not rescind 
its recognition of Roberto's government in exile but did establish a 
special committee to try to reconcile the nationalists' differences. In 
October 1964, after visiting Neto's guerrilla bases in Congo- 
Brazzaville, the committee reported that the MPLA was a "serious, 
active and capable movement able to lead an efficient fight" and 
recommended that OAU support be re-authorised. 206 The Liberation 
Committee agreed, and funds began to flow again on a provisional basis.
The MPLA's claim to OAU aid was also strengthened by events in 
Congo-Leopoldville. In July 1964, Roberto's ally, Adoula, was ousted by 
Moise Tshombe. The new leader was on good terms with the Portuguese and 
restricted FNLA activities.
204 Savimbi resignation statement, Brazzaville, 17 August 1964, mimeo.
205 Source one, confidential interview by author, Maputo, Mozambique, 
October 1984.
206 Organisation of African Unity, "Report of the Conciliating 
Committee Between the Angolan Revolutionary Government (GRAE) and the 
People's Liberation Movement of Angola (MPLA)", mimeo, 1964.
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By the October 1965 OAU summit, the Liberation Committee was 
allocating one-third of its Angolan assistance to the MPLA. Although 
OAU recognition of the GRAE was not rescinded and the FNLA started to 
regain its footing following the 24 November 1965 rise to power in 
Congo-Leopoldville of Roberto's relative by marriage, Lieutenant 
General Joseph-Desire Mobutu, the MPLA was definitely recovering some 
ground in the competition for international respectability.
Meanwhile, Savimbi was searching for external allies of his own. 
He went to China (where he won a promise of limited support), North 
Korea, North Vietnam, Algiers (where he met Cuban guerrilla leader Che 
Guevara), and finally travelled on to Brazzaville for consultations 
with Neto.207
The MPLA had helped get Savimbi1s supporters out of Angola into 
Brazzaville and given them financial support on their arrival, so 
relations were cordial. According to an individual active in the 
nationalist movements at the time, Neto wanted to give Savimbi the 
promised high-level MPLA post, but "left-oriented" MPLA militants 
insisted that he work his way up from the bottom of the organisation. 
Savimbi declined.208 Whatever his intent, the MPLA's insistence that he 
join as an ordinary member showed that its claim to be a front unifying 
all nationalists was inaccurate. Savimbi was capable of bringing a 
sizable following into the MPLA, and to offer him only ordinary 
membership was not just a failure to live up to the Cairo pledge, but 
also a calculated insult intended to be rejected.
In 1965, Savimbi's relationship with the MPLA soured even 
further. He arrived in Lusaka in February and announced plans to found 
his own movement using Zambia as a base. The MPLA was distressed, as it 
considered Zambia its exclusive ally. In July 1965, Savimbi supporters, 
speaking as the Amigos do Manifesto Angolano (Amangola), said, "Since 
the MPLA demanded that we take a clear stand on co-operation, i.e., 
sign MPLA party cards, we... ceased to co-operate".209 Shortly 
afterwards, the MPLA cut all relations with Savimbi and violence broke 
out between MPLA and Savimbi supporters in Brazzaville.
207 Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 160-161.
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Eventually, in March 1966, Savimbi entered Angola and founded 
the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Uniao Nacional 
para a Independencia Total de Angola--UNITA). Its constitution pledged 
it to educate "all Angolans living outside the country... that real 
independence for Angola will only be achieved through an armed struggle 
waged against the Portuguese Colonial Power inside the country".210 
UNITA was ethno-populist and, while not explicitly anti-white, it did 
not have a any whites or mesticos in its hierarchy and the membership 
was mainly uneducated peasants. The predominance of the Ovimbundu 
ethnic group provided the social glue to hold the organisation 
together. To the extent that it had any ideology at all, it was Maoist. 
The Maoist influence, however, extended more to strategy for guerrilla 
war than it did to the definition of post-independence economic and 
social policies.
Messiant's model, described in chapter 1, is again useful here. 
She describes the UNITA leadership around Savimbi as nouveaux assimiles 
who did not want to accept the domination of the anciens assimiles and 
mesticos of the MPLA and saw then as "non-Angolan". UNITA prioritized 
racial distinctions regarding mesticos. and cultural distinctions 
regarding the anciens assimiles. Messiant believes Savimbi embraced 
Maoism because it was "a Marxism that opposed the European Marxism of 
the anciens assimiles and valued the Angolan people who were majority 
rural" .211
Savimbi's personality also was an important factor. Minter has 
asserted that Savimbi believed he was destined to be Angola's leader 
and was frequently more hostile to rival rebel groups than he was to 
the Portuguese.212 Savimbi also showed, as Messiant has noted, 
"remarkable ideological agility capable of forming the most un-natural 
alliances".213 Savimbi presented himself as a black power advocate to 
visiting U.S. black nationalists, and as a Maoist to white radicals.214
210 "Constitution of UNITA", article 2, as quoted in Marcum, vol. 2, 
op. cit., p . 166.
211 Messiant, op. cit., pp. 166-168.
212 Minter, Apartheid's Contras. op. cit., pp. 221-222.
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A year after its founding, UNITA's rhetorical commitment to 
self-sufficiency became an operational necessity. In March 1967, UNITA 
sabotaged Angola's Benguela railroad, a major export route for Zambia's 
copper. Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda was enraged and had Savimbi 
arrested upon arrival in Lusaka in June, and then expelled from the 
country and forbidden to return. Its Zambian access denied, UNITA made 
a virtue of necessity and emphasised self-reliance even more than 
previously.
The emergence of UNITA was a short-term blessing for the MPLA.
It broke the FNLA's monopoly on OAU aid, thereby rescuing the MPLA from 
approaching obscurity and possibly encouraging greater socialist- 
country support. The appearance of UNITA also confirmed the MPLA's 
character as an artificial front. It is not clear if Savimbi would have 
agreed to merge his group with the MPLA even if a genuine common front 
offer had been made. In the event, the MPLA's unrealistic offer 
prevented his intentions from being truly tested.
RELATIONS WITH THE EASTERN BLOC
Shortly after the FNLA split caused the OAU to renew assistance to the 
MPLA, Moscow and Havana also increased their aid to Neto. Although a 
detailed examination of Soviet and Cuban decision making is outside the 
scope of this work, it is clear that the OAU blessing encouraged these 
governments to take the MPLA more seriously. Other motivations, 
including the heightening of cold war tensions occasioned by the 
October 1962 missile crisis, also undoubtedly played a role. Whatever 
the reason for the aid increase, MPLA statements on foreign policy 
matters became increasingly pro-Soviet and pro-Cuban. Though there is 
no proof that either of these powers specifically offered aid in return 
for the MPLA's adoption of a hostile attitude towards the West, the 
MPLA knew that a cordial relationship with Western countries was not 
the best way to ensure its benefactors' largesse.
Cuban involvement with the MPLA was consolidated when Che 
Guevara came to Brazzaville in May 1965 for extensive consultations.215 
Neto was embarrassed that the MPLA had few guerrilla accomplishments, 
but Guevara nonetheless agreed to provide Cuban instructors for the 
MPLA and promised diplomatic and political support.216 In 1966, the MPLA
215 Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 172.
216 Ottaway and Ottaway, op. cit., p. 101.
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sent its first guerrilla recruits to Cuba for training, was the 
exclusive representative of the Angolan nationalists at the 
"Tricontinental Conference" hosted in Havana, and even created a 
"Cienfuegos Column", named after a Cuban guerrilla leader. When Cuban 
instructors came to train the Congo-Brazzaville militia, some started 
training MPLA guerrillas as well.217
Soviet support also increased in the second half of 1964, 
coinciding with the OAU decision to reinstate assistance. Portuguese 
communist leader Alvaro Cunhal arranged for Neto to go to Moscow for 
consultations. Correspondence reflecting mutual admiration between the 
MPLA and Moscow became common. In April 1965, Pravda concluded that by 
aiding the MPLA the Soviet Union and "other socialist countries" were 
playing "an important part in spreading the ideas of socialism and 
revolutionary anti-colonialist ideology without which the participation 
of vast masses in the liberation fight is impossible".218 In August 
1965, the MPLA thanked Moscow for discrediting Roberto as an "American 
puppet" and declared that when independence was won "our first words of 
gratitude will be addressed to our most loyal friends, the people and 
government of the USSR".219 Growing numbers of MPLA militants went to 
Eastern Europe for military training.
The MPLA's position on the Soviet Union's 1968 intervention in 
Czechoslovakia then highlighted its increasing compliance to Soviet 
wishes. Most nationalist movements in Africa denounced the 
intervention, but the MPLA, like Cuba, stuck by Moscow.
"IMPERIALISM ABANDONS ITS LIBERAL MASK"
The MPLA's perception of Western policies in the 1964 to 1969 period 
had an important impact upon the movement's co-optability, and 
encouraged its already inherent tendency to shift leftward. The MPLA 
responded to increased Western investment in the Portuguese colonies 
and Western diplomatic and military co-operation with Lisbon by 
increasing its anti-Western rhetoric. The MPLA also arrived at an 
analysis of Washington's previous co-optation attempt that, for the 
time being at least, ensured a suspicious response to any co-optation
217 Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 172.
218 Pravda. 22 April 1965.
219 Message from MPLA Foreign Secretary Luis de Azevedo, Jr., Pravda,
11 August 1965.
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effort. (Chapter 7 shows that the MPLA did later consider liberal 
sectors of Europe as potential useful allies.)
The year 1964 started with a clear reminder that the United 
States was not interested in cordial relations. In March of that year, 
U.S. envoy Averell Harriman met with Algerian officials who repeatedly 
protested the direct aid the United States was sending Roberto, and 
reminded Harriman the OAU had declared all aid was to go through that 
group's liberation committee. Harriman interrupted the proceedings, 
announced he had another appointment, and left.220 Harriman's hostile 
demeanor surely was conveyed to the MPLA, further deepening the 
movement's distrust of Washington.
Even more disturbing to the movement, however, was increased 
Western investment in Portuguese Africa. Previously, Portugal had 
sought to exclude foreign powers from its colonies in an attempt to 
protect the Portuguese private sector. Labour had been rented out to 
foreigners and transit facilities provided for neighbours, but direct 
foreign investment in Mozambique and Angola had been discouraged. There 
are two explanations for why Lisbon decided to change investment 
policy. The conventional view is that the war bills had become onerous. 
Supporters of this argument point out that by 1965 Portugal's military 
spending accounted for 6.5 percent of its gross national product (GNP), 
double the level before the Angolan war started.221 Even more alarming, 
war expenditures took up 48 percent of government spending.222 Hence the 
"open door" investment policy was introduced.
Clarence-Smith, in contrast, asserts, "The negative effects of 
the wars on Portugal's economy have been greatly over-rated" and in the 
late 1960s "the economic utility of empire receded".223 He argues that 
the colonies became "a drain on the public purse" after the 1950s, due 
to non-war factors.. From 1963, to better integrate the colonies with 
the Portuguese economy, Portuguese products were allowed to enter the 
colonies freely and restrictions on transfers of funds to Portugal were 
relaxed. Since the colonies imported more goods from Portugal than they 
exported, the balance "had to be funded by the foreign exchange
220 Noer, op. cit., p. 113..
221 Munslow, op. cit., p. 47.
222 Ibid.
223 Clarence-Smith, op. cit., p. 18.
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surpluses gained in transactions with foreign countries, which were 
turned into escudos". However, "as a crash programme of 
industrialisation and economic growth was implemented in the colonies, 
their balance of payments in regard to foreign partners deteriorated, 
and they were unable to pay their debts to metropolitan suppliers".
The author further argues that the cost of the war was not as onerous 
as it appeared because "the Portuguese budget cannot readily be 
compared with those of wealthy European nations, because of the very 
low rate of social spending". The Portuguese spent 7.7 percent of GNP 
on its military from 1965 to 1970, a little less than the 8.1 percent 
spent by the United States in the same period.224 Therefore, in 
Clarence-Smith's view, the new investment rules were not related to the 
cost of the war but rather to "worries about the balance of payments, 
the need for integration into regional trading groups and the desire to 
gain Western support for the war in Africa...."225
Which ever argument one finds persuasive, and this author finds 
the second more plausible, the impact remained the same--increased 
Western investment was perceived as hostility to the nationalists.
New incentives included tax holidays, free repatriation of 
profits and capital, withdrawal of the obligation to invest only 
through joint ventures with Portuguese companies, simplification of 
investment procedures, and improved investment guarantees. Foreign 
company interest was considerable, though there was a delay of a year 
or two before large sums actually began to flow. The most notable 
transaction was Gulf Oil's 1966 investment in Angola's Cabinda 
province.
The MPLA criticised both this Portuguese overture to foreign 
capital and the West's response in a July 1965 article. The movement 
claimed that previously Western interests in Angola had conflicted at 
several levels. The "imperialist powers understood that Portugal in 
trying to "maintain' Angola would end by losing it, and mortgage itself 
to foreign interests". This, the MPLA believed, was not entirely 
against Western interests, because it permitted them to penetrate 
Portugal's sphere of influence. But as a result "Portuguese colonialism
224 Ibid. , p. 194-195.
225 Ibid., p. 205.
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[became] nothing but a collective colonialism".226 Thus, the rest of the
West, in the MPLA's eyes, was as guilty as Portugal.
More important, the MPLA now claimed that previously the United
States had adopted a liberal posture not out of true concern for
Angola, but in order to compete with traditional European influence in
southern Africa:
American imperialism thus mounted on the back of African 
nationalism, taking advantage of it as a vehicle of penetration 
in the competitive struggle with the interests of the European 
bloc in the Congo, so closely associated with the Portuguese 
interests in Angola, in the other Portuguese colonies, and in 
Portugal. Via Angolan "nationalism" it would be possible to find 
a supplementary door to the Congo, mainly through Katanga, by 
means of the Benguela railway and the port of Lobito.227
Apart from a divergence in European and U.S. interests, the MPLA
also perceived a contradiction within the U.S. policy:
The United States... sought, on the one hand, to support 
strongly Portuguese ultra-colonialism, while at the same time 
condemning some of its secondary aspects, in order to be able to 
satisfy the demands of world-wide public opinion.... On the 
other hand it was essential to preserve the future. In this way, 
there arose the need to create a false leadership of the Angolan 
nationalist movement, in order to make it deviate from its real 
goals. This false leadership, constituted by approved 
"nationalist" elements, would... permit the channelling of the 
aid destined to the people of Angola, and thus remove it from 
the real nationalists.228
The MPLA added another element to its analysis of U.S. support
for Holden Roberto, seeing him as a U.S. weapon used to defeat the
secessionists in Congo-Leopoldville, who were backed by Belgium:
Holden was... a means of pressure, which was used by the USA in 
the framework of the competition between the imperialist powers 
in Angola and mainly in the Congo. At the time of [Katanga's] 
secession, Holden constituted a potential weapon perpetually 
directed against Katanga and the interests of the European 
group.229
The article added that Roberto had received U.S. instructions to 
sabotage the Benguela railway, the main export route for Katanga's
226 Hugo Menezes, "Angola and the New Imperialist Strategy in Southern 
Africa", Faulha (Accra), 1 July 1965. Reprinted in Quern e o Inimiqo. 
vol. 3, ed. Aquino de Bragan<?a and Immanuel Wallerstein (Lisbon: 
Iniciativas Editoriais, 1978), p. 87.
227 Ibid., pp. 87-88.
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minerals. The MPLA concluded, "Thus, to American "liberalism1 and
"anti-colonialism1 which found expression in Cyrille Adoula and Holden
Roberto, there stood opposed Anglo-Belgian-Portuguese colonialism,
embodied in the personality of Moise Tshombe".230
The MPLA believed that this formula had recently changed,
however, accounting for the U.S. shift away from the liberal approach.
The United States, the MPLA concluded, had become more nervous about
the prospects of a nationalist victory in Angola:
In effect, imperialism was forced to unite, in order to fight 
the liberation movement. Imperialism was forced to abandon its 
"liberal" mask, to tighten its ranks, to take the positions 
called for by its most reactionary elements.231
Clearly the MPLA believed that Washington's past support for the 
nationalists was due more to competition with Europe and a desire to 
limit the nationalists' leftward drift than to true sympathy, and that 
in any case the United States was now falling back into step with its 
more conservative partners.
In 1969, MPLA rhetoric grew more hostile and focussed 
particularly on the West's economic investment in Angola. Neto cited 
Gulf Oil's involvement in Cabinda, Belgian assistance to the oil 
operation, and West Germany's investment in iron ore development. Neto 
accused investors of providing Lisbon with the "means to prosecute the 
war" and remarked, "When our people win their independence they will 
have to examine this problem and take decisions in accord with our 
national interests".232
The death of Portuguese Premier Salazar in 1968 and his 
replacement by Marcello Caetano had no impact upon MPLA policy, even 
though many observers expected that Caetano would take a more 
progressive attitude towards decolonisation. An October 1969 MPLA 
article said that the leadership change "does not signify anything", 
and added that international capital still determined Portuguese 
policy. In the same statement, the MPLA claimed that Portugal wanted to
230 Ibid.
231 Ibid. , p. 90.
232 Agostinho Neto, "Angola: Urn Povo em Revolugao", 1969 speech. 
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form a South Atlantic military alliance "with the consent of the world 
guardian of imperialism, the United States".233
The MPLA's perception of Western policies was very different in 
1969 than it had been seven years earlier. In 1962, the MPLA 
leadership, and particularly Neto, believed that although capitalism 
was not a desirable model, there might be a partial overlap between the 
goals of Western liberals and those of socialist-oriented nationalists. 
In 1969, the MPLA leadership believed that Western liberalism was 
simply a more sophisticated approach designed to achieve the same goals 
as old-style "imperialism"--political domination and economic 
exploitation of the Third World and competitive advantage in the race 
between Western powers to obtain the most benefits from that domination 
and exploitation. (This MPLA position was subsequently tempered 
slightly, as shown in chapter 7.)
EFFECT OF ARMED STRUGGLE
The MPLA's efforts to pursue armed struggle in the 1964 to 1969 period 
may have had a small negative impact upon its co-optability, but the 
scarcity of firsthand information makes a firm conclusion impossible.
The MPLA's military efforts were hampered by two conditions. 
First, until 1966, when MPLA infiltration via Zambia became possible, 
the MPLA had no reliable route into Angola proper and relied on actions 
launched from Congo-Brazzaville into the northern Cabinda enclave. 
Second, much of the MPLA leadership was reluctant to risk life and limb 
in battle and resisted Neto's attempts to move the MPLA's headquarters 
from Brazzaville to the interior, where guerrilla war could be better 
managed. Though Neto proposed the headquarters move at a February 1965 
MPLA conference, the transfer did not occur until 19 6 8 , 234 and even then 
the leadership spent more time outside the country than inside.235 These 
limitations on MPLA military manoeuvres curtailed the group's ability 
to build up "liberated" areas in which to develop its ideas about 
social organisation through practise.
233 MPLA, "Tudo o que acontece em Angola e determinado pela acqao do 
MPLA", Vitoria ou Morte (October/November 1969). Reprinted in Textos 
e Documentos do MPLA. op. cit., 76.
234 Khazanov, op. cit., pp. 177-178.
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That said, the MPLA did gain control of some territory. In 
September 1966, the Cienfuegos column finally broke through Portuguese 
defences and FNLA obstruction to the Dembos area in northern Angola and 
reactivated guerrillas who had been stranded there since access to the 
border of Congo-Leopoldville had been denied in 1963. In the same year, 
the MPLA opened an eastern front in Moxico district, using supplies 
transported from the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam via Zambia. Zambia 
had become independent from Britain in October 1964236 and lifted 
restrictions on nationalist movement activities two years later.237 
Despite scuffles with the FNLA and increasingly efficient Portuguese 
counterattacks, by the late 1960s the MPLA controlled three chunks of 
"liberated" territory, in Cabinda, Dembos, and Moxico.
It is not clear just how MPLA interaction with the peasantry 
affected the movement's co-optability, for difficulties in obtaining 
access to the "liberated" areas discouraged scholarly investigation, 
and the MPLA's subsequent versions of events may not be accurate. 
According to Marcum, the MPLA largely failed to mobilise political 
support among Cabindans. 238 In the Dembos area, competition with the 
FNLA hindered peasant-guerrilla bonding. The eastern front was lightly 
populated, and MPLA action consisted primarily of infrastructure 
sabotage and ambushes of Portuguese patrols. According to Basil 
Davidson, the MPLA was able to establish only a "minimal network of 
political co-operation" in the area.239 In general, the MPLA encountered 
problems establishing a political base in areas dominated by tribes not 
related to the Mbundu, the dominant ethnic group in the movement. The 
division of "liberated" territory into three separate geographic areas, 
and the fact that travellers between them had to run a gauntlet of FNLA 
and Portuguese units, also limited the development of a coherent social 
programme. Finally, the leadership's preference for exile slowed the 
growth of peasant-guerrilla relationships.
That said, the MPLA clearly was able to establish political 
bonds with some portions of the population. In such areas, peasants
236 Ibid., pp. 176-178.
237 Fred Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa. (New York, Paragon 
House, 1987), p. 70.
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were grouped into small villages of no more than 100 people each to 
avoid exposing large numbers to Portuguese attack. Each village had its 
own elected "action committee", a militia, a "people's plantation" run 
on a collective basis, and a "people's shop". Fledgling labour unions 
were established to "stimulate production". Neto repeatedly exhorted 
guerrilla leaders to depend less on the outside and to cultivate 
support from the local people. 240 To the extent that the peasants' 
desires for equitable distribution of land, health care, and education 
were consistent with the MPLA's socialist values, the armed struggle 
reinforced the MPLA's left orientation. The tenuous and inconsistent 
bond between the guerrillas and the population at this time, however, 
meant that the armed struggle experience was not a main factor driving 
the MPLA away from a co-optable position.
IDEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT
By the end of the 1960s, the MPLA's statements on ideological matters 
were more explicitly Marxist than they had been at the beginning of the 
decade. A 1967 article in the MPLA newsletter Victory or Death (Vitoria 
ou Morte) started by dividing Angolan society by class rather than 
race: "[G]enerally the behaviour of an Angolan before the phenomenon of 
the fight for national liberation varies fundamentally according to the 
social group to which he pertains, and not according to the ethnic 
racial group".241 It criticised the theory of neqritude for focussing on 
colour rather than economic relations. As the Ottaways have noted, one 
of the major appeals of Marxism for the MPLA leadership may have been 
that, by focussing on class rather than race, it provided an 
ideological framework that legitimised a major mestico leadership role 
in an organisation with a largely black African rank and file.242 
Colonialism was also analysed in Marxist terms:
[C] olonialism is no more than a manifestation of the fundamental 
contradiction of history, that is, the contradiction between the 
productive forces and the relations of production in the epoch 
of the supreme phase of capitalism and imperialism....
[C]olonialism is fundamentally the exploitation of man by man, 
with the peculiarity that the exploiter is foreign....
240 Ibid.
241 MPLA, "Caracter Social da Luta de Libertagao Nacional", in Vitoria 
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[Therefore] the process of struggle against colonialism should 
be encompassed in the process of struggle against all forms of 
exploitation in any society: this is revolutionary progress.... 
National independence, as the logical result of revolutionary 
struggle, should consist of the realisation of a society free 
from any type of exploitation of man by man.243
In 1969, Neto emphasised the importance of creating a vanguard
party, a central tenet of Marxist-Leninist theory:
These [other African] countries fall into neo-colonialism 
because they do not mobilise their masses, because they do not 
have a vanguard organisation nor a party that directs the 
people. We are taking precautions against these dangers so that 
in the future Angola can be the truly progressive country that
we all want. 244 [Author's emphasis]
Clearly the MPLA was increasingly using a philosophical 
framework that integrated it with the socialist world and distanced it 
from the Western tradition.
SUMMARY
In sum, the MPLA, already exhibiting low co-optability in 1964, was 
even less co-optable by the end of the decade. It was supporting Moscow
when many other Soviet allies were reluctant to do so, as in the case
of the Czechoslovakian controversy, and had concluded that past 
evidence of Western goodwill was simply part of a sophisticated 
strategy to better dominate and exploit the Portuguese territories.
The main factors responsible for these developments in the 1964 
to 1969 period were the movement's perception of Western policy and the 
influence of non-Western allies. The West appeared to the MPLA 
leadership to have lost interest in the nationalist cause. What pro­
nationalist actions the West did take were perceived as designed to 
usurp the cause for "imperialist" purposes. The simultaneous growing 
generosity of the socialist world towards the movement, particularly 
the aid from the Soviet Union and Cuba, and the tacit pressure to 
support those benefactors' foreign policies and ideology, pulled the 
movement away from a co-optable position. The conditions of armed 
struggle may have marginally reinforced the trend away from co- 
optability, but were not a critical factor. The division of the MPLA's 
main rival enhanced the movement's prestige, which in turn may have
243 MPLA, "Caracter Social da Luta de Libertagao Nacional", op. cit., 
pp. 55-56.
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encouraged greater socialist-country largesse, but was not in itself a 
critical factor influencing the movement's evolving co-optability.
What might have occurred if Neto and his colleagues had 
perceived the West to be pursuing anti-colonial, pro-nationalist 
policies that did not exclude the MPLA? Given the legacy of low co- 
optability inherited from the 1956 to 1963 period, it seems unlikely 
that the MPLA would have responded to such an overture by becoming pro- 
Western. The availability of other funding options would, however, have 
made it less beholden to the Eastern bloc and perhaps able to resist 
pressure to endorse Soviet policy. For example, the MPLA might have had 
the courage to criticise, or at least not support, Moscow's 
intervention in Czechoslovakia. In short, a friendlier policy on the 
part of the West might have encouraged the MPLA to pursue a more 
balanced foreign policy, but the movement's early history would have 
prevented full co-optation.
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CHAPTER 5 
FRELIMO: "THESE COUNTRIES ARE NOT REALLY OUR FRIENDS"
From 1964 to 1969, FRELIMO's co-optability steadily declined, but the 
movement never completely turned its back on the West.
FRELIMO's ideology gradually shifted leftward, diplomatic 
exchanges with Western governments became less frequent, and diplomatic 
and material ties with the Eastern bloc steadily rose. Towards the end 
of the period, FRELIMO's language also showed the first evidence of 
ideological as well as operational conflict with the West. FRELIMO 
began to criticise not only the West's perceived support of Portugal in 
the Mozambican war, but also the West's capitalist system.
Four factors were responsible for the decline in FRELIMO co- 
optability. The most obvious were the movement's perception of Western 
policies and the influence of non-Western allies, which simultaneously 
pushed and pulled the movement leftward. FRELIMO came to believe that 
Western governments were uninterested in Mozambican independence and 
instead were increasingly providing military and financial assistance 
to Portugal's counter-insurgency efforts. There was also some suspicion 
that the West was exacerbating internal strains within the movement. At 
the same time, socialist governments provided growing material and 
diplomatic assistance to the movement, accompanied by pressure to 
support the Eastern bloc's foreign policy agenda.
Two less obvious factors, the conditions of armed struggle and 
internal factionalism, were also important. The former caused much of 
the FRELIMO leadership to increasingly adopt quasi-socialist rhetoric, 
while the latter led to the expulsion of those who did not share that 
view. The racial aspect of the internal factionalism, and the utility 
of Marxist analysis, which justifies cross-racial alliances, increased 
the philosophy's attractiveness to the increasingly multi-racial 
leadership.
Although it is impossible to come to a definitive judgement, it 
seems likely that without these two latter factors (conditions of armed 
struggle and internal factionalism), FRELIMO might have been slower to 
add an ideological element to its conflict with the West. It also seems 
likely that these developments probably would have shifted the movement 
somewhat leftward even if the push-pull effect of cold war politics had 
not played a major role.
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Despite its disillusionment with Western governments, however, 
FRELIMO still had a high opinion of Western liberals and in the 1964 to 
1969 period invested considerable resources lobbying liberal 
organisations in both Western Europe and the United States. This 
openness to Western liberals, even in the face of hostility from 
Western governments, was due in large part to a fifth factor: the 
background of the leadership. Because of Mondlane's long period of 
residence in the United States and his United Nations experience, he 
was aware that Western governments at times are forced to respond to 
their own populations' public opinion. He concluded that efforts to 
influence that public opinion remain worthwhile even when official 
policy seems intransigent.
EARLY INTERNAL DISSENSION
In 1964, FRELIMO's internal difficulties delayed the launch of armed 
struggle and contributed to suspicions about U.S. intentions. Early in 
the year, Mondlane travelled to Cairo to try to convince the defectors 
who had broken with the party in 1963 and re-formed UDENAMO (see 
chapter 2) to return to the fold. UDENAMO claimed that it could not do 
so because, being without financial resources, it would be swamped by 
FRELIMO. The United Arab Emirates therefore gave the dissidents a gift 
of funds, on the condition that they rejoin FRELIMO. UDENAMO accepted 
the terms and the cash, but asked for sixty days to inform its 
membership and Central Committee. FRELIMO agreed, and a deadline was 
set for 20 September 1964.245
Originally FRELIMO had intended to initiate its armed activity 
in July 1964, when weather would be suitable for guerrilla warfare. 
Mondlane delayed, however, hoping to launch the struggle from a united 
base.246 As 20 September approached, there was no sign that UDENAMO 
would follow through on its undertaking. Also, revelations concerning 
mid-ranking FRELIMO official Leo Milas, who had been implicated in the 
upsurge of factionalism, made the leadership fear that foreign parties 
were engineering the splits and that therefore they might not be healed 
easily.
Specifically, FRELIMO "began to suspect that Leo Milas might be 
one of those counter-revolutionary agents whom the enemy from time to
245 Source one, interview.
246 Editorial, Mozambique Revolution, no. 6 (May 1964), pp. 2-3.
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time infiltrates in order to destroy our movement".247 A FRELIMO 
investigation into his background concluded that he had intentionally 
provoked factionalism and sought to "create a bad reputation for 
FRELIMO... in co-operation with... imperialism". Even more seriously, 
it concluded that Milas "is not a Mozambican.... He is a citizen of the 
United States of America, having been b o m  in the State of Texas, and 
that his parents, also native born citizens of the United States, still 
live in southern California".248 Milas was expelled from FRELIMO in 
August and travelled to Khartoum, where he published anti-Mondlane 
pamphlets, "financed", said FRELIMO, "by who knows who".249
The Milas incident, together with UDENAMO's procrastination, 
eventually made Mondlane give up hope of establishing greater unity 
before launching armed struggle. Five days after UDENAMO's deadline 
expired, on 25 September 1964, FRELIMO's first armed actions inside 
Mozambique began.
A final round of talks with UDENAMO were held in Dar es Salaam 
in February 1965 at the behest of Tanzania's President Julius Nyerere. 
UDENAMO insisted that FRELIMO change its name in return for unity. 
Mondlane refused. "We finally concluded that these people were not 
really interested in unity and were merely negotiating so as to 
precipitate more splits", said a FRELIMO militant familiar with the 
talks. "We came to believe that they were simply enemy agents and did 
not waste any more energy trying to resolve the issue".250 The fact that 
most of the dissidents then went to the United States to study may have 
subsequently encouraged the view that Washington had a hand in the 
affair.
"U.S. WANTS TO CALM ITS ALLY"
FRELIMO had additional reasons to be annoyed with the West during the 
first two years of the period under examination. As outlined in chapter 
6 , the United States was adopting conciliatory policies towards
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Portugal and abandoning its former liberalism. Mondlane nonetheless 
traveled to Washington in the early summer of 1964 to lobby for 
weapons. He met with William's deputy, Wayne Fredericks, and other mid­
level officials who encouraged him "to concentrate on political 
organizing rather than on violence".251 In an article published as the 
armed struggle was initiated, Mondlane criticised the new U.S. 
ambassador to Lisbon, Admiral Andersen, who had ended a March 1964 
visit to Mozambique and Angola with pro-Portugal statements. Mondlane 
retorted:
When Admiral Andersen proclaims the unity that he says exists 
between Portugal and the United States of America, we... have no 
other alternative than to conclude that this is the point of 
view of the government of the United States.... We can only 
think that the United States of America wants to calm its ally, 
Portugal, and provide solidarity and material support for the 
maintenance of Portuguese colonialism and imperialism in the 
African continent.252
FRELIMO1s opinion of the United States was not improved in late 
1964 when the Ford automobile company established a new subsidiary in 
Portugal. That subsidiary then announced that the Ford Foundation had 
promised to consult the Salazar government on any future grants 
relating to Portuguese Africa.253 Shortly afterwards the Foundation 
withdrew support for FRELIMO1s Mozambique Institute. A FRELIMO 
editorial responded, "The lesson is that, concerning our relations with 
imperialist countries, there is a certain principle to be adopted.
These countries are not really our friends".254
It is therefore perhaps no coincidence that on 3 December 1964 
Mondlane released a statement in Dar es Salaam redrafting FRELIMO's 
definition of African nationalism. Once again he left out any mention 
of socialism or Marxism, but he did say that African nationalism "is a 
reaction against foreign, especially Western, economic exploitation of 
the African natural and human resources".255
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In 1965, FRELIMO grew even more frustrated with the United
States. In February the party said that it had
tried to... contact the members of the American government who 
deal specifically with African matters.... The American 
government, however, refused to receive us. They told us that a 
member of the State Department would meet us privately, secretly 
at a hotel or restaurant, but not officially. We refused of 
course. FRELIMO is not at all interested in secret talks with 
the American government.256
FRELIMO noted the impending visit of a U.S. delegation to Mozambique
and remarked, "We assume... that among other reasons, it was fear of
Salazar's reaction that determined this attitude of the American
government" .257
The United States was not the only Western country to encounter 
FRELIMO criticism. In March 1965, FRELIMO labelled West Germany as the 
only country "which does not conceal her support to the colonial 
war".250 Relations with Bonn deteriorated even further later that year, 
when FRELIMO, along with other liberation movements in the Portuguese 
colonies, invited East German representatives to the second meeting of 
the Conference of Nationalist Organisations of the Portuguese Colonies 
(Conferencia das Organizagoes Nacionalistas das Colonias Portuguesas-- 
CONCP). The West German ambassador in Dar es Salaam asked Marcelino dos 
Santos if this implied FRELIMO recognition of the German Democratic 
Republic. Dos Santos replied that it did not. Nonetheless, the 
ambassador reportedly responded, "If they participate, you will pay".259
Portugal's 1965 decision to open up its colonies to foreign 
investment then heightened FRELIMO's disdain for the West. FRELIMO 
responded in November 1965 with the most explicit rejection of "neo­
colonialism" it had enunciated to date:
Neo-colonialism is a modern form of colonialism.... The 
principal difference in relation to colonialism is that there is 
no occupation of territory. There is only economic exploitation. 
The Portuguese would not need to have either troops or
da Braganca and Immanuel Wallerstein, (London: Zed Press, 1982), p. 
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administrators in Mozambique: It would be Mozambique's own 
puppet government which would [exploit Mozambicans] .260
FRELIMO's overall foreign alignment in the 1964 to 1966 period
was perhaps best summarised by Mondlane's answer in August 1965 to a
question concerning what foreign policy FRELIMO would adopt after
independence. Mondlane said, "We will be an independent African state,
non-aligned in the sense that Tanzania is, and we will make friends
with any country with which we feel we have a common interest and a
common policy".261
By early 1966, FRELIMO clearly perceived the West to be allied
with Portugal and unsympathetic to the nationalist cause. The movement
was also now apprehensive about future "neo-colonialism" in Mozambique.
FRELIMO had not yet, however, adopted an explicitly Marxist outlook,
and its conflict with the West was still operational rather than
ideological. Indeed, even in 1966 Mondlane still thought it worthwhile
to meet with Robert F. Kennedy in Dar es Salaam.262
RELATIONS WITH THE EAST
FRELIMO's growing dissatisfaction with the West was not immediately 
accompanied by realignment towards Moscow. Indeed, a FRELIMO activist 
involved in mobilising foreign support at the time later commented, 
"Nobody believed that we could launch a successful guerrilla war. The 
USSR took a condescending view towards us, saw us as "country 
bumpkins'. We started the armed struggle with arms supplied only by 
Algeria" ,263
FRELIMO did have cordial contacts with Soviet representatives, 
participated in Soviet-sponsored conferences of liberation movements, 
and welcomed visiting Soviet journalists to its camps, but the 
atmosphere was uneasy.
Relations with China were warmer, though still ambivalent. In 
January 1964, Marcelino dos Santos and Mondlane had extensive
260 FRELIMO, A Voz da Revolucao. November 1965, quoted in Alpers, op. 
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conversations with Mao Tse-tung. According to FRELIMO, Mondlane left 
China convinced that the Chinese experience was relevant to Africa.264 
The idea that the peasantry was a necessary and sufficient basis for 
launching revolution was particularly appealing. FRELIMO disliked 
Chinese cultural-revolution hysteria, however, and tried to avoid 
taking sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute, hoping eventually to cultivate 
support from both nations.265 Mondlane circumvented Beijing's demand 
that aid recipients sign propaganda statements condemning Soviet 
revisionism and arranged for all Chinese aid to be channelled through 
the Liberation Committee of the OAU. This camouflaged its origin and 
avoided embarrassing the Soviet Union.
FRELIMO also had some contact with Cuba in the early stage of 
the armed struggle. Che Guevara visited FRELIMO's headquarters in Dar 
es Salaam in 1965, but FRELIMO reportedly rejected Cuban tactics as 
unsuitable for the Mozambican situation.266
In sum, FRELIMO's policy towards the socialist countries in the 
early stage of the armed struggle was cordial, especially regarding 
Beijing, but in no way could the relationship be called an alliance. 
Mondlane was impatient with Sino-Soviet squabbling, and if he seemed to 
favour Beijing over Moscow, it was because the Chinese experience 
seemed more applicable to the Mozambican situation rather than because 
of an ideological preconception. FRELIMO's profound disappointment with 
Western, and especially U.S., policy on Portuguese colonialism 
certainly encouraged it to explore the possibility of obtaining help 
from the socialist countries more energetically than it might have done 
otherwise, but FRELIMO was still cautious.
THREE THEORIES REGARDING IDEOLOGY
From 1966 onwards FRELIMO intensified its armed struggle, suffered 
severe internal factionalism, and increasingly adopted socialist
264 "Mozambican Leaders Visiting China", Mozambique Revolution, no. 2 
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rhetoric. There are three theories regarding how these trends 
intersected.
The first, put forward by Munslow 267 and many others, argues 
that the conditions of armed struggle pitted a "revolutionary" faction 
against a "bourgeois" group, and that the former developed socialist 
philosophy as a result of its efforts to engender grassroots support 
for FRELIMO guerrillas. This view, which for ease of reference will 
henceforth be termed the "conventional" perspective, argues that in the 
1966 to 1969 period FRELIMO began to embrace socialism as a result of 
its experience on the ground, and that it was an authentic socialism 
which eventually evolved into a true intent to build a socialist post- 
independence society.
The second argument, espoused by Hall and Young, is that 
"[i]ndeed, far from FRELIMO's Marxism 'coming from experience' the 
truth was almost the exact opposite--again like much else, FRELIMO's 
Marxism was imported from outside". 268 The authors argue, in what will 
henceforth be termed the "psychological view", that Portugal's 
"colonialist and assimilationist ideology...[was] desperately 
humiliating for those Mozambicans who aspired to education and 
'modernity'". They further quote a remark made by the first president 
of Mozambique, Samora Machel, in which he lamented that Portugal 
"forced a Mozambican to deny his personality, to transform himself into 
a little black Portuguese". Hall and Young assert that "the 
psychological strain induced by Portuguese colonialism in African 
aspirants to modernity was... peculiarly intense".269 The psychological 
view argues that the obvious alternative to colonial civilisation, 
African tradition, was unacceptable because conquest by Portugal had 
been facilitated by manipulation of traditional African divisions, and 
because FRELIMO wanted to modernise the country. Marxism, Hall and 
Young argue,
offered an historical labelling that restored both the dignity 
and historicity of African peoples--their capacity to 
participate in progress.... Marxism in all its variants provides 
a powerful secular vision of transcendence and renewal in which 
divisions have disappeared and new institutions have emerged to 
ensure progress, purity and harmony. The appeal of this to the
?67 Munslow, op. cit., pp. 87-111.
268 Hall and Young, op. cit., pp. 66-67.
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leaders of a society notable for its divisions is hardly 
surprising.270
The authors do concede that "it would be far-fetched to imagine that
all FRELIMO's ideological effort was no more than an elaborate ruse (to
secure Soviet bloc aid and obscure elite tensions), or that the FRELIMO
leadership was over-awed by foreign advisors". They also believe
FRELIMO voluntarily adopted socialist rhetoric for "its appeal lay in
providing a language to account for the past, a vision of the future
and an understanding of the struggle to attain that future, in terms
which had the greatest affinity with FRELIMO's own political-military
experience11.271 The role of experience is acknowledged, though not given
as much importance as in the conventional view.
The third theory, propounded by Cahen, is that FRELIMO split
into "two petty bourgeois factions that were socially different" and
did not experience a genuine struggle between a revolutionary and
bourgeois line. In Cahen's view, the internal factionalism that wracked
FRELIMO from 1966 to 1969 set a "rural trader bourgeoisie" against the
"bureaucratic bourgeoisie" of "nurses and office workers" who came to
dominate FRELIMO's military operations. Cahen argues, "Marxism appeared
as the most appropriate nationalist ideology for a social faction in
specific conditions where massive popular mobilisations were necessary
to obtain independence".272 (Emphasis in original.) Cahen concludes,
Stalinist Marxism was effective in legitimising the struggle for 
a modern, Jacobin, European-type nation. This was not a Marxism 
for a socialist transition.... The sincerity of the leadership 
is not in question--but they wished to construct a republic of 
bureaucrats and associated peasants in order to build a nation 
and not something else.273
Cahen's theory, henceforth referred to as the "bureaucratic" 
view, is partially congruent with the "conventional" explanation 
because he claims it was "the combination of these specifics with the 
circumstances of armed struggle [that] created the conditions for the 
implantation of 'Marxism'". (Emphasis in original.)274
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ARMED STRUGGLE AND INTERNAL FACTIONALISM
Before arriving at conclusions regarding the merits of these three 
theories, knowledge of the specifics of FRELIMO's history are required.
Initially FRELIMO planned to launch operations all over the 
country simultaneously, and in September 1964 cadres were sent to seven 
of Mozambique's nine provinces. Military strategy was still unclear, 
however, and the choice between a Roberto-style insurrection and a 
prolonged popular war had not yet been made.
The actions of Mozambique's neighbours and the efficiency of the 
Portuguese secret police then started to resolve this ambiguity. The 
Malawian, South African, Southern Rhodesian, and Swazi governments 
clamped down on Mozambican nationalists within their borders, making it 
nearly impossible to infiltrate arms for a sudden uprising. By 
Christmas 1964, most of the southern underground network was uncovered, 
and the FRELIMO operation in Lourenqo Marques was totally wiped out. 
Altogether about 1,500 FRELIMO sympathisers were arrested. Guerrilla 
units struggled forward in Tete and Zambezia provinces, but they too 
were soon forced to withdraw.275
Tanzanian policy also conditioned FRELIMO's options. Because of 
the difficulty of operating inside Mozambique, FRELIMO had been 
mobilising among Mozambican exiles resident in Tanzania. President 
Julius Nyerere became uneasy with this disruption of Tanzanian society, 
and FRELIMO agreed to cease the mobilisation and closed its recruitment 
facilities there. Through these actions Nyerere encouraged FRELIMO to 
move its focus from outside to inside Mozambique.276
In 1965, the war continued only in the north, in Cabo Delgado 
and Niassa provinces bordering Tanzania, and FRELIMO had to rethink its 
strategy. If it could not easily cross borders other than Tanzania's 
into Mozambique, and if it could not recruit among exiles in Dar es 
Salaam, it would have to build up liberated areas inside the country.
In the eyes of much of the FRELIMO leadership, that required a closer 
relationship with the peasantry, which in turn meant paying attention 
to their problems.
The evolving guerrilla strategy interacted with two internal 
problems that preoccupied the party--the reluctance of some FRELIMO 
students to participate in the armed struggle inside Mozambique, and
275 Munslow, op. cit., p. 87.
276 Ibid., pp. 89-90.
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the lack of coordination between the military and political sectors of 
the party.
The Central Committee addressed these difficulties in an October 
1966 meeting. It was concerned that students tended to use the 
Mozambique Institute purely as a means to obtain education, without 
making a commitment to the armed struggle. The Central Committee noted 
the need to re-integrate the students into the struggle, ruled that 
those educated abroad must return to Mozambique upon finishing their 
schooling, and "ordered the Department of Education to change the 
Institute's programme to better suit the needs of the war".277
Even more important were the Central Committee's decisions 
concerning military-political divisions that had pitted the Department 
of Internal Organisation against the Department of Defence. The 
Committee argued that if all the people were to be mobilised to 
participate in the war, then the guerrillas would have to play an 
active role in politicisation. The Committee's final communique 
condemned "those who think there are two types of FRELIMO members, 
military and civil", and insisted that all Department of Internal 
Organisation militants "must pursue a political-military education".278
These directives were not meekly accepted. Resistance was 
particularly strong in Cabo Delgado province. The local Department of 
Internal Organisation leaders, called "Chairmen" in the British 
tradition, opposed delegating "their" political functions to either the 
fighters or the peasants. They wanted the army to remain simply the 
military force, while they retained political power, and at the end of 
1966 they began organised opposition to the Central Committee's 
instructions.
This faction (the "trader/petty bourgeoisie" in Cahen's 
bureaucratic model, the "bourgeois" faction in Munslow's conventional 
view)increasingly associated with the leading FRELIMO civil authority 
in Cabo Delgado, Lazaro Nkavandame, defined the enemy simply as 
colonialism and wanted only independence, without changing the existing 
social structure. In contrast, Mondlane's group, (the "bureaucratic 
petty bourgeoisie" in Cahen's model, the "revolutionary" group in the
277 FRELIMO, "Reuniao do Comite Central em Outubro 1966, Comunicado 
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conventional view), increasingly defined the enemy as both colonialism 
and the economic system that "exploited" the peasants.
Similarly, Nkavandame's group saw whites as the enemy, 
regardless of individual characteristics. White members of FRELIMO, and 
Africans with white wives (including Mondlane), were criticised. The 
"revolutionary" group divided people according to their role in the 
economy, regardless of race.279
The same differences of approach were evident in arguments about 
economic policy in the liberated areas. Mondlane's group wanted to 
collectivise production while the Chairmen wanted to continue the 
existing economic system more or less intact, but with themselves in 
control. In 1966, Nkavandame supporters in Cabo Delgado started 
employing peasants to work their fields at low wages. Both agricultural 
produce and essential imported goods were marketed at high prices by 
the Chairmen's trading shops. The peasants knew the prices of products 
in Tanzania and realised they were being forced to work far longer to 
earn a given item than they would have had to in Dar es Salaam.280
Nkavandame also used tribalism against the Mondlane group. He 
played on the northern Makonde's long-standing fear of domination by 
southerners, making much of the fact that many FRELIMO military leaders 
came from the south. In the same spirit, he allied with traditional 
chiefs, who resisted the threat to their authority represented by 
Mondlane.281
Mondlane's ideas on the role of women in the struggle 
consolidated the traditional leader-chairmen alliance. Mondlane wanted 
to mobilise all possible energies in the struggle and called for the 
emancipation of women and their acceptance into society in the 
liberated areas as full equals. He opposed the bride-price system, 
child marriage, and polygamy. A Women's Detachment was created within 
the Department of Defence, and representatives attended the Chairmen's 
meetings. This enraged traditional leaders.282
The Chairmen also opposed the idea of making the struggle a 
"people's war". Such a war entailed a rise in the status of the young
279 Munslow, op. cit., p. 104.
280 Ibid., p. 105.
281 Ibid., p. 106.
282 Ibid.
102
guerrillas and an increasing FRELIMO identification with the 
peasantry.283 The Chairmen counter-proposed a shift to urban warfare, 
which was more easily controlled by political authority. The Department 
of Defence said that it would be impossible to win the conventional 
military confrontations with the Portuguese such a strategy would 
entail. The Chairmen accused the guerrillas of cowardice and encouraged 
the peasants to withhold food. Nkavandame and his cohorts recruited 
their own armies and began plans to declare Cabo Delgado independent 
without waiting for the struggle to spread to the rest of the 
country.284
Another controversy with similar underlying causes broke into 
the open at the Mozambique Institute in 1968. Over the previous two 
years, tensions between students, led by the Catholic teacher-priest 
Father Mateus Gwenjere, and Mondlane's group had escalated. Gwenjere 
backed student demands that courses all be given in English, was anti­
white, insisted that student's lives not be jeopardised in the armed 
struggle, and claimed that students were being deprived of offered 
scholarships because leaders feared that their positions would later be 
taken over by the better educated graduates.285
In March 1968, major disturbances forced the closure of the 
Institute. About 80 percent of the student body fled. FRELIMO suspected 
that West Germany had a role in the incident, as that country's Dar es 
Salaam embassy promised that scholarships would await the students in 
Nairobi and provided their air fares.286
Violence continued in May, when a group of Makonde exiles 
repeatedly attacked the FRELIMO offices, killing a member of the 
Central Committee. In an effort to restore order, the Tanzanian 
government, some of whose members were close to Gwenjere and 
Nkavandame, expelled all whites working with FRELIMO from the 
country.287
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THE SECOND CONGRESS AND ITS AFTERMATH
All these issues were finally brought into the open in the 1968 Second 
Congress, one of the most important gatherings in FRELIMO's history to 
date. When organising the event Mondlane's group used a weapon 
Nkavandame could not counter. They declared the Congress would be held 
within Mozambique in "liberated territory". This was the stronghold of 
the "revolutionary" faction, since Nkavandame's supporters were 
concentrated in Dar es Salaam. Nkavandame and his entire delegation 
from Cabo Delgado decided not to attend the meeting.
The Second Congress was an almost total victory for the Mondlane 
line.288 It endorsed his positions regarding the relationship between 
military and political roles, the need for "prolonged popular war", the 
role of women, and the structure of production in the liberated areas. 
It also explicitly stated, "The administration of the liberated zones 
will move towards the establishment of popular power".289 The Central 
Committee was enlarged from twenty to forty members to permit the 
inclusion of militants from the front line of the battle, who shared 
the Mondlane group's aspirations.
Nkavandame and his supporters were not yet resigned to defeat, 
however. In a manner reminiscent of the FNLA's attacks against MPLA 
forces trying to enter Angola, Nkavandame attempted to prevent FRELIMO 
guerrillas from infiltrating into Mozambique from Tanzania by sealing 
off the main access area, Cabo Delgado. Mondlane sent one of his most 
trusted aides to attempt a reconciliation, but the emissary was killed 
as he tried to cross the border on 22 December 1968. Although 
Portuguese soldiers actually carried out the killing, FRELIMO believed 
that Nkavandame arranged it, and on 3 January 1969 he was stripped of 
all party responsibilities. FRELIMO hoped to try him for the murder, 
but by the spring of 1969 he had joined forces with the Portuguese and 
enjoyed their protection.290
FRELIMO was then thrown into total disarray by the assassination 
of Mondlane exactly a month after Nkavandame's expulsion. On 3 February
288 For full details of all Second Congress resolutions, see FRELIMO, 
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1969, Mondlane received a book through the post at his Dar es Salaam
home that exploded as he opened it, killing him instantly. It was not
clear if the parcel had been sent by the Portuguese secret police, or
by Nkavandame's faction, or was the result of co-operation between
those two forces. Within four weeks, two other FRELIMO leaders,
Marcelino dos Santos and Uria Simango, were sent similar parcels, but
they were intercepted before delivery.
FRELIMO's Central Committee met from 11 to 21 April 1969 to
discuss the crisis. The internal conflict was publicly acknowledged and
analysed. The Central Committee rejected the politics of Nkavandame and
Gwenjere, and pledged to continue the revolutionary line advocated by
Mondlane. A collective leadership was then selected to replace
Mondlane. The new "Council of the Presidency" contained Uria Simango,
who had sometimes supported Nkavandame in the previous debates, but had
since changed sides; Samora Moises Machel, secretary of the Department
of Defence and a long-standing advocate of the "revolutionary" line;
and Marcelino dos Santos, ideologically among the most Marxist of
FRELIMO's leaders, a loyal supporter of Mondlane, and, incidentally, a
light-skinned mestico.291
The crisis was still not over, however, as Simango took up the
conservative cause. In November 1969, he published an article entitled
"Gloomy Situation in FRELIMO" that attacked the new ideological content
of FRELIMO rhetoric. He insisted that FRELIMO need only agree on the
desirability of liberating Mozambique from Portuguese colonial
domination through armed struggle:
The question of scientific socialism and capitalism in 
Mozambique should not divide us.... [A]n indigenous bourgeois
class does exist and if it is willing to contribute to the 
liberation of our country, we must accept its help.292
He accused Machel, Chissano, and dos Santos of plotting against
northerners in FRELIMO and planning his assassination.293
Simango's tactic backfired. Instead of rallying the chairmen's
group, he gave the Mondlane supporters the justification for crushing
him. FRELIMO's Executive Committee immediately suspended him from the
291 Editorial, Mozambique Revolution, no. 38 (March-April 1969), pp.
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Council of the Presidency, 294 and in May of the following year (1970) 
the Central Committee expelled him. Machel was elected president, 
Marcelino dos Santos vice president, and the Mondlane line was finally 
consolidated in power. The report of the May Central Committee meeting 
reaffirmed:
[T]he quality of the enemy for us does not derive from colour or 
nationality or race or religion of a person. Our enemy is all 
who exploit or create conditions for the exploitation of our 
people, whatever colour, race or religion.295
In a manner somewhat reminiscent of the MPLA's evolution a few years
earlier, Marxist, class-based analysis, although motivated by a number
of non-racial factors, also became particularly useful to a leadership
that wished to legitimise inclusion of whites and mesticos in its top
ranks.
Five years after the launch of armed struggle, FRELIMO appeared
to know what sort of post-independence society it was fighting for--a
socialist one. As the history of the internal debate shows, this
conclusion was not primarily due to outside influence. It was in large
part a result of the concrete conditions of armed struggle within
Mozambique. One FRELIMO organiser later commented on the period:
We became Marxists without reading Marx. The conflict with 
Nkavandame in particular made us oppose both a continuing feudal 
organisation of society and a capitalist one.... Our Marxism 
grew out of our own attempts to resolve our concrete problems.296
Before moving on to discuss the manner in which these
developments influenced FRELIMO's relations with the West, this is an
appropriate moment to reflect on the utility of the three previously
described theories regarding the divisions within the movement.
While some insist their perspective is the only "correct" one,
in the view of this writer the three theories are not necessarily
mutually exclusive. The "bureaucratic" view of Cahen shares with the
"conventional" perspective of Munslow a conviction that the key
ingredient which pushed FRELIMO's leadership towards socialist rhetoric
was the specific conditions of armed struggle. While Hall and Young at
one point reject the role of experience, in other parts of their work
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they seem to imply it had a role, as in their reference to Marxism's 
"affinity with FRELIMO's own political-military experience".297 Hall and 
Young's psychological theory can be accepted as valid without 
necessarily negating the conventional and bureaucratic models. One can 
conclude that FRELIMO increasingly adopted socialist rhetoric because 
it helped the movement overcome past humiliations and was 
psychologically appealing (Hall and Young), and because the armed 
struggle experience taught some socialist lessons (Munslow), and 
because socialist ideology permitted a bureaucratic elite of "nurses 
and office workers" to defeat a "rural trader bourgeoisie" (Cahen). 
Acceptance of one theory does not necessarily entail complete rejection 
of the other two.
Even if one does not agree with this author, and does insist on 
the supremacy of one model over the other two, for the purpose of this 
work a main conclusion remains valid. All three theories agree that 
FRELIMO adopted socialist language, at least to some extent, because of 
internal developments and conditions within Mozambique. Because the 
movement chose a socialist option in large part in reaction to its own 
circumstances in Africa (a claim consistent with all three models) it 
was more prepared to adjust ideology as conditions changed than those 
who adopted Marxism primarily due to theoretical discussions in a 
radical European environment.
Whether FRELIMO embraced socialism because it genuinely drew 
socialist conclusions from the war experience, or because it provided a 
psychological antidote to past humiliation, or because it served a 
bureaucratic bourgeoisie's effort to build a modern state, is of import 
to, but not central to, the conclusion relevant to this work. Whether 
one finds the arguments of Munslow, Hall and Young or Cahen most 
compelling, one is still left with a movement that gradually, and 
largely voluntarily, adopted socialist rhetoric, rather than one, as in 
the case of the MPLA, which began the independence struggle with pre­
set assumptions about the nature of society, developed following 
exposure to European radical trends.
IMPACT OF ARMED STRUGGLE AND INTERNAL CRISES ON CO-OPTABILITY
The leftward shift in FRELIMO's internal politics from 1966 to 1969 was 
accompanied by a pronounced decline in its co-optability. The
297 Hall and Young, op. cit., p. 64.
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movement's ties with socialist countries grew even closer, in part due 
to their ongoing largesse, and in part because of FRELIMO's own 
ideological evolution. FRELIMO's relationship with Western countries 
simultaneously deteriorated. The operational antipathy of the 1964 to 
1966 period grew even more intense, and a new, though vaguely 
expressed, ideological strain entered the relationship. FRELIMO still 
did not totally turn its back on the West, however, and continued to 
court Western liberals in the hope that they in turn would pressure 
their governments in its favour.
As in other aspects of FRELIMO affairs, the 1968 Second Congress 
marked a turning point in the movement's relations with foreign 
governments, though signs of the new attitude were increasingly evident 
prior to the meeting.
Over the two years preceding the Congress, FRELIMO made 
overtures to the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Vietnam. In early 1966,
FRELIMO attended the Tricontinental Conference in Havana.298 Later the 
same year Mondlane took a FRELIMO delegation to Moscow at the 
invitation of the Soviet-sponsored Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. In 
a joint declaration with its host, FRELIMO condemned Rhodesia's recent 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence, the "imperialist provocations 
in the near east and the provocation of the American imperialists 
against the heroic people of the Republic of Cuba", as well as U.S. 
actions in Vietnam.299 In October 1967, FRELIMO celebrated the 
anniversary of the Russian Revolution with considerable fanfare.300
These actions and statements apparently convinced Cuba that 
FRELIMO might be ready to accept the assistance it had declined earlier 
in the decade, and the offer was repeated in 1967. FRELIMO declined 
once more, again on the grounds that Cuban tactics were not suitable 
for the Mozambican situation.301 But in July 1968 FRELIMO officially 
thanked Cuba for medicine, war material, and training, so relations
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must have improved somewhat in the 1967 discussion. 302 And despite the
increased contacts with the Soviet Union and its allies, FRELIMO still
remained very close to China.
FRELIMO's operational conflict with the West also grew more
intense in the 1966 to 1968 period, primarily in response to the
movement1s perception of ever greater Western support for Portuguese
colonialism. Western investment in Portugal's Cabora Bassa dam project
was particularly noted. In 1966, Portugal decided to build this huge
dam within Mozambique to provide electricity for South Africa. Lisbon
hoped that the large lake to be created by the dam would act as a
natural barrier against guerrilla infiltration into the south of the
country. 303 In May 1966, Western firms were invited to bid for dam
construction contracts. FRELIMO tried to convince Western governments
to discourage their firms from participating, but most authorities
responded along the same lines as the British. Britain's position was:
[The Foreign Office] should not wish to dissuade British firms 
from participation in this project if they felt it was in their 
commercial interest to do so, except in so far as participation 
might involve contravention of existing Rhodesian sanctions 
legislation.304
One of the first firms to be hired by Portugal was Sweden's ASEA, even 
though Sweden was unpopular with Portugal because of its anti-colonial 
policy.
When asked, in November 1967, what FRELIMO needed but was not
receiving, Mondlane replied,
Above all, perhaps, we wish we had the outright political and 
diplomatic support of the Western powers for our struggle....
The United States, France, West Germany, Great Britain, and most 
of the NATO powers tacitly support the status quo in Portuguese- 
governed Africa.... If the West has decided, for reasons of 
expediency, that it cannot part company with fascist Portugal, 
and to leave the Africans of southern Africa to fend for 
themselves, remember it's not our choice. It's yours. We will 
accept that. But don't be surprised later if we are not very 
friendly to you.305
302 FRELIMO, "Segundo Congresso da FRELIMO: Discurso Oficial do Comite 
Central", op. cit., p. 71.
303 Middlemas, op. cit., p. 32.
304 Written reply to Parliamentary Question, 27 April 1970. Quoted in 
Middlemas, op. cit., p. 48.
305 Kitchen, op. cit., pp. 50-51.
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Despite this increasing disillusionment, FRELIMO still did see 
value in making friends within the "progressive forces" of the West. 
Thus, in March 1968 Mondlane visited the United Kingdom on the 
invitation of radical British organisations. He spoke at the House of 
Commons, at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, and at Oxford 
University. FRELIMO remarked that Mondlane's enthusiastic reception by 
British radicals "proves that the British people [are] in solidarity" 
with the movement.306 (Emphasis in original.) Portugal formally 
protested Britain's decision to allow "the terrorist Mondlane to enter" 
the country, but London replied that anyone could enter as long as they 
did not break the law.307 FRELIMO remarked, "This attitude of the 
British government, however, must not deceive us" and noted that 
Whitehall had given in to pressure, knowing there would have been a 
public protest had it attempted to forbid the visit. Nonetheless, 
Mondlane's experience in Britain reinforced the movement's belief that 
"[i] t is worthwhile maintaining contacts with the progressive 
movements" in the West as they could influence their governments.308 The 
Mozambique-Angola-Guinea Information Committee (MAGIC) run by British 
supporters of the liberation movements was established during 
Mondlane's visit.309 FRELIMO had already been distributing, since 
January 1964, an English-language version of its newsletter, titled 
Mozambique Revolution. The size and sophistication of that newsletter 
markedly increased in 1968.
The July 1968 Second Congress was then a turning point in 
FRELIMO's relations with both East and West. The Congress resolutions 
read in part:
[T]he struggle of the governments of the socialist countries for 
the consolidation of socialism is a great contribution to the 
struggle of the people against imperialism, and an important 
support for the movements of national liberation.310
3°6 "Mondlane Visits UK", Mozambique Revolution, no. 33 (February- 
March 1968), pp. 14-15.
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309 Source one, interview.
310 FRELIMO, "Resolugoes do II Congresso", op. cit., p. 101 and p. 
105.
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It declared that the movement would "intensify even more the relations 
of friendship and solidarity between FRELIMO and the socialist 
countries"311 and announced the intention to open an office in Cuba.
The Congress documents illustrated not only the movement1s 
appreciation of Eastern bloc support but also contained the first 
evidence of ideological antipathy towards the West. One of the 
resolutions read, "This struggle... seeks the total liquidation of 
colonialism and imperialism, and the construction of a society free 
from exploitation of man by man".312 The expression "exploitation of man 
by man" was conventional Marxist terminology for capitalism, and 
FRELIMO's rejection of that system was now explicit and overt.
The Second Congress language regarding the West also reflected 
the new ideological antipathy. In addition to the now-common criticism 
of Western support for Portugal, FRELIMO condemned the "exploitation" 
of workers in "imperialist countries" and declared that "blacks in the 
United States live under the racial and economic oppression of American 
capitalism".313 For the first time, FRELIMO criticised not just Western 
aid to Portugal but also the West's internal politics.
Despite this tough language, the Congress reaffirmed its 
previous decision to cultivate influence within progressive circles so 
as to influence Western governments and isolate Portugal. In September 
1968, at the Second Session of the Central Committee, FRELIMO decided 
to establish a "support committee" in the United States, to be run by 
U.S. liberals, and to operate separately from the FRELIMO office in New 
York. At the same meeting more personnel were authorised to work on 
foreign affairs, and the external relations section was allocated 
additional funds.314 In April 1969, immediately after Mondlane's death, 
the movement decided to establish permanent representation in 
Scandinavia.315
311 Ibid., p. 106.
312 Ibid.
313 Ibid., pp. 104-105.
314 FRELIMO, "Resoluqoes da 2a. Sessao do Comite Central de Setembro 
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The latter move bore quick results. In late 1969, ASEA withdrew 
its $350 million share in the Cabora Bassa consortium. The company 
claimed it pulled out because of legal problems associated with United 
Nations sanctions against Rhodesia, but FRELIMO insisted that "the real 
reason was the wholesale opposition to the project by the progressive 
forces in Sweden".316
As part of the strategy to separate Portugal from its allies, 
FRELIMO also sought to prevent the metropole from being admitted to the 
European Free Trade Association then being formed. The movement 
believed this was critical, as Portugal's weak and poorly developed 
internal economy would not be "able to stand the economic strain of the 
war without constant injections of foreign capital".317 The Western 
military ties with Portugal continued to be targeted, particularly 
those relating to NATO. The movement provided information to Western 
liberals about NATO arms officially restricted to the metropole but 
discovered in the Mozambican battlefield.318
SUMMARY
By 1969, FRELIMO was considerably less co-optable than it had been five 
years earlier. In 1964, FRELIMO was puzzled and disappointed by 
Washington's declining interest in its cause, and anxious to re­
establish the rapport of the 1962 to 1963 period. What criticism it did 
level at the West was purely operational. By 1969, FRELIMO's 
operational criticism had escalated, and the movement now also 
criticised the West's capitalist economic system. Though the language 
was vague, an ideological element was distinctly evident in the 
movement's evaluation of Western policy. Nonetheless, FRELIMO still 
believed that "progressive" movements in the West were capable of 
influencing their governments, and continued its contacts with these 
groups. In that sense, the movement had left the door at least partly 
open to the West.
FRELIMO's simultaneous perception of growing Western support for 
Portugal's colonial policies and appreciation of rising assistance from 
the socialist world from 1964 to 1969 were major motivations for its
316 "ASEA Withdraws from Cahora Bassa", Mozambique Revolution, no. 40 
(25 September 1969), p. 67.
317 Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique, op. cit., pp. 206-207.
318 Ibid., p. 105, quoting Flying Review International. April 1966.
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co-optability shift. The addition of ideological antipathy to FRELIMO's 
relations with the West was also the result of FRELIMO's armed struggle 
experience and the related internal factionalism that led to the 
expulsion of conservatives. Whether one accepts the conventional 
analysis, the psychological view or the bureaucratic model, one is 
still left with the conclusion that FRELIMO's internal developments 
played a critical role in shaping its ideological outlook, and that 
external influences were not the sole nor the prime motivating factor.
The legacy of Mondlane's background was also important in this 
period. His long residence in the United States had educated him about 
how Western governments respond to the public opinion of their own 
populations. This made him particularly tenacious in the public 
relations field. The positive results obtained by this strategy caused 
his successor, who had not had the advantage of learning about Western 
culture firsthand, to continue the approach. (This was in marked 
contrast with the MPLA, which by 1969 had concluded that Western 
liberalism was simply a more sophisticated strategy to obtain political 
domination and exploitation of the Third World.)
What might have happened if the United States had continued to 
support FRELIMO as in the early days of the Kennedy administration, if 
the content of the "perception of the counterpart's policy" (PCP) 
factor had been reversed? The historical record suggests that the 
influence of the other three factors that pushed FRELIMO away from co- 
optability-socialist country assistance, conditions of armed struggle, 
and internal factionalism--would still have shifted its ideology 
leftward, though probably not as abruptly as in fact occurred.
This suggests that the West lost an opportunity in Mozambique in 
the 1964 to 1969 period. The three non-PCP factors ensured that no 
amount of Western largesse would have produced a fully co-optable 
FRELIMO, but if the movement had perceived the West to be more 
supportive, it well could have remained more open to Western concerns.
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CHAPTER 6 
COURTING THE COLONISER
During the period from 1964 to 1969, the United States not only moved 
farther away from the past effort to co-opt rebellious colonised 
Africans, but began actively to court the coloniser, particularly after 
Richard Nixon won the 1968 presidential election. Contacts with the 
nationalists, already reduced, ceased entirely.
As in the Kennedy administration's initial decision to back away 
from co-optation, the primary U.S. policy motivation was a strategic 
consideration--fear of losing access to the Azores base. Growing U.S. 
economic interests in the colonised territories, particularly Angola, 
played a modest role, while relations with the Soviet Union and 
internal U.S. politics were relevant but not central. The U.S. 
perception of the nationalists' policies had virtually no influence on 
U.S. decision making.
THE JOHNSON YEARS
When Lyndon Johnson moved into the White House following President 
Kennedy's assassination in November 1963, he consolidated the shift 
away from a co-optation strategy initiated by his predecessor.
For example, in December 1963 African delegations at the United 
Nations protested Portugal's use of U.S. aircraft in the African 
conflicts. Washington demanded the aircraft be returned, but took no 
punitive action when Lisbon agreed but kept the equipment on the 
continent.319 Similarly, when Portuguese intelligence discovered that 
officials at the U.S.'s UN office had met secretly with Roberto in 
December 1963, they protested and Secretary of State Dean Rusk 
instructed the mission to halt such contacts.320
Roberto's flamboyant playing of the "China card" did energise 
Rusk, who was very concerned about Chinese intentions, but those 
energies were spent beseeching Lisbon rather than building 
relationships with the nationalists. In January 1964 Roberto announced 
he was accepting aid from China and other communist countries because
319 Noer, op. cit., p. 107.
320 Ibid., p. 109.
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"only the communists can give us what we need".321 Rusk responded with 
what Noer characterises as an "almost hysterical" cable to embassies in 
Africa and Lisbon saying China was trying to take over African 
liberation movements. However, Rusk did not authorise renewed contacts 
with the nationalists. Rather, he urged a "new attempt to force 
Portugal to accept some form of self determination".322 Roberto's 
flirtation with China did not prompt a new effort to coopt the 
nationalists, but it did temporarily energise an effort to coerce 
Lisbon. The NSC did meet to consider Rusk's idea, and considered 
various responses, weighing each possible policy in terms of the 
importance of maintaining U.S.-Portuguese military cooperation. In the 
end, the NSC simply recommended that European allies be encouraged to 
pressure Portugal to compromise. Even the NSC, however, conceded that 
France and the U.K. probably would not act as the United States 
desired. The NSC specifically rejected any direct action against 
Portugal because it would undermine U.S. interests in the Azores 
base.323
In April 1964 Assistant Secretary for African Affairs G. Mennen 
Williams submitted a memo to Rusk recommending that Washington respond 
to the growing ties between the nationalists and communist countries by 
offering "clandestine" assistance to those African nationalists willing 
to follow a moderate strategy of building a non-violent political 
underground and using strikes and demonstrations to win independence.324 
The Pentagon, however, opposed the suggestion, and no new aid was 
provided to the nationalists, though Roberto's small stipend continued 
for the time being.
Meanwhile, U.S. Ambassador to Portugal Admiral Andersen opposed 
any action that might endanger U.S. relations with Lisbon, and his 
influence on policy steadily grew. After a 1964 visit to Mozambique and 
Angola, he made a speech that signalled the new U.S. attitude. He 
recommended that the principle of self-determination be loosely 
interpreted and not imposed by force, and insisted that extensive
321 Ibid. , p. 109.
322 Ibid.
323 Ibid., p. 112.
324 G. Mennen Williams, "Portuguese African Territories: Action 
Memorandum" to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 29 April 1964, as 
described in Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 421.
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Western economic assistance would encourage Portugal to reform its 
political system.325 After the speech he had the following exchange with 
Salazar:
Salazar - You know, Admiral, you Americans seem to think you can 
make changes in a matter of years, and we in Portugal know it 
takes centuries.
Andersen - Well, Mr. President, perhaps with good will on the 
part of all and a good deal of effort, it might be someplace in 
between.326
Andersen then lobbied against the Department of State liberals
when he travelled to Washington a few weeks later. He reported to his
superiors that the Portuguese considered Angola, Mozambique, and their
other African provinces as part of Portugal; sincerely believed in a
multiracial policy; and "rightfully believe that they have been victims
of controversy and attacks in the UN and from many parts of the United
States, Great Britain, and some of the Scandinavian countries". He
concluded that "the steps they [the Portuguese] are taking are
commendable if one recognizes the limitations of the resources which
Portugal has" and suggested that President Johnson send a special envoy
to Portuguese Africa to investigate the situation. 327 Kennedy's former
number two in the Department of Defence, Rosswell Gilpatrick, was
selected and visited the territories in the autumn, leaving the area
just before FRELIMO launched its armed struggle on 25 September.
Upon his return, Gilpatrick took up the Andersen refrain. During
a stopover in Lisbon he praised Portugal's administration, technical
competence, troop morale, and black education programme.328 His
subsequent report to Washington read in part as follows:
From the point of view of the security of the United States, the 
continuation of Angola and Mozambique as part of the Portuguese 
nation is preferable to any other foreseeable alternative; the 
departure of Portugal would create a dangerous vacuum which 
could lead to a confrontation between the African powers; there 
is no reason to think that Portugal's Africa policy will change 
in the short term nor that external pressure will have any 
effect, even if those pressures come from the United States; the
325 Nogueira, op. cit., p. 551.
326 Admiral George W. Andersen (U.S. Navy, retired), Policy Toward 
Africa for the Seventies, hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa 
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327 Ibid., p. 122.
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economic and social situation of Angola and Mozambique... only 
permits the base for autonomy or independence in the long term; 
in light of this the U.S. must reorient its policy and, without 
violating its principles, cease blindly following Afro-Asian 
hostility against Portugal.329
Gilpatrick suggested removing the restriction on U.S. arms supplies to
the Portuguese African territories. In return, he believed, Lisbon
would renew the Azores agreement on a long-term basis.
Meanwhile Portugal sought to pressure President Johnson not only
by threatening to cut off Azores access, but also by approaching those
countries the United States wished to isolate. In 1964, Lisbon made a
diplomatic overture to China330 and signed a commercial accord with
Cuba.331
The following year Washington's security establishment developed 
a new interest in the Azores base, which further enhanced Portugal's 
leverage. The Pentagon wanted to install long range navigational aids 
(LORAN-C) in the Azores. In January 1965, Washington requested 
Portuguese permission to install the equipment, and again pressed for a 
formal new lease on the base. Portugal responded that it would only act 
on the two requests in exchange for arms sales and an end to U.S. 
pressure for African independence. Washington officially demurred, but 
did abstain on a UN resolution directed at Portugal.332 In May 1965, 
however, the CIA "offered to sell Portugal 20 B-26 planes, through 
Intermountain Aviation, a CIA front organisation, knowing they would be 
used in the colonial wars".333 The secret deal, termed "Operation 
Sparrow", was revealed at the UN in September, and was halted, though 
not before Portugal acquired seven aircraft. Noer postulates that the 
operation "was most likely a 'rogue' initiative rather than an 
elaborate plot to aid Portugal", though he notes it "does show... the 
willingness of at least some in the administration to actively support 
Lisbon in its battle with African nationalism".334
329 Ibid., p . 586 .
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U.S. investigation of Portuguese use of NATO equipment in Africa
also suffered ongoing neglect. U.S. military attaches rarely sought to
verify the alleged violations, and when reports were issued they were
confidential and sent only to the U.S. Department of Defence. In a
subsequent interview, a Portuguese official remarked,
This issue of the arms never became more than theatre. Clearly 
we used NATO arms in the war.... From time to time the Americans 
scolded us. But I, at least, never was reluctant to... [use NATO 
arms] when I had commands in Mozambique and Angola.335
Perhaps the most important development of the 1960s, however,
was the U.S.'s direct intervention in Vietnam in 1965. All U.S. foreign
policy was affected by the effort to get international support for the
U.S. position. Portugal, predictably, supported Washington on the
issue. As Noer has pointed out,
...[D]irect U.S. military intervention in Vietnam in 1965 
crushed any remaining possibility for renewed efforts to force 
Portugal to compromise. Even more than Berlin or Cuba, Vietnam 
shifted American attention from all other global issues. 
Diplomacy in Africa became largely concerned with trying to 
rally support for the war in Asia.336
When the pro-co-optation Williams met with Johnson in August 1965, he
found the president unwilling to consider any policy which might risk
the Azores or lose any European support for the war.337
During the early years of the Johnson administration, most
European governments also remained relatively tolerant of Portugal1s
colonial policies, with one notable exception. Portugal was admitted to
the European Free Trade Association despite its Africa policies. In
1964, France requested permission to establish a station for scientific
and ballistic tests in the Azores, together with associated air and sea
rights. Portugal agreed on the promise of eight generously financed
submarines and frigates. Following this accord, French arms supplies to
Lisbon increased. 338 The only European country out of step with the
neutral or outright pro-Portuguese policies prevailing in the West was
335 Antunes, Nixon e Caetano. op. cit., p. 110.
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Sweden, which began helping FRELIMO in 1964, channelling funds through 
its aid institution.339
For the next four years, from 1965 to 1969, Western policy in 
general followed the same path. In 1965, the General Assembly of the 
United Nations approved a resolution criticising NATO countries for 
supporting Lisbon and calling for an economic boycott of Portugal. The 
United States and Britain both abstained. 340 The Azores agreement 
continued on a year-by-year basis, with Portugal constantly holding the 
threat of eviction over Washington's head. In 1965, a spokesman for the 
Department of Defence conceded in a hearing in Congress, "The status 
[of the Azores agreement] is dead center". The United States had 
indicated a desire to discuss the issue and was awaiting Portugal's 
response.341 A year later, a spokesman for the same bureaucracy 
testified, "These negotiations continue in the form of occasional 
discussions... but no progress has been made recently".342 Portugal was 
content to let Washington sweat.
Andersen had no doubt what was required. In 1966, he insisted 
that a "more sympathetic attitude" towards Portugal's Africa policies 
would produce "a very remarkable change in Portuguese views on NATO".343 
The 1966 decision of President Charles de Gaulle to pull France out of 
integrated NATO military operations then caused NATO's naval command to 
be moved from Brest to Lisbon, further enhancing Portugal's leverage on 
Washington. The following year, the U.S. military used the Azores base
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as a staging post for rearming Israel, highlighting the importance of 
the islands.344
Another factor influencing U.S. policy was the slow but steady 
rise in U.S. corporations' interest in the territories following the 
lifting of Portuguese restrictions on foreign investment. Gulf Oil 
discovered petroleum in Angola's Cabinda enclave in 1966 (see chapter 
4) and started exporting crude in November 1968. By the end of 1970, 
Gulf had paid $30 million in taxes and royalties to the colonial 
government in Luanda. U.S. trade with the colonies also surged forward. 
According to the Department of Commerce, U.S. imports from Angola 
increased from $26 million in 1960 to $68 million in 1970, reflecting a 
rise in shipments of robusta coffee. U.S. exports to Angola rose 245 
percent over the same period, from $11 million to $38 million. The 
percentage rises in Mozambique were similar, although the actual sums 
were more modest. U.S. imports rose 260 percent in the 1960s, from $5 
million to $18 million, while exports more than doubled from $10 
million to $22 million. Significantly, a large part of the increase in 
U.S. exports to Mozambique entailed sales of commercial and general- 
purpose aircraft.345
U.S. economic interests in Mozambique and Angola were still 
modest in comparison with interests elsewhere but did have some impact 
on policy. Concern about these economic ties was reflected, for 
example, at the United Nations in 1967, when a resolution on economic 
sanctions against Lisbon was again introduced. The U.S. representative 
said:
My delegation... has strong reservations concerning the emphasis 
placed in the draft resolution on factors other than the 
outmoded Portuguese policy [in Africa]. In particular the United 
States is concerned about the stress on the activities of 
foreign economic and financial interests.346
Ambassador Andersen acknowledged the role of economic interests 
in a November 1964 memo to Rusk, in which he said U.S. objectives in
344 Henry F. Jackson, From the Concro to Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy 
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346 Quoted by Mondlane in The Struggle for Mozambique, op. cit., pp 
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Africa were to "block communist penetration", keep Africa "Western- 
oriented" , and protect "access to African markets for our commerce".347
Another development that influenced the Johnson administration 
concerned the ports in Mozambique and Angola. The United States navy 
had used the ports of South Africa until 1967 when a controversy arose 
concerning the visit of a U.S. aircraft carrier. After that, the South 
African ports were only used in an emergency. The ports of Angola and 
Mozambique were valued as alternatives, even though they were not able 
to accommodate aircraft carriers.348
THE TAR BABY OPTION
Richard Nixon's victory in the 1968 elections then opened a new phase 
in U.S. southern Africa policy. The new administration adopted an even 
more pro-Portuguese stance, and cut the remaining tie with Angola's 
"pro-West" nationalist, Holden Roberto.
The process began even before Nixon actually took office. Lisbon 
thought the new U.S. leader would be sympathetic to the Portuguese 
cause and immediately after the elections, in November 1968, told 
Washington that it would draw up specific proposals relating to future 
use of the Azores base. Simultaneously, Nixon selected Henry Kissinger 
to head the National Security Council, and Kissinger in turn chose 
Roger Morris as his senior staff assistant for Africa. Before Nixon's 
inauguration, Morris was instructed to begin work on a major review of 
U.S. policy in southern Africa.
Official authorisation for the study came through on 10 April 
1969, in the form of "National Security Study Memorandum 39", popularly 
dubbed the "Tar Baby" study. The memo, from Kissinger to the secretary 
of state, the secretary of defence, and the director of the CIA, called 
for a study to consider: "(1) the background and future prospects of 
major problems in the area; (2) alternative views of the U.S. interests 
in southern Africa; and (3) the full range of basic strategies and 
policy options open to the United States".349
The study, delivered to the National Security Council on 15 
August 1969, described a variety of possible policies, ranging from
347 Andersen to Rusk, 5 November 1964, NSF: Congo, box 2, Johnson 
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option one, "closer association with the white regimes to protect and
enhance our economic, strategic and scientific interests", to option
five, "dissociation from both black and white states in an effort to
limit our involvement in the problems of the area".350
Subsequent actions by the Nixon administration suggest that
option two was the alternative finally adopted. The study summarised it
as, "Broader association with both black and white states in an effort
to encourage moderation in the white states, to enlist cooperation of
the black states in reducing tensions and the likelihood of increasing
cross-border violence, and to encourage improved relations among states
in [the] area".351 The "premise" underlying the option read,
The whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive 
change can come is through them. There is no hope for the blacks 
to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which 
will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the 
communists. We can, by selective relaxation of our stance toward 
the white regimes, encourage some modification of their current 
racial and colonial policies and through more substantial 
economic assistance to the black states... help to draw the two 
groups together and exert some influence on both for peaceful 
change.352
The study outlined the general posture that the United States 
would adopt under this option. The United States would maintain public 
opposition to racial repression but relax political isolation and 
economic restrictions on the white states. Washington would accept 
Portugal's claim that its current policies were reformist and would 
indicate its willingness to accept a solution short of majority rule.353 
As operational examples, the paper proposed continuation of the arms 
embargo on Portuguese territories, but more liberal treatment for 
exports of dual purpose equipment and encouragement of trade and 
investment in Portuguese territories with full U.S. Export-Import Bank 
(Eximbank) facilities. Regarding the African insurgent movements, the 
paper suggested that the United States declare its opposition to the
350 National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Africa, 
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use of force in racial confrontation and willingness to continue 
humanitarian assistance for refugees.354
Though all these measures were presented as just some of many 
options, and the paper did not specifically advocate one or another 
course, the report's final section, titled "The Area: Situation, 
Prospects and U.S. Interests", did make concrete evaluations and 
predictions. It said that the rebels could not oust the Portuguese and 
Lisbon could contain but not eliminate the guerrillas, change was 
likely to come from decisions made in Portugal, and there was no 
indication that the Caetano government planned to permit the 
territories self-determination.355 The text basically summarised the 
"premise" underlying option two.
Events over the following months made it even clearer that 
Washington had selected option two. Covert CIA aid to Roberto was 
reduced to $10,000 per year for "information collection".356 A modest $5 
million aid programme to the African states bordering those ruled by 
white minority regimes was launched to try to convince them to modify 
their policies. In the first year of the Nixon administration, the 
number of Portuguese trained by the United States both in U.S. 
territory and abroad almost doubled.357 In January 1970, U.S. officials 
were instructed to curtail criticism of minority regimes and colonial 
conflicts in southern Africa.358 Simultaneously, U.S. diplomats abroad 
were instructed not to contact any of the nationalists. In Angola, U.S. 
Consul Richard Post had no communication channel with the MPLA. U.S. 
political officers in Lusaka and Dar es Salaam reduced their efforts to 
collect information on the nationalist movements and those nationalists 
who had tried to maintain contact with U.S. diplomats began to avoid 
such ties as the policy of the Nixon administration became evident.359
354 Ibid., pp. 107-108.
355 Ibid., p. 128.
356 Antunes, Nixon e Caetano. op. cit., p. 134.
357 National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Africa, 
Study in Response to National Security Study Memorandum 39: Southern 
Africa. AF/NSC-IG 69, 15 August 1969, quoted in El-Khawas and Cohen, 
op. cit., p. 48.
358 Ibid., p. 29.
359 Antunes, Nixon e Caetano. op. cit., p. 133.
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The CIA virtually dismantled its networks in Angola and Mozambique on 
the pretext of budget cutting.360 Antunes asserts that "the non­
communist elements within FRELIMO, previously stimulated and subsidised 
by the CIA, ceased to merit American attention".361 One week after 
Mondlane's assassination the head of the CIA in Malawi expressed 
concern about the radicalising effect the event might have on FRELIMO 
and "confessed the ignorance of Langley concerning the play of 
[FRELIMO] internal forces".362 John Stockwell, working for the CIA out 
of Zaire, was scolded by his superiors for visiting an FNLA base within 
Angola. Increasingly, the agency's knowledge of the nationalist groups 
"essentially came form the secret services of the white states".363
Shortly afterwards, the United States voted against several 
African-sponsored resolutions that proposed that Portugal be condemned 
for not recognising the right of people in the Portuguese territories 
to self-determination and independence, expressed concern over 
intensification of foreign economic activity in these territories, and 
appealed for a halt to Western training of Portuguese military 
personnel and the sale of arms.364 In 1973, Charles C. Diggs, Jr., 
chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa of the U.S. House of 
Representatives' Committee on Foreign Affairs, testified:
It has become obvious that the major decision to relax the arms 
embargo [against Portugal and South Africa] came at the end of 
1969 and was linked with the National Security Council study 
memorandum... of that year regarding general U.S. policy toward 
southern Africa.365
While pressure from the U.S. business community was not the 
primary or even an important secondary reason for the Nixon
360 Ibid., p. 134.
361 Ibid.
362 Ibid.
363 Ibid.
364 National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Africa, 
Study in Response to National Security Study Memorandum 39: Southern 
Africa. AF/NSC-IG 69, 15 August 1969, quoted in El-Khawas and Cohen, 
op. cit., p . 46.
365 Charles C. Diggs, Jr., Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo, 
hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 1st 
Session, March and April 1973, p. 71.
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administration's decision to increasingly accommodate Portugal,
elements of the business community did encourage a relaxation of
restrictions on equipment sales to the Portuguese military. Antunes
cites a 1969 letter from a U.S. entrepreneur, William Durney, to Nixon
which read in part:
It is difficult to understand the tremendous investment the 
United States is making in the Congo, when our policy in 
relation to Portuguese Africa remains inflexible, even regarding 
the supply of any military equipment that would help the 
Portuguese protect themselves....366
Lisbon quickly sensed a change in Washington 's tone and became 
more complacent. In a 23 October 1969 memo U.S. Consul Post wrote from 
Luanda, "The Portuguese feel there has been a 'loss of innocence'...in 
relation to Portuguese Africa in the heart of U.S. public opinion...and 
that it is only a matter of time before official policy reflects this 
change" .367
While the United States was consolidating its pro-Portuguese 
policies, Europe stuck to its laissez-faire attitude, again with the 
exception of Sweden. Not only did the Swedish construction company ASEA 
pull out of the Cabora Bassa project, but Sweden's Social Democratic 
Party invited the Portuguese liberation movements to attend its 1969 
Congress in Stockholm. This was tantamount to diplomatic recognition.368
SUMMARY
By the end of the 1960s, the United States had executed a 180 degree 
turn, reversing the policy adopted at the beginning of the decade. 
Kennedy's "New Frontier" was replaced by Nixon's "Tar Baby". The MPLA 
and FRELIMO were no longer perceived as nationalists seeking their 
legitimate right to independence, who with careful coaxing could be 
persuaded to see the advantages of alliance with the West. They were 
considered inconvenient irritants disrupting Portuguese relations with 
NATO, who could not possibly win and were therefore best ignored. 
Although Europe may have differed with this conclusion in some 
respects, it generally concurred with the U.S. complacence.
366 Antunes, Nixon e Caetano. op. cit., p. 127.
367 Ibid., p. 116.
368 Davidson, "Arms and the Portuguese", op. cit., p. 11.
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The shift in attitude reflected no re-evaluation of the 
nationalists1 policies. Rarely in the various congressional hearings 
and policy papers was the ideological hue of the nationalists or their 
growing ties to the socialist bloc mentioned. Even "pro-West" Holden 
Roberto found his CIA payments reduced to a pittance. Only if the MPLA 
and FRELIMO had stopped being nationalist and accepted rule by Portugal 
might U.S. policy have been different.
The primary motivation for U.S. policy was the ongoing strategic 
interest in maintaining access to the Azores base. Despite the sharp 
about-face in U.S. treatment of the nationalists, it is worthwhile to 
acknowledge an underlying consistency in policy. Even the most anti-co­
optation members of the Johnson and Nixon administrations were seeking 
the same long term goal as the most idealistic Africanists of the 
Kennedy administration. Both sought to position the United States 
advantageously in the competition for primacy in the international 
community and to prevent the emergence of additional communist states. 
The definition of Washington's long term strategic goals remained 
identical. What changed was the specific tactic adopted to attain that 
goal. Efforts to co-opt would-be communists were dropped when they 
threatened the perceived need to maintain cordial relations with a NATO 
ally controlling access to a strategically located base and 
increasingly valued port facilities in Angola and Mozambique. U.S. 
intervention in Vietnam also meant that the effort to gain support for 
that war overshadowed other, less pressing, issues. For the first time, 
growing U,S. commercial interests in the region began to play some 
role, but were not yet significant.
Developments regarding day to day relations with the Soviet 
Union were relevant, but not central. If relations had been better, the 
need to retain access to a strategically located base might have seemed 
less urgent. The use of the base to resupply Israel in 1967 was only 
indirectly related to the cold war, however, and yet played an 
important role in confirming the U.S. shift away from co-optation.
Internal U.S. politics were important to the extent that 
liberals uneasy with the anti-co-optation policy were insufficiently 
powerful to force a re-evaluation of approach, and the 1968 elections 
placed an even more pro-Portuguese administration in power. But the 
weight given to strategic considerations by the U.S. decision-making 
structure suggests that even if internal U.S. politics had been quite 
different, policy on FRELIMO and the MPLA would not have changed much.
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PART III
MUTUAL ANTIPATHY GROWS: 1970 TO 1974
INTRODUCTION TO PART III
From 1970 until the fall of the Portuguese government in April 1974, 
the relationship between the nationalists and Western countries was 
increasingly characterised by mutual antipathy, with a few notable 
exceptions.
There was a brief, modest increase in apparent MPLA co- 
optability during the first two years of the decade, when it issued 
non-communist rhetoric and, in sharp contrast to its attitude in the 
late 1960s, sought to establish relations with liberal sectors in 
Europe. This phase ended in 1972, when the Angolan movement became more 
hostile towards the West than ever before. It declared that while 
Portugal was the direct enemy, "imperialism" was the principal enemy, 
and the socialist countries the main support of the nationalist cause. 
The effort to court Western liberals slackened. In the sphere of 
ideology, Agostinho Neto declared that the MPLA sought not only to 
"violently correct" production relations within Angola, but also to 
overthrow "a whole unjust system of oppression existing in the 
world" .369
FRELIMO followed a more consistent course, becoming steadily 
less co-optable over the four-year period. The shift from operational 
to ideological criticism of the West, already evident in the late 
1960s, became more pronounced. The socialist countries were identified 
as "natural allies", and conditions were placed on acceptance of aid 
from Western donors. Nonetheless, the movement did continue
369 Agostinho Neto, "Who is the Enemy?... What is Our Objective?", 
lecture delivered at the University of Dar es Salaam on 7 February 
1974, published in The African Liberation Reader, vol. 3, op. cit., 
p. 214.
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communication with liberal sectors in the West and sought to maintain 
independence from socialist supporters by playing donors off against 
each other.
In the years immediately preceding the coup, the international 
context was influenced by events in Portugal more than previously.
After a short effort at colonial reform in the early 1970s, Portuguese 
soldiers adopted more brutal tactics in the field and Lisbon authorised 
close collaboration with white minority regimes in southern Africa. The 
Caetano government made it clear that Western overtures to the 
nationalists would result in retaliation against the state concerned, 
with Azores base access being used as a bargaining lever.
During the 1970 to 1974 period, the United States did not even 
consider seeking to co-opt the nationalists. Instead, relations with 
Lisbon steadily improved. Restrictions on arms sales were relaxed, 
training of Portuguese officers in the United States became the norm, 
and investments in Mozambique and Angola increased. The United States 
supported Portugal in the United Nations, refrained from criticising 
growing Portuguese coordination with Rhodesia and South Africa, and 
praised Portugal's policy of racial "toleration". In contrast, the 
nationalists were characterised as "implacably anti-Western".370
Because European countries devoted increasing attention to 
Portugal's colonial wars as the conflicts intensified, Part III also 
features a separate chapter on their policies. France generally went 
along with the U.S. approach, while West Germany and the United Kingdom 
exhibited unease with Portugal's policies and contemplated co-optation 
initiatives directed towards FRELIMO. Bonn considered such a policy 
option more seriously than did London, but both refrained from 
following through. In contrast, the already significant Scandinavian 
support for the nationalists increased, and the Netherlands adopted a 
similar approach.
Chapters 7 through 10 describe these events in detail and, as in 
previous sections, analyse the factors that influenced the decisions of 
the various protagonists. Why did the MPLA's co-optability fluctuate 
while FRELIMO's followed a less erratic course? What role was played by 
the differing conditions of armed struggle encountered by the 
respective nationalists? Did perception of Western policies have a
370 Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 
1982), p. 859.
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critical impact upon nationalist co-optability or were other factors 
more significant? What accounted for the minor differences between the 
approaches of the United States and some of the large European 
countries, and the major differences between the policies of Washington 
as opposed to those of Scandinavia and the Netherlands? When the United 
Kingdom and West Germany contemplated co-optation efforts, why did they 
only consider targeting FRELIMO, and why did they both fail to follow 
through on these plans? Finally, did perception of the nationalists' 
policies significantly influence Western policies in this period, or 
were other considerations more critical?
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CHAPTER 7
MPLA OVERTURES FOLLOWED BY HOSTILITY
The MPLA went through two phases in the period from 1970 to 1974.
During the first two years of the decade the movement's co-optability 
appeared to rise, though it is not clear if the new attitude reflected 
a genuine willingness to accommodate Western concerns or was designed 
only to achieve short-term goals. The MPLA disclaimed the communist 
label, showed irritation with the Soviet Union despite growing military 
ties to the socialist bloc, and developed cordial relations with 
Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands. During the second half of the 
period, from 1972 to 1974, the MPLA's co-optability declined 
substantially. It returned to overtly socialist rhetoric and sharply 
criticised the West. Conditions of armed struggle (including rivalry 
with other nationalists and the attitude of a key regional power), 
perception of Western policies, and relations with non-Western allies 
were the main factors responsible both for the initial rise and then 
the sharp fall in co-optability, though the factors had different 
weights and substantive contents during the first and second periods.
In addition, internal factionalism played a role in the second period.
CO-OPTABILITY APPEARS TO RISE: 1970 TO 1972
The MPLA leadership entered the decade of the 1970s in an optimistic 
frame of mind. Its diplomatic lobbying in Africa began to show results 
in June 1971 when the OAU withdrew recognition from Roberto's 
government in exile. Though that body did not de-recognise the FNLA, 
the bulk of OAU liberation funds flowed to the MPLA. The same OAU 
meeting decided not to recognise UNITA.371
The MPLA held its own in the military struggle against the 
Portuguese, despite its ongoing inability to infiltrate through Zaire 
(as Congo-Leopoldville was re-named in 1971). Supported from bases in 
Zambia, the movement hit Portuguese convoys and blew up bridges, roads, 
and barges on the Zambezi and other rivers in eastern Angola. British 
writer Basil Davidson visited the MPLA guerrillas inside Angola in mid- 
1970 and reported that they were "extremely well organised".372 Even
371 Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 209.
372 Basil Davidson, "Angola in the Tenth Year: A Report and an 
Analysis, May-July 1970", African Affairs. January 1971, pp. 37-49.
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South African commentators conceded that the guerrillas were 
"efficiently trained" and "well armed", adding, "They hide in the rank 
undergrowth or dig in behind grass patches in the open, mere yards from 
the road but nigh invisible in... camouflage uniforms, their Simonov 
automatic rifles and Kalashnikov submachine guns aimed".373
Although there were only an estimated five hundred MPLA 
guerrillas operating in the east, in some areas they forced the 
Portuguese back to small outposts. In an attempt to cut the MPLA off 
from peasant support, the Portuguese stepped up the aldeamento policy, 
modelled on the U.S. strategic hamlet tactic in Vietnam, and forced 
inhabitants into protected villages. This, and the escalating sabotage, 
inflated the cost of the war to Lisbon. Portuguese commanders reported 
that they could not cope with the MPLA without more helicopters, which 
were subsequently acquired from the West at considerable expense. When 
these arrived, the MPLA switched to laying mines and booby traps.374 The 
MPLA tended to exaggerate its successes in the field, but the claim of 
MPLA officer Iko Carreira in 1971 that "after two years of marking 
time" the MPLA regained its "forward momentum" was not far from the 
truth.375
Some of the military progress may have been due to increased 
arms supplies from the socialist countries. During his mid-1970 visit 
to MPLA-controlled territory, Basil Davidson concluded that 70 to 80 
percent of the MPLA's arms came from the socialist bloc.376 Significant 
numbers of MPLA students and military personnel were also receiving 
training in the Soviet Union.
Despite strengthening military ties with the socialists, the 
MPLA started to cultivate a non-communist public image. In a 1971 
interview with Cologne Radio in West Germany, Neto responded to a 
question on the sort of economic system the MPLA would adopt by saying
373 Star (Johannesburg), 31 July and 1 August 1968. Rhodesian Herald 
(Salisbury), 30 July 1968.
374 Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 214.
375 Ibid., p. 214.
376 Basil Davidson, "Walking 300 Miles With Guerillas Through the Bush 
of Eastern Angola" (remarks presented at a seminar at the California 
Institute of Technology), Muncrer Africans Library Notes (Pasadena, 
California), no. 6 (1971), p. 8, cited in Marcum, vol. 2, p. 229.
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that an elected Constituent Assembly would decide this question after 
independence.377
Then, on 4 February 1971, the MPLA's "Directing Committee" 
argued that the MPLA was not "a communist movement" but rather "a mass 
movement that gathers militants from many ideological currents, from 
all religions and social classes".378
In a December 1972 message commemorating the fifteenth 
anniversary of the MPLA's founding, Neto was more explicit. He remarked 
that after independence the MPLA would not appropriate "honestly 
acquired goods" and insisted that the claim that the MPLA was a 
communist organisation was "propaganda designed to mislead our 
people" .379
When Neto was asked about MPLA ideology in mid-1972, he first
rejected the communist label "as our movement is formed by a people
that are ideologically and politically different". He then added:
But the movement does have a political orientation. We have a 
precise goal.... Concerning the organisation of the economy we 
say that the Angolan people should be the owners of the riches 
of our country, that they should be paid fair salaries in order 
to avoid exploitation of workers, etc. This is what is normally 
called the socialist path. It is socialist because we don't have 
the intention of permitting either Angolans or foreigners to 
exploit anyone in our country.... We think that ideologically we 
do not necessarily follow the communist or Marxist line, but we 
follow the socialist line, with justice for all.380
These statements eloquently summarised the MPLA's dilemma. On
the one hand, the MPLA is not communist, respects honestly acquired
property, and embraces members of all ideological persuasions. But on
the other hand it will organise the post-independence Angolan economy
along socialist lines.
377 Agostinho Neto, "A Camarada Agostinho Neto responde a 13 perguntas 
feitas pela Radio Colonia da Alemanha Federale e pelo Jornal 
Socialista Italiano 'Avanti'", 1971. Reprinted in Jose Fortunato, 
ed., Ancrola: Documentos do MPLA. vol. 1 (Lisbon: Ulmeiro, 1977), p. 
184.
378 "Declaragao do Comite Director do MPLA", 4 February 1971.
Reprinted in Textos e Documentos do MPLA. op. cit., p. 81.
379 Agostinho Neto, "Mensagem Por Ocasiao do 15 Aniversario da 
Fundaqao do MPLA", 10 December 1971, reprinted in Angola: Documentos 
do MPLA. vol. 1, op. cit.,, pp. 199-202.
380 Agostinho Neto, "Entrevista Concedida a Ian Christie", July 1972. 
Reprinted in Angola: Documentos do MPLA. vol. 1, op. cit., pp. 219- 
221.
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Several considerations motivated the MPLA's non-communist
rhetoric. A primary factor was the circumstances under which armed
struggle was being conducted. Portuguese offensives in eastern Angola
were making it increasingly difficult for the MPLA to communicate with
its units in that region. Greater co-operation with the FNLA, which
controlled access to the area from Zaire, could potentially solve the
problem. The MPLA therefore explored the possibility of establishing a
unity pact with the FNLA, and it was clear that a non-communist posture
would aid negotiations.
Asked, in July 1972, if one of the reasons for seeking unity was
the fact that President Mobutu let the FNLA but not the MPLA operate
from Zaire, Neto replied:
If we could use the 2,000-kilometre frontier between Zaire and 
Angola we could send in a lot of supplies, particularly war 
supplies for the first region. We are not capable, at this 
moment, of conveniently supplying the people of this region, and 
this is causing us major difficulties. Therefore the geographic 
situation is important when we discuss the proposal of unity 
between Angolan forces.381
The FNLA-MPLA unity talks at first proceeded well. The FNLA was
anxious to appear co-operative and thus worthy of OAU and other
external support.382 In June 1971, Neto and Roberto announced their
reconciliation and pledged to work for unity. A formal agreement was
then signed in December 1972 in Kinshasa. The parties promised to end
hostile acts towards each other, create a Supreme Council for the
Liberation of Angola, and coordinate a unified military command and a
political council. They were allocated equal power in these structures.
Representatives of the four OAU presidents who sponsored the unity
talks were to arbitrate in the event of dispute.383
The accord did not outline the foreign relations or the
ideological guidelines for the new organisation and made no mention of
socialism. A few months before the signing, Neto referred to this:
[P]olitical and ideological differences are less important than 
the fact that the enemy is occupying our home.... Later there
381 Ibid.
382 Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 209.
383 "0 Acordo MPLA-FNLA", MPLA document, CIDAC archives, Lisbon, 
Portugal.
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will be the problems of class differences. But for the moment 
the rich and the poor must unify for the same objectives.384
The MPLA was clearly playing the non-communist card to obtain immediate 
military advantages.
Though the conditions-of-armed-struggle factor was perhaps the 
most important influence pushing the MPLA towards moderate rhetoric, 
relations with non-Western allies also played a role. Neto was becoming 
concerned at Soviet "arrogance", and particularly the apparent Soviet 
assumption that Moscow would be afforded base facilities in post­
independence Angola.385 An August 1971 MPLA document published in 
Algiers highlighted this worry. It mentioned that the strategic 
location of Portugal's Africa colonies meant they were desirable as 
military bases and then added:
It is believed that when a people liberates itself from colonial 
domination, this is in order to put itself at the disposition of 
another country, more precisely, the socialist countries....
But... we are totally autonomous and we do not follow the
directives of any world power. It is we ourselves who elaborate
our policy, we ourselves who formulate the directives of our 
life, we, finally, who determine our orientation.386
The juxtaposition of a reference to Angola's desirability as a base
site and the statement that the MPLA would not "put itself at the
disposition of... the socialist countries" was a clear rejection of
Soviet appeals for base promises.
The fact that during this period the MPLA also courted those
socialist countries on poor terms with Moscow also supports the theory
that Neto was seeking to counter-balance Soviet ties. An information
bulletin published by the MPLA in Algiers in August 1971 reported that
Neto, Lucio Lara, and other top MPLA officials had recently travelled
to China for conversations with Chou En-lai. 387 MPLA timing was poor, as
China had just increased aid to the FNLA and was on good terms with
UNITA. Consequently, Beijing did not give Neto material aid, though its
propaganda did start to refer to his organisation in more flattering
384 Neto, "Entrevista Concedida a Ian Christie", op. cit., pp. 219- 
220.
385 Source three, interview.
386 Agostinho Neto, interview with Ayanti, 1971. Reprinted in MPLA 
Informations (Algeria: MPLA Propaganda Department, August 1971), pp. 
9-10.
387 Ibid., p. 37.
134
terms. At the end of the year Yugoslavia was added to the list of 
socialist but anti-Moscow countries whose support the MPLA 
highlighted.388
A third motivation for the non-communist rhetoric was the MPLA's 
perception of Western policies and the example set by FRELIMO. The 
movement concluded that although widespread Western support for African 
"liberation" might be unobtainable, NATO could be forced to split on 
the issue of Portuguese colonialism, and Western religious institutions 
might be approachable. (This was a shift from the movement's 1965 
evaluation of all Western interest in the liberation struggle as 
cynical and entirely self-serving.) A 1970 MPLA message to militants 
stated:
The population of Europe better understands the objectives of 
our Revolution and our just anti-racist position. In the 
external sphere Portugal's fascist government has suffered major 
defeats and has not succeeded in maintaining the unity that 
apparently existed in NATO on the Portuguese colonial 
problem. ...389
In 1971, the MPLA repeated that "even within the heart of NATO there is 
already some criticism of Portugal and [statements of] the need to 
change this colonial situation...."390
The MPLA was aware of the success of FRELIMO's courting of 
Western liberals, particularly in discouraging Western investment in 
Mozambique, and sought to emulate the strategy. (See chapter 8 for more 
details on FRELIMO's strategy.)
The MPLA's hopes were partly fulfilled, for Denmark, Norway, and 
the Netherlands did move more openly in favour of the MPLA. In 1970 
Neto visited Scandinavia at the invitation of the region's Social 
Democratic Parties. In March 1972, the MPLA's radio programme "Angola 
Combatente" announced that Denmark was helping the MPLA to build a 
secondary school, providing medical help, and aiding the development of 
production. The Netherlands was praised in the same programme for 
turning down a Lisbon offer to visit Angola, and the commentator added 
that the Amsterdam government would probably accept an invitation to
388 "Mensagem Por Ocasiao do 15 Aniversario da Fundagao do MPLA", op. 
cit., p. 202.
389 "Mensagem aos Militantes Pronunciada Atraves da Radio Tanzania", 1 
January 1970, reprinted in Angola: Documentos do MPLA. vol. 1, op. 
cit., p. 164.
390 Neto, interview with Ayanti, op. cit., p. 9.
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visit MPLA liberated territory.391 The Scandinavian tour also 
consolidated MPLA relations with a non-NATO state, Sweden, which gave 
the MPLA about $433,000 from 1972 to 19 7 3 . 392
The MPLA's perception of greater openness on the part of some 
sectors of Western society was also encouraged by the actions of 
religious institutions. On 1 July 1970, Pope Paul VI received Neto, 
Amilcar Cabral, and Marcelino dos Santos, enraging the Portuguese.393 In 
the same year the World Council of Churches established a Special 
Program to Combat Racism. From 1970 to 1973 it gave between $10,000 and 
$25,000 to the MPLA per year. It gave UNITA far less, and fluctuated 
between equal and inferior treatment for the FNLA.394
It would appear that in the 1970 to 1972 period the MPLA 
partially revised its views towards at least a portion of the West. 
Although past U.S. efforts to court the nationalists were still 
regarded as cynical attempts to divert the movement from its goal, 
religious institutions and some European countries were now considered 
useful allies in the struggle against Portugal. Despite its non­
communist rhetoric, however, the MPLA still clearly remained committed 
to socialist goals, and military ties with the socialist bloc increased 
during this period.
MPLA FORTUNES AND CO-OPTABILITY DECLINE
From 1973 to 1974 the MPLA suffered reverses on every front, returned 
to vigorous anti-Western rhetoric, and put less effort into courting 
Western liberals. By the eve of the Portuguese coup in April 1974, the 
movement appeared less co-optable than it had at virtually any point in 
its history. The same factors evident in the earlier period were 
largely responsible for the decline, but internal factionalism also 
played a subsidiary role.
First, the conditions of armed struggle changed, removing one 
motivation for the MPLA leadership to promote a non-communist image. 
Specifically, it became clear that the unity pact with the FNLA was not
391 "Mensagem Radiodifundida Pelo "Angola Combatente'", 30 March 1972, 
reprinted in Angola: Documentos do MPLA. vol. 1, op. cit., p. 206.
392 Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 232.
393 Lawrence W. Henderson, Angola: Five Centuries of Conflict (Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University Press, 1979), p. 220.
394 Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 233.
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going to afford the MPLA access to the Zairean infiltration routes. In 
January 1973, Neto foreshadowed future difficulties when he remarked 
that divisions between the FNLA and the MPLA were "the result of 
different conceptions of the struggle".395 Regarding problems obtaining 
access to the Zaire-Angola border, Neto implied that President Mobutu 
was a particular obstacle. "The problem is complex", he said, "because 
it is not only the Angolans who must negotiate, but, owing to the 
presence of our neighbours, African countries that help us also 
influence the course of the collaboration negotiations".396 Though the 
accord remained formally in effect, it was never implemented.
The FNLA then went on to usurp some of the MPLA's African 
allies. In 1973, Roberto visited Dar es Salaam twice at the invitation 
of Nyerere and was authorised to open an office there. Nyerere 
subsequently helped arrange Holden Roberto's visit to China in December 
1973. In August, Roberto met with the OAU secretary general and was 
invited to attend the anniversary celebrations of one of the MPLA's 
most important allies, Congo-Brazzaville.397
The changing conditions of armed struggle not only reduced the 
MPLA's interest in moderating its rhetoric, but also contributed to 
internal factionalism, which in turn eventually influenced MPLA 
relations with the Soviet Union.
When it still appeared that the accord with the FNLA might 
succeed, some of the MPLA's guerrilla commanders became uneasy with the 
pact's military implications. Most important, Daniel Chipenda, leader 
of the part of the MPLA's Eastern Front bordering Zambia, feared that 
the Zairean access associated with the FNLA accord would permit the 
organisation to shift resources from his area to the North-Eastern 
Front. This suspicion was fuelled by the fact that both Chipenda and 
the area in which he was fighting were Ovimbundu, while the ethnic 
population in the front accessible from Zaire was Mbundu, the dominant 
ethnic group in the MPLA. At a January 1973 meeting with MPLA leaders 
from the Eastern Front, Neto exacerbated this fear by announcing his
395 Agostinho Neto, "Entrevista Concedida a Revista "Africasie'", 
January 1973, reprinted in Angola: Documentos do MPLA. vol. 1, op. 
cit., p. 224.
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397 Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 228.
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intention to transfer human, financial, and military resources to the 
north, where, he said, there are people "who want to fight".398
In addition, Portugal's Operation Attila, launched in February 
1972 in eastern Angola, began to inflict serious defeats on the MPLA, 
and by May 1973 the Lisbon press was reporting reduced insurgent 
activity.399 Although it was not widely known at the time, it has since 
become evident that, beginning in 1971, UNITA helped the Portuguese 
military battle the MPLA in return for various favours, including 
medical treatment for Savimbi, supply and repair of weapons, and safe 
passage for UNITA combatants through Portuguese-held territory. The 
full details are carefully documented in Minter's work.400 Portuguese 
General Costa Gomes, for example, made written reference to the UNITA - 
Portuguese deal as a "gentleman's agreement". Costa Gomes subsequently 
said it would have been easy to eliminate UNITA's several hundred 
guerrillas but from a military point of view it was better to use them 
against the MPLA.401 The alliance is also confirmed by UNITA sources. 
Among many corroborating documents is a 14 September 1971 letter from 
UNITA Sector Chief Edmundo Rocha to a local timber merchant, who acted 
as ago-between with the Portuguese military. "Regarding our possible 
cooperation in the struggle against the MPLA, or even the UPA", Rocha 
said, "We were always ready for such cooperation...."402 Thus, in 
Eastern Angola the MPLA was actually fighting two, allied, enemies.
The military setbacks caused dissension in the ranks and a 
search by the leadership for scapegoats in the middle levels of 
military command. Tensions between Chipenda and Neto had been simmering 
through 1972, but broke into the open in a June 1973 letter from Neto 
to the government of Zambia, where Chipenda and his supporters had been 
staying:
In April [1973] a plot was discovered and subversive elements 
began to be detained.... They have all confessed that overall, 
Daniel Julio Chipenda was head, that the objective was to
398 Ibid., p. 204.
Ibid., p . 201.
Minter, Operation Timber, op. cit.
Ibid., p . 18.
402 Ibid., p. 37, quoting Expresso. 17 November 1979.
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physically eliminate the President of MPLA, and that Chipenda 
should be President of the Organisation.403
The letter appealed to Zambia to prevent Chipenda and his associates
from leaving that country.
Chipenda's explanation of the Eastern Revolt, as it came to be
called, was quite different:
The eastern part of Angola where we were operating was 
economically very underdeveloped. The MPLA leadership had an 
urban, intellectual orientation. It was difficult for them to 
understand the countryside. The rural people felt discriminated 
against in the organisation. It was not an ideological problem. 
It was simply that the leadership was not respectful of the 
rural people's feelings. We wanted more democratic procedures.404
Messiant has asserted that the Eastern Revolt, like some post-
independence MPLA schisms, resulted from tensions between anciens
and nouveaux assimiles rather than from primarily ethnic differences.405
As the above Chipenda quote illustrates, he represented the more
recently educated, rural assimilado group, while the Neto-affiliated
MPLA leadership had closer ties with mesticos and the anciens
assimiles. Heimer's central/tributary society model is also helpful in
understanding the Eastern Revolt; the rebels were closer to the latter
and the central leadership closer to the former. 406 The incident ended
with Chipenda and some of his followers joining the FNLA.
The defection of the Eastern military and the failure of the
FNLA unity agreement to permit resupply of the North-Eastern Front from
Zaire further slowed MPLA military progress, and this in turn changed
relations with Moscow. The Soviet Union accepted Neto's public sniping
and flirtation with rival nations as long as he led the movement most
likely to take power after independence. When his military fortunes
reversed, however, the Soviet Union began considering alternatives.
According to Paulo Jorge, the MPLA's foreign minister following
independence, "There was a temporary suspension of help from the Soviet
Union, a period of doubt when the MPLA appeared divided".407 With the
403 Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 202.
404 Daniel Chipenda, interview by author, Lisbon, Portugal, April
1984.
405 Messiant, op. cit., pp. 172-173.
406 Heimer, op. cit., p. 96.
407 Jorge, interview.
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FNLA increasingly tied to the Chinese, and UNITA militarily weak, the 
logical alternative for the Soviets was Chipenda. In early 1973, Moscow 
was still apparently on good enough terms with Neto to pass on 
intelligence concerning the alleged Chipenda plot, but Moscow then 
provided Chipenda with modest assistance later in the year and in 
19 7 4 . 408
Neto was furious and allegedly believed that there was "an 
American-Soviet agreement that placed Angola within an American sphere 
of influence and Mozambique within a Soviet sphere of influence".409 In 
a February 1974 speech at the University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, 
he remarked that the socialist camp was divided "and the relations of 
solidarity" had declined. He lamented:
[T]he national liberation struggle in Africa does not have a 
very sound basis in the international arena, and it is not 
political or ideological affinities that count, nor even the 
objectives themselves, for in most cases other interests 
dominate relations between the liberation forces and the 
world.... [E]fforts to transform the liberation movements into 
satellites of parties in power, subject to unacceptable 
paternalism, are caused by the fact that most of the liberation 
movements conducting an armed struggle have to do so from 
outside their countries.410
Though much of the speech may have also been directed against the West,
the statement that other interests besides ideological ones dominate
relations between the liberation forces and the world seems to be a
clear reference to Soviet pressure regarding base facilities and
Moscow's recent tilt towards Chipenda.
As Neto mentioned, however, not all the socialist countries
followed the Soviet Union's lead. A Yugoslav diplomat stationed in
Luanda after independence reported that his country did not reduce
support to the MPLA at the time of the Chipenda split. Neto visited
Yugoslavia several times when the problems were occurring in his
relations with Moscow, the diplomat stated, remarking that this was
probably why the MPLA subsequently tended to speak highly of President
408 Weinstein and Henriksen, op. cit., p. 66; Marcum, vol. 2, op. 
cit., p. 201; Ottaway and Ottaway, op. cit., p. 105.
409 Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 229.
410 Neto, "Who is the Enemy?... What Is Our Objective?", op. cit., pp. 
218-219.
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Tito.411 Cuba also maintained aid, but as Havana was on better political 
terms with Moscow than was Belgrade, it made less of a public issue of 
the fact.412 These allies' decisions to stand by Neto, and the Soviet 
Union's ambivalence, had important implications for Neto's foreign 
policy after independence.
As the deal with the FNLA unravelled and factional problems 
damaged relations with the Soviet Union, the MPLA also lost confidence 
in its ability to divide NATO further. After the success obtaining 
Danish, Dutch, and Norwegian aid in the early 1970s, no additional 
Western donors materialised. Neto concluded that Portugal's new 
autonomy proposals, which stopped far short of independence, were part 
of a neo-colonialist plot, and he was uneasy about both rising Western 
arms sales to Portugal and increased foreign investment in the 
Portuguese colonies.
Unlike FRELIMO, the MPLA's commitment to collaboration with 
Western liberals was tactical rather than strategic, and was not based 
on a thorough understanding of the cyclical nature of domestic politics 
in Western democracies. When the tactic no longer yielded swift 
results, it was de-emphasised.
It was in this context that the MPLA shifted towards anti- 
capitalist, anti-Western rhetoric. The new approach was first evident 
in a February 1973 Neto speech in which the MPLA leader said that the 
Portuguese autonomy proposals reflected a "general change of tactics of 
the imperialist enemy" and noted that there had recently been a 
"massive influx of imperialist capital", announcing that the level of 
foreign investment in Portugal and its colonies had risen a third from 
1969 to 1971. Neto also claimed that NATO was considering establishing 
naval bases in Angola.413
Angola was therefore not dominated only by Portugal, Neto 
argued, but also by Britain, the United States, and other European 
countries that were competing to exploit Angola's wealth:
411 Source four, confidential interview by author, Luanda, Angola,
1985.
412 John A. Marcum, interview by author, Berkeley, California, United 
States, October 1986.
413 Agostinho Neto, "The Enemy Have Changed Their Tactics", February 
1973, reprinted in The African Liberation Reader vol. 3, op. cit., 
pp. 30-32.
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[I] f we can say that Portugal is the manager of a series of 
politico-economic deals, we will see that it is not our 
principal enemy, but merely our direct enemy.... [T]he enemy is 
colonialism, the colonial system, and also imperialism, which 
sustains the former, to the point of being the principal 
enemy.414
Neto also was less ideologically coy in this speech than
previously. After remarking that the class interests of the poor
Portuguese peasant sent to Angola "as a watchdog for fascism" and the
class interests of black Angolans were similar because both "feel
themselves slaves of the system as a whole", Neto addressed the
international dimension of MPLA ideology:
I should like to emphasise that the liberation struggles are not 
aimed solely at violently correcting the relations between men 
and especially production relations within the country--they are 
also an important factor for the positive transformation of our 
entire continent and the whole world. [Emphasis in original] The 
national liberation struggle is also a means of overthrowing a 
whole unjust system of oppression existing in the world.415
Finally, while criticising the Soviet aid suspension, Neto still
insisted, "Within [the capitalist-socialist] division it is the
socialists who hold high the banner of internationalism and in fact
give the most support to the liberation movements".416 Nowhere in the
long speech was reference made to the support that the MPLA had
received from some sectors of the West, a sharp departure from previous
practise.
The rhetoric continued in July 1973, when the MPLA published an 
"Outline of the Unholy Anglo-Portuguese Alliance" in Lusaka. It claimed 
that the "historic" Anglo-Portuguese alliance had been strengthened 
since the coming to power of a conservative government in London in 
1970, visits between the two countries had increased, and economic 
"concessions" had multiplied. Prince Philip's visit to Portugal in June 
1973 was cited as proof of "not only Britain's tacit support for 
colonialist fascist Portugal, but also [its] total disregard [for 
people of the African colonies]".417
414 Neto, "Who is the Enemy?... What Is Our Objective?", op. cit., pp. 
210-219.
415 Ibid., p. 214.
416 Ibid., p. 218.
417 "Outline of the Unholy Anglo-Portuguese Alliance", MPLA Department 
of Information and Propaganda, Lusaka, Zambia, July 1973.
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SUMMARY
It is clear from the above description that the MPLA became somewhat 
more co-optable in the 1970 to 1972 period, though it was ambivalent 
about just how much it was willing to distance itself from past 
policies, and then shifted to considerable hostility towards the West 
in 1973. The same three factors--conditions of armed struggle 
(including rivalry with other nationalists and the position of a key 
regional power), relations with non-Western allies, and perception of 
Western policies--contributed to both the increase and decline of co- 
optability. In the 1970 to 1972 period, the MPLA perceived NATO to be 
divisible on the question of Portuguese colonialism, hoped to obtain 
military access to an area controlled by more pro-Western individuals 
(Roberto and Mobutu), and was confident enough of Soviet aid to risk 
showing some independence from the Moscow line when that ally adopted a 
"paternalistic" attitude. In the 1972 to 1974 period, there was no hope 
of obtaining access to the coveted Zairean infiltration routes, there 
appeared to be little prospect of more support from the West, and the 
Soviet Union's decision to back the Chipenda faction both reduced the 
utility of a non-communist posture and increased the MPLA's interest in 
proving that it alone among the Angolan nationalists was the 
ideological true believer and therefore most deserved Soviet 
assistance.
What might have happened in the 1970 to 1974 period if the MPLA 
had perceived Western policies differently? What, for example, might 
have happened if, during the first two years of the decade, it had not 
perceived NATO to be divisible? Because of the strength of the 
movement's desire to obtain access to the Zairean infiltration routes 
and the utility of non-communist rhetoric in negotiations with 
individuals controlling these routes, it seems likely that the MPLA's 
appearance of co-optability still would have risen, though perhaps to a 
lesser extent. A different perception of Western policy could have had 
an even greater impact in the 1972 to 1974 period. The MPLA was 
simultaneously angry and panic-stricken over the Soviet Union's 
decision to back Chipenda rather than Neto. If the West had appeared 
well disposed towards the nationalists, the MPLA might have been 
willing to make a number of major compromises in return for assistance. 
Given the deep-rooted socialist and "anti-imperialist" philosophies of 
many of the movement's most prominent leaders, however, it is doubtful
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that even a desperate MPLA would have shifted to a posture fully 
accommodating Western interests.
Perception of Western policy, therefore, had an important impact 
on fluctuating MPLA co-optability, though not one critical enough to 
cancel out entirely the influence of other, independent, factors.
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CHAPTER 8 
FRELIMO SHIFTS FROM OPERATIONAL 
TO IDEOLOGICAL CRITICISM OF THE WEST
FRELIMO's course in the 1970 to 1974 period was less erratic than that 
of the MPLA. Over the four years preceding the Portuguese coup the 
movement grew steadily less co-optable, and by the eve of Caetano's 
fall from power it was more hostile to the West than ever before. Most 
significantly, the Marxist tendencies evident earlier became more 
pronounced and the shift from operational to ideological criticism of 
the West, already under way in the late 1960s, accelerated. The FRELIMO 
leadership now identified the socialist countries as "natural allies" 
and devoted less resources to lobbying Western governments than 
previously, concluding that Portugal's principal NATO allies were now 
immune to appeals. Indeed, so displeased was the movement with these 
administrations that it established pre-conditions for acceptance of 
Western aid.
However, the FRELIMO leadership did continue the past policy of 
distinguishing between governments and peoples, and in the 1970 to 1974 
period facilitated the establishment of "support committees" in major 
Western capitals. FRELIMO also continued to court the small Western 
states that had already expressed sympathy for the nationalist cause 
and stepped up contacts with the Western churches that took a 
sympathetic view of the "liberation struggle".
Three main and two subsidiary factors influenced FRELIMO's 
attitude towards the West. Conditions of armed struggle continued to 
encourage the leadership to rely on the discretion and goodwill of the 
peasantry for survival, ensuring that the concerns of Mozambique's 
rural poor received some consideration. As in the late 1960s, 
socialist ideology also continued to serve as a useful framework for 
the "bureaucratic" elements trying to mobilise the masses in the name 
of modernising nationalism and a psychological balm for past 
humiliations.
Another main factor contributing to the decline in FRELIMO's co- 
optability was the growing assistance and related influence of the 
socialist countries. Because there were a variety of such allies and 
they were divided among themselves, the socialist country supporters 
were not in a position to dictate policies to the movement. They did,
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however, reinforce FRELIMO's predisposition to view socialism as a more 
just system than capitalism. Perception of Western policies continued 
to play an important role as FRELIMO became more convinced that the 
West, with only a few exceptions, was now firmly opposed to the 
nationalists' cause
Finally, internal factionalism and the background of the 
movement's new leaders were subsidiary but still significant factors. 
Both were results of the specific conditions of armed struggle that in 
turn reinforced the tendency towards radical politics.
FACTIONAL AND MILITARY ISSUES
The first task of the new decade was to resolve the remaining internal 
difficulties caused by Mondlane's assassination and the Nkavandame 
split. At its May 1970 Central Committee meeting FRELIMO expelled Uria 
Simango, suspended since the November 1969 publication of his article 
"Gloomy Situation in FRELIMO". The Council of the Presidency was 
replaced by a more centralised president and vice president structure. 
Samora Machel was named to the former post and Marcelino dos Santos to 
the latter.418
The background of the new FRELIMO leader was quite different 
from that of his predecessor. Mondlane was highly educated, familiar 
with the West, had strong Christian convictions, and came to the 
FRELIMO leadership with few ideological preconceptions. Machel, in 
contrast, had less formal education but more experience on the ground. 
From the south of the country, he had worked as a nurse in Lourengo 
Marques in the 1950s. He then received military instruction in Algeria, 
where most of the radical wing of FRELIMO was trained, and in 1965 
became an instructor at the newly established camps in Tanzania. In 
1966, he was promoted to secretary of the Department of Defence after 
the assassination of its former head, and spent the last four years 
before Mondlane's death in the most radical part of the movement. From 
the defence post he had strongly advocated politicisation of the 
military, and backed the "radical" faction in the power struggle with 
Nkavandame and Simango.419 The appointment of dos Santos as number two
418 "Comunicado Final da 4o Sessao do Comite Central da FRELIMO de 
Maio de 1970", reprinted in Documentos Base da FRELIMO. op. cit., pp. 
157-159.
419 Munslow, op. cit., pp. 69, 72, 85, 88, 103.
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was also significant, because he had developed a Marxist philosophical 
framework during his education in Portugal and France.420 (Because he 
was a light-skinned mestico. his promotion reflected a concrete 
implementation of the "radical" wing's views on race relations.)
Clearly the new leadership was more likely than the old to lead FRELIMO 
in a Marxist direction.
With its internal problems under control, FRELIMO turned its 
attention to the military struggle. The movement had already concluded 
that it could not push the Portuguese out of Mozambique simply by 
continuing operations in the northern areas accessible from Tanzania, 
principally the provinces of Cabo Delgado and Niassa. It sought to 
expand into the more central Tete Province, which could act as a link 
between anticipated supply sources in Zambia and the interior, and was 
the site for the Cabora Bassa dam project.
As FRELIMO moved into Tete, the Portuguese retaliated by 
launching "Operation Gordian Knot" against FRELIMO strongholds in Cabo 
Delgado. Beginning in May 1970, the rural population was subjected to 
extensive air attacks421 and rounded up into "protected villages", 
called aldeamentos. in an effort to sever peasant-guerrilla links.
FRELIMO responded by providing peasants protection at FRELIMO 
bases and instructing the population in guerrilla tactics. The movement 
and the northern population grew somewhat closer as the Portuguese 
attacks caused them increasingly to rely upon each other for 
protection.422
By June 1970 the commander of the Portuguese forces in 
Mozambique, Kaulza de Arriaga, reported to Caetano that FRELIMO 
controlled about 150,000 people in Cabo Delgado alone, and the 
aldeamentos were "heavily infiltrated.423 By August, "Operation Gordian 
Knot" was defeated.
420 Ibid., pp. 54, 65.
421 Reis and Muiuane, eds., Datas e Documentos da Historia da FRELIMO. 
op. cit., p. 153.
422 Munslow, op. cit., p. 116, quoting interview with Commander 
Leonardo Njawala, April 1975.
423 Letter from Kaulza de Arriaga to Marcello Caetano, 1 June 1970, 
reprinted in Jose Freire Antunes, ed., Cartas Particulares a Marcello 
Caetano. vol. 2 (Lisbon: Publicaqoes Dorn Quixote, 1985), pp. 259-264.
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The stabilisation of FRELIMO's position in Cabo Delgado 
permitted the movement to focus on Tete in 1971 and 1972. In November 
1971, de Arriaga told Caetano that FRELIMO could, "without any 
difficulty, contact the people [in Tete] and entice or force them to 
give support.... This support results in an almost perfect mixing of 
the enemy within the people".424
The Portuguese military's discomfort increased in July 1972, 
when FRELIMO used supply lines through Tete to open fronts in the 
provinces of Manica and Sofala. FRELIMO then conducted three 
"advances", which progressed slowly. The eastern advance got under way 
at the end of 1973, the southern advance was established by March 1974, 
while the north-eastern advance bogged down.425
FRELIMO's intermittent military successes had a profound impact 
on the Portuguese population resident in the country, leading them to 
conclude that their army was either unwilling or unable to provide 
protection. As Cahen has noted, FRELIMO's military actions "consummated 
the divorce" between the Portuguese army and Portugese settlers, and 
strained relations between the Portuguese officer corps and the 
government in Lisbon. From 1971 to 1973 about a fifth of the Mozambican 
Portuguese population had returned to the metropole or re-emigrated to 
South Africa or Brazil.426
FRELIMO never came to control Manica and Sofala as it did Cabo 
Delgado, Niassa, and, to a lesser extent, Tete. From 1973 to the coup 
in Portugal, the tempo of FRELIMO territorial conquests slowed. Whether 
this was due to the length of supply lines, ethnic differences between 
guerrillas and the population, conflicts with local chiefs over FRELIMO 
opposition to certain traditions, or improved Portuguese efficiency is 
not clear. But by the eve of the coup the two armies were at a 
standoff, each controlling a third of the country and disputing the 
remaining third. This was reflected in de Arriaga's 1973 remark that 
while FRELIMO activity had decreased somewhat, it "could flare up again
424 Letter from Kaulza de Arriaga to Marcello Caetano, 18 November 
1971, reprinted in Antunes, ed., Cartas Particulares a Marcello 
Caetano, vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 265-274.
425 Statements of Fernando Matavele, quoted in Reis and Muiuane, eds., 
Datas e Documentos da Historia da FRELIMO. op. cit., pp. 164-168.
426 Cahen, "Le Portugal et l'Afrique", op. cit., p. 11.
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at any moment" and "the general population is predisposed to be 
receptive to subversion".427
THE DEVELOPMENT OF IDEOLOGY
The resolution of FRELIMO's internal split in favour of the Mondlane 
group and the extension of the movement's territorial control led to a 
crystallisation of ideology. Though FRELIMO still stopped short of 
openly declaring itself Marxist-Leninist, it increasingly adopted 
language compatible with that philosophy.
Right at the beginning of the decade, in a September 1970 
speech, Machel specifically labelled capitalism as "the system of 
exploitation".428 Joaquim Chissano, a future president of Mozambique who 
at this point was rising through FRELIMO's ranks, echoed these 
sentiments, saying that socialism "leads to human dignity".429 In the 
same year, efforts to raise the political consciousness of the military 
were increased, and at the beginning of 1972 there was a mid-level 
reshuffle because, in Machel's words, "[W]e felt that our struggle... 
was no longer just a fight against colonialism... but rather was a 
struggle that integrated itself in the general struggle of all the 
revolutions" .43°
A Defence Department meeting held in July 1972 then sought to 
draw ideological conclusions from the conflicts that had wracked the 
movement in the late 1960s,431 and five months later the ideology issue 
was re-addressed at a Central Committee meeting. The Central Committee 
decided that armed struggle should be made an integral part of the life 
of the Mozambican people, and the war should be more fully popularised. 
In 1973, FRELIMO ruled that a vanguard party on the lines established 
by Lenin should eventually be adopted when conditions permitted. The
427 Letter from Kaulza de Arriaga to Marcello Caetano, 22 January 
1973, reprinted in Antunes, ed., Cartas Particulares a Marcello 
Caetano, vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 275-277.
428 Samora Machel, quoted in Rosberg and Callaghy, eds., op. cit., p. 
292 .
429 Joaquim Chissano, interview by Africrue Australe. 27 November 1970. 
Published in Africrue Australe. no. 2-3 (1971) .
430 Samora Machel, "Intervenqao do Presidente Samora Machel na 
Primeira Sessao de Trabalhos", reprinted in Documentos Base da 
FRELIMO. op. cit., p. 203.
431 Munslow, op. cit., p. 137.
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same year saw the formation of the first FRELIMO committees inside the 
military, and in January 1974 the FRELIMO school began operating. It 
taught the works of Marx and Lenin, and used examples from FRELIMO's 
own history to illustrate the theory of "class struggle".432
The movement1s ideology at the eve of independence is probably 
best summarised in a paper titled "The People's Democratic 
Revolutionary Process in Mozambique". It was written by Machel in 
February 1974 for the Soviet Academy of Sciences and published in 1975 
in Moscow. Machel emphasised the need for "installing power based on an 
alliance of the exploited social strata in our country, and bringing to 
fruition the national liberation struggle by destroying the system of 
exploitation of man by man".433 (Note: Cahen has argued that "popular 
power" in FRELIMO-ruled independent Mozambique was "a complete 
ideological fiction" and that socialism was used more to develop a 
modern state with a national consciousness than it was to really 
provide for the "massive and durable intervention of workers and 
peasants".434 However, this does not render irrelevant the manner in 
which FRELIMO chose to present itself in the early 1970s. Whether it 
subsequently lived up to or failed to fulfill its promises, at this 
stage in its development it was declaring with increasing energy its 
intention to pursue a socialist path.)
Machel presented the internal divisions within FRELIMO as an 
example of class struggle between a group that wished to replace the 
colonialists as the "exploiting class" and another reflecting "the 
objective interests of the masses struggling to abolish exploitation of 
man by man".435 Machel also remarked somewhat apologetically that "the 
absence of a vanguard party from the broad front" was not a specific 
FRELIMO strategy, but rather the result of "the non-existence of an 
organised working class and tradition", the burden of "reactionary
432 Ibid., p. 138.
433 Samora Machel, "The People's Democratic Revolutionary Process in 
Mozambique", reprinted in Samora Machel. An African Revolutionary: 
Selected Speeches and Writings, ed. Barry Munslow (London: Zed Books, 
1985), p. 35.
434 Cahen, Mozambique, op. cit., pp. 141-142.
435 Machel, "The People's Democratic Revolutionary Process in 
Mozambique", op. cit., p. 41.
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tradition”, and the isolation of Mozambican communities from the "world
revolutionary movement". Machel insisted that FRELIMO needed to
replace obsolete loyalties to tribe, language, religion and 
culture with national unity and with a sense of belonging to an 
immense, exploited working class.... [T]he central question is 
one of a balance between the broad front intended to overthrow 
colonial imperialist domination on the one hand, and demands on 
the other of an ideology that can bring the revolution to its 
fruition, and already represents the claims of the broad working 
masses. [Author's emphasis]
He said that FRELIMO's strategy was to broaden the front by 
bringing in "new faces" and simultaneously raising the general standard 
of "consciousness". He concluded, "[W]e are gradually creating the 
conditions whereby, within the broadening front, there should be taking 
shape an organised revolutionary vanguard of the mass of Mozambican 
workers".436 Machel also rejected the non-traditional "foco" theory of 
Che Guevara, saying that it was "based on false premises".437
Although the organisation's rhetoric approached classical 
communism, FRELIMO's actual economic policies were more closely related 
to the African socialism of Nyerere and Kaunda. By the eve of the 
Portuguese coup, FRELIMO had four types of production relationships: 
individual peasant production (the most common form), pre-collective 
machambas (farms) in which peasants with adjacent plots jointly 
defended their crops against predators, collective machambas that were 
worked in addition to private plots, and totally collective production 
within FRELIMO's own structures.438 Full co-operative production was 
prevalent only in the liberated areas of Cabo Delgado. (Note: This 
coincides with Cahen's assertion that "Mozambican Marxism was not 
fundamentally different, in its ideological nature... from the 
nationalisms of Nkrumah, Nasser, Lumumba, [and] the FLN of 
Algeria. . . . "439)
The development of political structures, on the other hand, more 
closely parallelled the rhetoric. "Structures of people's power", a 
form of rural democracy based on elected committees at the village and 
higher levels, were extended to all the liberated areas. As Cahen has
436 Ibid., pp. 42-45.
437 Ibid.
438 Munslow, op. cit., p. 142.
439Cahen, Mozambique, op. cit., p. 167.
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noted, they were flawed and insufficiently democratic, but they did 
represent FRELIMO's intention to adopt a "socialist" political model. 
Education was ostensibly designed to instil the "collective ideology 
that will enable us to make progress in the revolutionary process".440
RELATIONS WITH SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
In the years immediately preceding the Portuguese coup, FRELIMO's 
relations with the socialist countries grew steadily warmer.
Socialist country support to FRELIMO markedly increased in 
1971.441 The July-September 1971 issue of Mozambique Revolution 
announced Machel's return from visits to the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, 
Romania, and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), commenting, "We form 
an alliance based on the fundamental fact that our aims are the same: 
to build a society where oppression and exploitation of man by man will 
no longer be possible".442 During this tour, formal relations were 
established between FRELIMO and the communist parties in the countries 
visited.443 When Machel returned to the GDR in April 1972, Mozambique 
Revolution criticised the "Bonn-Pretoria axis" and supported the 
admission of the GDR to the United Nations. 444 In June 1973, Machel 
again visited the Soviet Union and Romania, opening a FRELIMO 
representative office in the latter country.445
Though these Warsaw Pact contacts were important, and resulted 
in some material aid, it was the improvement in FRELIMO's relations 
with the Chinese that had the most effect upon the course of the armed 
struggle and the evolution of FRELIMO ideology. Machel visited China in 
the second half of 1971, along with North Korea and Vietnam. Upon
440 Machel, "The People's Democratic Revolutionary Process in 
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441 Ibid., p. 70.
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returning he proclaimed solidarity with Beijing.446 China's support for
FRELIMO soon increased, eventually providing 80 percent of the
movement's weapons.447 Chinese journalists visited FRELIMO liberated
territory for three weeks early in 1972448 and Chinese experts began to
provide regular training in FRELIMO's Tanzanian camps. By 1973, most
junior guerrilla commanders had received this instruction.
One reason for the improvement in Sino-FRELIMO relations was
that Chinese culture and political ideology meshed particularly well
with that of the nationalists. The trainers' humble lifestyle meant
that they did not mind working alongside the peasants, as mandated by
FRELIMO policy. The Chinese cultural revolution tactic of exposing
"heretics" while retaining them within the organisation was attractive
to FRELIMO following its internal crises.
FRELIMO also was impressed by Chinese "selflessness". Concerning
this period, a FRELIMO official later remarked:
China... didn't demand anything in return. China supported the 
liberation struggle the way some evangelists support missionary 
work. They did it because they believed in it, without any 
expectation of material reward.449
FRELIMO's relations with Beijing were also strengthened by the 
evolution of the movement's contacts with the nationalists in Rhodesia. 
Since 1968, FRELIMO had officially been allied with the Zimbabwe 
African People's Union (ZAPU), a guerrilla movement supported by the 
Soviet Union that was launching intermittent raids into Rhodesia from 
bases in Zambia. FRELIMO was suspicious of ZAPU's rival, the Chinese- 
supported Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) because of the 
latter's cordial relations with some FRELIMO defectors, and because it 
did not seem to be doing much fighting.450
Once FRELIMO established a presence in Tete, which bordered 
Rhodesia, it suggested that ZAPU use this area to infiltrate guerrillas 
into the neighbouring state. When ZAPU declined the offer, and ZANU 
requested permission to use the Tete route for guerrilla infiltration,
446 Middlemas, op. cit., p. 179.
447 Source one, interview.
448 "Chinese Guests Praise FRELIMO's Success", Mozambique Revolution, 
no. 50 (January-March 1972) , pp. 17-19.
449 Source one, interview.
450 Martin and Johnson, op. cit., pp. 14-16.
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FRELIMO re-evaluated its alliances. In mid-1972 FRELIMO finally allowed 
ZANU guerrillas and armaments to pass through Tete and into north­
eastern Rhodesia. FRELIMO's shift from the Soviet-affiliated ZAPU to 
the Chinese-affiliated ZANU thus consolidated the movement's 
connections with Beijing, while weakening its relationship with 
Moscow.451
Despite this steady shift in the direction of Beijing, FRELIMO 
rhetoric did try to avoid taking sides in the Sino-Soviet rivalry.
Thus, Machel called "the great October Revolution" an "example" and a 
"strategic rear base for our fight".452 In the same spirit of Sino- 
Soviet neutrality, Machel equally congratulated China and the GDR for 
"break [ing] out of isolation".453
It is relevant to note that while the evolving relationship with 
China influenced FRELIMO in a pro-socialist direction, China itself was 
in the midst of rapprochement with the United States at this time. 
(President Nixon made his historic visit to Beijing in 1972.)
Therefore, growing FRELIMO-China ties did not necessarily result in 
pressure for a tough anti-Washington stance.
RELATIONS WITH THE WEST
While relations with the socialist countries grew more cordial, 
relations with the major Western powers became more strained than ever. 
In 1971, Mozambique Revolution said that FRELIMO sent delegations to 
socialist countries and not to the major Western powers because the 
latter "support Portuguese colonialism and are opposed to our people's 
aspirations".454 Though stated in more dismissive terms than usual, this 
was a restatement of the previous FRELIMO operational theme, that the 
West was hindering FRELIMO by assisting the Portuguese. However, the 
new, ideological, element in FRELIMO rhetoric also grew stronger. The 
West was also attacked for its economic and philosophical orientation:
This enmity [between FRELIMO and the West] has even deeper roots
which lie in the contradictions between our ultimate aims on the
451 Ibid.
452 Machel, "The People's Democratic Revolutionary Process in 
Mozambique", op. cit., pp. 69-70.
453 Ibid., p. 70.
454 "Alliance Against Imperialism", Mozambique Revolution, no. 48 
(July-September 1971), p. 6.
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one hand and the very nature of their society on the other. Thus 
capitalist society is characterised by the principle of 
exploitation of man by man.... Yet we fight to put an end to 
these very evils in our own country!455
The United States was subject to the most vigorous criticism. 
Just as FRELIMO escalated from a strategic to a philosophical enmity 
with the West, it progressed from criticism of U.S. material aid for 
Portugal to a broader definition of U.S. "imperialist" interests in 
Mozambique. The United States, according to a 1970 FRELIMO article, 
wanted Mozambique "to remain as [a] colon[y]--providing a valuable 
source of raw materials, extensive markets and strategic military 
bases... for the U.S. and other imperialist powers...."456
In 1970, FRELIMO published an article titled "USA--How Far From 
Intervention?" The movement stated that the previous November a "highly 
placed member of the U.S. government [Assistant Secretary of State for 
African Affairs Bob Moore] paid a discreet, and for us highly 
disquieting, visit to Mozambique.... What was his mission?" (Emphasis 
in original.) Increasing U.S. investments in Mozambique were then 
tabulated. Remarking that it would be necessary to launch a 
pacification campaign against FRELIMO before these investments could be 
safe, and speculating upon U.S. interest in the port of Nacala, the 
author announced: "[I]t is easy to conclude that a more direct 
involvement of the U.S. in the Mozambican war cannot be excluded".457 
(Emphasis in original.)
When the United States renewed the Azores agreement with 
Portugal in December 1971 and simultaneously provided Portugal with 
over $4 million in loans and aid, FRELIMO reacted with a wave of anti- 
Americanism. Mozambique Revolution printed an article titled 
"$435, 000,000--Nixon's Investment in Portuguese Colonialism", 
accompanied by a cartoon showing a grinning caricature of the U.S. 
president handing a bag of money to a diminutive, begging Caetano.458 
The writer claimed that the Azores base was not important enough to the 
United States to justify the large financial agreement that accompanied
455 Ibid.
456 "U.S.A.--How Far From Intervention?", Mozambique Revolution, no.
42 (January-March 1970), p. 33.
457 Ibid., pp. 33-34.
458 "$435,000,000--Nixon1s Investment in Portuguese Colonialism", 
Mozambique Revolution, no. 50 (January-March 1972), pp. 22-25.
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the treaty, and that the funds were intended as direct aid to Lisbon. 
The article detailed alleged U.S. assistance to Portugal's military 
battle in Mozambique, citing "the supply of 20 B-26s" in 1969, "U.S. 
sales of herbicides" later used in "chemical warfare" in Mozambique,
CIA co-operation with the Portuguese secret police, and CIA training 
for Portuguese special forces.459
Although the United States was criticised the most vigorously, 
West Germany was not far behind. In 1970, FRELIMO targeted the West 
German firm Siemens for contracting to work on the Cabora Bassa dam and 
complained that it had expected that Bonn's newly elected Social 
Democratic government "would speak with a new voice".460 The movement 
underlined its dissatisfaction with the West German position in March 
1970 by writing an "Open Letter" to the new West German chancellor, 
Willy Brandt. The letter ridiculed the claim by West Germany's 
ambassador to Tanzania that Bonn supported FRELIMO, asking, "when, 
where and how has the Government of West Germany expressed any kind of 
support, even simply moral, to FRELIMO?" It further commented that 
FRELIMO was "astonished" by the "absolute silence from you and your 
government" on Siemens' Cabora Bassa contract. The letter closed with 
the claim that West Germany had provided Portugal with warships worth 
$40 million in 1969 and that Bonn had known they were to be used in 
Africa.461
Three years later, FRELIMO's hopes were raised when a Congress 
of West Germany's still-ruling Social Democratic Party (SDP) pledged to 
"concede to the national liberation movements all our solidarity and 
our political and humanitarian support"462 and invited FRELIMO to Bonn 
for discussions. After much internal debate, FRELIMO accepted. The 
discussions ran from 2 to 8 August 1973, but were unproductive. FRELIMO 
demanded that the SDP force the West German government to halt arms 
supplies to Lisbon, "do everything in its power" to encourage companies 
to withdrew from Cabora Bassa, and "[p]ut whatever support [it] is
459 Ibid., p. 25.
460 "Africa on W. Germany", Mozambique Revolution, no. 42 (January- 
March 1970), p. 29.
461 "Open Letter to the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of 
Germany", Mozambique Revolution, no. 42 (January-March 1970), p. 30.
462 "FRELIMO and West Germany's SDP--NO Grounds for Co-operation", 
Mozambique Revolution, no. 56 (July-September 1973), pp. 20-21.
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willing to give FRELIMO on a political and not a humanitarian basis".463 
The SDP, according to FRELIMO, initially rejected these requests but 
did offer humanitarian aid.464 Shortly thereafter, the SDP retracted the 
humanitarian aid offer as well, citing allegiance to NATO policies.465
(See chapter 10 for details.)
The FRELIMO delegation returned empty handed, stating that it
would not have accepted the humanitarian aid in any case because its
other conditions were not fulfilled. "[W]e cannot establish relations
with any organisation except on a correct political and moral basis",466
remarked Mozambique Revolution alongside a cartoon depicting Brandt
handing warplanes to Caetano with one hand and medicines to a puzzled-
looking Machel with the other.467
It is not clear what role was played by East German pressure on
FRELIMO in this period. It is clear, however, that competition between
East and West Germany was the backdrop for the discussions and must
have had some bearing on FRELIMO's position. Over a decade later a
FRELIMO official familiar with the episode said:
West Germany was worried about the influence East Germany was 
developing in Africa through its support for the liberation 
movements, and mounted a campaign to compete in this sphere.
East Germany, in turn, was nervous about West Germany's 
manoeuvring. Rivalry between the two caused FRELIMO a number of 
problems.468
The United Kingdom also was the target of criticism. While 
expressing satisfaction that "English Electric" (sic) was not going to 
participate in Cabora Bassa, a 1970 issue of Mozambique Revolution 
lambasted Barclays Bank for helping to finance the project. It noted 
that the chairman of Barclays was prominent in the UK-South Africa
463 Ibid., p. 21.
464 Ibid.
465 "Germans Deny Support for FRELIMO", Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg, 
South Africa), 8 August 1973.
466 "FRELIMO and West Germany's SDP--No Grounds for Co-operation", op. 
cit., p. 21.
467 Ibid., p. 20.
468 Source one, interview.
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Trade Association and depicted the bank as a vulture with its talons 
embedded in southern Africa.469
Later the same year FRELIMO published what it claimed were 
excerpts from a foreign policy working paper of the newly elected 
British Conservative Party. The working paper allegedly advocated 
Anglo-Portuguese co-operation in southern Africa, particularly 
regarding naval port facilities in Angola and Mozambique.470 The 
Mozambique Revolution article commented that Britain was now taking the 
lead among Western nations in openly aligning herself with Portugal and 
South Africa.471 As in the case with the United States, an ideological 
element was evident in the above article. The real motivation of the 
"clique" calling for support to Portugal and South Africa, it claimed, 
were the "interests... of the international capitalist class to which 
they belong".472
Britain's subsequent 1973 vote against an anti-Portugal United 
Nations measure was then cited as "no surprise". 473 In the same year, 
when the British-Portuguese alliance celebrated its six hundredth 
birthday, FRELIMO published an article titled "600 Years--End British 
Collaboration in Portugal's Wars".474
FRELIMO did, however, attempt to establish links with Britain's 
Labour Party, then in opposition. A FRELIMO delegation addressed its 
annual conference in late 19 7 3 . 475 In the same year Machel met with 
Labour Party politician Joan Lestor.476
469 "Cahora Bassa and Barclays DCO", Mozambique Revolution, no. 42 
(January-March 1970), pp. 35-37.
470 "Britain--Defending the Freedom to Exploit", Mozambique 
Revolution, no. 44 (July-September 1970), pp. 27-28.
471 Ibid.
472 Ibid.
473 "Sorting Our Friends from Our Enemies", Mozambique Revolution, no.
57 (October-December 1973), pp. 1-2.
474 "600 Years--End British Collaboration in Portugal's Wars",
Mozambique Revolution, no. 54 (January-March 1973), pp. 18-19.
475 "Britain: Labour Party Conference", Mozambique Revolution, no. 57 
(October-December 1973), p. 9.
476 Malcolm Rifkind (Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs), interview by author, London, United Kingdom, 30 January 
1985.
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France was the final major Western "enemy", but FRELIMO devoted 
relatively little effort to specific analysis of French policy.
Instead, France was consistently listed as one of the primary 
supporters of Portugal, a significant arms supplier, and a main blocker 
of anti-colonial resolutions in the United Nations. France was 
specifically selected for criticism in 1970, when Minister of Finance 
Valery Giscard d'Estaing visited Mozambique, and FRELIMO speculated 
that he was negotiating some "secret deal on [Mozambican] minerals" 
with the Portuguese.477
The above events show that FRELIMO was increasingly 
disillusioned with the main Western powers. As mentioned in chapter 2, 
however, Mondlane's 1968 experience with liberal sectors in the United 
States and Europe convinced him that it was worthwhile to cultivate 
"progressive" Western organisations. Mondlane's successors, who did not 
share his lengthy experience with Western institutions, were 
nonetheless convinced of the strategy's practical efficacy, and 
consistently continued his efforts. 478 By the eve of the Portuguese 
coup, FRELIMO support committees had been established in Italy, the 
United States, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, 
Finland, and Canada.479
In 1972, FRELIMO credited U.S. committees with some U.S. local 
governments' rejection of bids from Gulf Oil because of its involvement 
in Mozambique and Angola.480 The following year Machel remarked, "In the 
United States, solidarity actions are multiplying, and [there is] 
collection of both financial and material help".481
Support from Italian communities associated with the Italian 
Communist Party was also noted. Co-operation between the FRELIMO-
477 "The Mystery of Mr. Giscard D Estaing Safari" (sic), Mozambique
Revolution, no. 42 (January-March 1970), pp. 38-39.
478 "Intervenqao do Presidente Samora Machel na Primeira Sessao de
Trabalhos", op. cit., p. 200.
479 FRELIMO, Relatorio do Comite Central ao 3 Conqresso. op. cit., p. 
43 .
480 "$435,000,000--Nixon's Investment in Portuguese Colonialism", op. 
cit., pp. 22-25.
481 Samora Machel, "A Nossa Luta Transforma-se Efectivamente na Luta 
de Todo o Povo Moqambicano", speech, 25 September 1973, reprinted in 
Samora Machel; A Luta Continua. ed. Jose A. Salvador (Porto, 
Portugal: Ediqoes Afrontamento, 1974), p. 135.
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controlled Cabo Delgado hospital and the Santa Maria Nuova Communal 
Hospital in Reggio Emelia was undertaken, and a similar pact was 
established between the Commune of Bologna and FRELIMO's Education 
Centre at Tunduru.482
Probably the most important support committee was the one 
established in the Netherlands, for it played a major role in 
persuading that country's government to aid FRELIMO. FRELIMO previously 
classified the Netherlands as a supporter of Portugal in the United 
Nations. In January 1970, however, representatives of the MPLA and 
FRELIMO were received in the Hague by the Commission of Foreign Affairs 
in the Dutch Parliament, partly due to lobbying by the support 
committees. The Parliament then passed a resolution condemning 
Portuguese colonialism and Dutch military co-operation with Lisbon.483
Support organisations in the United Kingdom also had some 
effect. A "Dambusters Committee" designed to discourage British firms 
from participating in the Cabora Bassa project disrupted shareholder 
meetings at a number of banks, and, according to Middlemas, "helped 
persuade the Joseph Roundtree Social Services Trust to make its 
controversial grant of £30,000 to the Mozambique Institute".484 FRELIMO 
credited the British agitators for the fact that, when Caetano visited 
Britain in 1973, "about half of the British Parliament accused him of 
assassination" ,485
Another part of the FRELIMO strategy was to partially isolate 
Portugal by vigorously lobbying the small Western governments that had 
already shown sympathy for the nationalist cause. The Scandinavian 
governments, as in the past, stood out as particularly sympathetic to 
FRELIMO, and in the 1970 to 1974 period their material contributions to 
the cause increased. In 1971, Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, who 
had established a personal relationship with Machel, budgeted £125,000 
for FRELIMO's use.486 According to a Swedish diplomat, however, these
482 "Foreign Policy", Mozambique Revolution, no. 51 (April-June 1972),
p. 28.
483 "Dutch Parliament Condemns NATO Support to Portugal", Mozambique 
Revolution, no. 42 (January-March 1970), pp. 22-24.
484 Middlemas, op. cit., p. 66.
485 Machel, "The People's Democratic Revolutionary Process in 
Mozambique", op. cit., p. 66.
486 Middlemas, op. cit., p. 166.
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funds were only to be used for "humanitarian" purposes, with much of 
the money going to the Mozambique Institute.487 Curiously, FRELIMO had 
no qualms about accepting this restricted aid, in contrast to its 
attitude to the brief West German offer. Transport in FRELIMO liberated 
areas was also increasingly via Swedish-donated "Scania" vehicles, and 
some rural children began to use the term "Scania" as a generic word 
for "truck".488
Relations with other Scandinavian governments also continued to 
improve. On 25 September 1972, Machel announced that the foreign 
ministers of Norway and Denmark had recently visited the FRELIMO office 
in Dar es Salaam and affirmed their governments' support for the 
movement1s cause. 489 This was particularly notable because Norway was a 
NATO member. In April 1973, Norway followed up on this initiative by 
hosting an anti-colonial conference and promising to support FRELIMO.490
The Netherlands also eventually joined the list of countries 
providing official support for FRELIMO. Partly due to the above- 
mentioned pressure brought by the support committees, on 2 July 1973 
the Dutch Minister for Development Aid announced, "The Dutch government 
is going to give support to the liberation movements because it wants 
to speed up the process of decolonisation in the territories occupied 
by Portugal, and not for 'humanitarian' reasons".491 FRELIMO favourably 
compared this with the West German position.
Overtures were also made to the Italian and Belgian governments, 
and while neither outright supported FRELIMO, both were given credit 
for trying harder than most other NATO members to reduce military 
support to Portugal.492
487 Karin Storm Roxman (political officer, Swedish embassy), interview 
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161
FRELIMO also made major breakthroughs in its relationship with 
Western churches. The Presbyterian churches in the United States had 
helped from the early days. 493 One of FRELIMO's New York representatives 
subsequently reported also collecting funds from Quaker, Amish, and 
Mennonite communities.494
The December 1972 massacre of villagers by Portuguese soldiers 
at Wiriyamu, just south of Tete, then helped FRELIMO consolidate church 
support. A horrific eyewitness account by the British priest Father 
Adrian Hastings was published in the London Times in July 19 7 3 . 495 After 
Hastings made a presentation at the United Nations later that month, 
FRELIMO's Marcelino dos Santos publicly embraced him.496 Shortly 
thereafter, the World Council of Churches, which had already condemned 
the Cabora Bassa project and offered safe conduct to deserters from the 
Portuguese army, gave $60,000 to FRELIMO.497 More important, the Pope 
twice condemned the Portuguese action498 and FRELIMO noted that the 
massacre had "obliged even the Vatican to abandon its customary policy 
of silence on the colonial war".499
SUMMARY
By the eve of the Portuguese coup, FRELIMO was far closer to the 
socialist countries than it had been a decade earlier, and was 
espousing Marxist-Leninist ideology more often and energetically. This 
was due to a combination of external and internal factors.
Internally, the movement's armed struggle experience in first 
taking over and then administering the "liberated" areas convinced the 
leadership that Marxist ideology was a useful analytical and propaganda 
tool. (The author leaves open the possibility propounded by Cahen that
493 Middlemas, op. cit., p. 170.
494 Source one, interview.
495 Isaacman and Isaacman, op. cit., p. 106.
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this "capture" of the FRELIMO leadership by Marxism was somewhat 
superficial and did not entail a genuine intention to build a socialist 
state.) The factional conflict with Nkavandame was resolved to the 
Mondlane faction's benefit by using Marxist "class struggle" precepts. 
The need to offer peasants better living conditions and political power 
in order to win them to the guerrilla cause found a familiar, though 
not perfectly congruent, echo in Marxism's call for "rule by the 
working class". Thus, FRELIMO's own concrete experiences on the ground 
were leading it to increasingly embrace Marxism as its official 
ideology.
A dual external dynamic then consolidated the internally 
generated shift. The major Western countries appeared to support 
Portugal, while the socialist countries, to differing degrees, aided 
FRELIMO operations. Thus, FRELIMO was naturally inclined to adopt the 
ideological trappings of its benefactors, adding a foreign element that 
overlaid, and seemed compatible with, the indigenous political trend 
already developing in the movement.
The internally and externally generated embrace of Marxism also 
added another element to FRELIMO's relationship with the West. In the 
1970 to 1974 period the West was criticised not just because it 
operationally sided with FRELIMO's enemy, the refrain in the 1960s, but 
now also because its political philosophy contradicted the movement's. 
Thus, the West was criticised both because it was aiding Lisbon and 
because it was capitalist.
Despite all the above, however, FRELIMO retained certain 
important links with the West, had significant differences of opinion 
with the socialist allies, and was ambivalent about some aspects of 
Marxist ideology.
FRELIMO retained contacts with "progressive" sectors of the 
Western communities, establishing personal relationships with student, 
religious, and political leaders. These contacts were reasonably 
successful at pressuring some governments to refrain from supporting 
Lisbon, and at raising funds and "humanitarian aid" for the movement. 
Thus, the West was not classified as a homogeneously evil entity, even 
though overall its economic interests and philosophy--"exploitation of 
man by man"--were inimical to FRELIMO's ideals. The tenacity with which 
FRELIMO continued to court Western liberals finds its roots in 
Mondlane's firsthand experience with and deep understanding of domestic
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politics in Western democracies, which he managed to convey to his 
successors.
The desire to consolidate relations with progressive Western 
forces, however, sometimes clashed with the interests of FRELIMO's 
socialist allies, as the 1973 caution about West German aid 
illustrates. Thus, FRELIMO was sceptical about certain gestures by 
Western progressives who were on particularly hostile terms with the 
movement's socialist benefactors.
Just as enmity with the West was incomplete, so was solidarity 
with the socialist bloc. FRELIMO refused to promise any of them base 
facilities, rejected Soviet suggestions that it remained allied with 
ZAPU, and deemed Cuba's "foco" strategy unsuitable to Mozambican 
conditions. Even with the Chinese, FRELIMO's closest ally, differences 
were evident. The movement was uneasy with the cultural revolution, and 
refused to back Beijing in its rivalry with Moscow.
Identification with classical Marxist-Leninist ideology was also 
imperfect. Establishment of a vanguard party, though accepted in 
principle, was considered inappropriate for FRELIMO's stage of 
development. Similarly, establishment of fully collectivised forms of 
production, praised in theory, was judged unsuitable for the conditions 
existing in much of the liberated areas.
In short, FRELIMO exhibited a mixture of pragmatic and 
ideologically driven policies at the time of the Portuguese coup. It 
had come to its policy positions primarily as a result of the armed 
struggle conditions it encountered in Mozambique, the internal strains 
that occasionally wracked the organisation, the influence of its 
principal allies, and its perception of Western policies.
What might FRELIMO's attitude towards the West have been if it 
had perceived the major NATO powers to be assisting the movement and 
firmly opposed to Portuguese colonialism? Because FRELIMO's outlook was 
by now so firmly rooted in its own specific armed struggle and internal 
factional experience, it seems unlikely that it would have shifted to a 
capitalist, pro-Western attitude under such circumstances. As in the 
late 1960s, a vigorous co-optation effort on the part of the West at 
this time would probably have won greater FRELIMO consideration of 
Western interests and more moderate rhetoric. Regardless of the nature 
of Western policies, however, the movement's ideology would have 
shifted significantly leftward, bringing it into some degree of 
conflict with the capitalist West.
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CHAPTER 9 
U.S. COMPLACENCY
From 1970 until the Portuguese coup in April 1974, Washington relegated 
the MPLA and FRELIMO to the status of irrelevancies. No effort was made 
to establish contact with their leaders. No voices of any consequence 
called for a co-optation effort. Those uneasy with policy sought only 
to limit Washington's growing alliance with Portugal.
Even the limited efforts of such liberals were unsuccessful and 
Washington's courting of Lisbon, initiated in the late 1960s, 
intensified. Restrictions on sales of U.S. equipment likely to be used 
in the African wars were relaxed, the training of Portuguese military 
officers in U.S. facilities increased, U.S. investments in Portugal's 
African colonies grew, and generous loans were granted to the 
coloniser.
A mix of factors similar, but not identical, to those motivating 
U.S. policy in the late 1960s influenced Washington's posture in the 
1970 to 1974 period. The ongoing cold war with the Soviet Union, 
related concern about maintaining access to the strategically useful 
Azores base (made more acute in the early 1970s by events in the Middle 
East), and internal politics were the most important elements. U.S. 
economic interests in the African territories played only a minor role, 
and while perception of the nationalists' policies did have some impact 
on policy, it was not a critical determinant.
THE NIXON-KISSINGER WORLD VIEW
From 1970 to the coup in 1974, U.S. policy on Mozambique and Angola was 
heavily influenced by the world views of Henry Kissinger and Richard 
Nixon. Philosophically, both focussed on the U.S. competition with the 
Soviet Union, and in the early 1970s their preoccupation with Vietnam 
simultaneously reinforced this predisposition and reduced resources 
available for other international questions.
Kissinger's subsequent memoirs also revealed that he believed that 
Third World "radicalism" derived from ideological inspiration and was 
therefore unreformable. He rejected the idea that it might, in part, be a 
reaction to Western behaviour-a reaction that could change in response to 
shifts in Western policy. Thus, he has written of the late 1960s and 
early 1970s:
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The working level in our government, especially in the State 
Department, operated on the romantic view that Third World 
radicalism was really frustrated Western liberalism. Third World 
leaders, they believed, had become extremist because the West had 
backed conservative regimes, because we did not understand their 
reformist aspirations, because their societies were backward and 
eager for change--for every reason, in fact, other than the most 
likely: ideological commitment to the implacable anti-Western 
doctrines they were espousing.500
Kissinger also placed great emphasis on not conceding to the Soviet Union
even in relatively minor conflicts. He subsequently wrote:
Soviet ideological hostility translates itself into geopolitical 
rivalry in the manner of a traditional great power, seeking gains 
any one of which might be marginal but whose accumulation will 
upset the global equilibrium. Emotionally committed to facing an 
overall moral challenge in an apocalyptic confrontation, we thus 
run the risk of floundering vis-a-vis more ambiguous Soviet 
attempts to nibble away at the balance of power.... The United 
States as the leader of the democracies had a responsibility to 
defend global security even against ambiguous and seemingly 
marginal assaults.501
Both the MPLA and FRELIMO produced radical rhetoric, and because 
Kissinger associated this with "implacable anti-Western doctrines", he 
concluded that diplomatic efforts to woo these organisations would be 
futile. He believed that, given their associations with Moscow, their 
coming to power would represent a "gain" for the USSR, which, "marginal" 
though it might be, could help the Soviet Union "nibble away at the 
balance of power".
Strengthening relations with Portugal, on the other hand, was 
perfectly compatible with the above world view. First, because Third 
World radicalism was seen to arise from ideology and not from Western 
backing of conservative regimes, closer association with Portugal was not 
viewed as risking further radicalisation of African leaders. Second, 
because Portugal was both a staunch anti-communist ally in Europe and a 
key member of NATO, Kissinger viewed it as a valuable ally in the 
overriding competition with Moscow. Third, Portugal had important 
existing and potential base assets, specifically the Azores and port 
cities in Africa, which were growing in significance as aircraft 
refuelling and submarine surveillance facilities gained increasing weight 
in the Soviet-U.S. military race.
500 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 
1982), op. cit., p. 859.
501 Ibid., pp. 980-981.
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Option 2 of National Security Study Memorandum 39 (NSSM 39) , as 
described in chapter 6, neatly fitted the above Kissinger-Nixon 
preoccupations and in January 1970 Nixon and Kissinger "officially 
endorsed 'option 2 1 and began their policy of 'communication' with the 
white minorities".502 (This fact did not become widely known publicly 
until 1975.)
The year following the NSSM study, 1970, provided numerous 
examples of the new U.S. attitude towards Portuguese colonialism. U.S. 
Representative to the United Nations Charles W. Yost told the 
Subcommittee on Africa of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on 
Foreign Affairs that Portugal's "multiracialism and the opportunities for 
non-whites in its African territories" distinguished it from "the rest of 
southern Africa".503 Secretary of State William Rogers echoed this 
sentiment during a 1970 visit to Lisbon, commending "the Portuguese 
policy of racial toleration".504
U.S. actions in the United Nations during 1970 also reflected 
concern for Portugal's position. The United States voted against African- 
sponsored resolutions that proposed that Portugal be condemned for not 
recognising the African territories' right to self-determination, 
expressed concern over the intensification of foreign economic activities 
in those territories, and appealed for a halt to training of Portuguese 
military personnel by foreign countries and the sale of arms.505
Although the United Nations votes raised Lisbon's morale and 
reinforced the nationalists' anger at the United States, Washington's 
policy decisions on sales to Portugal probably had a more decisive impact 
on the course of the struggle in the Portuguese territories. On 28 
January 1970 Kissinger sent a secret memo to his principal colleague in 
Washington announcing the decision that "dual use" non-lethal equipment
502 Noer, op. cit., p. 240.
503 Testimony of Charles W. Yost, U.S. Representative to the United 
Nations, Policy Towards Africa for the Seventies, hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S.
House of Representatives, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, March 17, 18, 
19, 23, 24, May 19, 20, 21, June 4, September 30, October 1, November 
18, and December 3, 1970, p. 298.
504 William Rogers as quoted by Ken Owen, "Closer Ties with US", Star 
(Johannesburg, South Africa), 4 June 1970.
505 El-Khawas and Cohen, op. cit., p. 46.
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would be excluded from the arms embargo on Portugal. 506 The National 
Security Council subsequently issued new guidelines that liberalised 
regulation governing such of sales. Department of Commerce official Rauer 
H. Myer later stated that in 1970 jurisdiction over sales of two 
herbicides was taken away from the Office of Munitions Control, where 
sales were supervised by the Department of State, and placed under 
"validated licensing control", meaning that sales would be supervised by 
the Department of Commerce. The justification, according to Myer, was 
that the chemicals "were not the defoliants that were particularly 
favored... for military defoliations".507
Similarly, at the end of 1970 the United States indicated 
willingness to sell Boeing 707 aircraft to Portugal, where they 
presumably could be used for troop transport.508 Assistant Secretary of 
State for African Affairs David D. Newsom subsequently explained that the 
request to purchase the aircraft "came at a time... that was critical in 
the American aerospace situation" and the sale was therefore approved 
"without restrictions".509 The total number of aircraft, both planes and 
helicopters, going from the United States to Mozambique and Angola in 
1970 amounted to thirty-three, up from seven in 1969.510 After listening 
to testimony on this subject in 1973, Representative John C. Culver 
concluded that in 1970 there had been a "substantial relaxation" of the 
control programmes.511
Not even Lisbon's apparent November 1970 assistance to rebels who 
invaded the country of Guinea (formerly part of French West Africa, and 
sometimes referred to as Guinea-Conakry) from bases in the Portuguese
506 Antunes, Nixon e Caetano. op. cit., p. 147.
507 Testimony of Rauer H. Myer, Director, Office of Export Control, 
Bureau of East-West Trade, Department of Commerce, Implementation of 
the U.S. Arms Embargo. op. cit., pp. 60-61.
508 Oudes, statement, Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo, op. 
cit., p. 6.
509 Testimony of David D. Newsom, assistant secretary of state for 
African affairs, Department of State, Implementation of the U.S. Arms 
Embargo, op. cit., p. 153.
510 "Exports of Aircraft and Helicopters to Mozambique and Angola, 
1963-1972", U.S. Bureau of Census FT-410 Export Statistics. Reprinted 
in Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo, op. cit., p. 52.
511 Statement of Representative John C. Culver, Implementation of the 
U.S. Arms Embargo. op. cit., p. 42.
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colony of Guinea-Bissau disrupted the increasingly friendly relations 
between Lisbon and Washington. The United States abstained on a United 
Nations vote criticising Portugal for its action, though U.S. diplomats 
reported privately that they believed Portugal had indeed been involved 
in the invasion.512
Perhaps anticipating that the administration would turn a blind 
eye, a few U.S. companies also engaged in deals with Portugal of 
questionable legality. According to Antunes, some sympathisers of 
Portugal within the Nixon administration "established channels through 
which war material was supplied to Lisbon".513 Former Portuguese Foreign 
Minister Nogueira told Antunes in an interview, "John Mitchell was a 
friend of [Portuguese] Ambassador Garin and arranged ways for us to 
receive arms".514 In September 1970, the Chrysler company sold Portugal 
almost $200,000 worth of military equipment without obtaining a license 
from the State Department and was later fined.515
As already mentioned in chapters 7 and 8, U.S. diplomats in Africa 
were instructed to reduce contacts with the nationalists and, and the CIA 
cut back its information gathering in the region.
U.S. concern for Lisbon's needs continued into 1971. In June, 
Department of Commerce official Harold B. Scott was asked by the House 
Subcommittee on Africa if the previously sold Boeing 707s could be used 
by Portugal to transport troops for the African wars. He replied that 
they were "for such use as the Portuguese Government wished to make of 
them". Asked about export licenses to the Bell Company for export of five 
helicopters for the Portuguese government, he replied that the licenses 
had been issued, but the helicopters "were for transporting materials to 
a dam construction site"516 (the Cabora Bassa dam). The possibility that 
these aircraft might be used for military purposes and therefore violate
512 "Conakry Raid Puts Doubts on Caetano", Star (Johannesburg, South 
Africa), 22 December 1970.
513 Antunes, Nixon e Caetano. op. cit., p. 131.
514 Ibid.
515 Ibid., p. 132.
516 Testimony of Harold B. Scott, Deputy Assistant Secretary and 
Director, Bureau of International Commerce, Department of Commerce, 
U.S. Business Involvement in Southern Africa, hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. 
House of Representatives, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, Part 1, May 4, 
5, 11, 12, June 2, 3, 15, 16, 30, and July 15, 1971, p. 270.
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the U.S. embargo against arms sales for use in Portugal's Africa wars 
concerned some members of Congress, but not the administration.
Three months later, in September, Assistant Secretary of State 
Newsom defended Washington's United Nations voting record in a manner 
that Lisbon must have found profoundly reassuring. He said that as a 
major power the United States needed to consider issues in a world 
context, and consider "how any particular action would affect other 
problem areas in the world". He added, "Rarely can one nation, any 
nation, however powerful, affect basic attitudes in another society if 
that society clings to its vested interests and resists change".517
Further revelations of growing Portuguese-U.S. military co­
operation occurred in November 1971 when a Pentagon spokesperson 
testified that the budget for U.S. training of Portuguese military 
personnel had doubled since Nixon took office. It subsequently emerged 
that the United States planned to train eighty-three Portuguese air force 
officers in fiscal years 1971 and 1972, a tenfold jump over the average 
of the previous seven years. During the November 1971 hearing, the 
Pentagon spokesperson noted that it was likely that U.S.-trained 
Portuguese personnel were rotated to African assignments, and added, "We 
would have no prohibition on U.S.-trained Portuguese officers going where 
their country sen[ds] them".518
THE AZORES AGREEMENT
In December 1971, negotiations for continued U.S. use of the Azores, 
which had been going on behind the scenes since 1969 and undoubtedly 
accounted for much of Washington's sensitivity to Portuguese concerns 
outlined above, culminated in a visit by President Nixon to the base and 
the simultaneous exchange of notes in Brussels between the Portuguese 
foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state. This was the first 
visit by a U.S. president to Portuguese soil since before the wars began 
in the African territories.519 The "executive agreement" Nixon celebrated
517 "A Look at African Issues at the United Nations", address by David 
D. Newsom, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, to the 
Atlanta Press Club, 21 September 1971.
518 Pentagon spokesman's testimony at the November 1971 hearings as 
summarised in Oudes, statement, Implementation of the U.S. Arms 
Embargo, op. cit., pp. 8-9.
519 Bruce Oudes, "Naval Bases and Foreign Quarrels", Washington Post 
(Washington, D.C.), 30 January 1972.
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was also the first formal U.S.-Portuguese Azores accord in nine years, as 
Washington had let the previous lease expire in the early 1960s. (During 
the intervening period the United States had used the Azores on an ad hoc 
basis, with the rent in effect being about $1 million per year in grant 
military aid. 520)
Lisbon drove a hard bargain. In return for a relatively short 
twenty-five month lease, Portugal received the loan of an "oceanographic 
research vessel" (worth $8 million according to Caetano),521 $1 million in 
educational assistance, the transfer of $5 million worth of "non-military 
excess equipment" from the U.S. Department of Defence,522 favourable terms 
for the purchase of U.S. food commodities valued at $30 million, an offer 
of up to $400 million in U.S. Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) financing 
credits,523 and the waiver of Portugal's $350,000 contribution to support 
of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group in Portugal.524
Lisbon was delighted, and on 16 December 1971 Caetano announced 
that the United States and Portugal were "now allies".525 Some members of 
the U.S. Congress were less pleased. Both Senator Clifford P. Case and 
Representative Charles Diggs protested, the former by demanding that
520 Ibid.
521 Text of the radio and television talk broadcast by Portuguese 
Prime Minister Marcello Caetano, 16 December 1971. Reprinted in 
Executive Agreements with Portugal and Bahrain, hearings before the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 92nd Congress, 2nd 
Session, on S. Res. 214 Relative to the Submission of Any Portuguese 
Base Agreement as a Treaty, February 1, 2, and 3, 1972, p. 26.
522 Testimony of Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary of 
State for Political Affairs, Department of State, Executive 
Agreements with Portugal and Bahrain, op. cit., p. 58.
523 Testimony of George W. Bader, Regional Director (Africa), Office 
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security 
Affairs), Department of Defense, Implementation of the U.S. Arms 
Embargo, op. cit., p. 99. See also Johnson, testimony, Executive 
Agreements with Portugal and Bahrain, op. cit., p. 24.
524 Testimony of Col. Richard A. Bowen, Country Desk Officer, European 
Region, Department of Defense, Implementation of the U.S. Arms 
Embargo, op. cit., p. 105.
525 Oudes, "Naval Bases and Foreign Quarrels", op. cit., quoting 
Caetano's 16 December 1971 radio and television address.
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Congress be consulted on the Azores base deal, 526 and the latter by 
resigning his post from the U.S. delegation to the United Nations.527
CONSOLIDATION OF THE NEW RELATIONSHIP
Over the following months U.S.-Portuguese relations continued to blossom. 
Remarks by U.S. officials were consistently favourable to Lisbon, and the 
nationalists, if mentioned at all, were referred to dismissively.
In June 1972, Assistant Secretary Newsom told the Mid-America 
Committee in Chicago, "[0]ur response to the needs of one area is 
frequently limited by our interests in another"; he emphasised that the 
United States had only limited influence on southern African governments. 
Regarding the nationalist movements in Portuguese territories, Newsom 
conceded, "The leaders... seek contacts with and help from the West [but] 
the United States has traditionally been unwilling to recognize 
opposition elements in colonial territories until an internationally 
recognized transfer of power has taken place".528 Nine months later,
Newsom visited Lisbon for talks with Caetano and other top officials, and 
returned to remark that it would be "unrealistic" to expect the United 
States to pressure Portugal to change policies "rooted in tradition and 
politics" .529
The United States continued to be considerate of Portuguese 
interests in the United Nations as well. In February 1972, the United 
States, (along with the United Kingdom, France, Argentina, Belgium, and 
Italy) abstained on a United Nations Security Council resolution calling 
for Portugal to give its African territories independence.530 In November
526 Statements of Senator Clifford P. Case and Representative Charles 
C. Diggs, Jr., Executive Agreements with Portugal and Bahrain, op. 
cit., p. 2.
527 U.S. Representative Charles C. Diggs, Jr., Press Conference 
Statement of Resignation from U.S. Delegation to the 26th Session of 
the United Nations General Assembly, reprinted in Executive 
Agreements with Portugal and Bahrain, op. cit., pp. 138-141.
528 David D. Newsom, "Southern Africa: Constant Themes in U.S.
Policy", speech, June 1972. Reprinted in Current Foreign Policy. 
Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media 
Services, p. 4.
529 David D. Newsom, testimony, Implementation of the U.S. Arms 
Embargo, op. cit., p. 143.
530 "End Portuguese Rule--UN Call", Star (Johannesburg, South Africa), 
5 February 1972.
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the General Assembly voted ninety-eight to six, with eight abstentions, 
in favour of a call for Portugal to begin negotiations with the "national 
liberation movements" with a view to independence.531 The United States 
again voted against the measure.532
Again, consolidation of the Portuguese-U.S. relationship was 
marked by rising sales of dual-purpose equipment. In 1972, the value of 
aircraft exported to Portugal alone (not counting Mozambique and Angola) 
rose more than fivefold. 533 In the autumn of 1972, Marches Trooicaux and 
the Portuguese press reported that the United States was permitting the 
sale of Aero Commanders manufactured by Rockwell International to 
Portugal for use in Mozambique, and Rockwell officials said that they 
were negotiating for the sale of four more.534 In late 1972, a dozen Bell 
helicopters were sold to Mozambique with the support of the U.S. official 
export credit agency, Eximbank,535 and in 1973 Portuguese newspapers 
announced that the Portuguese national airline was buying Boeing 747s as 
troop carriers. 536 In the fifteen months between January 1972 and March 
1973 the United States sold $341,920 worth of aircraft to Angola and 
$3,370,998 worth to Mozambique.537 In April 1973, a Department of Commerce 
official reported that over the previous seven years only one application 
to export aircraft to Mozambique or Angola had been denied.538
Portugal also was able to increase dramatically its herbicide 
purchases. Though technically deemed agricultural products, these 
herbicides in fact were useful for killing off vegetation in which 
guerrillas could conceal themselves, and for damaging the crops of
531 "Success at the UN", Mozambique Revolution, no. 53 (October- 
December 1972), p. 17.
532 Middlemas, op. cit., p. 174.
533 "Exports of Aircraft and Helicopters to Mozambique and Angola, 
1963-1972", op. cit., p. 52, p. 58.
534 Oudes, Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo, op. cit., p. 7.
535 Ibid., p. 8.
536 Jennifer Davis, statement, Implementation of the U.S. Arms 
Embargo, op. cit., p. 79.
537 "Aircraft and Helicopter Licenses and Reexport Authorizations 
Issued to Portuguese Territories in Africa during 1972 and 1973 (as
of Mar. 15)", in Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo, op. cit., 
p. 29.
538 Myer, Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo, op. cit., p. 50.
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peasants who lent them assistance. In 1972, the United States exported 
$680 million worth of herbicides to Portugal, Mozambique, and Angola, up 
from $59 million in 19 6 9 . 539
Many of the aircraft and herbicide deals were financed with 
Eximbank assistance, extended in association with the Azores agreement.
At the close of 1972, Eximbank exposure in Angola and Mozambique was over 
$20 million and $12 million respectively, up from about $13 million and 
$5 million respectively in 1971.540
The number of Portuguese military personnel receiving U.S. 
training rose only slightly after the leap in 1971, averaging eighty-six 
per year for 1972 and 1973, but the type of training grew more 
sophisticated.541 Portuguese jet fighter pilots were trained in West 
Germany using U.S. Air Force facilities, 542 a group of Portuguese officers 
received counterinsurgency training in the U.S. Army's Jungle Warfare 
School in the Panama Canal Zone,543 and Portuguese officers received 
special instruction at U.S. centres such as the Naval Postgraduate School 
in Monterey, California.544 Asked by Representative Donald Fraser in 
September 1973 to provide "some assurance" that none of the U.S.-trained 
Portuguese officers were involved in the war in Africa, the Department of 
State's director of the Office of Southern African Affairs, John Foley, 
replied, "I don't think I can".545
539 "Portugal Afrique: La Guerre de L'OTAN", Jeune Afrioue. no. 705 
(13 July 1974), p. 64.
540 Testimony of Robert S. Smith, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
for African Affairs, Department of State, U.S. Business Involvement 
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Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 93rd 
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The U.S. military's operational interest in Portuguese Africa also 
rose. In June 1973, the Supreme Allied Atlantic Command in Norfolk, 
Virginia "began to elaborate emergency plans for an eventual intervention 
in South Africa, which reinforced American attention regarding Angola and 
Mozambique within the NATO context".546
Ironically, the U.S. decision to consolidate relations with 
Portugal in 1972 coincided with a rightward shift in internal Portuguese 
politics. From 1970 to 1972 Portuguese "Europeanists", who believed that 
the nation's future prosperity lay in economic integration with Europe 
rather than Africa, had challenged their "Africanist" rivals. Their 
arguments resembled Ball's 1963 call for a "Eurafrican transition" and 
Wasserman's theory of "consensual decolonisation", and they called for 
granting greater autonomy to the African territories. However, in mid- 
1972 hard-line Africanists regained control, Portugal began to accept 
military assistance from southern Africa's minority governments, and 
reports of atrocities against civilians rose. As military reverses in
Africa increased, anti-war sentiment began to emerge within the armed
forces. In late 1973 the Movement of the Armed Forces (Movimento das 
Forqas Armadas--MFA) was formed and called for a negotiated solution to 
the military conflict in Africa.547 The United States allied itself more
closely with Portugal just as the top of that ally's structure was moving
rightward, while the middle and bottom, together with "Europeanist" 
economic interests, was shifting left.
THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS
In October 1973, Egypt's attack on Israel in the Yom Kippur War firmly 
cemented Washington's ties with Caetano and further strained relations 
with the nationalists. The United States urgently wanted to airlift arms 
to Israel and sought permission from its NATO allies to refuel supply 
planes at their bases en route to the Middle East. All refused548 except
Committee of Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 93rd 
Congress, 1st Session, August 1, September 13, 19, 20, 27, October 3, 
4, 10, 11, 16, 18, 24, 25, November 1, December 7, 1973, p. 186.
546 Antunes, Nixon e Caetano. op. cit., p. 267.
547 Henderson, op. cit., p. 225.
548 "Portugal Earns the Gratitude of Washington", Star (Johannesburg, 
South Africa), 30 November 1973.
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Portugal, which, after tense negotiations, provided unconditional transit 
rights at the Lajes air base in the Azores.549
Kissinger, who had become secretary of state in September 1973 and 
now was running U.S. foreign policy without much input from a Watergate- 
preoccupied President Nixon, was grateful. He swiftly asked Congress to 
eliminate an amendment to the pending Foreign Assistance Act that would 
have made a law of the executive order forbidding the use of U.S. arms in 
Portuguese Africa.550 It had been introduced by liberal members of 
Congress, who now found themselves in an awkward position as most 
supported Israel and appreciated Lisbon's recent help. Kissinger then 
visited Lisbon in December 1973 on his way back from a tour of the Middle
East. In his memoirs, Kissinger remarked that he "owed the Portuguese a
show of support for its [sic] assistance during the airlift".551 He also 
presumably wanted to discuss extension of the Azores base agreement, 
officially due to expire in February 1974, though the "grace period" 
would not end until six months after that. Kissinger himself subsequently 
acknowledged that the December visit led to "a large area of agreement" 
with respect to "problems of concern" to both countries.552
Author Henry Jackson claims that Kissinger promised Lisbon 
sophisticated arms, including transport aircraft and "red eye" (surface- 
to-air) missiles.553 Jackson further says that after Kissinger returned to 
Washington, rumours abounded that the secretary of state had consented to 
Portugal's use of these weapons in Africa and some black officials in the 
Department of State contemplated resigning in protest.554 Gerald Bender, a 
leading U.S. specialist on Angola at the University of California, also 
insists that Kissinger privately agreed to meet Portugal's request for 
arms for Africa.555 Speculation that Kissinger's decisions had pleased
549 Kissinger, op. cit., p. 520.
550 "Portugal Calls for U.S. Aid in African Wars", Star (Johannesburg,
South Africa), 15 November 1973.
551 Kissinger, op. cit., p. 792.
552 Department of State Bulletin 70. Number 1803. 14 January 1973, pp. 
25-26.
553 Jackson, op. cit., p. 63.
554 Ibid.
555 Gerald J. Bender, "Kissinger and Angola: The Anatomy of Failure" 
(unpublished typescript, 1976), p. 6; Noticias de Portugal (Lisbon),
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Lisbon was naturally encouraged by reports in early 1974 that Portugal 
was offering the United States use of the Mozambican ports of Lourenqo 
Marques556 and Nacala557 as naval bases. However, Antunes' exhaustive 
analysis of the Lisbon-Washington interaction shows that Kissinger drove 
a hard bargain, that Lisbon received little material reward for its 
assistance, and that Portugal's request for missiles was specifically 
rejected.558 The event did, however, strengthen U.S. concern to maintain 
access to the Azores base, and impacted the tone of U.S. pronouncements, 
which became even more solicitous of Lisbon's concerns.
Heightened U.S. sensitivity to Lisbon's concerns was also evident 
in the March 1974 hearings in Congress on Portuguese Africa. On 14 March, 
Department of State official W. Paul O'Neil Jr. told the House Africa 
Subcommittee, "We do not... feel that Portugal must necessarily be 
completely excluded from the future of these areas.... Portugal's 
official policy of racial equality... gives the parties involved a 
framework within which they could achieve some common ground for 
discussion". 559 A week later, David Newsom made a two-day trip to Lisbon 
for talks with Caetano and Foreign Minister Rui Patricio amid intense 
press speculation that the visit indicated increased U.S. sympathy for 
Portugal's Africa policies.560
ECONOMIC PENETRATION
A final aspect of U.S. actions in the 1970 to 1974 period that had 
important implications for post-coup developments, but received 
relatively little attention at the time, was the growing U.S. economic
29 December 1983.
556 "Lourenqo Marques Considered as an American Naval Base", South 
Africa Financial Gazette (South Africa), 1 February 1974.
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African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, The 
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Coup, hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 2nd 
session, March 14, October 8, 9, and 22, 1974, pp. 6-7.
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penetration of the Angolan and, to a lesser but still significant extent, 
the Mozambican economies. In 1970 the Department of Commerce abandoned 
its previous policy of "neither encouraging nor discouraging" investments 
in South Africa and began to actively promote U.S. economic involvement 
in southern Africa.561 Antunes cites a U.S. businessman who, in a 1970 
visit to Angola, enthusiastically chortled that "Angola is twice as big 
as Texas and three times as rich".562 In 1970, businessmen "of 
conservative outlook" also replaced liberal members of the State 
Department's Africa Advisory Council.563
By 1970, U.S. investment in the Portuguese colonies equalled that 
of the United Kingdom. They both provided 15 percent of the total, behind 
South Africa, which accounted for over one-third of the investments.564 
David Newsom testified to Congress that the U.S. private sector had 
invested "at least" $170 million in Angola, of which $150 million was 
associated with the oil business. This represented 6.3 percent of total 
U.S. investment in Africa.565 The most important U.S. economic activity in 
the territories was Gulf Oil's investment in Angola's Cabinda Province. 
Gulf had discovered oil there in 1966 and gained almost total control of 
oil production in the province by 1971.566 By 1972 it had invested $209 
million in Angola and in that year paid $61 million to the Portuguese 
authorities, 567 providing 13 percent of the total Angolan provincial 
budget and 60 percent of its 1972 military expenditures.568 By 1975 (a 
year after the Portuguese coup), Gulf's Cabinda operation had absorbed
561 Noer, op. cit., p. 241.
562 Antunes, Nixon e Caetano. op. cit., p. 132.
563 Ibid., p. 128.
564 Munslow, op. cit., p. 48.
565 Testimony of David D. Newsom, Assistant Secretary of State for 
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566 Jackson, op. cit., p. 59.
567 Henderson, op. cit., p. 210.
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$300 million in investments and was producing 150,000 barrels per day.569 
Texaco also was involved in Angola, but on a much smaller scale.570
Gulf's activities attracted some criticism from liberal U.S. 
organisations, but the firm argued that its Cabinda investment was a 
"politically neutral" act.571 In 1971 a Gulf representative also insisted 
that Gulf had not contributed funds to any of the nationalist movements 
in Angola.572
Though the oil operation was by far the largest U.S. investment in 
Angola, U.S. firms were also involved in manufacturing, the most 
significant investment being General Tire's 10 percent interest in a 
factory, 573 and in mining, where U.S. firms were active in iron ore, 
diamond, sulphur, and phosphates exploration and extraction. 574 Trade with 
Angola was also spurred by the investments. In 1970, the United States 
was importing 162 percent more from Angola (primarily coffee) and was 
sending 245 percent more exports to that territory than it had a decade 
earlier.575
U.S. economic penetration of Mozambique was less vigorous. David 
Newsom testified in 1970 that direct U.S. investment amounted to "at 
least $15 million" of which $10 million was associated with oil 
exploration. This represented about 0.6 percent of total U.S. investment 
in Africa.576 In 1970, the United States was importing 260 percent more
569 Jackson, op. cit., p. 59.
570 Newsom, testimony, Policy Toward Africa for the Seventies, op. 
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from Mozambique (mainly cashews) and exporting 112 percent more to that 
territory than it had in I960.577
The rising level of U.S. private investment in Angola led to an 
interesting political development. While U.S. diplomats were accepting 
the picture painted by Portugal, the private sector's aim was to protect 
profits rather than reassure politicians. Thus, in the 1970 to 1974 
period Gulf Oil executives extended tentative feelers to the nationalists 
in Angola. According to sources close to the discussions, the contacts 
with MPLA officials were "very informal" and took place outside Angola, 
occasionally in Canada. Gulf was given only vague undertakings regarding 
the MPLA's future policy on the oil industry. However, on the basis of 
these talks, and similar ones with the FNLA and UNITA, the company came 
to the conclusion that it "could do business with an MPLA government in 
Angola". It was less sure of its ability to conduct business under a 
regime led by the other movements. This assessment was primarily based on 
the educational level and economic sophistication of the officials of the 
respective movements.578
SUMMARY
By the eve of the Portuguese coup, U.S. policy towards the MPLA and 
FRELIMO entailed no official contact with the liberation movements, 
economic aid and financial credits for Lisbon, relaxation of restrictions 
on sales of dual-purpose equipment, lax policing of the prohibition 
against use of U.S. equipment in Africa, increased training of Portuguese 
forces, and support for Lisbon's position at the United Nations. The 
possibility that Washington's obsession with the Soviet Union might hand 
Moscow opportunities in the battle for African nationalists' "hearts and 
minds", a major preoccupation in the early 1960s, did not occur to U.S. 
decision makers in the Kissinger era. The likelihood of the nationalists 
taking power was deemed so remote, and the damage that contacts with the 
movements would inflict upon the Portuguese-U.S. relationship was judged 
so severe, that Washington simply turned its back on the African leaders 
who, within nineteen months, would be running the independent nations of 
Mozambique and Angola.
577 Scott, testimony, U.S. Business Involvement in Southern Africa. 
Part 1, op. cit., p. 271.
578 John Sassi (ex-Gulf Oil employee), interview by author, New York, 
United States, 14 October 1987.
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Three main factors were largely responsible for this U.S. policy. 
Tense relations with the Soviet Union caused Washington to be 
particularly hostile towards any political organisation espousing 
socialist goals. Concern about access to strategic assets such as the 
Azores base, already heightened by cold war tensions, was further 
accentuated by the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the extensive use of the 
Azores to re-supply Israel. Internal U.S. politics, moving in an anti-co- 
optation direction following Nixon's 1972 landslide electoral victory, 
were further complicated by that conflict. Many of the liberals in 
Congress most critical of the growing U.S. relationship with Portugal 
also were extremely concerned about Israel's security, and the utility of 
the Azores in 1973 muted their criticism of Lisbon.
U.S. economic interests in Mozambique and Angola grew remarkably 
in the 1970 to 1974 period, but still accounted for only a small portion 
of worldwide U.S. business. Therefore, they did not have a profound 
impact on U.S. policy, though the investments and trade did further 
alienate the nationalists, as described in chapters 7 and 8.
Perception of the nationalists' positions did, superficially at 
least, appear to play some role in the development of U.S. policy.
Nixon's principal foreign policy architect, Henry Kissinger, considered 
the nationalists inherently anti-Western and therefore unlikely to 
respond positively to any U.S. overture. Unlike the U.S. private sector 
in this period, however, the U.S. government made no effort to look 
beyond the movements' public rhetoric and discover what their plans for 
post-independence society might imply for a long term relationship.
In short, U.S. interests mandated a coercion policy. Washington's 
need to retain trans-Atlantic alliances, gain support for its extra- 
Africa international agenda (regarding Israel and Vietnam), and ensure 
access to strategically located bases and ports (including not only the 
Azores base but now also Mozambican ports), all pushed it toward 
accommodating Lisbon rather than the nationalists. It sought to block 
alliances with the Soviet Union and encourage Western orientation of 
states not by efforts to co-opt nationalist groups contending for power, 
but by reinforcing the status quo.
What might Kissinger's position have been if the MPLA and FRELIMO 
had adopted a pro-Western, pro-capitalist posture? The weight given to 
strategic and cold war considerations by the Nixon administration 
suggests that in this circumstance a co-optation effort still would have 
been ruled out. The nationalists were thought incapable of taking power,
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and the short-term political-military cost of alienating Portugal was 
considered too great. The U.S. administration referred to its perception 
of the nationalists' policies when that perception appeared to confirm 
the wisdom of an anti-co-optation policy already adopted for other 
reasons, and not because that perception was actually a key determinant 
of policy. If perception of nationalist policies really had been an 
important consideration, Kissinger would have distinguished between the 
socialist-style MPLA and FRELIMO and the more conservative UNITA and 
FNLA. He made no such discrimination.
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CHAPTER 10 
EUROPEAN AMBIVALENCE
From 1970 to 1974 France adopted a policy similar to that of the United 
States regarding the nationalists, while West Germany and the United 
Kingdom displayed some unease with Washington's approach but refrained 
from launching major co-optation efforts of their own. As in the late 
1960s, however, the Scandinavian countries took a quite different course. 
Those governments already aiding the nationalists increased their 
support, neighbours joined in, and a small state outside the region, the 
Netherlands, eventually followed suit.
In no case was a European country's anti-co-optation policy 
primarily motivated by decision makers' perceptions of nationalist 
policies. Economic, cultural, and historical ties with the region, 
policies of allies, relations with the Soviet Union, strategic 
considerations, and internal political alignments played the most 
prominent roles in shaping the policies of the large European states. In 
the case of the small pro-nationalist states--Sweden, Denmark, Norway, 
and the Netherlands--internal politics was the main factor in shaping 
policy, though the absence of counterbalancing pressures favouring an 
alliance with Lisbon was also significant.
THE UNITED KINGDOM
During the first two years of the decade, London paid little attention to 
the MPLA or FRELIMO, and turned a blind eye to Portugal's counter­
insurgency efforts. From 1973 to the April 1974 coup, however, the 
British government began to express unease about the course of the 
conflict and established tentative contacts with FRELIMO.
The most important consideration influencing Britain's policies 
was the nation's economic, cultural, and historical links with the 
region. As long as it appeared that Portugal could prevent the wars in 
its territories from spilling over into neighbouring ex-British colonies, 
Britain's Conservative government was content to let the conflicts 
unfold. Once the violence in Mozambique appeared likely to disrupt the 
Anglophone states of Swaziland, Tanzania, Malawi, and Rhodesia, however, 
Whitehall became uncomfortable. Britain had important ties with these 
states and wished to protect its long-term interests. While maintaining 
access to markets was perhaps a modest U.S. interest, it was a very 
strong British interest.
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Internal British politics also played a significant, though less 
vital, role. When the brutal tactics adopted by Portuguese troops in 
Mozambique became public in 1973, the British population became 
increasingly unhappy with London's close association with Lisbon. The 
Labour Party's victory in the March 1974 elections also made Britain's 
internal political alignments more conducive to criticism of Portugal, 
though this new development barely had time to affect policy before the 
April coup in Lisbon transformed the political context entirely.
Finally, Britain's relations with allies had an impact on policy. 
Initially, Britain was most concerned about maintaining cordial relations
with its NATO allies, which largely accepted Portugal's counter­
insurgency efforts. Once the extreme violence of Portuguese soldiers 
became known, however, there was an outcry from Britain's Commonwealth 
friends, placing London in the uncomfortable position of trying to please
two sets of allies with opposing positions.
By the eve of the Portuguese coup, therefore, the British 
government was re-evaluating its approach towards the nationalists, 
particularly those in Mozambique, but had not yet firmly declared against 
Portuguese colonialism. In this period, as previously, perception of the 
policies of FRELIMO and the MPLA had little to do with British decision 
making.
1970 to 1972
Britain began 1970 with a decision that reflected its lack of 
interest in a co-optation policy. In April 1970, the Foreign Office 
issued a written reply to a Parliamentary question on Cabora Bassa, the 
dam project in Mozambique that FRELIMO vehemently opposed. The Foreign 
Office said that it would not dissuade British firms from participating 
in the project "except insofar as participation might involve 
contravention of our existing Rhodesian sanctions legislation".579 
(Britain had imposed sanctions on Rhodesia in 1965, when Rhodesia made a 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence following Britain's efforts to 
bring about more equitable race relations in the colony.)
The June 1970 electoral victory of the Conservative Party and 
Edward Heath's rise to the post of prime minister consolidated the anti- 
co-optation tendency. Heath continued his predecessor's Cabora Bassa
579 Middlemas, op. cit., p. 48.
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policy and indeed subsequently quarrelled with Zambian President Kenneth
Kaunda over the participation of British firms.580
A series of trips by British politicians then increased the public
perception of British-Portuguese harmony. Iain Sprout, a Member of
Parliament from Aberdeen, spent Christmas of 1970 in Mozambique as a
guest of Kaulza de Arriaga and spoke glowingly of Portuguese policies.581
Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas Home then remarked that he hoped
Britain would have a more intimate relationship with Portugal,582 and in
June 1971 visited Portugal for "cordial" talks about southern Africa.583
A few months later the Portuguese envoy to NATO, JosS Gago de
Medeiros, wrote to Caetano that the British chief of defence staff, Sir
Peter Hill-Norton, had recently told him (Gago de Medeiros):
Write to me and say what, in your opinion, are the points of
divergence between Portugal and England. It is important that we 
return to a situation of full friendship, trust and co­
operation.584
Britain's voting record in the United Nations also remained 
neutral or pro-Portuguese. In November 1970, the United Nations 
Trusteeship committee called for independence for the Portuguese 
territories. Britain, along with South Africa, Portugal, the United 
States, Brazil, Spain, and Colombia, voted against the measure.585 In 
February 1972, when the United Nations Security Council called on 
Portugal to give independence to its territories, the United Kingdom 
abstained.586
The British left took two different approaches in the 1970 to 1972 
period. The Labour Party, now in opposition, adopted rhetoric sympathetic
580 Ibid., p. 164.
581 "Mozambique Lauded by British MP", Star (Johannesburg, South 
Africa), 4 January 1971.
582 "Closer UK, Portugal Ties Seen by Home", Rand Daily Mail 
(Johannesburg, South Africa), 3 June 1971.
583 "Southern Africa as Main Talking Point", Star (Johannesburg, South 
Africa), 21 June 1971.
584 Letter from Jose Gago de Medeiros to Marcello Caetano, 18 November 
1971, reprinted in Antunes, ed., Cartas Particulares a Marcello 
Caetano, vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 146-148.
585 "Portugal Asked to Hand Over", Star (Johannesburg, South Africa),
19 November 1970.
586 "End Portuguese Rule--UN Call", op. cit.
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to the liberation movements, approving pro-nationalist resolutions in its 
1970 and 1971 Party Conferences and condemning British participation in 
Cabora Bassa. But Labour leader Harold Wilson was careful, in the words 
of Middlemas, "not to commit his party against a European ally".587
The left outside the official opposition took a more vigorous 
role. As mentioned in chapter 8, members of Britain's Committee for 
Freedom formed a "Dambusters Committee" to pressure British firms not to 
participate in Cabora Bassa and to urge philanthropies to support 
FRELIMO' s Mozambique Institute.588
1973 to the Coup
On 10 July 1973, the London Times ran a story titled "Portuguese 
Massacre Reported by Priest". The story was written by Father Adrian 
Hastings, who in turn based his information on reports from Spanish 
missionaries in Mozambique. Hastings claimed that Portuguese soldiers had 
killed hundreds of Mozambican peasants in a frenzied rage. Among other 
atrocities, he claimed they disembowelled pregnant women and shot off the 
heads of children and used the severed skulls as footballs.589
The emotive story divided British opinion. Though the Times backed 
the massacre report in a 13 July editorial, 590 the BBC refused to air a 
film by Hastings, saying it had "no news value".591 Considerable 
scepticism was voiced in establishment quarters, but in September 1973 
Portugal finally admitted that one hundred people had been gunned down at 
close range and that twenty to thirty had survived to report the event. 
Caetano quickly fired Col. Armando Videira, the military commander of 
Tete Province.592
The massacre report could not have come at a worse time for 
Portugal, as Caetano was scheduled to make an official visit to London
587 Middlemas, op. cit., p. 166.
588 Ibid.
ssa "Portuguese Massacre Reported by Priest", Times (London), 10 July 
1973.
590 mphe Evidence of Massacre", Times (London), 13 July 1973.
591 "'Ban' on Priest Film", Star (Johannesburg, South Africa), 14 July 
1973.
592 "There Was a Massacre in Mozambique", Star (Johannesburg, South 
Africa), 25 September 1973.
186
within a few days. He made the journey, but had to be protected by one
hundred security men. A protest march of about five thousand people was
organised in London, and Caetano was heckled in Parliament.593
Though Labour leader Harold Wilson called for Portugal to be
expelled from NATO,594 the Conservative government remained publicly
supportive of Lisbon. In December, Britain voted against a United Nations
resolution proposing that Portugal no longer represent the territories of
Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau in the General Assembly.595 In
January 1974, Portuguese official Manuel Sarmento Rodrigues referred to
British Secretary of State for the Environment Geoffrey Rippon as a
"grande amigo" of Portugal.596
Despite the public show of solidarity with Portugal, however,
Britain was becoming uneasy about the deteriorating security situation in
Mozambique and its impact on neighbouring Anglophone states. Rhodesia and
Tanzania were both increasingly affected by the war, and the civil
service began to contemplate alternatives to the established policy.597
Domestic British politics then changed on 4 March 1974, when the
Labour Party regained power and Harold Wilson returned to the post of
prime minister. Wilson was less forgiving of Portuguese behaviour in
Africa, and his past sympathetic rhetoric regarding the nationalists
suggested that he would take a more flexible policy at the United
Nations. An intriguing remark by a British diplomat also confirms
Britain's growing interest in FRELIMO:
There has always been a historical difference between the way 
London has viewed Mozambique, and the way other Western 
governments have. Mozambique is surrounded by ex-British colonies 
in which the U.K. had, and still has, major economic interests. 
Britain has a trade interest in the long-term stability of 
Mozambique, and therefore established contact with FRELIMO before 
the Portuguese coup.598
593 "Heavy Police Precautions", Times (London), 16 July 1973.
594 Middlemas, op. cit., p. 171.
595 "Sorting Out Our Friends from Our Enemies", op. cit., pp. 1-2.
596 Letter from Manuel Sarmento Rodrigues to Marcello Caetano, 24 
January 1974, reprinted in Antunes, ed., Cartas Particulares a 
Marcello Caetano. vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 346-349.
597 Rif kind, interview.
598 Ibid.
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Though there was apparently no concerted effort at co-optation, the 
report suggests that London was seriously considering such a strategy, 
even before the Labour Party returned to power.
WEST GERMANY
From 1970 to 1973 Bonn essentially went along with Washington's anti-co­
optation approach. In mid-1973, however, the ruling Social Democratic 
Party (SDP) split on the issue of Portuguese colonialism, and a brief 
attempt was made to launch a co-optation effort targeted at FRELIMO. The 
pro-Portuguese element in the SDP regained influence, the co-optation 
effort was abandoned, and by the eve of the Portuguese coup Bonn was 
still a Lisbon ally.
West Germany's relationship with the Soviet Union and its allies, 
related strategic considerations, policies of Bonn's allies, and internal 
politics were the primary considerations shaping policy. The co-optation 
experiment in 1973 was caused by the growing strength of left-wing SDP 
members and a shift in the party's interpretation of how to further 
Bonn's competition with the Soviet Union and East Germany, not by a 
substantive change in the nature of West German interests. Though FRELIMO 
reacted to the SDP overture in a suspicious manner that did little to 
encourage further assistance, perception of the nationalists' policies 
does not seem to have been a critical factor in West German decision 
making.
1970 to 1973
When Willie Brandt's SDP took power in June 1970, it inherited a 
strong relationship with Portugal. Brandt's predecessor had been a major 
arms supplier to Caetano in the NATO context, and Bonn benefited from 
access to a tracking station and air base facilities on the Azores. The 
more liberal members of the SDP were uncomfortable with this legacy, but 
initially did not act on their concerns. Brandt defended the 
participation of West German firms in the Cabora Bassa construction and 
defined the venture as a purely commercial project that would benefit the 
people of Mozambique regardless of who ruled the territory.599 Concerned 
that this would be viewed negatively by the rest of Africa, where support 
was sought in the diplomatic competition with East Germany, Brandt sent 
Heinz Kuhne, Chief Minister of North-Rhine Westphalia, to explain West
599 Middlemas, op. cit., p. 165.
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German participation in Cabora Bassa to Zambia's President Kenneth 
Kaunda. Kuhne stopped off to meet with FRELIMO officials in Dar es 
Salaam, and returned to Bonn highly sympathetic to the Mozambican 
nationalists. He told Brandt that Cabora Bassa could "light a spark" in 
Africa. Later, as chairman of the partly government-funded Friedrich 
Ebert Peace Foundation, Kuhne arranged for the donation of DM16 million 
to FRELIMO.600
Kuhne's counsel may have influenced the government's decision to 
deny export credits to Siemens and AEG for their operations in 
Mozambique. His position also stimulated the growing anti-Portuguese 
sentiment in the Bundestag, where eventually more than a dozen deputies 
supported the anti-Cabora Bassa campaign.601
However, correspondence between Portuguese officials in the early 
1970s shows that Lisbon perceived Bonn to be merely protecting its image. 
In March 1971, a deputy to the Portuguese National Assembly returned from 
a trip to Bonn and reported to Caetano that West German diplomats were 
having difficulty maintaining good relations with black Africa because of 
the Bonn-Lisbon connection. He reported that there was "no bad faith" in 
the West German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but rather a strong desire 
that Portugal resolve its problems "in accordance with the policy... laid 
down by President... Caetano".602 Similarly, in a November 1971 letter to 
Caetano, de Arriaga classified the West German consul in Mozambique as 
among the diplomats with whom he "maintained very friendly relations".603
1973 to 1974
The low-level tensions between the Kuhne and Brandt positions then 
exploded in August 1973. As mentioned in chapter 8, FRELIMO 
representatives were invited to Bonn for talks with the SDP. On 7 August, 
newspapers declared that the SDP had "announced its support for 
FRELIMO... and a ban on any West German arms deliveries to Portugal". SDP
600 Ibid., pp. 167-168.
601 Ibid.
602 Letter from Manuel Homem de Mello to Marcello Caetano, 8 March 
1971, reprinted in Antunes, ed., Cartas Particulares a Marcello 
Caetano, vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 334-340.
603 Letter from Kaulza de Arriaga to Marcello Caetano, 18 November 
1971, reprinted in Antunes, ed., Cartas Particulares a Marcello 
Caetano. vol. 2, op. cit., p. 273.
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official Hans Jurgen Wischnewski said that his party would help FRELIMO 
with its publicity work, and talks on future aid would continue the 
following day. The Portuguese embassy in Bonn protested vigorously.604
On 8 August, the West German government denied the reports. A 
spokesman for the West German embassy in Pretoria, South Africa, 
remarked:
My government made it clear this morning that there will be no 
official contact with FRELIMO. There is an element in the SDP, 
however, which is anxious to demonstrate support for the FRELIMO 
movement and their hostility to Portugal.605
A spokesman for the Foreign Office in Bonn similarly said that West
Germany and Portugal "are both members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation and it would be ridiculous if our policies in this respect
were different".606
As outlined in chapter 8, FRELIMO said that it would only accept
West German aid if it were given on a "political" rather than a
"humanitarian" basis.607 This complicated the task of FRELIMO sympathisers
within the SDP, but there is no evidence that FRELIMO's position played a
critical role in determining the West German decision. Pressure from
Portugal and NATO, and concern not to alienate those allies in light of
ongoing tensions with East Germany and the Soviet Union, seem to have
been the critical determinants.
Thus, on the eve of the Portuguese coup West Germany was only
slightly better prepared than other Western countries for the coming
upheaval. Some members of its ruling party had established rapport with
nationalist leaders, but their policy recommendations were overruled. An
ideal opportunity to influence decisively one of the movements that was
soon to take power was consequently left unexploited. At the end of the
day, Bonn's NATO concerns overrode its desire to cultivate African
support in its competition with East Germany.
604 "Support for FRELIMO From Brandt Party", Times (London), 1 August 
1973. See also "FRELIMO Promised Aid By Party", Star (Johannesburg, 
South Africa), 7 August 1973.
6°5 "Germans Deny Support for FRELIMO", op. cit.
606 Ibid.
607 "FRELIMO and West Germany's SDP--NO Grounds for Co-operation", op. 
cit., p. 20.
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FRANCE
From 1970 to 1974, France, unlike Britain and West Germany, never 
considered launching a co-optation effort directed at either FRELIMO or 
the MPLA. Paris did occasionally vote for resolutions critical of 
Portugal at the United Nations, but throughout the period it continued to 
market arms vigorously to Lisbon, well aware that a portion were destined 
for the African wars.
The most important factor motivating French policy was the 
country's special strategic circumstances. Due to France's qualified NATO 
membership, its access to Portugal's Azores facility was based on a 
bilateral agreement with Lisbon.608 Therefore, it was particularly 
vulnerable to Portuguese retaliation should it threaten Lisbon's 
interests. The French desire to maintain Azores access was also motivated 
by the nature of French relations with the Soviet Union.
A secondary, but still important, factor influencing policy was 
France's historical, cultural, and economic connection with the region. 
Specifically, France wanted to protect the stability of ex-French 
colonies near the Portuguese territories and ensure good relations with 
Francophone states throughout Africa. Unlike London, however, Paris never 
concluded that fulfilling these goals might be incompatible with a close 
relationship with Portugal.
France's most important contribution to the war was helicopter 
supply. The Portuguese had already purchased French helicopters in the 
1960s, and stepped up purchases of Alouette Ills and Pumas in the 1970 to 
1974 period.609 An estimated sixty Alouettes were in service in Angola by 
1971.610
France's qualified membership in NATO meant that the final 
destination of arms it sold to Portugal was less strictly monitored than 
was the end-use of NATO arms sales. According to historian Lawrence 
Henderson, French military support to Portugal was provided with no 
official restriction as to where the material could be used.611
608 In 1964 France received Portuguese permission to establish a 
station on the Azores for scientific and ballistic tests, together 
with air and sea rights. See Nogueira, op. cit., p. 566.
609 Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 213.
610 S. J. Bosgra and Christopher van Krimpen, Portugal and NATO 
(Amsterdam: Angola Comite, 1972), pp. 26-28.
611 Henderson, op. cit., p. 238.
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The French were concerned, however, about the effect of Portugal's 
wars on Francophone African security. No threat was perceived from 
Mozambique, for it bordered no ex-French colonies, or from Angola, where 
the war was fairly contained. However, the third war in Portuguese 
Africa, the conflict in Guinea-Bissau, did threaten Francophone 
neighbours. Hoping to "neutralise the war potential of the enemy in his 
sanctuaries",612 in November 1970 Portugal assisted an exile invasion of 
Guinea-Conakry, which was helping the PAIGC nationalist movement of 
Guinea-Bissau.613
Portugal perhaps expected France to acquiesce to the Guinea- 
Conakry raid, given the poor relations between Paris and Guinea-Conakry's 
radical leader, Sekou Toure. Portugal guessed incorrectly; France was 
extremely indignant about this foreign meddling in its "own" sphere. 
Irritation with Lisbon's interference may have been partially responsible 
for France's October 1972 decision to vote for the United Nations General 
Assembly resolution requiring Portugal to negotiate with the liberation 
movements.614 Whatever the motivation for the vote, France then joined the 
United States and the United Kingdom in getting the language watered down 
in the Security Council.615
French relations with Rhodesia also conditioned attitudes towards 
the nationalists. In 1971, Rhodesia boldly asked France to help Portugal 
combat FRELIMO. As Ken Flower, then head of Rhodesia's Central 
Intelligence Organisation, tells it, "De Gaulle and Pompidou were only 
too ready to snub their noses at the British and ignore the United 
Nations, and thus I found that my opposite number in Paris... was always 
anxious to help".616 In 1971, when Rhodesia became increasingly worried 
about Portuguese setbacks in Mozambique, Flower conveyed the concern to 
Paris. Flower reportedly told the French that Portugal was not 
controlling cross-border infiltration into Rhodesia and was permitting 
the Cabora Bassa project to be threatened. Flower asked France to
612 Letter from Antonio de Spinola to Marcello Caetano, 12 November 
1970, reprinted in Jose Freire Antunes, ed., Cartas Particulares a 
Marcello Caetano. vol. 1 (Lisbon: Publicagoes Dorn Quixote, 1985), pp. 
148-150.
613 Ibid.
614 Middlemas, op. cit., p. 174.
615 "Success at the UN", op. cit., pp. 16-17.
616 Flower, Serving Secretly, op. cit., p. 74.
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consider this information "at the highest level" with a view to 
coordinating a response with Lisbon. When France pursued the matter, 
Portugal insisted that the situation was under control. France apparently 
accepted Lisbon's reassurance, and, according to a Portuguese source, the 
French intelligence branch told its Ministry of Foreign Affairs to 
discount Flower' s report.617
It is worth noting that France rejected Rhodesia's request not 
because it found "coordination" with Portugal against FRELIMO politically 
distasteful, but because Lisbon said that such coordination was not 
necessary.
In sum, by the eve of the Portuguese coup the French were little 
better prepared than the rest of the West for the disintegration of the 
Portuguese empire. Their marketing of military equipment to Portugal 
remained vigorous, and when France did criticise Lisbon, it was over 
Portuguese meddling in Francophone Africa, rather than in response to 
Portuguese colonial tactics.
SCANDINAVIA AND THE NETHERLANDS
Scandinavia, already much closer to the nationalist movements than the 
rest of the West, increased its aid to the MPLA and FRELIMO in the 1970 
to 1974 period, and the Netherlands eventually adopted a similar policy. 
Domestic politics was the motivation. Liberal opinion was important to 
these governments, as liberals either kept them in power or were part of 
the coalition that formed the government's base. The more South Africa 
and Rhodesia became involved in the war, and the more Portuguese 
"atrocities" were highlighted in the press, the more concerned liberals 
became over the fate of the nationalists. The governments, structurally 
linked to liberal opinion, had to respond or face domestic opposition.
Had these governments been concerned about preserving Azores base 
access, or had major economic interests in trade with Portugal, they 
might have decided to run the risk of flouting domestic opinion. In the 
event, however, they had little to lose by aiding the nationalists and 
much to lose in the domestic arena by maintaining close links with 
Lisbon.
617 Letter from Jorge Jardim to Marcello Caetano, 28 October 1971, 
reprinted in Antunes, ed., Cartas Particulares a Marcello Caetano. 
vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 23-26.
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Sweden
As already mentioned in chapter 8, Swedish aid to the nationalists 
increased considerably in the 1970 to 1974 period. Fund-raising began in 
the schools and youth centres. In 1971, Olof Palme's government budgeted 
a contribution of £125,000 for FRELIMO.618 In the 1972 to 1973 fiscal 
year, the Swedish government allocated about $3 million in assistance for 
"civilian activities" of the MPLA, FRELIMO, and the PAIGC,619 while FNLA 
aid requests were rebuffed. In July 1973, the Swedish foreign minister 
said that his government would double aid for FRELIMO over the following 
twelve months.620 In March 1974, just a month before the Portuguese coup, 
Sweden announced that it would triple its FRELIMO aid.621
Sweden was extremely careful, however, to keep its support 
restricted to humanitarian and civilian activities, refusing to permit 
funds to be spent for military purposes. It is also interesting to note 
that, according to a Swedish diplomat, the main motivation for Swedish 
aid to the MPLA and FRELIMO during this and later periods was not 
sympathy for the individual nationalist organisations themselves, but 
rather a desire to assist those who were fighting minority rule in 
southern Africa. "We actually were uncomfortable with many aspects of 
MPLA and FRELIMO policies", the diplomat remarked, "but we supported them 
because they were part of the overall anti-apartheid struggle".622
Denmark. Norway, and the Netherlands
The Danish government started to aid the MPLA and FRELIMO in 1970, 
with support restricted to humanitarian supplies. In July 1973, however, 
Danish students began raising funds for the nationalists, and placed no 
conditions on use of the funds. One student leader remarked, "The more 
recent developments, with Rhodesia and South Africa fighting together
618 Middlemas, op. cit., p. 166.
619 Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 232.
620 "Sweden to Double Frelimo Aid", Star (Johannesburg, South Africa), 
16 July 1973.
621 "Sweden Triples Its Aid to Frelimo Guerrillas", Times (London), 26 
March 1974.
622 Fin Altan (political officer at the Swedish embassy) , interview by 
author, Luanda, Angola, 20 May 1985.
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with Portugal, make it necessary to increase aid to the African freedom 
movements" .623
Perhaps the most remarkable Scandinavian aid source was Norway, as 
it was a NATO member and therefore technically allied with Portugal. Like 
Sweden, it decided to increase aid in March 1974, just a month before the 
Portuguese coup, allocating substantial funds to FRELIMO, the MPLA, and 
the PAIGC.624
Throughout the early 1970s, liberals in the Netherlands had 
criticised the Dutch foreign minister for the support he gave Portugal. 
Finally, in July 1973 the minister for development aid, under pressure 
from Social Democrats, announced grants "to speed up the process of 
decolonisation in the territories occupied by Portugal, and not for 
humanitarian reasons " .625
The "Angola Comite" support group in the Netherlands, active since 
1961, also organised a successful boycott of Angolan coffee, reducing the 
Angolan portion of Dutch coffee imports from 30 percent to 2 percent by 
19 7 2 . 626 By 1973, the Netherlands had also stopped imports of Angolan 
petroleum.627
SUMMARY
In the 1970 to 1974 period the policies of Britain, West Germany, and 
France differed in significant details, but not in overall direction. All 
three continued their alliances with Portugal, albeit with varying 
degrees of enthusiasm. None launched a vigorous co-optation effort, 
though London and Bonn considered such overtures towards FRELIMO.
These governments did not acquiesce to Portugal's coercion 
policies primarily because they perceived the nationalists to be hostile 
to Western interests. West Germany's SDP did not abruptly withdraw its 
offer to aid FRELIMO because it suddenly discovered that Machel 
envisioned a socialist future for independent Mozambique, but because it
623 "Students Aid Terror Groups", Star (Johannesburg, South Africa),
21 August 1973.
624 "Norway, India Give Aid", Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg, South
Africa), 11 March 1974.
625 Middlemas, op. cit., p. 167.
626 Angola Comite, press communication, 12 December 1972, cited in
Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 232.
627 Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 232.
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was reluctant to disrupt the unity of NATO, its main protector against 
security threats posed by its Eastern neighbours. France continued to 
sell arms to Portugal for use against the nationalists not primarily 
because it considered the latter a threat to Western interests, but 
because the sales were profitable and Paris wanted to maintain good 
relations with Portugal to ensure access to the Azores base.
Moreover, the United Kingdom did not establish contact with 
FRELIMO just before the Portuguese coup because it concluded that the 
organisation had become more open to Western influence, but because the 
FRELIMO/Portugal conflict was damaging British interests in the region 
and it therefore wished to broker a peace.
It was not perception of the nationalists' policies that drove 
decision making in London, Bonn, and Paris, but a shifting combination of 
East-West concerns, related strategic interests, internal politics, and 
historically rooted economic and other ties to the region. If FRELIMO and 
the MPLA had renounced their socialist ambitions, but still insisted on 
their territories' independence from Portugal, the policies of the major 
European powers probably would have been little different.
There is one area in which the policies of nationalists did make a 
difference, however. When West Germany and Britain became ambivalent 
about Portuguese colonialism and decided to establish tentative contacts 
with a nationalist group, why did they select FRELIMO and not the MPLA? 
The ideological content of the two movements' rhetoric was by now quite 
similar, and both were declaring themselves allies of the Eastern bloc.
In Britain's case, the fact that FRELIMO was disrupting neighbouring 
Anglophone states, and the MPLA was not, played a critical role. This was 
not a consideration, however, in the West German case. Part of the 
explanation can be found in the divergent MPLA and FRELIMO strategies 
towards the Western public. By the time Portuguese colonialism began to 
appear increasingly threatened, in 1973 and early 1974, the MPLA had 
reduced its efforts to reach out to the West. FRELIMO had done the 
opposite, increasing contacts with liberal sympathisers in Europe as the 
wars progressed. Therefore, while London and Bonn were not reacting to 
the ideological content of FRELIMO's policies, they were reacting to the 
fact that FRELIMO's public relations campaign both created domestic pro- 
FRELIMO constituencies and raised the organisation's profile within the 
respective capitals.
Finally, while the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands 
increased aid to the nationalists in this period, it was the internal
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politics of these states, and the impact upon those politics of rising 
Rhodesian and South African assistance to Portugal, that motivated 
policy. Perception of the nationalists' policies did not play a primary 
role. If the MPLA and FRELIMO had adopted more or less ideological 
stances, it would not have made much difference to the Scandinavian 
public. As long as they fought against minority rule in southern Africa, 
public opinion in Scandinavia remained on their side.
To recap, European interests in the disputed territories 
overlapped with U.S. interests, but were not identical. Like their 
counterparts in Washington, European diplomats wished to retain 
traditional alliances and ensure access to markets. However, unlike the 
United States, one European state (Britain) found that enmity to one of 
the nationalist groups was incompatible with those interests as they 
pertained to Mozambique and its neighbours. For some European countries 
(Scandinavia, the Netherlands and to a certain extent West Germany) the 
need to placate domestic critics occasionally over-rode other interests, 
a development which did not concern the United States. The overall nature 
of U.S. and European interests were similar. The specific substantive 
content of some European states' internal and external conditions, 
however, sometimes mandated responses that diverged considerably from 
those of Washington.
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PART IV
THE FINAL DAYS: 1974 TO 1975
INTRODUCTION TO PART IV
Shortly after midnight on 25 April 1974, the announcer on Lisbon's 
Catholic Radio station read the chorus of a prohibited song. At this 
signal, the MFA, having recovered from a failed coup attempt the month 
before, began to execute a new set of plans. Key military commanders were 
detained, government radio and television stations were occupied, as were 
strategic highways, the national bank, and the international airport. At 
8:00 P.M. the government announced the surrender of Caetano to General 
Antonio de Splnola. Within twenty-four hours, a new "Junta of National 
Salvation" appeared on television screens and pledged to govern Portugal 
according to the programme of the MFA.628
The coup in Portugal completely altered the context of the 
nationalist struggles. From the coup to the independence of Mozambique 
and Angola in June and November 1975 respectively, each participant in 
the colonial conflicts had to make hard choices between co-optation and 
coercion strategies in a constantly shifting political-military 
environment.
Overall, the MPLA became less co-optable during the months 
following the Portuguese coup. By the time it took power on 11 November 
1975, it had solidified previously strained ties with the socialist 
countries and its public statements had a strong anti-Western tone. 
However, during the nineteen-month period under consideration, the MPLA 
did make occasional, quite vigorous, efforts to establish a mutual 
understanding with Western governments. Despite its growing links with 
the East, it seemed reluctant to burn all its bridges with the West.
628 Henderson, op. cit., p. 240.
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FRELIMO's relations with the United States and Europe followed a 
convoluted course. It initially paid little attention to the West while 
it sought to force Lisbon to agree to hand over power to its leaders as 
the government of Mozambique. Once Portugal largely agreed to FRELIMO's 
terms in September 1974, the movement began to focus on its future 
international alignment and showed interest in accommodating some Western 
concerns. In early 1975, however, FRELIMO grew more hostile to most 
Western governments. The main exception, other than the Scandinavian and 
Dutch governments, with which it had long enjoyed friendly relations, was 
the United Kingdom. Relations with London continued to improve markedly, 
while relations with Washington deteriorated to their worst state ever.
Top Washington officials initially paid little attention to the 
situations in Mozambique and Angola, and lower-ranking officials were 
left free to explore co-optation possibilities. However, this soon 
changed. Pro-co-optation diplomats were fired and Washington adopted a 
military coercion policy in Angola while a policy of semi-hostile neglect 
was applied to Mozambique. Some European countries, such as France, aided 
the coercion policy in Angola and ignored Mozambique, while others, such 
as Britain, were neutral in Angola and enthusiastically pursued co­
optation in Mozambique.
Chapters 11 through 14 explore the factors that influenced the 
various actors' policies in this period. What was the impact of the two 
nationalist movements' levels of internal factionalism and rivalries with 
other groups? Did the attitudes of the nationalists' allies play a 
critical role? Did the movements' varying perceptions of Western policies 
significantly influence their level of co-optability? Concerning the 
other, Western, side of the equation, did domestic politics primarily 
explain the differences in the approaches of Western countries to the 
nationalists, or did economic and cultural ties also have a role? Were 
relations with tacit and open allies a major influence? Was a perception 
of high internal factionalism and rivalry with other groups conducive to 
adoption of coercion policies? Did a Western country's relationship with 
the Soviet Union primarily determine its reaction to the nationalists, or 
did Western governments also carefully weigh the actual policies of the 
nationalists themselves?
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CHAPTER 11 
ANGOLA: A CASE OF FAILED COERCION
From the Portuguese coup until Angola's independence, the MPLA became 
progressively less co-optable. By the time the movement took power on 11 
November 1975, it was firmly allied with the Eastern bloc and issuing 
harsh anti-Western rhetoric. However, throughout this period, even at the 
end when the movement was fighting U.S.- and South African-backed rivals, 
the MPLA made periodic efforts to establish contacts with Western 
leaders. So while the MPLA's co-optability was lower than ever before at 
independence, it still retained, albeit at a very modest level, some 
interest in reaching a modus vivendi with Western governments.
Six interrelated factors accounted for the decline in MPLA co- 
optability. The first two, rivalry with other nationalists and the 
attitude of regional powers, created a context conducive to external 
intervention, which in turn conditioned the second two factors--the 
MPLA's perception of Western policies and its relations with non-Western 
allies. A fifth factor, internal factionalism, created circumstances that 
at one point exacerbated suspicions of a Western anti-MPLA conspiracy, 
and later created internal pressures for an anti-Western posture. A sixth 
factor, Angola's economic structure, became relevant in a new manner.
That structure both deprived neighbouring tacit Western allies of 
opportunities to act as bridges to the West (as chapter 12 will show did 
occur in the case of one Mozambican neighbour) and gave the MPLA the 
confidence that a poor relationship with Western governments would not 
prevent independent Angola from obtaining the capital and technology it 
would require for development.
THE MPLA ON THE DEFENSIVE (APRIL TO JULY 1974)
Immediately following the coup, the Portuguese government was dominated 
by a group associated with Spinola that sought a slow transfer of power 
to internal coalitions in Mozambique and Angola likely to be dominated by 
the resident Portuguese communities.629 Spinola conditioned his offer of a 
referendum on self-determination with the comment that "self­
629 Carlos Gaspar, "Incomplete Failure: Portugal's Policies Towards 
Angola and Mozambique Since Independence", in Regional Conflict and 
U.S. Policy: Angola and Mozambique, ed. Richard J. Bloomfield 
(Algonac, Michigan: Reference Publications, 1988), pp. 43-45.
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determination should not be confused with independence".630 The MPLA 
responded that if there were no change in colonial policy, the MPLA would 
"clean up the situation in Angola by striking harder blows at the 
Portuguese army".631 Meanwhile, the movement's mission in Algiers 
announced that it was ready to negotiate with the new Portuguese 
government, but only "concerning the complete independence of our 
country". In a somewhat conciliatory gesture to the West, the MPLA added 
that a future independent Angola would co-operate with other countries 
and welcome foreign residents "who wish to work honestly and within the 
framework of the future institutions".632
Neto, who was in Canada at the time of the coup, travelled to 
Europe and devoted particular attention to the United Kingdom. On 1 May, 
he called on Joan Lestor, Minister of State in the Foreign Office with 
special responsibility for Africa, and asked the United Kingdom to cease 
all arms sales to Portugal. Copies of Neto's 1974 Dar es Salaam speech, 
in which he stressed the MPLA's interest in a non-racial government, also 
began to appear in London post boxes. 633 If the MPLA's rhetoric was 
partially designed to suit Western ears, however, it certainly was not 
designed to have a soothing effect upon Salisbury634 and Pretoria. While 
in the United Kingdom, Neto pledged to aid the guerrillas fighting those 
governments and promised that the MPLA would fight South Africa if 
Pretoria intervened in Angola.635
Meanwhile, new factional problems, in addition to the ongoing 
Eastern Revolt, arose within the movement. On 11 May 1974, a group of 
Brazzaville-based exiles calling themselves the "Active Revolt" issued 
the "Appeal of the Nineteen". The document, signed by prestigious MPLA 
mesticos. intellectuals and some assimilados blamed recent MPLA reverses 
on insensitive and secretive leadership, accused Neto of undemocratic
630 "Portuguese Junta Opposes Freeing African Lands", New York Times.
28 April 1974.
631 "Terrorists to step up armed fight", Rand Daily Mail 
(Johannesburg, South Africa), 27 April 1974.
632 "MPLA ready to talk", Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg, South 
Africa), 29 April 1974.
633 "Fight Will Continue Says Neto", Star (Johannesburg, South 
Africa), 2 May 1974.
634 Salisbury (now Harare) was the capital city of Rhodesia.
635 Ibid.
201
"presidentialism", and demanded that a congress be held to resolve 
leadership issues.636 According to Messiant, the Active Revolt was 
spearheaded by anciens assimiles.637
Neto loyalists believed that the Active Revolt was fomented by 
"imperialism".638 The MPLA knew that elements in the French government and 
U.S. ally Zairean President Mobutu favoured secession of Angola's oil- 
rich province of Cabinda. Congo-Brazzaville Prime Minister Henri Lopes 
also backed Cabindan secession and aided the movement fighting for that 
cause, the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (Front pour 
la Liberation de 1'Enclave de Cabinda--FLEC). When Lopes supported the 
Active Revolt and urged the group to endorse Cabindan secession, 639 the 
MPLA suspected a U.S.-French-Congolese-Zairean plot.
As events unfolded in mid-1974, the MPLA was neither the strongest 
militarily nor the most popular political power among the three 
contending movements. UNITA signed a cease-fire with Portugal in June 
1974 and immediately was able to operate legally.640 It quickly launched a 
campaign among the Ovimbundu, and was able to add significantly to both 
its army and its overall membership, including recruitment of some "high 
level assimilados",641 In Messiant's words, UNITA "played the ethnic 
card".642 Although UNITA was the weakest movement militarily, its 
political base was widening and beginning to outstrip that of the MPLA. 
The FNLA was by far the strongest movement militarily. In late May 1974, 
the Chinese announced the arrival of a contingent of 112 military 
advisers in Zaire to train the FNLA, and implied that more would soon
636 Artur Queiroz, Angola do 25 de Abril ao 11 de Novembro: A Via 
Aareste da Liberdade (Lisbon: Ulmeiro, 1978), p. 15. See also Marcum, 
vol. 2, op. cit., p. 248.
637 Messiant, op. cit., p. 173.
638 "Temperemo-nos Para Novas Lutas Para a Nova Fase da Revoluqao", 
speech by Agostinho Neto at opening of Inter-Regional Conference of 
Militants, September 1974. Reprinted in Tudo Pelo Povol (Luanda:
MPLA, 1978), p. 99.
639 Queiroz, Angola, op. cit., p. 32.
640 Bridgland, op. cit., p. 105.
641 Heimer, op. cit., pp. 47-48.
642 Messiant, op. cit., p. 169.
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follow.643 The group's popular support, limited to the Bakongo and some 
whites, was less than that of either the MPLA or UNITA. 644 The MPLA had
significant political support in the urban areas and in the colonial and
administrative apparatus, but unlike FRELIMO, it was never accepted as
the liberator of "all the people" and its social base was "comparatively
very narrow". 645 Politically, the MPLA was stronger than the FNLA and 
weaker than UNITA. Militarily, it was weaker than the former but stronger 
than the latter. If its two rivals allied, it could be out-voted in an 
election, and out-gunned in a war. Consequently, the Neto group feared 
that the FNLA and/or UNITA would declare one or both of the MPLA revolts 
(Active and Eastern) to be the "real MPLA", conclude a deal with the 
rival, and exclude the Neto element.
While Chinese support for the FNLA gravely worried the MPLA, it 
actually helped the latter re-attract Moscow's interest. The Soviet Union 
was competing with China for influence in the Third World and did not 
want to be seen to permit its historical ally (the Neto-MPLA) to lose to 
Beijing's. As China specialist Eugene Lawson has pointed out, "the Soviet 
Union... was reeling from a series of diplomatic defeats in Africa, and 
the Chinese move to back the FNLA was the last straw". Lawson even claims 
that "the dynamics of Sino-Soviet competition" rather than cold war 
tensions "probably were dominant in Moscow's considerations".646 Another 
observer, U.S. international relations expert Charles Ebinger, argues 
that to explain Moscow's involvement as solely "a test of America's will 
in the wake of Vietnam and Watergate" is erroneous, and that the Soviet 
Union was also "deeply disturbed by the level of material support that 
the Chinese began to send" the MPLA's rivals.647
Meanwhile, the MPLA was coping with a rising tide of violence in 
Luanda. On 11 July 1974, the body of a white taxi driver was found in the 
outskirts of the capital. His colleagues, believing he had been murdered
643 Stockwell, op. cit., p. 67.
644 Heimer, op. cit., pp. 64066.
645 Messiant, op. cit., pp. 171-172.
646 Eugene K. Lawson, "China's Policy in Ethiopia and Angola", in 
Weinstein and Henriksen, op. cit., pp. 174-175.
647 Charles K. Ebinger, "External Intervention in Internal War: The 
Politics and Diplomacy of the Angolan Civil War", Orbis, Fall 1976, 
pp. 684 and 687.
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by MPLA sympathisers, attacked blacks in Luanda's slums.648 Death squads 
soon emerged, armed by right-wing elements in the Portuguese army. The 
MPLA had difficulty arming its supporters, partly because the Soviet 
Union was still reluctant to provide aid in light of MPLA factional 
problems.649
In the immediate post-coup period all three movements realized
that they might eventually compete for white votes in a future election.
The MPLA therefore used "pragmatic" language that implied it would pursue
social goals of equality and justice without immediately implementing
sweeping changes, though it left no doubt its long term plans included a
non-capitalist model. The Neto faction of the MPLA
advocated a reconstrucao nacional supported by all population 
segments-a policy which opposed precipitating incisive structural 
changes that the Angolan economy and society could not yet cope 
with, and which was fundamentally oriented towards the undogmatic, 
though marxist-inspired, elaboration of a non-capitalist 
decolonization.... (Emphasis in original.)650
The movement also emphasised its non-racist tradition and multiracial 
leadership.651 While this posture was adopted for internal Angolan 
consumption, it was less threatening to Western powers than other 
political options.
During the three months following the Portuguese coup, the MPLA's 
co-optability declined only slightly. The movement perceived that Western 
governments, in coordination with certain regional powers, were fomenting 
internal factionalism within the movement. However, the same internal 
factionalism caused the MPLA's socialist allies to be less than generous 
in aid decisions. While increasingly suspicious of Western intentions, 
the movement nonetheless remained open to contacts with Western leaders 
in the hope of offsetting lukewarm socialist support. Finally, internal 
electoral dynamics caused the MPLA to adopt "pragmatic" language 
regarding future plans.
648 Queiroz, Angola, op. cit., p. 18.
649 John A. Marcum, "Southern Africa After the Collapse of Portuguese 
Rule", in Africa; From Mvsterv to Maze, ed. Helen Kitchen (Lexington, 
Massachusetts: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company, 1976), pp. 
96-98.
650 Heimer, op. cit., p. 86.
651 Ibid., p. 60 .
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MPLA RECOVERY (JULY 1974 TO JANUARY 1975)
From July 1974 to early 1975, the MPLA's fortunes improved, in part due 
to the rising influence of radicals in the Portuguese government. 
Relations with the Soviet Union also consolidated, and MPLA suspicions 
about Western intentions grew.
Developments in Lisbon were perhaps the most important aspect of 
this period. Radicals were becoming impatient with Spinola's reluctance 
to decolonise. They were supported by war-weary commanders in Africa and 
much of the Portuguese population. The pressure on Spinola increased in 
July 1974 when the radicals first forced the replacement of his prime 
minister by their candidate, Vasco Gonsalves, and then used the 
escalating violence in Luanda as justification for the appointment of a 
leading radical figure, Admiral Rosa Coutinho, as the territory's 
governor-general.652 Upon arrival in Luanda, Coutinho declared that only 
the (Neto) MPLA, UNITA, and the FNLA would be considered representative 
of the Angolan people, marginalising the Active and Eastern Revolts.653 On 
27 July 1974, Spinola agreed to an ill-defined independence process.654
These events, together with concern about competition with China, 
spurred the Soviet Union to strengthen its support for the MPLA. Moscow 
realised that the FNLA and UNITA were gaining external assistance and, 
due to the rise of the left in Portugal, Neto was now back as a 
"legitimate" participant in the decolonisation process. The Soviet Union 
did not want to be politically shut out in Angola, and thus in August 
1974 it declared the MPLA the "true spokesman" for the Angolan people. 
Whether Moscow re-started military aid at this time is unclear.655
The new Soviet attitude was perhaps responsible for Neto's remarks 
on foreign affairs at the MPLA "Inter Regional Conference of Militants" 
held inside Angola from 12 to 21 September. (The conference was attended 
only by the Neto group because the Eastern and Active Revolts had 
permanently split from Neto during a 12 August MPLA Congress in
652 Queiroz, Angola, op. cit., pp. 37-38.
653 Ibid., p. 40 and p. 48.
654 "Spinola spells it out", Sunday Times (Johannesburg, South 
Africa), 28 July 1974.
655 According to Stockwell, around this time the Soviet Union began to 
fly arms to Dar es Salaam for the "liberation movements" in Africa. 
CIA analysts at the time were unsure if the weaponry was intended for 
the ANC, ZAPU, or the MPLA. See Stockwell, op. cit., p. 67.
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Zambia.)656 Neto blamed the internal MPLA problems on "systematic 
sabotage... by foreign forces commanded by imperialism"657 and praised the 
socialist states, remarking, "We all recognise once again that the 
solidarity of the socialist countries was and is fundamental, it is the 
principal material base of our combat".658
Just as the MPLA was getting its own affairs in order, reports 
began to circulate that convinced its leaders the United States was 
plotting to exclude Neto from independence negotiations. On 28 September 
1974, a Guinea-Conakry newspaper, Horova. published a letter allegedly 
written by a member of the MFA to the country's president, Sekou Toure. 
The letter said that on 14 September Spinola, Mobutu, Roberto, and 
Chipenda had met on the island of Sal in Cape Verde and agreed that 
Portugal should support Roberto in an Angola without oil-rich Cabinda, 
which would be handed over to FLEC. A Zaire-Angola-Cabinda federation 
would then be formed with Mobutu as president, and possibly with Roberto 
as vice president. Chipenda and Active Revolt leader Pinto de Andrade 
would be recognised as the leaders of the MPLA, and along with Savimbi 
would be in the Angolan government under Roberto.659
Whether accurate or exaggerated, this report caused pro-MPLA 
journalists to label the Sal meeting a "United States plot".660 President 
Nixon's June 1974 meeting with Spinola in the Azores, at which the U.S. 
leader appeared to endorse the General's plans for Africa,661 together 
with Washington's close relations with the FNLA, made such a claim 
plausible to those already suspicious about U.S. intentions. In an 
interview with the Mozambican magazine Tempo shortly after the Sal
656 Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 250.
657 "Temperemo-nos Para Novas Lutas Para a Nova Fase da Revolugao", 
op. cit., p. 99.
658 Ibid., p. 102.
659 Marga Holness, "Angola: The Struggle Continues", in Martin and 
Johnson, op. cit., p. 83.
660 Queiroz, Angola, op. cit., p. 46.
eel "spinola's Summit Triumph", Star (Johannesburg, South Africa), 20 
June 1974.
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meeting, Neto said that Angola was subject to an "imperialist siege" 
assisted by "some African countries".662
Whatever the true nature of Spinola's discussions in Sal, he 
clearly had gone too far for the radicals in the MFA and was forced to 
resign at the end of September. His replacement by General Costa Gomes 
meant that the more radical wing of the MFA now firmly had the upper 
hand.
Following Spinola's removal, Portugal began cease-fire discussions
with the MPLA and FNLA. On 12 October, Neto stated in Lusaka that the
MPLA programme "guarantees the protection of the persons and goods of all
foreigners who respect the laws in force in the country", and insisted
that Portugal's concern about the future of the white population was
therefore unfounded.663
Among allies, however, Neto's rhetoric was less reassuring. In an
interview with a radical journalist from Mozambique, he acknowledged that
white concerns about future property rights were "just", but added:
On the other hand they must not... forget... a bigger factor, the 
MPLA's concern to really defend the interests of the masses, of 
the most exploited classes..., the peasants and workers.... We do 
not think it very fair that they now propose that priority be 
given to the resolution of their problems rather than to the 
problems of those who suffered most from colonialism.664
Despite Neto's contradictory stances, the negotiations with Lisbon
progressed rapidly. On 21 October, the MPLA finally signed a cease-fire
with the Portuguese and thereby won the right to operate legally in
Angola.665 Ironically, at approximately the same time, the Soviet Union
began to supply the MPLA with a modest amount of weaponry. Some sources
say that Soviet military aid began in October, 666 and most agree that some
shipments arrived via Congo-Brazzaville in November. The MPLA itself
states that about 250 individuals went to the Soviet Union for training
662 "Agostinho Neto: Angola e o cerco imperialista ao MPLA", Tempo 
(Mozambique), 3 November 1974.
663 "Declarapao do MPLA Sobre a Posiqao Portuguesa no Processo de 
Descolonizagao de Angola", statement by Neto in Lusaka, 12 October
1974. Typewritten document, CIDAC archives, Lisbon, Portugal.
664 "Agostinho Neto: Angola e o cerco imperialista ao MPLA", op. cit.
665 Queiroz, Angola, op. cit., p. 48.
666 Marcum, "Southern Africa After the Collapse of Portuguese Rule", 
op. cit., p. 97.
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in December.667 The MPLA believed that it needed the weaponry and skills 
in order to compete with its rivals, which it believed were already 
receiving Western support. One MPLA commander lamented at the time of the 
cease-fire:
It will be very difficult to pursue the armed struggle that will 
follow the negotiations for independence. The UPA [FNLA] and UNITA 
will ally against us. Chipenda also will ally with them. If we do 
not rapidly receive the support of the socialist countries it is 
going to be very difficult. They have all the support they need 
from the Americans, from France, from West Germany....668
The official cease-fire signing meant that the MPLA was now
entitled to open offices in Angola, which it rapidly did. The MPLA
representatives promptly made statements that must have further alarmed
the minority regimes in the region. First, a mid-ranking official,
Erminio Escorcio, 669 and then the effective number two in the movement,
Lucio Lara, proclaimed support for the guerrilla struggles in South
Africa, Namibia (as South West Africa had been renamed by the United
Nations in 1968), and Rhodesia and implied that the MPLA would give such
organisations bases in Angola.670 The strident MPLA rhetoric contrasted
with that of the FNLA, which expressed solidarity with the region's
"oppressed people" less explicitly,671 and UNITA representatives, who said
they would not aid guerrilla movements in the region.672
These same MPLA representatives went out of their way, however, to
present a non-aligned image concerning East-West matters. Erminio
Escorcio, for example, told a South African journalist:
Certainly our aid came mainly from the Eastern bloc but to the 
question whether we will bend to pressure from that direction the
667 Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 253. See also Queiroz, Angola, op. 
cit., p. 51.
668 Queiroz, Angola, op. cit., pp. 49-50.
669 Tom Ballantyne, "Angola will back terror", Star (Johannesburg, 
South Africa), 25 October 1974.
670 Carol Birkby, "Angola threat to SA", Sunday Times (Johannesburg, 
South Africa), 17 November 1974.
671 Ibid.
672 "Angola "won't support rebels'" Star (Johannesburg, South Africa), 
13 November 1974. See also "Guerrilla Aid Offer", Star (Johannesburg, 
South Africa), 10 February 1975.
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answer is ^absolutely not!' The MPLA did not fight for the freedom 
of Angola for the benefit of the Eastern bloc.673
The MPLA also appeared to be open to overtures from the U.S.
government and private sector. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for
Africa Donald Easum visited Luanda from 21 to 23 November 1974. Easum and
the U.S. consul general in Angola, Tom Killoran, met with Lucio Lara to
discuss future U.S.-MPLA relations, the possible structure of a
transition government, and the MPLA's attitude towards UNITA and the
FNLA. Interviews with three participants at the meeting suggest that
there was a general, though not unanimous, expression of goodwill. In a
1985 interview, Lara remarked:
Killoran apparently had a good attitude towards us. His opinion 
appeared to be that the U.S. should not be hostile to the MPLA, 
that we were in the best position to govern Angola in a reasonable 
manner. We had really serious talks, and he apparently informed 
Washington of his judgement.674
In a 1989 interview, Donald Easum recalled, "We were cordially 
received and given the impression Lara believed good relations with the 
U.S. were in the interest of both the MPLA and the Angolan nation".675 
Killoran's aides were less impressed with Lara, and one subsequently 
remarked, "I came away with the impression that there were both 
nationalist and communist tendencies within the MPLA, sometimes embodied 
in the same person".676
The MPLA also began to meet openly with representatives of the 
U.S. Gulf Oil Corporation. (Secret contacts had already occurred between 
Gulf and the MPLA earlier in the year. 677) According to an executive who 
worked for Gulf at the time, the MPLA expressed interest in extending the 
boundaries of the Gulf concession in Cabinda to permit the firm to 
operate in deep water. The terms compared well with those previously 
offered by the Portuguese government. Throughout the discussions, the
673 Ballantyne, "Angola will back terror", op. cit.
674 Lucio Lara, interview by author, Luanda, Angola, 26 June 1985.
675 Donald Easum, interview by author, New York, United States, 15 
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676 Source five, confidential interview by author, Harare, Zimbabwe, 
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677 Testimony of Paul Sheldon, Vice President, Gulf Oil Corporation, 
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MPLA representatives were perceived by Gulf to be conducting themselves 
in a "businesslike manner”.678
Meanwhile, the independence process continued apace. Neto,
Roberto, and Savimbi had a preliminary meeting in Mombasa, Kenya, from 3 
to 4 January 19 7 5 . 679 Formal independence negotiations began five days 
later (on 10 January) in Alvor, Portugal. After acrimonious discussions, 
the three leaders signed the Alvor Accord on 15 January. This document 
named the three as the sole legitimate representatives of the Angolan 
people, classified Cabinda as a part of Angola, set 11 November 1975 as 
the date for independence, allotted ministries in a coalition government, 
mandated that government to draft a provisional constitution and conduct 
legislative elections during an eleven-month transition period, and 
instructed each movement to pool eight thousand soldiers each into a 
common national army.680 One casualty of the Alvor negotiations was Rosa 
Coutinho. The FNLA and UNITA delegations insisted that he not occupy the 
newly created "High Commissioner" post created by Alvor, and Silva 
Cardoso was selected instead.681
During the above-described seven-month period, from mid-1974 to 
early 1975, the MPLA's co-optability declined moderately. It accused the 
West of mounting an "imperialist siege", strengthened ties with Moscow, 
and loudly proclaimed support for other nationalist groups with which the 
West was uncomfortable. However, the movement still sought to maintain a 
non-aligned image and remained open to cordial contacts with both Western 
diplomats and the U.S. private sector.
The factors accounting for the moderate decline in MPLA co- 
optability were similar to those evident in the previous period, though 
internal factionalism was temporarily not involved. The growing rivalry 
with other nationalist groups and the MPLA's perception that the West and 
other powers (Zaire and China) were plotting with those groups to exclude 
it from the independence process caused the movement to ask for more help 
from its Eastern allies. Because the victory of the Portuguese left had 
put the MPLA back into the power race, Moscow was more willing to provide 
aid than previously. The dual influence of increased perception of
678 Sassi, interview.
679 Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 255.
680 Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 255.
681 Queiroz, Angola, op. cit., p. 71.
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Western hostility and greater assistance from Eastern allies pushed the 
MPLA leftward. The movement's willingness nonetheless to maintain 
contacts with Western representatives seemed to be related to the 
leadership's perception that some Western officials, particularly the 
U.S. consul general, were open minded, and that some links with Western 
capitalism would promote the prosperity of post-independence Angola.
TENSIONS ESCALATE (JANUARY TO MAY 1975)
The Alvor Agreement began under inauspicious circumstances. On 22 January 
1975, days before the inauguration of the Transitional Government, the 
U.S. government's "Forty Committee" approved a CIA proposal to provide a 
covert grant of $300,000 to the FNLA, though it rejected a proposal that 
$100,000 be provided to UNITA. 682 The decision was made possible by 
Kissinger's late November 1974 dismissal of Assistant Secretary of State 
Donald Easum, who had been blocking the plan.683 (See chapter 14 for 
details.) Shortly after the U.S. aid decision, the FNLA's purchase of a 
Luanda newspaper and television station alerted observers that cash was 
arriving from somewhere. 684 Although the MPLA could not be certain about 
the source of the funds, it was obvious to the movement's leaders that 
some external financial source was now supporting its main rival more 
vigorously. Given past experience, Western sources were naturally 
suspected.
The Transitional Government was installed on 31 January as 
planned, and the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA representatives took up their 
ministerial portfolios. Almost immediately, however, they began using 
their positions to further inter-movement competition rather than to 
prepare the country for independence.
On the symbolic date of 4 February, the fourteenth anniversary of 
the MPLA's launching of armed struggle, Agostinho Neto returned to Luanda 
and received an enthusiastic welcome.685 In a speech two weeks later, he 
declared that the MPLA would support the African National Congress (ANC) 
of South Africa and the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), 
both of which were left-inclined guerrilla movements fighting minority
682 Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 257.
683 Easum, interview.
684 Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 257.
685 Ibid., p. 259
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rule. Neto further criticised the fact that the Angolan economy was "in 
the hands of foreigners", and called for wealth redistribution. However, 
Neto also assured listeners that the MPLA would respect honestly earned 
private property and claimed that the movement would be non-aligned in 
East-West matters. "We do not obey the orders of any great powers in this 
world", 686 he said.
While Neto was on the political hustings, violence in the country 
continued to increase. On 1 February, a day after the Transitional 
Government was installed, a confrontation in Luanda between the MPLA and 
the FNLA left seven people dead. 687 FNLA-MPLA battles in Luanda's slums 
subsequently escalated. The perception of the U.S. consul general's 
assistants, who toured the strife-torn parts of Luanda, was that the FNLA 
was the main instigator of the skirmishes. 688 Violence also spread to 
other parts of the country later in February as Holden Roberto moved 
forces from Zaire into northern Angola. 689 By the end of the month it was 
clear that neither the Transitional Government nor the Portuguese 
authorities were in control of the country.690 ***
As the violence increased, the MPLA representatives in Luanda 
remained in periodic contact with the office of the U.S. consul general, 
and Tom Killoran reportedly continued to think highly of those MPLA 
members he encountered.691
The biggest urban battle to date then occurred on 23 March when 
FNLA soldiers launched a major attack on MPLA installations in Luanda.692 
A few days later, FNLA soldiers gunned down a large number (fifty 
according to U.S. sources, sixty-five according to the MPLA) of unarmed 
MPLA activists at a "Revolutionary Instruction Centre" sixty kilometres
686 Agostinho Neto, "0 MPLA e Uma Barreira Intransponivel", 16 
February 1975. Reprinted in Tudo Pelo Povo!. op. cit., pp. 107-111.
687 Henderson, op. cit., p. 247.
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689 Stockwell, op. cit., p. 68.
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691 Source five, interview.
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from the capital. 693 A contingent of FNLA soldiers (estimated at five 
hundred by Marcum) then arrived in Luanda, and intense fighting raged for 
days in the slums.694
The MPLA urgently appealed to its socialist allies for assistance 
and soon began to receive arms stockpiled in Cabinda. 695 The weapons were 
reportedly delivered to that enclave by socialist countries via Congo- 
Brazzaville.696
Socialist-country arms for the MPLA continued to arrive in Angola 
through April, and a U.S. consulate official monitoring MPLA radio 
communication in Luanda believes that he detected a conversation 
concerning the off-loading of Polish arms at Luanda port at this time.697 
Greek, Soviet, and Yugoslav ships also delivered arms to both Angolan 
ports and Congo-Brazzaville.698
The increased arms supplies to the MPLA, the influx of FNLA 
soldiers from Zaire, and an early April assassination attempt against 
Neto exacerbated tensions.699 Evidence of increased Chinese aid to the 
FNLA, Roberto's trip to the Middle East in search of additional funds,700 
China's pledge to provide UNITA with seventy tons of arms via Tanzania,701 
minor MPLA-UNITA skirmishes in the Angola town of Sa de Bandeira, 702 and 
Savimbi's lavish praise of South African leader John Vorster703 also
693 Stockwell, op. cit., p. 68. See also "Angola: Tempo de Massacre-- 
Entrevista com o Presidente do MPLA, Dr. Agostinho Neto", Tempo, 11 
May 1975, p. 23.
694 Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 258.
695 Queiroz, Angola, op. cit., p. 87.
696 Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 259. See also Stockwell, op. cit., p.
69.
697 Source five, interview.
698 Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 259.
699 "Target was MPLA leader's aircraft", Star (Johannesburg, South 
Africa), 8 April 1975.
700 Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 259.
701 Bridgland, op. cit., p. 118.
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exacerbated the situation. When the FNLA killed an estimated seven 
hundred MPLA supporters in Luanda at the end of April, it became clear 
the violence had gained a momentum of its own and would be very hard to 
stop.704
MPLA interest in maintaining relations with Western governments 
nonetheless continued. Neto visited the Netherlands and Belgium in the 
spring of 1975 and said that the consultations "produced positive 
results". In the Netherlands he met primarily with "friends who always 
supported us", while in Belgium he was "happily surprised" to obtain a 
sympathetic hearing. Neto also praised the role of Scandinavian 
countries. The only Western country Neto explicitly criticised at this 
time was France, which he accused of "never hiding its hostility to the 
people of Angola" and having a "close relationship with South Africa".705 
The MPLA belief that President Giscard d'Estaing had endorsed Mobutu's 
Cabinda secession plan when the French leader visited Kinshasa in early 
1975 probably accounted for Neto's irritation.706
At this time, Lucio L£ra stated that the essential first step 
towards securing peaceful transition to independence would be an embargo 
on arms and personnel coming into Angola by air, sea, and land. This may 
have been designed as a subtle overture to the West, but it produced no 
discernible Western response.707
Although the MPLA leadership evinced interest in contacts with 
Western governments, this interest did not lead it to soften its 
ideological pronouncements, which indeed became even more radical. In a 
May 1975 interview with the left-leaning Mozambican magazine Tempo. Neto 
said that the MPLA sought "a socialist road" and would "abolish the 
privileges acquired at the cost of the least favoured sectors of the 
population and plan... a redistribution of wealth". When asked to respond 
to the accusation that the MPLA followed an "imported ideology", Neto 
said, "One part of the world still suffers from capitalist exploitation,
704 Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 259.
705 "Angola: Tempo de Massacre--Entrevista com o Presidente do MPLA, 
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706 Colin Legum and Tony Hodges, eds., After Angola: The War over 
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the other part of the world tries to create a socialist society.... A 
choice has to be made".708
In sum, during the five months following the signing of the Alvor 
Accord the MPLA became increasingly anxious about mounting evidence that 
Western countries, China, and regional powers were intervening, or 
preparing to intervene, on behalf of its primary nationalist rival, the 
FNLA. The initiation of FNLA attacks on MPLA supporters in Luanda 
exacerbated the threat perception. The movement responded by 
simultaneously appealing to the Eastern bloc for increased assistance and 
lobbying Western diplomats in the hope of convincing them not to view the 
MPLA as an enemy. This led to contradictory public statements, as the 
movement sought to appeal to two audiences. Overall, the MPLA's co- 
optability level declined somewhat, but the movement still had not 
entirely given up on the prospect of reaching a mutually acceptable 
accord with Western governments.
THE RACE FOR POWER (MAY TO NOVEMBER 1975)
From May 1975 until Angola's independence on 11 November 1975, political 
violence rose daily as all three Angolan movements and their respective 
backers participated in an unabashed race for power. The U.S. alliance 
with the FNLA and UNITA was strengthened, Zaire and South Africa 
vigorously entered the fray on behalf of the same movements, and MPLA 
dependence on socialist-country assistance sharply escalated. By 
independence day, MPLA relations with the West were more hostile than at 
any previous point in Angolan history. However, even during this tense 
period there was still evidence of some, albeit very modest, MPLA 
interest in reaching an understanding with the West.
A primary trigger for the increased violence was the MPLA's 
attempt to stage a demonstration to celebrate 1 May. 709 When the FNLA 
attacked the celebrants, the MPLA responded with its newly acquired arms. 
FNLA offices in Luanda were destroyed.710 Commanders of the integrated 
armed forces established by Alvor and officials in the Transitional 
Government tried to establish a truce, to no avail. An observer close to 
Neto later remarked, "The leaders of the MPLA knew that it was not worth
708 "Angola: Tempo de Massacre--Entrevista com o Presidente do MPLA,
Dr. Agostinho Neto", op. cit., p. 23.
709 Queiroz, Angola, op. cit., p. 89.
710 Ibid., p. 90.
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stopping. The UPA [FNLA] men would again return to let loose the 
massacres and the attacks against the movement's bases".711 As the MPLA 
moved onto the offensive in Luanda in mid-May, Zaire sent an estimated 
1,200 soldiers into Angola to fight alongside the FNLA.712 In the same 
month, Neto met with Cuban commander Flavio Bravo in Brazzaville,713 and 
in late May or early June (sources differ about the date) more than two 
hundred Cuban combat advisers arrived to staff MPLA training camps.714
South Africa also became more involved in the conflict at this 
time. At the end of May, Daniel Chipenda, who by now was the FNLA's 
political commissar, flew to Windhoek in Namibia for "medical 
treatment".715 His trip was known to the MPLA because it was reported by 
the media. In light of later developments, it is possible that Chipenda 
discussed the possibility of South African aid for the FNLA during the 
period of his "treatment".
MPLA relations with UNITA also deteriorated. After Savimbi 
rejected a Neto proposal that the two movements join forces,716 the MPLA 
went on the offensive and on 4 June killed a large number of UNITA 
recruits preparing to leave Luanda for military training in the south of 
the country.717 Many observers, including a U.S. diplomat present in 
Luanda at the time, believe that the far-left MPLA Central Committee 
member Nito Alves may have organised the action without Neto's 
permission.718
The MPLA, UNITA, and the FNLA were now at war not only in Luanda, 
but also in outlying areas. Alarmed by this development, African leaders 
convinced the three movements to meet in Kenya. The discussions occurred
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from 16 to 21 June, and produced the "Nakuru agreement".719 While the 
discussions were under way, however, Zairean soldiers continued to enter 
Angola,720 and fresh supplies of socialist-country arms arrived for the 
MPLA.721
In July, the conflict intensified still more. On the ninth, the 
MPLA began to attack its rivals in Luanda with even greater ferocity.722 
Most UNITA and FNLA members fled the capital, and the Transitional 
Government collapsed. The FNLA fought back elsewhere in the country, 
assisted by right-wing Portuguese groups and Zairean soldiers, and drove 
the MPLA out of the Uige and Zaire districts of Angola.723
External involvement in Angola also escalated. On 16 July, the 
U.S. National Security Council approved a plan to increase aid to the 
FNLA and begin aid to UNITA. By the end of the month, $14 million was 
approved and planes of equipment were on their way to Kinshasa.724 
Ironically, on the same day (16 July) that the National Security Council 
approved the aid increase, Cuba's President Fidel Castro asked a leftist 
MFA leader visiting Havana to arrange for Portuguese permission for the 
Cuban armed forces to enter Angola, making it clear that Cuba was 
planning to intervene militarily. 725 FNLA sources say that fifty Cuban 
soldiers entered Congo-Brazzaville in late July to help handle shipments 
of Russian arms.726 South Africa also increased its involvement during 
July, in two phases. First, the head of South Africa's Bureau for State 
Security met Chipenda in Windhoek and discussed possible future 
assistance to the FNLA. Then a South African engineer working on a joint 
South African-Portuguese project in southern Angola (the Cunene-Ruacana 
hydroelectric enterprise) was robbed and beaten up. South African forces
719 Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 260.
720 Queiroz, Angola, op. cit., p. 92.
721 Ibid. p. 93.
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immediately entered the town, disarmed all FNLA, UNITA, and MPLA units in 
the area, and took some MPLA officials prisoner.727
Although South Africa was involved in the Cunene-Ruacana water 
project along the Angola-Namibia border, its economic links with Angola 
overall were modest. Unlike the case in Mozambique, Angolan labourers did 
not migrate to work in South Africa, and Angolan ports were too far away 
to be useful for South African transit traffic. The only significant 
South African economic tie was the investment of the De Beers company in 
Angola's diamond mines.728 In 1973, just 6 percent of Angola's imports 
came from South Africa, in contrast to 70 percent from Western Europe.729 
This left South Africa with relatively little economic leverage on 
Angola, and military action consequently became the primary instrument 
for exerting influence. (As chapter 12 illustrates, the situation was 
quite different in Mozambique.)
During the months of August and September 1975, earlier decisions 
by Zaire, South Africa, the United States, China, the Soviet Union, and 
Cuba to back their respective Angolan allies more vigorously became 
clearly evident on the ground. Not only did the level and sophistication 
of weaponry rise, but observers detected the growing physical presence of 
foreign "advisers". If the MPLA leadership had harboured any doubts about 
U.S. or South African intentions earlier, these developments convinced 
even the most open-minded in that leadership that Washington and Pretoria 
intended to oppose the movement militarily.
In early August, the South African forces that had previously 
crossed to just inside Angola moved north to occupy the entire Cunene- 
Ruacana hydroelectric project.730 Within days, South African forces fired 
on MPLA installations and a supermarket.731 In late August, South Africa 
also agreed to establish training camps for UNITA and the FNLA in 
southern Angola. In early September, South Africa used helicopters to 
move its troops thirty-five miles further north to intercept alleged
727 Wolfers and Bergerol, op. cit., p. 12.
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SWAPO activities. 732 According to a source that may not be entirely 
reliable, the FNLA's Chipenda met shortly thereafter with South African 
Minister of Defence P.W. Botha in Windhoek and pledged that if the FNLA 
gained power it would adopt a favourable policy towards the Republic and 
establish full trade links.733 Whether that is true or not, by late 
September South African instructors were staffing FNLA and UNITA training 
camps in southern Angola.734
The U.S. role also grew. On 20 August, President Ford authorised 
the expenditure of an additional $10.7 million to be spent on arms, 
ammunition, and advisers for the FNLA and UNITA. 735 At about the same 
time, the first U.S. arms for UNITA, authorised in mid-July, began to 
arrive in Angola.736 Many of the details concerning U.S. decision making 
were not known to the MPLA leadership at the time, but soon the MPLA 
encountered evidence of those decisions. For example, on 10 September the 
MPLA found crates of U.S. weapons complete with U.S. Air Force shipping 
labels when it drove the FNLA out of Caxito.737
Evidence of Chinese and Zairean involvement also continued to 
surface. Although China was becoming uneasy about the performance of FNLA 
troops, it did authorise Zaire to release additional Chinese arms to the 
organisation. 738 In early September, the FNLA acknowledged receipt of 450 
tons of arms from China. 739 Mobutu further assisted his allies by 
committing still more Zairean troops to aid both the FNLA and FLEC.740 A 
large shipment of Chinese arms for UNITA also arrived at this time in the 
Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam, but Samora Machel convinced President
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Nyerere to prevent them from being shipped on to Zambia for UNITA.741 The 
cordial relationship between Machel and Neto suggests that the former 
probably informed the latter of the arms' arrival in Dar es Salaam.
Despite President Nyerere's interference in the delivery of 
Chinese arms, Savimbi was able to increase his military operations. On 4 
August, MPLA forces fired on a plane that British industrialist Roland 
"Tiny" Rowland had provided Savimbi, and UNITA counter-attacked. 742 From 
that date forward, UNITA initiated a growing number of offensive 
operations, though it remained weaker militarily than either the MPLA or 
FNLA.
The MPLA also contributed to the internationalisation of the 
conflict. Neto, like Savimbi and Roberto, realised that the planned 
October elections were not going to take place, and that whoever 
controlled Luanda on independence day would declare himself president. 
Whether the MPLA was committed to the Alvor Accord and a democratic 
resolution of the power struggle previously is an open question, but from 
August onwards it clearly was committed to a military strategy. Military 
support from the socialist bloc, already significant, continued to 
escalate.
In August, the MPLA enquired if Moscow would be willing to send 
troops to Angola, and was informed that as this might trigger a U.S. 
response, such aid would not be possible. The Cubans were more 
forthcoming, however, and during August an additional two hundred Cuban 
infantry instructors arrived in Angola. By late September, Cuban ships 
carrying heavy arms and hundreds of soldiers began to arrive in Congo- 
Brazzaville's Pointe Noire port, and Angola's Amboim and Novo Redondo 
ports.743
Clearly, the MPLA's perception that Western countries were 
providing significant assistance to the FNLA and UNITA played a major 
role in pushing the movement towards a closer relationship with the 
socialist bloc and frostier relations with the West. But internal MPLA 
developments also played a role, for Neto was experiencing growing 
leftist pressure within his own ranks.
741 Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 265.
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As the MPLA established control in Luanda, it set up "People's 
Neighbourhood Committees". These soon were influenced by young Portuguese 
activists who were arriving from the metropole. One such individual was 
Sita Valles, a woman formerly associated with Portugal's Union of 
Communist Students. She and Nito Alves became romantically involved and 
set up house together in Luanda. Alves and the new allies he formed via 
Valles took up key posts in the Neighbourhood Committees, and used them 
as a base from which to criticise Neto from a far-left perspective.744
Although the left-wing pressure at this point primarily focussed 
on local Luanda matters, it created a climate that affected MPLA policy 
on other issues. Alves's new-found friends were extremely anti-West and 
opposed any negotiated solution to the conflict with the FNLA or UNITA. 
These attitudes, combined with the ability of the charismatic Alves to 
whip the Luanda slums into a state of highly emotional excitement, 
influenced Neto's attitudes towards both the West and the rival 
movements.
Despite these developments, Neto continued to communicate with the
U.S. consulate in Luanda, though the discourse now featured increased
mutual suspicion. According to a U.S. Department of State source familiar
with the contacts:
We tried to explain to the MPLA that while we insisted Angola have 
elections, we were not out to destroy their movement. The MPLA 
appeared not to believe us because they knew we were aiding the 
FNLA and UNITA.745
The MPLA also again tried to convince Western observers that it 
was primarily nationalist rather than Marxist. In an August interview 
with the Financial Times, an MPLA official said, "We are a nationalist 
movement that has Marxists in its leadership. We accept help from anyone, 
and would accept help from the devil himself. We have received much aid 
from Western as well as communist sources".746
Contacts with Gulf Oil also continued. According to Colin Legum, 
in September 1975 Gulf began paying its quarterly royalties due Angola, 
worth $116 million, into "the MPLA's own account".747
744 Wolfers and Bergerol, op. cit., pp. 71-74.
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The ongoing cordial contacts between the MPLA and Gulf Oil also 
illustrated an aspect of Angola's economic structure that limited MPLA 
co-optability. Angola's prime economic resources were oil and diamonds. 
Because these commodities are capable of rendering large profits for 
firms participating in their extraction, Angola's main resources were 
attractive to a wide range of foreign companies. The MPLA concluded, 
correctly, that exploitation of its natural resources would be judged 
sufficiently lucrative by the international business community that poor 
relations with Western governments would not block access to foreign 
technology and capital needed for development. The high value of the 
products also indicated that large amounts of official development 
assistance (aid) would not be required, further reducing the relative 
cost of hostile relations with the West.
The final battle for Luanda got under way in earnest on 14 
October, when the South Africans mounted Operation Zulu from a Namibian 
staging base.748 A motorized force entered Angola at Cuangar. The column's 
armoured cars soon linked up with one thousand UNITA soldiers, and began 
to move rapidly through MPLA defences. The Zulu force captured Mogamedes 
(now Namibe) on Angola's southern coast on 28 October, and by 7 November, 
four days before independence, was still rapidly pushing northward. A 
second, smaller South African column drove the MPLA's Katanga gendarme 
allies out of Luso and moved towards the MPLA's last outpost on the 
Benguela railroad, Texeira de Sousa, on Angola's eastern border.749
Meanwhile, the FNLA, using South African and U.S. arms, and aided 
by Zairean soldiers, pushed towards Luanda from the north. An 
unsuccessful operation was also launched in Cabinda.750 On 8 November, 
Roberto began an all-out assault on Luanda, traversing the Kifangondo 
plain twenty kilometres outside Luanda. By the eve of independence, the 
FNLA was shelling Luanda.751 Roberto was deprived of Chinese assistance, 
however, for on 27 October the Chinese special instructors left Zaire,752 
apparently due to Beijing's disillusionment with the FNLA.
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In an acute state of agitation about the impending, possibly 
simultaneous, arrival of South African, Zairean, UNITA, and FNLA troops 
on the outskirts of Luanda, the MPLA sent a special delegation to 
Washington, which arrived on 22 October. According to John Stockwell, 
former leader of the CIA Angola Task Force, the group came "to plead the 
MPLA's potential friendliness towards the United States" but was only 
received at a low level in the Department of State.753
With the MPLA rebuffed by Washington, and still panicked about its 
future security, on 4 November an envoy of the organisation asked Cuba to 
provide manpower to help defend the capital. The Cuban Communist Party 
Central Committee approved the request on 5 November.754 On November 7, a 
battalion of Cuban soldiers was airlifted in aged Cuban planes to help 
hold Luanda until reinforcements could be sent.755 The newly arrived Cuban 
troops, together with the MPLA, immediately confronted the FNLA on 10 
November in the now infamous "Battle of Kifangondo", 756 halting the FNLA's 
advance. While that battle was raging outside Luanda, the Portuguese high 
commissioner announced that he was transferring power to "the Angolan 
people", lowered the Angolan flag, and together with the last two 
thousand Portuguese troops quietly boarded naval transports bound for 
Lisbon. A few minutes after midnight on the night of 10 to 11 November, 
thousands of Luanda residents gathered in a stadium heard Neto declare 
independence.
The Independence Proclamation757 and the new Constitution758 
announced on the same day provide useful material for analysing the 
MPLA's state of mind as it took power. Taken together, the documents 
reveal: a socialist, "anti-imperialist", ideological viewpoint; an intent 
to build a centrally planned, socialist economy that would leave some 
room for the private sector; a belief that there was a "natural"
753 Stockwell, op. cit., p. 200.
754 Szulc, Fidel: A Critical Portrait, op. cit., pp. 637-639.
755 Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 273.
756 Queiroz, Angola, op. cit., pp. 119-120.
757 Agostinho Neto, "Proclamaqao da Independencia", Textos Politicos 
Escolhidos (Luanda: Ediqoes DIP, 1985), p. 40.
758 "Constitutional Law of the People's Republic of Angola", approved 
by acclamation by the Central Committee of the MPLA, on 10 November
1975. Document in CIDAC archives, Lisbon, Portugal.
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political alliance with socialist countries, despite the MPLA's 
opposition to establishment of foreign bases; and an ongoing interest in 
building respectful diplomatic and trading relationships with Western 
countries.
In the six months preceding independence, the self-reinforcing 
cycle evident since the Portuguese coup gained momentum. The MPLA 
perceived its nationalist rival to be enjoying increasing support from 
Western countries, regional powers, and China. This caused it to move 
closer to the Eastern bloc, to which it appealed for money, arms, and 
eventually manpower. Internal factionalism again played a role as the 
Alves group agitated from a far left position. The interaction of these 
factors made the MPLA less co-optable than at any earlier point in its 
development when it took power on 11 November 1975, yet even then it did 
not completely turn its back on the West, as its independence day 
proclamation made clear.
SUMMARY
From the Portuguese coup in April 1974 until Angolan independence in 
November 1975 the MPLA clearly became considerably less co-optable. 
Relations with the West passed through four phases. Openness to 
accommodating Western concerns declined modestly in the first two phases, 
and then steeply in the last two. A complex interaction between local and 
international factors was responsible. Rivalry with other nationalist 
movements, resurgent internal factionalism, and the antagonistic attitude 
of regional powers made the MPLA leadership fearful of being either 
politically marginalised or physically eliminated. In this context, 
perception of Western policies and relations with socialist allies played 
a decisive role, particularly in the second two phases, pushing the MPLA 
to a quite hostile posture regarding the West. If either set of factors, 
local or international, had been different, the outcome could well have 
been distinct.
In the first phase--the three months following the Portuguese 
coup--the MPLA, in alliance with FRELIMO, sought to convince Lisbon to 
give the African territories full independence. The MPLA leadership was 
distracted from this task by rising racial violence in Luanda, and by the 
Active Revolt and Cabinda secession plot, which it believed were fomented 
by the West. The consequent hostility towards the West was partially 
balanced by the realisation that prospects for obtaining increased Soviet 
aid, still damaged by the Chipenda (Eastern Revolt) factionalism in 1973,
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remained endangered by the new internal division. Therefore, while the 
movement was increasingly suspicious of Western plans, it remained 
interested in contacts with Western leaders.
In the second phase, from July 1974 to January 1975, MPLA co- 
optability declined moderately again. Most of the factors present in 
preceding months were still evident, though internal factionalism played 
a lesser role. Increasing competition with UNITA and the MPLA, combined 
with the perception that these movements were receiving assistance from 
the West, excited both fear and resentment. The "Sal plot" to exclude 
Neto from power, which the MPLA believed bore Washington's 
"fingerprints", exacerbated anti-Western sentiment. The victory of the 
Portuguese left and its support for Neto increased the MPLA's 
attractiveness to Moscow just as the MPLA concluded that Western support 
for rivals meant that socialist allies were more urgently required. 
Moscow's willingness to provide the desired weapons pulled the movement 
further leftward.
Nonetheless, the MPLA leadership had not turned its back on the 
West entirely, as conversations involving Easum, Killoran, and Gulf Oil 
illustrate. The MPLA seemed to believe that although the West was 
generally hostile, some Western officials and businesspeople were open- 
minded .
During the third phase, from January to May 1975, MPLA co- 
optability declined more precipitously. Though the leadership was 
ignorant of the U.S. government's decision to increase aid to its rivals 
days after the Alvor Accord was signed, it saw the results of the 
largesse on the streets of Luanda and drew its own conclusions. FNLA 
violence against the MPLA in Luanda, confirmed by U.S. diplomats, 
increased MPLA fears and led to an even greater flow of arms from the 
Soviet Union. Evidence of Chinese aid for the FNLA and UNITA's growing 
public relationship with South Africa heightened the MPLA's threat 
perception still further. Unlike in the case of Mozambique, there were 
too few economic links between Angola and South Africa for economic 
interdependence to be used as a basis for rapprochement with Pretoria. 
(See chapter 12 for the contrasting situation with regard to Mozambique.)
Though rhetoric shifted leftward, and co-optability declined, the 
movement still did not abandon contacts with Western diplomats. It 
continued to lobby Western officials in the hope of convincing them that 
the MPLA was not necessarily hostile to their interests.
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From May to November 1975, a self-perpetuating cycle gained almost 
unstoppable inertia. The MPLA perceived increased threats from rivals, 
regional powers, and the United States. It successfully appealed to 
socialist allies for support, and then perceived even greater threat as 
its rivals obtained commensurate escalations from their regional,
Western, and Chinese backers. Internal factionalism again played a role 
as the Nito Alves faction pushed the MPLA, from within, towards greater 
friendship with the socialist states, more intransigence in negotiations 
with allies, and a more anti-Western rhetorical posture.
The apparent willingness of Gulf Oil to consolidate relations with 
the MPLA in this period, even as relations with the West reached their 
nadir, highlighted the fact that the territory's economic structure, 
specifically its highly attractive oil and diamond resources, meant that 
Angolan access to foreign technology and capital necessary for 
development would probably not be blocked by MPLA confrontation with 
Western governments. Thus, Angola's economic structure had a somewhat 
limiting effect on MPLA co-optability.
Yet, even in the heat of battle, the MPLA did not completely walk 
away from the West, as illustrated by its late October decision to send a 
delegation to Washington, and its independence day statement.
The six factors that influenced MPLA co-optability in the 1974 to 
1975 period were so closely intertwined that it is very difficult to 
weigh exactly what effect each had independently from the others. 
Consequently, it is hard to determine just what impact a concerted 
Western co-optation policy might have had. We can merely rule out certain 
possibilities.
By this point in the movement's history, even a vigorous co­
optation strategy would have produced only modest results. Even if the 
West had offered assistance to the MPLA in the months before 
independence, the movement would not have become pro-Western. The 
internal impetus for radical left ideology, manifested by the Nito Alves 
faction, militated against accommodation. The strengthening of the (Neto) 
MPLA by Portuguese internal politics would have attracted Soviet 
largesse, even if the West had not been perceived as threatening MPLA 
interests. Moscow's concern not to lose either substantive or symbolic 
battles in its competition with China meant that the Soviet Union would 
have been interested in bolstering the MPLA, even if it were no longer 
seen as a victim of Western aggression. Rivalry with other nationalist 
groups, and fear of alliances between those groups and both regional and
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Chinese backers, would have made the MPLA appeal for increased socialist- 
world support even if the West had not been aiding the movement's rivals. 
Angola's economic structure would have given the MPLA confidence that 
access to capital and technology required for exploitation of resources 
would not be jeopardised by political confrontation with the West.
However, the damage to Western interests could have been reduced 
considerably if a co-optation rather than a coercion strategy had been 
adopted. Such a strategy would have altered regional dynamics. If South 
Africa had not perceived that Washington would acquiesce to, or even 
support, an invasion, regional threats to the MPLA probably would have 
been less, and the MPLA might not have appealed for Cuban troops. If 
Zaire had concluded that the United States would energetically criticise 
its role as a channel for Chinese aid to the FNLA, the violence in Luanda 
would have been less, and the MPLA leadership would have been less 
frantic for protection. The MPLA leadership's reluctance to walk away 
from discussions with U.S. diplomats even in the midst of a coercive 
political environment, as manifested by the lingering contacts with Easum 
and Killoran, suggests that genuine negotiations could have occurred in a 
co-optation environment. In such talks, the MPLA surely would not have 
abandoned its friendly rhetoric regarding the socialist world or its 
socialist plans for Angola. But it well might have given greater weight 
to the importance of retaining Western goodwill, and perhaps returned to 
the delicate balancing act it occasionally performed in previous periods.
In short, a Western effort at co-optation would not have created a 
pliable ally, but it certainly would have resulted in a less implacable 
enemy.
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CHAPTER 12
MOZAMBIQUE: A CASE OF PARTIAL CO-OPTATION
FRELIMO's interaction with the West during the period from the Portuguese 
coup to Mozambique's independence in June 1975 can best be characterised 
as a case of partial co-optation.
FRELIMO's attitudes evolved in phases. At first, the movement 
focussed on the goal of forcing Portugal to accept the principle of 
independence and paid relatively little attention to other Western 
countries. However, once it became clear in September 1974 that Portugal 
would hand over power to FRELIMO as the government of an independent 
Mozambique, the movement began to focus on its future government-to- 
government relations and exhibited far greater interest in accommodating 
Western concerns. FRELIMO's attitude shifted in early 1975, however, and 
the movement became more selective about which Western countries it 
sought to accommodate. Relations with the United Kingdom continued to 
improve, while relations with the United States sharply deteriorated.
Several factors were involved in the movement's late 1974 opening 
to the West. FRELIMO's perception of Western and neighbouring states' 
policies played the most prominent and consistent role. Local economic 
and geographic circumstances, low levels of both internal factionalism 
and rivalry with other nationalist groups, poor relations with Moscow, 
and the effectiveness of the movement's guerrilla operations all also 
played important roles. FRELIMO never became totally co-optable, but by 
early 1975 it was well on its way to partial co-optability.
The factors that caused FRELIMO subsequently to adopt a more 
selective approach to Western countries were more limited. The movement's 
perception of certain states' policies towards the future FRELIMO-ruled 
state of Mozambique stands out as the most important consideration.
This analysis suggests that, had different Western policies been 
adopted, FRELIMO would have been more open to building constructive 
relationships with Western countries at the time of independence.
However, it also suggests that even if vigorous co-optation policies had 
been pursued, FRELIMO would not have emerged as "pro-Western".
THE INDEPENDENCE NEGOTIATIONS (APRIL TO SEPTEMBER 1974)
During the first five months following the coup, FRELIMO used a carrot 
and stick strategy. The movement tried to tempt Portugal into granting 
independence by repeatedly promising not to persecute whites, and
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simultaneously sought to pressure Lisbon by increasing guerrilla attacks 
on Portuguese targets.
Like the MPLA, FRELIMO was alarmed by Spinola's pledge to maintain 
Portugal as a "pluricontinental entirety".759 The FRELIMO Executive 
Committee responded, "[0]nly through recognition of the right to 
independence of the Mozambican people, led by FRELIMO, their authentic 
and legitimate representative, will the war end. Any attempt to elude the 
real problem will only lead to new... sacrifices". Thus, FRELIMO not only 
demanded immediate independence, but implied that power should be 
directly transferred to its leadership. The Executive Committee added 
that it feared that Rhodesia and South Africa might be planning to help 
Portugal block independence.760 FRELIMO did not include any Western 
countries in the list of potential anti-independence forces.
By May, Spinola had still failed to commit Portugal to immediate 
decolonisation, and FRELIMO swiftly launched new guerrilla operations in 
the Beira area. The Portuguese forces initially fought back, but their 
will soon collapsed. In June, MFA sympathisers in the Portuguese officer 
corps arranged informal cease-fires with individual FRELIMO units and 
thousands of Portuguese soldiers deserted.761
A first round of official discussions between FRELIMO and the new 
Portuguese authorities occurred on 5 and 6 June in the Zambian capital, 
Lusaka. The new Portuguese foreign minister, Mario Soares, proposed a 
cease-fire and a referendum to discover if the people of Mozambique 
wanted independence or not. Machel counter-demanded that Portugal 
recognise FRELIMO as the Mozambican people's legitimate representative, 
recognise Mozambique's right to complete independence, and begin a 
process of transferring power to FRELIMO. The talks were suspended until 
July.762
759 F. A. Gonqalves Ferreira, 15 Anos da Histdria Recente de Portugal 
(1970-1984); Os Factos. os Erros. os Protaaonistas. a Andlise e 
Interpretacao (Lisbon: Antonio Coelho Dias, 1985), p. 412. See also 
"Portuguese Junta Opposes Freeing African Lands", New York Times. 28 
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760 "Statement by the FRELIMO Executive Committee on the events in 
Portugal" 27 April 1974, FRELIMO document, CIDAC archives, Lisbon, 
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761 Hanlon, Mozambique, op. cit., pp. 43-44.
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House, 1988), p. 81.
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FRELIMO's position was not well received by the Soviet Union, 
which sought to "dissuade" the movement from making "excessive 
demands".763 A well-placed FRELIMO source says that the Soviets were 
urging caution because they were afraid that confrontational tactics 
would "jeopardise the democratic process in Portugal" and adds, "We did 
not welcome the advice".764 Some of FRELIMO's African allies, particularly 
Kenneth Kaunda and Julius Nyerere, also urged Machel to accept the 
referendum plan.765
FRELIMO was disconcerted by the pressure. The movement's 
newsletter, Mozambique Revolution, complained that the negotiations in 
Lusaka had "demobilised" public opinion and added, "Now more than ever, 
there must be no vacillation in international support for our struggle". 
The newsletter also announced plans to start new military operations in 
Zambezia province in July.766
In late June, at the eleventh OAU summit, Machel showed irritation 
with his allies' advice. "One does not ask a slave if he desires to be 
free", he said, "especially after his revolt, and much less when [the 
questioner] is the slave owner". He also revealed the second, "carrot", 
element of the movement's strategy, pledging that FRELIMO would 
"guarantee the life, integrity, and legitimate interests of Portuguese 
citizens in Mozambique".767
The talks scheduled for July were not held, largely due to power 
struggles in Lisbon. FRELIMO used the time to launch its new military 
operations in Zambezia province, the principle plantation region of 
Mozambique, "against an army that preferred fraternising with the 
guerillas to fighting".768 Indeed, two thousand Portuguese soldiers and
763 "Russia's Strategy in Portugal", Christian Science Monitor 
(Boston, United States), 9 July 1974. Also source seven, confidential 
interviews by author, Maputo, Mozambique, 30 September 1984 and Wye 
Plantation, Maryland, United States, 20 November 1986.
764 Source seven, interview.
765 Middlemas, op. cit., pp. 326-327 and Christie, op. cit., p. 82.
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767 "Discurso do presidente da FRELIMO, Camarada Samora Machel, a 11a 
Sessao da OUA", A Voz da FRELIMO. 27 June 1974, CIDAC archives, 
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768 Cahen, "Le Portugal et l"Afrique", op. cit., p. 11.
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officers at the Boane Barracks near Lourengo Marques refused to go north 
to fight.769 Officers at Nampula general headquarters also declared 
themselves in favour of ceasing operations against FRELIMO.770 In late 
July, Machel encouraged this trend by broadcasting a message from Dar es 
Salaam in which he reassured whites and Portuguese soldiers that those 
who "want to experience and build the new Mozambique" would be welcome to 
remain in the country.771 Lisbon's ambivalence about Mozambican 
independence ended on 27 July when the Portuguese left forced Splnola to 
declare his readiness to "initiate the transfer of power to the people of 
the overseas territories".772 In a secret meeting in the Tanzanian capital 
Dar es Salaam, beginning on 30 July, the Portuguese agreed that FRELIMO 
was the legitimate and authentic representative of the Mozambican people, 
and a secret protocol was signed.773
In early August, the Portuguese government again entered into 
quiet talks with FRELIMO, first in Rome and then in Dar es Salaam.774 This 
time the Portuguese delegation was led by Melo Antunes, an anti-colonial 
army officer who was one of the leaders of the 25 April coup.775 The talks 
provoked huge pro-FRELIMO rallies in Mozambique, and Portuguese 
residents, sensing that the tide was turning, began to depart in large 
numbers.776
The most important negotiations then occurred in Lusaka from 5 to 
7 September and culminated with the Lusaka accords. Portugal agreed to 
swiftly form a FRELIMO-dominated Transitional Government, and then to 
hand over power to FRELIMO as the government of an independent Mozambique
769 Hanlon, Mozambique, op. cit., pp. 43-44.
770 Christie, op. cit., p. 83.
771 Samora Machel, radio broadcast from Dar es Salaam, 24 July 1974. 
Quoted in Christie, op. cit., p. 84.
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on 25 June 1975. In return, FRELIMO agreed to the cease-fire that the 
Portuguese government urgently desired.777
The progress caused new problems. The Rhodesian government 
gradually realised that Lisbon was giving in to FRELIMO's demands. 
According to a mercenary who had worked for the Rhodesian government in 
1974 and 1975, within six weeks of the Portuguese coup Salisbury had 
developed a plan to divide Mozambique at the Zambezi river, install a 
non-communist Mozambican group in the southern section bordering 
Rhodesia, and let FRELIMO have the northern half. 778 Rhodesia's June 1974 
decision to welcome a group of forty ex-members of Portugal's Mozambique- 
based "Special Groups" and install them in a Rhodesian camp was 
undoubtedly related to this plan.779
When the Portuguese government initiated independence discussions 
with FRELIMO in August, Rhodesia began to develop the plan further. On 16 
August, the head of Rhodesia's Central Intelligence Organisation, Ken 
Flower, submitted a brief to Rhodesian leader Ian Smith in which he 
highlighted Rhodesia's recent military and intelligence successes and 
then remarked, "With the shutters coming down along our border with 
Mozambique we need to project these activities into Mozambique...." He 
further urged Smith to try to convince South Africa to assist such 
operations.780
Another result of the independence negotiations was the growth of 
rival political groups. In August, a variety of anti-FRELIMO forces 
united into the National Coalition Party, which included Nkavandame, 
Simango, and Gwenjere.781 The rising violence against FRELIMO supporters, 
including bomb attacks, beatings, and police killings of black 
demonstrators, contributed to the tense atmosphere.
In the period from the Portuguese coup to the 7 September 1974 
agreement on independence, FRELIMO devoted little attention to the issue 
of relations with Western countries and focussed its energy on obtaining 
a power handover promise from Lisbon. The only significant development in
777 Christie, op. cit., p. 85.
778 Source eight, confidential interview by author, Washington D.C.,
United States, 19 July 1986.
779 Ken Flower as quoted in Martin and Johnson, op. cit., p. 4.
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FRELIMO's international alignment was its irritation at Soviet meddling 
and apprehension about Rhodesian and South African plans.
EVOLUTION TOWARDS PARTIAL CO-OPTABILITY (SEPTEMBER TO JANUARY 1975)
After 7 September 1974, FRELIMO began to shift from a guerrilla movement
to a government in waiting. Through the last quarter of 1974 the movement
started to come to terms with the responsibilities governing would entail
and showed an interest in at least partially accommodating the concerns
both of Western governments and South Africa. Its attitude towards
Rhodesia remained unclear, perhaps deliberately so.
For a few days immediately following the Lusaka Accords, it
appeared that the Transitional Government might be physically prevented
from taking office. Within hours of the signing, angry whites took over
the Lourenpo Marques radio station and called for a Rhodesian-style
Unilateral Declaration of Independence. They also appealed to elite
Portuguese commando units to assemble and await instructions,782 and asked
customs officials to open the borders in the hope that South African
troops would intervene.703 Gwenjere and Simango lent their support to the
rebellion. Similar white rebellions were staged in other cities, and
whites drove through black residential areas shooting at random. Blacks
set up road blocks and burned cars.784
FRELIMO responded swiftly with an 8 September radio broadcast from
Dar es Salaam. Machel said that the rebels were at the service of
"international imperialism", which was trying to cause racial conflict
and thereby create a pretext for "internationalising aggression". He
reminded the Portuguese officers that a cease-fire was in effect, pledged
that the FRELIMO forces and the Portuguese army would "co-operate closely
to... safeguard the Mozambican independence process", and made a direct
appeal to whites:
Unaware elements in the white population, who were manipulated by 
villainous fascistic colonisers, should immediately return to 
their houses and refuse to be instruments of the fascists. This is 
the best way to defend their legitimate interests, which FRELIMO 
promises to protect....785
782 Christie, op. cit., p. 85.
783 Munslow, op. cit., p. 128.
784 Hanlon, Mozambique, op. cit., p. 45.
785 Samora Machel, "Moqambicanas, Mogambicanos!", 8 September 1974, 
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Machel1s broadcast also had a direct message for the governments of
Rhodesia and South Africa:
We must warn neighbouring countries that the criminals wish to 
involve in their desperate actions that neither FRELIMO nor the 
African and non-African allies of the Mozambican people nor the 
international community will tolerate what would necessarily be 
considered imperialist aggression.786
This implied that FRELIMO had a pledge of outside support in the event of
a South African or Rhodesian invasion.
FRELIMO supporters in Lourengo Marques also played an important
role in neutralising the crisis. Though there were few clandestine
FRELIMO cells in the capital, those that survived emerged from
underground and toured the black residential areas calling for calm.787
FRELIMO also began to fly its guerrillas to the capital from their
northern operational bases using planes provided by the OAU.788 The
situation was brought back under control before they became a factor. On
9 September the Portuguese armed forces gave the rebels an ultimatum to
evacuate the radio station or face the consequences, and the rebels
surrendered.789
Western diplomats were impressed. One said:
It is incredible the way FRELIMO managed to control the situation 
for three days in the face of great provocation.... After 400 
years of Portuguese colonialism, the Africans saw whites trying to 
steal their independence. But still they remained calm, and that 
demonstrates FRELIMO's control over the people and FRELIMO1s 
maturity.790
The swift resolution of the uprising permitted the Transitional 
Government to take power on schedule on 25 September. Machel decided to 
stay outside the government, in order to devote full time to party 
matters, and Joaquim Chissano became the prime minister. Under the Lusaka 
Accord six cabinet ministers were named by FRELIMO and three by Portugal.
Machel1s speech at the inauguration of the Transitional Government 
succinctly summarised FRELIMO's frame of mind. He said that the
786 Ibid.
787 Source seven, interview.
788 "Message from Comrade Samora Moises Machel, President of FRELIMO, 
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government would be an instrument of FRELIMO, the movement would try to 
create habits of "collective work", the white population had nothing to 
fear, and FRELIMO was grateful to its African allies, the socialist 
countries, and the anti-colonial forces in the West (in that order) for 
assistance during the war.791
The most pressing foreign policy issue for FRELIMO after the 
Transitional Government took office was relations with South Africa. For 
a number of reasons, South Africa had not sought to block independence, 
and FRELIMO set about ensuring that Pretoria did not change its mind.
One of the most important reasons for South Africa's inaction was 
its interest in continuing "detente" with African states. In May 1974, 
Prime Minister Vorster had met with President Leopold Senghor of Senegal 
and President Felix Houphouet-Boigny of Cote d'Ivoire in the latter's 
capital; he hoped for more encounters. He was well aware that 
intervention in Mozambique would have damaged detente, as FRELIMO was 
considered the legitimate claimant to power by virtually all African 
governments.792
Some sources say that a feud between branches of the South African 
government also contributed to South Africa's decision. The head of South 
Africa's Bureau of State Security (BOSS), General Hendrik van den Bergh, 
was engaged in a power struggle with South African Defence Minister P.W. 
Botha. The two had been enemies since 1968, when Vorster appointed van 
den Bergh head of the new intelligence agency (BOSS), and placed it above 
Military Intelligence.793 Van den Bergh had a close relationship with 
Vorster because the two had shared a cell when in detention during World 
War II. (They, like many Afrikaners, had refused to fight Germany.) Van 
den Bergh helped design Vorster's detente policy and condemned P.W. 
Botha's Military Intelligence for failing to support it.794 Most important 
for FRELIMO, van den Bergh was more interested in Namibia (often still 
referred to as South West Africa in official South African circles) than
791 "Mensagem do Presidente Samora Moises Machel Por Ocasiao do Tomada 
de Posse do Governo de Transigao", 20 September 1974, document from 
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Rhodesia. The head of Rhodesia's Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO),
Ken Flower, reports:
I remember van den Bergh saying there were only 40,000 whites of 
Afrikaner stock in Rhodesia compared with 75,000 in South West 
Africa, which meant that Rhodesia's future was of less importance 
to South Africa than the future of South West Africa.795
This partly explains why van den Bergh was subsequently willing to go
along with an operation against Namibia's neighbour, Angola, but remained
steadfastly opposed to an operation in Rhodesia's neighbour, Mozambique.
Another factor may have been South Africa's concern about the
reaction of radical Portuguese soldiers. "Van den Bergh realised he would
end up not just fighting FRELIMO but also many of the Portuguese soldiers
remaining in the country", a Mozambican source reported.796
Perhaps the most critical factor, however, was South Africa's
extensive economic links with Mozambique. These links conferred
significant, though not always equal, benefits to residents on both sides
of the border. The links gave South Africa a non-military tool with which
to influence any government ruling Mozambique and an interest in
maintaining stability within Mozambique. At the same time, the economic
benefits accrued on the northern side of the border gave any government
ruling Mozambique an interest in reaching a modus vivendi with its
southern neighbour.
The railroad from Mozambique's capital to South Africa had opened
in 1895, and traditionally carried half of the imports and exports of
South Africa's Transvaal province. In 1973, Mozambique handled one-fifth
of South Africa's imports and exports, a total of 6.2 million tonnes. The
next largest source of transit business was Rhodesia, with 3.3 million
tonnes.797 In 1974, revenue from transport services earned Mozambique 38
percent of its income.798
From 1908 until independence there had been an average of more
than eighty thousand Mozambicans working in South African mines. Indeed,
in the 1970 to 1974 period there were more Mozambicans than South
795 Ibid., p. 157.
796 Source two, confidential interviews by author, Maputo, Mozambique, 
September 1984 and February 1986.
797 Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours, op. cit., pp. 131-132.
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Peasant (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1983), p. 26.
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Africans working in those mines.799 Remittances from relatives working in 
South Africa were critical to large numbers of Mozambicans, and in 1975 
migrant labour accounted for 12 percent of Mozambique's wage labour 
force.800 In 1974 "invisible earnings", mostly from South African wage 
remittances, earned Mozambique 46 percent of its income.801
Trade ties were also strong. In 1973, 20 percent of Mozambique's 
imports came from South Africa (double the percentage in 1965), compared 
with 19 percent from Portugal (just over one-half the figure for 1965) .802 
In 1973, South Africa also became Mozambique's third most important 
export market, after Portugal and the United States.803
In several respects, Mozambique began to be more closely 
integrated with South Africa than it was with Portugal, more a colony of 
Pretoria than of Lisbon. This reflected the weak and underdeveloped 
character of the Portuguese economy, and the rapid growth and 
industrialisation of the South African economy in this period. It also 
reflected the character of Mozambique's resources. Mozambique's main 
resources capable of quickly earning the country foreign exchange were 
manpower and transport facilities. To be converted into cash, these 
resources required the goodwill of a neighbour possessing foreign 
exchange. Manpower needed nearby mines and commercial farms in which to 
labour, and transport facilities required neighbours' freight. South 
Africa was in a position to provide these economic linkages. No other 
country had both the geographic proximity and economic power to play this 
role.
The increasing integration of the two southern African economies 
gave Pretoria precisely the structural ties to Mozambique that Lisbon had 
been slow to develop. Pretoria used these economic connections to protect 
its interests and maintain past benefits despite the abrupt, radical 
change in the formal political structure of the Mozambican territory. One 
could perhaps say that at independence, South Africa was "consensually 
neo-colonising" Mozambique. To the extent that FRELIMO's decision to
799 Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours, op. cit., p. 133.
800 Ibid., p. 294.
801 First, op. cit., p. 26.
802 Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours, op. cit., p. 293; Hanlon,
Mozambique. op. cit., p. 283.
803 Munslow, op. cit., p. 28.
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treat South Africa respectfully enhanced the movement1s image in the 
West, South Africa's "consensual neo-colonisation" of Mozambique 
facilitated FRELIMO-Western relations.
Detente concerns, internal South African bureaucratic rivalries, 
military considerations, and the knowledge that the Republic's interests 
could perhaps best be protected through use of economic ties rather than 
force all caused Pretoria to adopt a cautious attitude towards those 
seeking to engage in violent resistance to a FRELIMO take-over. Thus, in 
August 1974 the South African consul general in Mozambique refused a 
request by Mozambican whites for assistance.804 A South African official 
later commented, "We said Portugal had the right to hand over to any 
government it wanted to. In Mozambique, Portugal chose to hand over to 
FRELIMO. In Angola, Portugal chose the Alvor Accord".805 The white rebels 
then reportedly approached Minister of Defence P.W. Botha for assistance. 
FRELIMO legend claims that Botha agreed to help, but that van den Bergh 
sabotaged the plot by having his agents place sugar in the tanks of the 
military vehicles gathering for the operation. 806 This colourful account 
has never been confirmed.
Not only did South Africa refrain from intervening, but its consul 
general was invited to the 25 September inauguration of the Transitional 
Government, where he was seated between the British consul general and a 
representative of the Chinese Communist Party.807 South Africa's Rand 
Daily Mail newspaper accurately summarised Pretoria's view in an 18 
September article when it said, "In the short term it seems unlikely that 
FRELIMO will do anything... to antagonise whites in... South Africa".808
Shortly after his inauguration as prime minister, Joaquim Chissano 
began to meet regularly with the South African diplomat Brand Fourie, 
and, according to a South African source, "Leant over backwards to 
establish a good relationship".809 Chissano's pragmatism was also evident
804 Source six, interview.
805 Ibid.
806 Source two, interview.
807 Source six, interview.
808 "Rumours... then came panic", Rand Daily Mail (.Johannesburg, South 
Africa), 18 September 1974.
809 Source six, interview.
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in a December 1974 interview. Asked about future relations with the 
neighbouring minority regimes, he said:
[0] ur relations... will depend upon the attitudes of South Africa 
and Rhodesia towards Mozambique.... We do not want to interfere in 
the internal affairs of South Africa or Rhodesia, despite our 
opposition to apartheid and racial segregation. But we also think 
that it falls to the South African and Rhodesian peoples to 
resolve their problems. It is convenient to note that between 
South Africa and Mozambique there exist commercial relations that 
were established by the Portuguese government.810
Chissano went on to remark that neighbours' fees for the use of
Mozambique's railroads and ports accounted for 40 percent of the
territory's foreign exchange earnings,811 strongly implying that South
Africa would continue to have access to these facilities. The
Transitional Government's decision not to disrupt existing labour
agreements with South Africa reflected FRELIMO's awareness of the
structural integration of the Mozambican and South African economies, and
its intention not to initiate a precipitous break.
FRELIMO also adopted a cautious policy regarding the ANC in this
period. Although Machel strongly implied that FRELIMO might aid the
guerrillas in Rhodesia (see below), on the subject of the ANC he simply
appealed to South Africa to respond positively to the guerrilla group's
request for talks, and did not address the question of future FRELIMO aid
to the movement.812 According to an ANC source, at around this time
FRELIMO secretly promised Pretoria that it would not provide bases to the
ANC.813
FRELIMO's respect for South African economic and military power 
and pleasure at Pretoria's decision not to block independence were 
important reasons for its cautious ANC policy. However, there was 
another, little known, cause. Back at the beginning of FRELIMO's "armed 
struggle", the ANC had adopted a paternalistic attitude towards its 
Mozambican colleagues. As a source close to Machel stated in 1984:
810 "Joaquim Chissano--"Para fazer a revoluqao Mozambique apoia-se na 
sua propria forqa'", Vida Mundial. no. 1839 (12 December 1974), pp. 
18-24, CIDAC archives, Lisbon, Portugal.
811 Ibid.
812 "Message from Comrade Samora Moises Machel, President of FRELIMO, 
to the 24th Session of the Liberation Committee of the OAU", op. cit.
813 Source nine, confidential interview by author, Maputo, Mozambique, 
17 October 1984.
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The ANC attitude in the early days was that we Mozambicans were 
too underdeveloped to start armed struggle. They said that they 
would first have to liberate South Africa, we would have to get 
more education, and then we would be in a position to start a 
guerrilla war against Portuguese colonialism.814
This early ANC condescension undoubtedly influenced FRELIMO's subsequent
attitudes.
FRELIMO's view of Rhodesia was somewhat different, in part because 
FRELIMO perceived Rhodesia's policies to be more hostile than South 
Africa's, in part because Mozambique's economy was less integrated with 
Rhodesia than with South Africa, and in part because FRELIMO had a closer 
relationship with ZANU than with the ANC. However, FRELIMO did moderate 
its anti-Rhodesian policy somewhat, probably due to behind-the-scenes 
negotiations (described below).
Rhodesia was annoyed by South Africa's reluctance to support the 
Zambezi division plot,815 but decided to proceed with anti-FRELIMO plans 
nonetheless. In September 1974, intelligence head Ken Flower went to 
Lisbon, where, he later recounted, he "got mixed up with a bunch of 
conspirators--leading all the way to General Splnola himself--plotting to 
reverse the march of events in Mozambique". In a report to Ian Smith 
about the trip he said, "[W]e have the advantage of being in with the 
conspiracy and should be able to provide practical assistance if and when 
the next stage occurs".816
FRELIMO did not know the details of these contacts, but clearly 
realised that Rhodesia was more hostile than South Africa. Thus, FRELIMO 
adopted a more aggressive tone with Salisbury than with Pretoria, though 
Machel still carefully stopped short of pledging immediate military aid 
to ZANU.817
The careful language on ZANU aid was probably related in part to 
secret negotiations under way at the time. Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda was 
working, in coordination with South Africa, on a plan by which the allies 
of the Rhodesian guerrillas would pressure them to lay down arms and 
negotiate with Smith in return for South Africa forcing Rhodesia to make
814 Source one, interview.
815 Source eight, interview.
816 Flower, op. cit., pp. 144-145.
817 "Message from Comrade Samora Moises Machel, President of FRELIMO, 
to the 24th Session of the Liberation Committee of the OAU", op. cit.
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a number of concessions.818 According to an ANC source in Mozambique, 
FRELIMO agreed that if these concessions were made, it would not provide 
bases to ZANU.819 South Africa, which was impatient with Smith and 
beginning to think that a moderate African government in Rhodesia might 
better serve Pretoria's interests, did indeed pressure Smith, who 
responded with only limited concessions.
FRELIMO also adopted a pragmatic position regarding Rhodesian 
access to Mozambican transport routes. Rhodesia had been using the Beira 
railroad and oil pipeline to avoid sanctions, with Portuguese complicity. 
FRELIMO's alliance with ZANU obviously made the movement very interested 
in closing the route. However, FRELIMO also knew that such an action 
could produce Rhodesian retaliation and would deprive Mozambique of 
important foreign exchange revenue. Consequently, Machel decided to 
consolidate FRELIMO's position first and only later take action to close 
the transport link.820
FRELIMO's policies on neighbouring minority regimes in the last 
quarter of 1974 and the first month of 1975 show that the movement was 
willing to be exceedingly flexible and "co-optable" if it believed that 
the other party involved would be equally flexible. The movement's 
awareness of the economic structure it was inheriting, and willingness to 
adjust policies to at least temporarily accommodate constraints inherent 
in that structure, were also evident in this period.
In late 1974 and early 1975, FRELIMO also demonstrated willingness 
to accommodate some Western interests, though it was not going to turn 
its back on socialist allies or abandon its socialist plans for 
independent Mozambique.
The U.S. Department of State was aware of Mozambique's "efforts to 
seek a solution to the problem of Rhodesia",821 and Assistant Secretary of 
State for African Affairs Donald Easum appeared to have an open mind 
concerning FRELIMO. In November, Easum met with Machel in Dar es Salaam
818 Martin and Johnson, op. cit., p. 145.
819 Source nine, interview.
820 Marcum, "Southern Africa After the Collapse of Portuguese Rule", 
op. cit., p. 83.
821 Testimony of Nathaniel Davis, Assistant Secretary for African 
Affairs, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Policy Toward Southern 
Africa, hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, 1st 
Session, June and July 1975, p. 51.
241
and indicated U.S. interest in building a new relationship with 
Mozambique. Machel replied that he was "prepared to let bygones be 
bygones" and promised to arrange for Easum to visit Maputo,822 the new 
name the Transitional Government had given Mozambique's capital city. 
Several weeks later, Easum became the first foreign diplomat granted an 
audience by the Transitional Government. Chissano stressed Mozambique's 
critical economic and relief needs. Mozambique's economy, unlike 
Angola's, was relatively poor and possessed resources of only limited 
interest to potential foreign sources of capital and technology. This 
meant that independent Mozambique would be quite dependent on 
international assistance, and FRELIMO knew it. Easum reported that he had 
already set up a working group in Washington to study possible aid 
programmes. He promised to expedite the group's deliberations when he 
returned to Washington and indicated that the next step might be a visit 
to Mozambique by a team of experts to study the situation on the 
ground.823 Upon departure, Easum told the Mozambican press, "I was not 
prepared for the great dedication and concern for the well-being of 
people that I have encountered when speaking to the prime minister in the 
Transitional Government".824
However, when Easum returned to Washington he found that his 
proposal for assistance to Mozambique had been turned down by Secretary 
of State Henry Kissinger. Kissinger said that any U.S. aid to Mozambique 
should be given to Portugal to administer since Washington wished to 
encourage the more conservative faction of the Portuguese regime. FRELIMO 
did not learn of this decision for several months, and as of early 1975 
was still hopeful of U.S. aid.825
FRELIMO also met with British envoys in Dar es Salaam shortly 
after the Transitional Government took office, and sources on both sides
822 Marcum, "Southern Africa After the Collapse of Portuguese Rule", 
op. cit., p. 81.
823 Easum, interview. Information first published in Gillian Gunn, 
"Learning from Adversity: The Mozambican Experience", in Regional 
Conflict and U.S. Policy: Angola and Mozambique, ed. Richard J. 
Bloomfield (Algonac, Michigan: Reference Publications, 1988), p. 149.
824 "Secretario de Estado-Adjunto Norte-Americano Para Assuntos 
Africanos contactou Governo de Transigao", Tempo (Mozambique), no.
219 (8 December 1974).
825 Easum, interview. Information first published in Gunn, op. cit., 
p. 149.
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recall the discussions as "highly constructive".826 Britain's Labour 
Party, having won the March 1974 general election, was anxious to repair 
Britain's relations with the African members of the Commonwealth, which 
it believed had been damaged by the previous Conservative government's 
handling of Rhodesia.827 Also, the United Kingdom was aware of FRELIMO's 
assistance to the Kaunda-Vorster initiative on Rhodesia, and was thus 
well disposed towards the movement. As is described in more detail in 
chapter 14, Britain was also interested in arrangements with FRELIMO that 
might reduce the cost of discouraging Rhodesian sanctions-busting via 
Mozambican territory.
For its part, FRELIMO appreciated the Labour Party's espousal of 
"socialist" philosophy and its past statements of support for Mozambican 
independence. The result of the discussions was a FRELIMO pledge to have 
the Transitional Government monitor Rhodesian sanctions-busting through 
Mozambican territory.828
FRELIMO also adopted a relatively open attitude towards Western 
investment in the closing months of 1974. In a December interview, 
Chissano responded to a question about the role of international capital 
by saying, "If the actions of these enterprises are in the interests of 
Mozambique, we will take adequate measures". Leaving the enterprises to 
function as they were was among the options he cited. Later in the same 
interview, Chissano responded to a question concerning development aid by 
saying, "[W]e can turn to any country, socialist or capitalist, as long 
as they do not insist, in exchange, on anything that compromises the 
political line of independent Mozambique".829
FRELIMO also adjusted its rhetoric when it realised that certain 
words irritated Western nerves. In an October 1974 interview with 
Chissano, a journalist pointed out that a pledge by Machel in Dar es 
Salaam to turn Mozambique into "a revolutionary base against imperialism 
and colonialism" had caused concern among Western diplomats. Chissano 
replied that being a revolutionary base "does not signify an arms arsenal
826 Rifkind, interview. Aquino de Braganga (professor, University of 
Mozambique), interview by author, Maputo, Mozambique, 20 August 1984.
827 Martin Meredith, The Past is Another Country: Rhodesia UPI to 
Zimbabwe (London: Pan Books Ltd, 1980), p. 170.
828 Rifkind, interview.
829 "Joaquim Chissano--'Para fazer a revolugao Mozambique apoia-se na 
sua propria forga'", op. cit., p. 18-24.
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or interference in the internal affairs of other countries" and added 
that Mozambique would be a "revolutionary base" by example, by building 
"an anti-imperialist society" that others could emulate.830
FRELIMO's clear interest in establishing cordial relations with 
the West by no means implied a reduction of its relations with the East. 
While Chissano was given responsibility for developing relations with 
neighbouring minority regimes and Western governments, Machel 
concentrated on building ties with socialist countries that had supported 
FRELIMO. Thus, in December 1974, Machel visited East Germany, Bulgaria, 
and Romania to make agreements about future economic co-operation, and a 
trip to China was planned.831 Furthermore, in a January 1975 speech in Dar 
es Salaam Machel declared the socialist countries FRELIMO's natural 
allies.832
FRELIMO repeatedly emphasised, however, that it would not directly 
copy Eastern bloc systems. At the inauguration of the Transitional 
Government Machel said, "Although we know how to seek inspiration and 
stimulation in the experiences of others, we will construct firmly on the 
basis of our own originality, basing [policy] on the special conditions 
of our country" .833
In the period from the September 1974 Lusaka Accord to early 1975, 
FRELIMO moved towards a state of partial co-optability both regarding 
neighbouring minority regimes and Western countries. It promised not to 
provide bases for the ANC, and made a similar, though conditional, pledge 
regarding ZANU. It did not instruct the Transitional Government to cut 
off transport routes serving those states, and left labour arrangements 
with South Africa intact. FRELIMO immediately sought out Western 
diplomats and proposed that relations start anew, letting the acrimonious 
relations of the war period be forgotten. Its proposals regarding Western 
investment and future aid relationships were tactfully couched. When the 
movement realised that it had excited Western concern with careless
830 "Mozambique: Base Revolucionaria Contra o Racismo e o
Imperialismo", Tempo (Mozambique), no. 211 (13 October 1974), pp. 27- 
32.
831 Christie, op. cit., p. 90.
832 "Message from Comrade Samora Moises Machel, President of FRELIMO, 
to the 24th Session of the Liberation Committee of the OAU", op. cit.
833 "Mensagem do Presidente Samora Moises Machel Por Ocasiao do Tomada 
de Posse do Governo de Transizao", op. cit.
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rhetoric, it swiftly made amends, for example by redefining the words 
"revolutionary base" to mean "example".
The most important reason for this rise in co-optability was 
FRELIMO's perception of Western governments' policies. The gracious 
treatment FRELIMO received from British and U.S. diplomats created the 
impression that these governments wanted to build a constructive 
relationship, and FRELIMO responded in kind. Simultaneously, local 
economic and geographic realities moderated relations with neighbouring 
minority regimes. This, in turn, helped the movement's relations with 
Western countries, which did not wish to see increased guerrilla warfare 
in southern Africa. Three other factors--Portuguese policies, FRELIMO's 
guerrilla strength, and lack of internal factionalism--also played roles, 
though more by refraining from sabotaging the movement's evolution 
towards partial co-optability than by actively promoting it. These three 
factors led to a direct handover of power that mitigated opportunities 
for external interference and associated nationalist resentments.
THE CO-OPTATION PROCESS STALLS (FEBRUARY TO JUNE 1975)
During the final months preceding Mozambican independence, FRELIMO became 
considerably less interested in accommodating the concerns of the United 
States, though it continued to respect the interests of the United 
Kingdom and South Africa.
As mentioned above, when Assistant Secretary of State Donald Easum 
returned to Washington following his talks with Chissano he found that 
his proposal for aid to Mozambique had been refused by Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger.834 Due to this and other problems unrelated to 
Mozambique, Easum was removed from his post. Shortly thereafter, the ex- 
U.S. ambassador to Chile, Nathaniel Davis, was nominated to replace him.
FRELIMO was puzzled and upset by this development. Chissano later 
remarked, "We made concrete proposals to the United States. We never 
received an answer. We think the United States was concerned about the 
manner in which we [were] receiv[ing] independence, and our alliance with 
the socialist countries".835 FRELIMO's disappointment was also underscored 
by a comment that Chissano allegedly made to Henry Kissinger in late
834 Easum, interview. Information first published in Gunn, op. cit.
835 Joaquim Chissano, (then Mozambique's foreign minister), interview 
by author, Maputo, Mozambique, 15 October 1984. Information first 
published in Gunn, op. cit.
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1975. When the two diplomats unexpectedly encountered each other at the 
United Nations, Chissano reportedly said to Kissinger, "A year ago you 
sent your Africa man to see us and we liked what we heard. Why have we 
heard nothing else from the U.S. since then?”836
FRELIMO was also alarmed by the background of the new assistant 
secretary. Davis was associated in FRELIMO thinking with the covert U.S. 
destabilisation of Chile, which contributed to the downfall of one of 
FRELIMO's friends, Salvador Allende. FRELIMO was not alone in this 
regard. Most African embassies in Washington boycotted the Davis 
swearing-in ceremony on 4 April 1975, and even a U.S. ally, President 
Mobutu of Zaire, criticised the appointment.837 Davis did little to redeem 
himself in FRELIMO eyes in the period between starting his African 
responsibilities and Mozambican independence. In that period, FRELIMO was 
lobbying hard for Western countries to contribute aid to a United Nations 
Fund being established to help Mozambique cope with the future economic 
costs of enforcing international sanctions against Rhodesia. In a 
congressional hearing, Davis appeared to oppose a U.S. contribution to 
the fund.838 FRELIMO disappointment in U.S. policy probably accounts for 
the decision not to invite a U.S. representative to the 25 June 
independence celebrations.
Relations with other Western countries did not suffer as much, 
but, with the exception of the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, 
and the United Kingdom, neither did they warm significantly. Once FRELIMO 
realised that it would not receive much help from the richest and most 
powerful Western state, its interest in the others waned too.
There were specific reasons for the relationship with the 
Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands. As detailed in previous 
chapters, these governments had historically provided humanitarian and 
diplomatic assistance to FRELIMO, and thus were regarded as "special 
cases". In addition, during the transition period their aid departments, 
in consultation with FRELIMO, prepared major assistance programmes to be
836 Easum, interview.
837 Marcum, "Southern Africa After the Collapse of Portuguese Rule", 
op. cit., p. 82; statement of Hon. Charles C. Diggs, Jr., Nomination 
of Nathaniel Davis to be Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs, hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. 
Senate, 94th Congress, 1st Session, 19 February 1975, p. 84.
838 Nathaniel Davis, testimony, U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa, 
op. cit., pp. 60-61.
246
implemented immediately after independence. They also made plans to 
establish embassies in the Mozambican capital shortly after independence 
day. These developments, combined with the ongoing close personal 
relationship between Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme and Machel, 
ensured that these governments were praised in FRELIMO documents.
The special relationship with Britain was due primarily to the 
Rhodesia matter. In January 1975, the Labour government's new Foreign 
Secretary, James Callaghan, visited southern Africa as part of his effort 
to repair relations with African members of the Commonwealth. Throughout 
the trip, which included Zambia, Botswana, and South Africa, he made 
disparaging comments about Ian Smith.839 Then, in May 1975, Britain's 
Minister of Overseas Development, Judith Hart, flew to Dar es Salaam to 
see Machel, and discussed the possibility of the United Kingdom providing 
Mozambique £15,000,000 over one to two years if Mozambique applied 
sanctions against Rhodesia.840 It later turned out that Hart had exceeded 
her authorisation, and the eventual offer was more modest, but the move 
certainly helped improve British-FRELIMO relations.
Relations with the remaining Western governments, however, were 
lukewarm to chilly. France appeared more interested in Angola, which was 
geographically close to ex-French colonies, and relations with West 
Germany remained as cold as they had been in the pre-coup era.
The invitation list to the 25 June independence ceremonies 
reflected this state of affairs. The U.S., French, and West German 
representatives were not invited. Only seven Western countries appeared 
on the list, which was dominated by African, Asian, socialist, and 
communist states. The Western guests were Britain, Denmark, Finland, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden.841
While relations with much of the West chilled or stagnated, 
relations with South Africa continued to be cordial. In March 1975, 
Chissano told the South African Sunday Express that Mozambique would not 
allow the ANC to establish bases after independence, but would permit 
African nationalist organisations to establish diplomatic missions in the
839 Meredith, op. cit., p. 170.
840 Martin and Johnson, op. cit., p. 226.
841 "5 nations not invited to Mozambique freedom day", Zambia Daily 
Mail (Lusaka, Zambia), 23 June 1975.
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territory.842 FRELIMO also remained in close contact with Pretoria 
regarding Rhodesia. The Rhodesia talks were moving slowly, and FRELIMO 
and Pretoria continued to consult on ways to get Smith and the guerrillas 
to the negotiating table.
In the final months leading up to independence, FRELIMO 
established a good working relationship with the South African officials 
running the railroad linking Lourengo Marques with South Africa, and 
FRELIMO indicated that it would like to continue the connection in the 
future. By June 1975, the relationship had developed to the point that 
the head of the South African Railways was invited to attend the very 
independence ceremonies from which the United States was pointedly 
excluded and received permission from his superiors to accept.843
The evolving relationship between South Africa and FRELIMO started 
to become so cordial that Machel was occasionally indirectly criticised 
by other African leaders at OAU meetings.844 Thus, in April 1975, in a 
speech to the Ninth Extraordinary Session of the OAU Council of 
Ministers, Machel emphasised that FRELIMO's contacts with South Africa 
did not indicate a willingness to enter into political dialogue with 
apartheid. 845 He also insisted that "the application of the principle of 
non-interference in internal affairs [did] not exclude our identification 
and solidarity with the popular struggle in any country".846
Relations with Rhodesia did not fare nearly as well, and Machel's
rhetoric was less reassuring than it had been in late 1974. When asked in
June 1975 what FRELIMO policy would be on that neighbour, he said "I will 
let practise respond for itself. Ask me this after the 25th of June". A 
few days before independence he explicitly said, "As for Rhodesia, we 
will be engaged in the combat".847 The aggressive rhetoric was undoubtedly
842 "Death week ends truce pact in Angola", Sunday Express 
(Johannesburg, South Africa), 30 March 1975.
843 Dr. J.G.H. Loubser (former general manager of South African 
Railways/Transport Services), interview by author, Cape Town, South 
Africa, 10 January 1986.
844 Meredith, op. cit., p. 184.
845 "A Africa Nada Tern a Diologar com 0 Regime de Pretoria", Tempo
(Mozambique), no. 238 (20 April 1975), pp. 18-21.
846 Ibid.
847 "Machel's Rhodesia Pledge", Times of Zambia (Lusaka, Zambia), 21 
June 1975.
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due to the slow progress of the Vorster-Kaunda initiative. 848 In January 
1975, Smith had stopped the release of political prisoners849 and by May 
he was obstructing the talks.850
In the final months leading to independence, FRELIMO continued to 
solidify its relations with the socialist countries. The most important 
contact was with China, which Machel visited for seventeen days in 
February 1975. Upon arriving in Beijing, Machel said, "Since the 
beginning of our struggle the Popular Republic of China has been in the 
vanguard of the magnificent solidarity movement around us".851 At the end 
of the visit China agreed to send a large delegation to the independence 
celebrations, to exchange ambassadors with Mozambique on independence 
day, and to provide the new nation economic and technical assistance, as 
well as a large food donation. 852 Machel also visited North Korea in March 
1975 on his way back from China.853
Although Machel excluded the Soviet Union from his travels, 
perhaps owing to his earlier irritation at this ally's unwelcome advice, 
relations with Moscow were far from frosty. For example, the pro-FRELIMO 
magazine Tempo began to publish numerous articles by the Novosti news 
agency, some of which were vigorously anti-American.854
In the final days before independence, and on independence day 
itself, FRELIMO issued a variety of statements regarding future policy. 
All of them, including the new Constitution and the Independence 
Proclamation, emphasised the following themes: a strong ideological 
commitment to socialism; a desire to build close relations with the 
socialist countries; an openness to, though not a burning interest in, 
establishing relations with Western nations; and a desire to aid 
"liberation movements" in Rhodesia and South Africa tempered by an
848 Meredith, op. cit., p. 186.
849 Martin and Johnson, op. cit., p. 156.
850 Meredith, op. cit., p. 186.
851 "Republica Popular da China--A Terra e o Povo", Tempo 
(Mozambique), no. 234 (23 March 1975).
852 Ibid.
853 Christie, op. cit., p. 90.
854 For example, see K. Khatchatorov, "Ambassador in Chile", Tempo 
(Mozambique), no. 239 (27 April 1975), pp. 23-24.
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acknowledgement that pragmatic considerations might make that difficult 
in the near term.855
Interestingly, on Angola FRELIMO did not come out openly in 
support of the MPLA, but rather called for unity between the movements in 
Angola.856 Though FRELIMO was close to the MPLA, and had a low regard for 
the FNLA, it reportedly considered UNITA to be a legitimate liberation 
movement.857
From January to June 1975, FRELIMO became more selective about 
which Western states it wished to accommodate, and the result was a 
general slowing of the movement's evolution towards partial co- 
optability. Relations with the United States sharply deteriorated, those 
with France and West Germany failed to improve, and Britain, alone among 
the major powers, received a warm reception. The friendship with the 
Scandinavian and Dutch governments continued to thrive. Relations with 
South Africa remained respectful while those with Rhodesia declined. Ties 
with the socialist states solidified, though the Chinese were given 
priority over the Soviet Union.
The major factor involved in all cases was FRELIMO's perception of 
the various governments' attitudes towards the future FRELIMO-ruled 
independent Mozambique. The governments of Britain, Scandinavia, and the 
Netherlands were perceived to be supportive, and South Africa was seen as 
non-interfering. The socialist states were viewed as allies ready to 
assist with significant aid packages, while the United States was seen as 
veering towards neo-colonial policies under the leadership of a CIA- 
tainted diplomat. France and West Germany were perceived as long-term 
backers of Portuguese colonialism who had not changed, and Rhodesia was 
considered to be increasingly untrustworthy.
As in the late 1974 period, Portuguese policies, FRELIMO's 
military strength, and the organisation's lack of factionalism created a
855 "The Constitution of the People's Republic of Mozambique", 
document from CIDAC archives, Lisbon, Portugal; "Entrevista com o 
Presidente Samora", Tempo (Mozambique), 25 June 1975; "The 
Proclamation of Independence" and "President's message to the nation 
on independence day", Mozambique Revolution, no. 61 (25 June 1975), 
p. 23; "Discurso de Abertura da 7a sessao do Comite Central da 
FRELIMO de Junho de 1975", in Documentos Base da FRELIMO, op. cit., 
pp. 181-197.
856 "Discurso de Abertura da 7a sessao do Comite Central da FRELIMO de 
Junho de 1975", op. cit., pp. 181-197.
857 Source one, interview.
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context unconducive to external interference and limited opportunities 
for FRELIMO-Western conflict, while local economic and geographic 
realities moderated relations with neighbouring states in a manner that 
assuaged Western fears. The influence of these factors did not change 
much from the previous late 1974 period, and yet FRELIMO's co-optability 
clearly declined. Therefore, these latter factors were not as significant 
as the factor that did change--FRELIMO's perception of Western policies.
SUMMARY
FRELIMO's relations with the West moved through three distinct phases in 
the period from the Portuguese coup of April 1974 to Mozambican 
independence in June 1975.
During the first five months following the coup, FRELIMO 
concentrated on convincing Portugal to agree to full independence for 
Mozambique. It used a carrot and stick strategy, pledging not to 
victimise Mozambican residents of Portuguese descent after independence, 
and threatening to escalate the guerrilla war if independence were not 
granted. Relatively little attention was paid in this period to other 
Western governments, which were perceived as neither significantly aiding 
nor hindering this process. However, two developments occurred that were 
to influence subsequent FRELIMO decisions. Rhodesia gave refuge to 
Portuguese army members who opposed independence, making FRELIMO fear 
that Rhodesia and/or South Africa might attempt to block independence.
The Soviet Union, by pressuring FRELIMO to soften its terms in 
negotiations with Lisbon, angered the FRELIMO leadership.
Once Portugal agreed to transfer power to FRELIMO as the 
government of an independent Mozambique, and the movement neutralised a 
right-wing rebellion, the FRELIMO leadership began to focus on its future 
government-to-government relations. Although this process involved 
intensive consultation with and travel to socialist countries, the 
FRELIMO leadership also began a vigorous exploration of prospects for 
repairing relations with the Western countries that it had previously 
perceived as supporters of colonialism. FRELIMO's proposals regarding 
Western investment and future aid relationships were tactfully couched, 
its leadership avoided rhetoric offensive to Western diplomats, and 
constructive meetings were held with U.S. and British envoys. FRELIMO 
also adopted pragmatic policies regarding South Africa and, to a lesser 
extent, Rhodesia. This approach both enhanced relations with neighbours
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and impressed Western governments concerned about stability in the 
region.
FRELIMO's desire to build new relationships with governments it 
viewed as past allies of Portuguese colonialism became more selective in 
the final months leading up to independence, however. The United States 
was rebuffed, while the relationship with the United Kingdom continued to 
warm.
Relations with neighbouring minority regimes similarly went in 
opposite directions. Relations with South Africa, although conducted at 
arms length, were cordial and respectful. Relations with Rhodesia 
deteriorated. Although the movement kept its intentions to itself for 
fear of exciting a Rhodesian intervention that might delay independence, 
FRELIMO made plans to aid guerrillas in anti-Rhodesian actions after 
independence.
Relations with the socialist countries and with the few Western 
countries that had long supported FRELIMO (Scandinavian countries and the 
Netherlands) also solidified in this period. China was clearly given more 
attention than the Soviet Union.
Overall, the movement's level of co-optability on independence day 
was roughly equal to, and on some regional and European matters slightly 
higher than, the level it had demonstrated on the eve of the Portuguese 
coup.
Several factors influenced the evolution of FRELIMO's policies, 
but one appeared consistently throughout the period from the coup to 
independence--FRELIMO's perceptions of other governments' policies. While 
the United States appeared interested in aiding independent Mozambique 
bilaterally, and sent an interlocutor who appeared to respect FRELIMO's 
views, the movement exhibited an interest in improving relations. When 
the United States was perceived to be shifting to a neo-colonial position 
regarding aid, and appointed an envoy viewed as an intelligence operative 
by most of Africa, FRELIMO rapidly lost interest in contacts with 
Washington. When Britain first exhibited cordial interest in FRELIMO, and 
then both criticised a FRELIMO enemy (Smith) and offered significant 
bilateral aid, relations swiftly warmed. Britain was the only country 
previously perceived as a supporter of colonialism to be invited to the 
independence celebrations.
Perception of the policies of Salisbury and Pretoria also shaped 
FRELIMO's attitudes towards its minority-ruled neighbours. When South 
Africa first refrained from supporting the September 1974 effort by
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right-wing whites to stop independence and then showed a willingness to 
provide technical and economic services, FRELIMO was encouraged to 
continue the respectful attitude towards South African concerns that it 
had already adopted. When Salisbury appeared to be willing to negotiate 
on issues that FRELIMO cared about (i.e., majority rule in Rhodesia), 
FRELIMO was similarly willing to act with forbearance. When Rhodesia 
appeared to be planning to abandon those negotiations, FRELIMO became 
less respectful of Salisbury's concerns.
Although perception of other governments' policies played a 
prominent role in FRELIMO decision making, local economic and geographic 
realities were also important. FRELIMO realised that the young state of 
Mozambique would need to retain some economic ties with its minority- 
ruled neighbours, at least for the short term, in order to survive. Thus, 
shortly after independence plans were finalised, FRELIMO explored the 
possibility of reaching a modus vivendi with both governments.
In the South African case, this helped initiate a constructive 
cycle. South Africa, already interested in reaching out to black states 
as part of its detente strategy and aware that its economic ties with 
Mozambique gave it considerable leverage to protect its interests without 
use of force, was sufficiently reassured by FRELIMO's behaviour to embark 
on a policy of "consensual neo-colonisation" rather than coercion. 
FRELIMO, aware of Mozambique's economic dependence on South Africa, 
accepted and even encouraged the neo-colonisation overtures, which 
reassured South Africa still further. As the word "consensual" suggests, 
both sides accepted the neo-colonial arrangement.
FRELIMO's adoption of a more aggressive policy towards Rhodesia in 
part reflects that neighbour's lesser degree of economic integration with 
Mozambique. The more modest structural ties meant that it would have been 
harder for Salisbury than for Pretoria to "consensually neo-colonise" 
Mozambique, even if the former had decided to pursue that policy rather 
than backing out of its modus vivendi with FRELIMO. The neo-colonial 
instrument was available to Salisbury, but it would have been less 
effective, and in the event Salisbury chose not to use it.
The exploration of FRELIMO's relations with neighbouring minority 
regimes might appear superfluous to a discussion of FRELIMO relations 
with the West. However, as further explored in the next chapter, it was 
this FRELIMO attitude that partially conditioned Western governments' 
attitudes towards the movement. Western diplomats were anxious to protect 
regional stability. If FRELIMO had shown no flexibility regarding its
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minority-ruled neighbours, and if the nature of Mozambique's economic 
structure had not provided South Africa the economic leverage with which 
to "consensually neo-colonise" Mozambique to protect its interests, 
Western attitudes towards FRELIMO would have been cooler.
It is also important to note that even when relations with a 
Western power were poor, neither side engaged in hostile acts against the 
other. For example, though FRELIMO and Washington distrusted each other, 
there was no substantive conflict, in sharp contrast to the Angola 
situation. This was due in part to South Africa's reluctance to aid any 
destabilisation effort, which deprived any hypothetical Western 
initiative of an easily accessible local base.
Additional important reasons for Western (and South African) 
disinterest in hostile actions were the strength of FRELIMO's guerrilla 
operations, the lack of internal factionalism within the movement, and 
the absence of a credible rival group. These three conditions forced 
Portugal to agree to the direct transfer of power in the Lusaka Accord. 
That accord (and particularly its rejection of elections as part of the 
transfer process), in turn, reduced opportunities for external 
intervention--there were no elections to tempt would-be foreign meddlers. 
The agreement also produced a unified government with no opposition 
legitimated by either international accords or strong electoral showing.
The Lusaka Accord was possible because of FRELIMO's strength, 
unity, and lack of credible opposition, and in turn reinforced those very 
characteristics. This shaped the choices available to those Western and 
regional governments uneasy with FRELIMO's rise to power. It deterred 
significant hostile action, which appeared to entail relatively high 
costs.
Finally, Mozambique's economic structure did not only contribute 
to the movement's co-optability by rendering it susceptible to 
"consensual neo-colonisation" by a tacit Western ally (South Africa).
That structure also made FRELIMO realise that as an independent state 
Mozambique would find it challenging to attract capital and would be 
relatively highly dependent on foreign assistance. This prospect of aid 
dependence somewhat enhanced the movement's willingness to engage in 
dialogue with the West.
Because FRELIMO's co-optability was consistently influenced by the 
movement's perception of Western states' attitudes towards the future 
FRELIMO-ruled state of Mozambique, could the movement have been pushed to
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a state of full co-optability if the West had behaved in a more friendly 
manner?
The history described in this and preceding chapters suggests that 
the answer is no. FRELIMO*s ideology had been conditioned by a decade of 
experiences which convinced the leadership that: Marxism is a vital 
propaganda tool for mobilising the masses in favour of independence and 
national unity; the egalitarianism and re-distributive aspects of 
socialism are useful to some extent in soliciting grassroots support for 
the movement; Marxism is an essential part of the struggle against 
against the "commercial petty bourgeoisie" who challenged the leadership 
in the past and might again in the future; the major Western powers are 
willing to accommodate colonialism and racism in certain circumstances; 
and socialist countries are willing to assist African nationalist 
aspirations materially and morally. In light of these conclusions by the 
FRELIMO leadership, no amount of Western courting during the transition 
period could have turned FRELIMO into a pro-Western movement.
However, a more accommodating attitude by some Western powers 
could have caused FRELIMO to evolve to a more advanced state of partial 
co-optation. Had the United States offered significant bilateral aid, had 
Washington willingly contributed to the United Nations fund to help 
Mozambique bear the cost of Rhodesian sanctions, had U.S. educational 
scholarships and financial aid been under negotiation, and had an 
assistant secretary trusted by Africans been in office, FRELIMO would 
probably have treated the United States with more consideration. Given 
the less than optimal state of Soviet-FRELIMO relations, fear of Soviet 
irritation with a warming of U.S.-FRELIMO relations would probably not 
have dissuaded the movement's leadership from such actions. The gain from 
a U.S. co-optation effort would have been modest, but nonetheless 
significant.
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CHAPTER 13 
WASHINGTON'S CHOICE
U.S. policy evolved from indifference by top decision makers, which 
permitted lower-ranking officials to explore co-optation possibilities, 
to a policy of tentative and then vigorous coercion in Angola and semi- 
hostile neglect in Mozambique. Thus, when the two new independent 
countries were added to the map of the African continent, the United 
States had little influence over or communication with their governments.
Four primary factors affected U.S. decisions in this period. In 
descending order of importance, they are (1) the relationship with the 
rival superpower, (2) internal U.S. politics, (3) perception of coercion 
and/or co-optation opportunities presented by factionalism within and 
rivalries between nationalist groups, and (4) the policies of tacit U.S. 
allies.
THE 1974 TO 1975 CONTEXT
The two factors that most influenced U.S. policy--internal politics and 
the relationship with the Eastern bloc--were in flux in the 1974 to 1975 
period.
Internal politics were recovering from the dual blows to national
pride of Watergate and the withdrawal from Vietnam. These events produced
a desire on the part of some politically influential constituencies and
officials for the United States to reassert itself as a capable, vigorous
world power. As Wright has noted,
...foreign policy was under assault by interests in the foreign 
policy establishment and the rising New Right.... These forces 
promoted a militant globalism, a position opposed to detente and 
the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT). They also wanted to 
pursue a unilateral foreign policy, implying non-consultation with 
U.S. allies, significantly increase military spending and actively 
confront the Soviet Union in the Third World.858
Watergate and Vietnam also created in the American people and in Congress 
a general distrust of the executive branch and the CIA, and an 
unwillingness to contemplate direct involvement in foreign conflicts 
perceived as marginal to U.S. interests. Another part of domestic 
politics that came into play at this time was the American people's 
profound distaste for South Africa and apartheid. Finally, "emergent 
Western European and Japanese business competition and OPEC quadrupling
ess bright, op. cit., p. 59.
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the price of oil" weakened the U.S. economy and eroded the nation's self 
confidence.859
Relations with the Eastern bloc were similarly shifting. The arms
negotiations engineered by Nixon and Kissinger began to founder in early
1974. Kissinger remarked in his memoirs:
Whether it was Watergate that caused Moscow to put East-West 
negotiations into low gear in the spring of 1974, whether it was 
the general trend of our domestic debate; or whether both of those 
were used as a cover for decisions Moscow made for its own reasons 
cannot be established.... The fact is that during April 1974 
Soviet conduct changed.... [N]egotiations stalemated.860
What Leonid Brezhnev needed, Kissinger added, was "an opposite number who
could deliver. And that was exactly what Nixon more and more had lost the
power to do".861
Given Kissinger's belief that Moscow respected power and military 
strength over all else and that restraint allowed the Soviets to conclude 
that there was room for them to advance their interests, 862 the power 
vacuum created by the Watergate-Vietnam aftermath made him extremely 
sensitive to any evidence that the Soviet Union intended to exploit U.S. 
vulnerabilities. This, combined with Kissinger's belief that "we must 
resist marginal accretions of Soviet power even when the issues seem 
ambiguous",863 made the secretary of state, and the U.S. policy structure 
he dominated, hypersensitive to any evidence of Soviet "meddling" in 
Africa.
WAIT AND SEE (APRIL TO NOVEMBER 1974)
During the first seven months following the Portuguese coup, decisions 
affecting Portuguese colonies were left to mid-ranking officials. They 
explored a co-optation strategy regarding FRELIMO and opposed pressure 
for a coercion strategy regarding the MPLA. However, the coercive 
strategies that followed were foreshadowed in the growing tension within 
the U.S. government concerning Africa policy.
859 Ibid. , p. 58 .
860 Kissinger, op. cit., p. 1153.
861 Ibid., p. 1160.
862 C. L. Sulzberger, The World and Richard Nixon (New York: Prentice 
Hall Press, 1987), p. 193.
863 Kissinger, op. cit., p. 301.
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Three players were involved in the controversy: newly appointed 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Donald Easum, Secretary 
of State Henry Kissinger, and the CIA. Easum was a classic regionalist.
He had extensive Africa experience and was respectful of African 
sensitivities. Kissinger knew little about the region, identified with 
NSSM 39's claim that "whites are here to stay", and was most concerned 
about possible Soviet efforts to exploit U.S. preoccupation with internal 
matters. The CIA shared Kissinger's views regarding Soviet intentions and 
was anxious to use its covert capabilities to limit Moscow's influence in 
Africa. The CIA-Kissinger versus Easum disagreement began as a conflict 
between globalist and regionalist perspectives, and evolved into a 
conflict between coercion and co-optation strategies.
Easum and Kissinger began to disagree even before the Portuguese 
coup. In early 1974, President Nixon had decided that the United States 
should be more forthcoming with Portugal, in order to consolidate NATO 
and create a favourable context for the pending renegotiation of the 
Azores base agreement. Kissinger therefore sought to modify the 
restrictions on arms sales to Portugal. When Easum discovered this plan, 
he expressed concern about its impact on African opinion, but found 
Kissinger unresponsive.864
U.S. policy continued to react to Portugal rather than Africa 
after the coup. On 12 June 1974, President Nixon met with Spinola in the 
Azores and expressed support for Portugal's decolonisation plans, which 
at this point still fell far short of the nationalists' demands. He also 
reportedly supported Spinola's view that Zaire might play a helpful role 
in Angola.865 Given Mobutu's known identification with the FNLA, this did 
not bode well for U.S. intentions regarding the MPLA.
Meanwhile, the CIA began to urge the Forty Committee, an advisory 
body of the National Security Council chaired by Kissinger, to authorise 
new covert activities in Angola.866 Easum adamantly opposed this and 
delayed paperwork necessary for a Forty Committee decision. Without that 
committee's approval, the CIA could only increase its intelligence
864 Witney Schneidman, American Foreign Policy and the Fall of the 
Portuguese Empire. 1961-1976. University of Southern California PhD 
thesis, 1987, p. 437.
865 Antonio de Spinola, interview by Schneidman, op. cit., p. 351.
866 Stockwell, op. cit., p. 67.
258
retainer to Holden Roberto from $15,000 to about $25,000, which it did in 
July 1974 .867
U.S. foreign policy was then disrupted by Nixon's August 1974 
resignation in connection with the Watergate scandal. However, the event 
did not dilute Kissinger's influence, for Nixon's successor, President 
Ford, had a close relationship with the secretary of state. When it 
became clear in the autumn of 1974 that Portugal was going to quit both 
Mozambique and Angola, Kissinger's concern about the territories grew.
Easum, meanwhile, continued with his regionalist approach. His 
testimony to the U.S. Congress in early October 1974 summarises his 
perspective. He praised the "responsible and helpful attitude on the part 
of African nations" concerning decolonisation, and said that credit for 
the "significant developments" should also go the "individual liberation 
movements themselves and their leaders". He analysed the differences 
between the nationalist movements in Angola primarily in ethnic rather 
than ideological terms, described the MPLA as influenced by "European 
socialism", not mentioning the Soviet Union. When asked about whether the 
MPLA would nationalise U.S. firms, he said that it was far too early to 
predict what policies the movement would adopt. He added that the United 
States was looking forward to establishing "mutually beneficial relations 
with each of the... emerging Portuguese-speaking African states" and 
reported that a working group of U.S. Agency for International 
Development (AID) and Department of State officials had been established 
"to study ways in which we might respond to requests for... assistance". 
He also revealed that the United States had recently provided a small 
amount of emergency assistance "to help alleviate the dislocation" due to 
the revolt in Lourenqo Marques.868
Shortly after testifying, Easum left for a tour of southern 
Africa. The frame of mind revealed by Easum's remarks to the U.S.
Congress helps explain why his meetings with Machel, Chissano, and Neto 
during the trip were so cordial. As noted earlier, the main result of his 
trip was the agreement to send an AID team to Mozambique to explore 
assistance possibilities.
867 Schneidman, op. cit, p. 442.
868 Testimony of Donald Easum, Assistant Secretary of State for 
African Affairs, The Complex of United States-Portuauese Relations: 
Before and After the Co u p , op. cit., pp. 92-95.
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The CIA, meanwhile, was preoccupied with Angola and urged the 
Forty Committee both to increase funding for Roberto by a factor of ten 
and to deliver the cash in one lump sum. The agency said that the funds 
were needed to purchase information from the FNLA and to enable the 
movement to buy sound trucks and other propaganda items. Kissinger, who 
had previously paid little attention to the issue, now began to side with 
the CIA. He was increasingly worried by the expanding role of the 
Communist Party in the Portuguese government.869 The 28 September 
resignation of Spinola and the formation of a left-inclined government 
under Costa Gomes and Vasco Gonsalves, with Portuguese Communist Party 
(PCP) participation, pushed his anxiety to a new high, particularly as 
the PCP had closer links to the Soviet Union than did most European 
communist parties.
Before leaving for Africa, Easum rejected the CIA proposal. He 
said that purchased information is inherently suspect, such a payment 
would favour one group over the others, and provision of a lump sum was 
unwise. While in southern Africa, Easum was inundated with CIA requests 
that he reconsider his objections.870
Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of the April-November 1974 
period was the timing of the CIA decision to ask for an aid increase for 
the FNLA. This occurred in June and July 1974, before the first, 
unconfirmed August reports of renewed Soviet aid to the MPLA. (See 
chapter 11.) Thus, the CIA's aid request was not a response to a Soviet 
action, but was in anticipation of increased Soviet aid to the MPLA.
THE DEBATE INTENSIFIES (NOVEMBER 1974 TO JULY 1975)
The simmering debate within the U.S. government over Mozambique and 
Angola escalated sharply during the first half of 1975, and the 
regionalists steadily lost ground to the globalists. The fledgling co­
optation effort in Mozambique stalled, and the officials favouring 
coercion in Angola finally prevailed in mid-year.
The first sign that policy was entering a new era was Kissinger's 
25 November decision to fire Donald Easum. Kissinger focussed on the 
Soviet Union's intentions in southern Africa, whereas Easum focussed on 
local conditions. Kissinger wanted someone who saw Africa through the 
same East-West prism as himself, and Easum clearly was not that person.
869 Schneidman, op. cit, p. 354
870 Easum, interview.
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The departure of Easum was a crucial turning point for both U.S. 
policy and African perception of that policy. The study team Easum had 
promised to send to Mozambique was delayed, causing the previously 
described puzzlement in FRELIMO about U.S. intentions. Even more 
important, Easum's removal cleared the way for the CIA to increase 
funding for the FNLA and UNITA. Before leaving his office for the last 
time, Easum placed the CIA proposal upon his desk with a note to his 
deputy, Ed Mulcahy, who was due to take over as interim assistant 
secretary for Africa, saying that implementation of the CIA proposal 
seemed inevitable.871
Mulcahy endorsed the proposal, and on 22 January the Forty 
Committee considered the aid request. CIA Africa division chief Jim Potts 
said that the agency had evidence that the Soviet Union was shipping 
weapons to the MPLA through Congo-Brazzaville, remarked "it was clear 
that Neto wasn't our man", and added that CIA support for Roberto and 
Savimbi would be "token" and give Washington leverage with the likely 
future rulers of Angola. Potts also highlighted Mobutu's alarm about 
developments in Angola.872
The intelligence regarding arms supplies, combined with 
Kissinger's growing concern about Soviet intentions in Portugal, 
guaranteed the secretary of state's support for the proposal. The Forty 
Committee authorised the CIA to provide $300,000 to the FNLA, though it 
turned down a request for $100,000 for UNITA.873 The Forty Committee 
intended the- FNLA support, small by U.S. terms, to be used for 
"political" purposes.
The aid decision, made exactly one week after the Alvor Accord was 
signed, did not remain secret for long. What was a token amount in 
Washington represented significant cash in Luanda. Roberto's immediate 
purchase of a Luanda newspaper, a television station, and vehicles led 
many observers, including the MPLA, to assume that funds were coming from 
the United States. When Roberto moved his forces from Zaire into northern 
Angola shortly after the aid was received, that manoeuvre also appeared 
to be U.S. financed.
871 Easum, interview
872 Schneidman, op. cit, p. 443.
873 Stockwell, op. cit., p. 68.
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Kissinger's decision regarding Easum's successor further 
illustrated his disregard for African opinion and lack of interest in co­
optation efforts in either Mozambique or Angola. As noted in chapters 11 
and 12, Kissinger could hardly have selected an individual more likely to 
offend African opinion than Nathaniel Davis. Because most African leaders 
believed that Davis had helped the CIA overthrow Chile's President 
Salvador Allende during his 1971 to 1973 term as ambassador to that South 
American country, Davis was viewed as a CIA "tool".
However, if Kissinger thought that by selecting Davis he chose a 
supporter of covert activities, he erred. Senator Joseph Biden asked 
Davis in his confirmation hearing if the nominee foresaw "circumstances 
in which you would recommend... use of CIA covert activities... in 
Angola, Mozambique or any other African country?" Davis replied, "I do 
not foresee such circumstances".874 Subsequent events proved that Davis 
meant what he said. Kissinger alienated African opinion without obtaining 
an obedient assistant secretary. Davis opposed covert intervention in 
Angola as Easum had, with just as little success.
Davis was not alone. The Angola desk officer at the CIA, Brenda 
MacElhinney, opposed the 22 January decision and did not believe that the 
MPLA was inherently hostile to the United States. She called for 
condemnation of outside interference and establishment of ties with all 
three movements.875
The U.S. consulate in Luanda was also divided. The consul general 
had good relations with the MPLA representatives, was impressed with 
their educational credentials, and believed them capable of ruling a 
united Angola. 876 Perhaps because of this, the CIA did not inform him of 
the 22 January Forty Committee decision. Two of the consulate's top 
staffers, Ed Fugit and Bruce Porter, had a different perspective. They 
travelled in the countryside more than the consul and were aware of the 
ethnic and other social tensions underlying the competition between the 
three Alvor signatories. They feared that the situation would deteriorate 
into civil war and were far more prone than the consul to suspect the 
Soviets of covertly assisting the MPLA. The consul was increasingly
874 Testimony of Nathaniel Davis, Assistant Secretary of State- 
Designate, Nomination of Nathaniel Davis to be Assistant Secretary of 
State for African Affairs, op. cit., p. 83.
875 Stockwell, op. cit., pp. 64, 69-70.
876 Source five, interview.
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isolated, and Kissinger relied heavily on the reports of these staffers. 
Indeed, Fugit wrote the crucial passages of some of Kissinger's 
speeches.877
U.S. concern about Angola escalated through the spring of 1975 as 
the FNLA1 s military fortunes deteriorated. Initially, the FNLA had 
dominated the MPLA. However, in March the MPLA received additional Soviet 
equipment and began to fight back. This, combined with yet another 
leftward shift of the Portuguese government in March 1975 following 
Spinola's failed coup attempt, highly alarmed both Kissinger and the CIA.
The increasing level of violence in Angola began to concern the 
country's African neighbours acutely. In April, the presidents of 
Botswana, Zambia, and Tanzania met and reportedly decided to back Savimbi 
as the leader for a government of national unity. 878 When Zambia's 
President Kaunda met with President Ford in Washington on 19 April,879 he 
conveyed his concern about the danger of large-scale Soviet intervention 
and his favourable impression of Savimbi.880 Some analysts believe that he 
also urged Ford and Kissinger to aid UNITA and the FNLA.881
The MPLA's successful campaign to expel the FNLA and UNITA from 
Luanda, and the June arrival of Cuban advisers at MPLA camps in Angola, 
all set off more alarm bells. The United States concluded that "the MPLA 
had decided it could not win an election, and had opted for a military 
solution".882 The possibility that the MPLA, which even Kissinger's 
advisers acknowledged suffered terribly at the hands of FNLA soldiers 
from February to May 19 7 4 , 883 believed that its rival was intent upon such 
a military victory and could count on U.S. support for the effort, 
apparently was not considered.
An individual close to Kissinger at this crucial point in mid-1975 
described the Secretary of State's attitude as follows.
877 Source five, interview.
878 Legum and Hodges, op. cit., p. 13.
879 Nathaniel Davis, testimony, U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa, 
op. cit., p. 239.
880 Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 259.
881 Bridgland, op. cit., p. 120.
882 Source five, interview.
883 Ibid.
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Kissinger's theory was that you don't talk tough to the Soviets 
until you have a bargaining chip--something on the ground. Then 
you can bargain for simultaneous withdrawal. The Saigon experience 
conditioned Kissinger's psyche. He did not want the U.S. to be 
further humiliated.884
This was a reference to the 30 April 1975 capture of Saigon by the 
North Vietnamese army, which discredited the U.S. claim that its 
withdrawal from Vietnam a year earlier had brought "peace with honor".885 
Again, Washington did not seriously explore the possibility that in the 
process of creating that "bargaining chip" on "the ground", the United 
States might contribute to suspicions within the MPLA and its allies that 
the United States was planning to install the FNLA in power by force.
It was in this atmosphere that the National Security Council met 
on 27 June 1975 and requested that the CIA prepare an options paper on 
Angola. The swiftly prepared paper noted that the CIA understood that 
Kissinger wanted a $14 million programme, that Assistant Secretary 
Nathaniel Davis opposed any covert programme in Angola, and that the 
special assistant to Kissinger, Sheldon Vance, favoured the operation 
because it would improve recently strained relations with Zaire's 
President Mobutu. (In June 1975, Mobutu had accused the United States of 
complicity in a coup attempt, expelled U.S. Ambassador Dean Hinton, and 
arrested most of the CIA's Zairean agents. 886)
The CIA paper listed four options--limited financial support for 
political activity, a $6 million programme, a $14 million programme, and 
a $40 million programme.887 On 16 July, President Ford approved the 
expenditure of $6 million in financial aid and arms shipments for the 
FNLA. Eleven days later, he authorised an additional $8 million for arms 
and aircraft, bringing the total up to Kissinger's figure of $14 million. 
Though these decisions were secret, the administration also made a public 
request for Congress to provide Zaire with $79 million in emergency aid. 
On 29 July, the first planeload of arms left the United States for 
Africa.888
884 Ibid.
885 Sulzberger, op. cit., p. 119.
886 Stockwell, op. cit., p. 39.
887 Ibid., p. 52.
888 Ibid., p. 53.
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The funds were not officially supposed to be spent on installing
the FNLA in power, but rather on preventing a "cheap Neto victory”.889
Former CIA Angola Task Force leader John Stockwell says that a CIA
superior, Carl Bantam, explained the decision as follows:
Kissinger would like to win.... [H]e would like to stop the
Soviets cold. But he knows that we can't get that kind of program 
through Congress.... [I]t would take a special appropriation....
So instead we are being asked to harass the Soviets, to...
"prevent an easy victory by communist-backed forces in Angola"!890
The July decisions were vigorously opposed by many Department of
State personnel, including Davis, who favoured using diplomatic and
political tools. They believed that the covert plan risked confrontation
with the Soviet Union, and would commit U.S. resources and prestige in a
situation where the outcome was uncertain. They urged President Ford to
approach the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels, work through the
United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity, and consult with
Tanzania, Zaire, and Zambia to reduce the arms flow into Angola.891
Ironically, this was exactly the policy the MPLA's Lucio Lara was
advocating at the time. (See chapter 11.) Davis fought vigorously for the
Department of State point of view, prompting Kissinger to recall in his
memoirs, "...[I]n 1975 the Assistant Secretary of State in charge of
Africa managed to delay my dealing with Angola for nearly ten weeks
because he opposed the decision he feared I would make".892 Davis reacted
to the July decision by quietly resigning and accepting a new assignment
as ambassador to Switzerland.
A Washington power battle concerning Somalia also influenced
Kissinger's thinking. In early June, a Kissinger rival, Secretary of
Defence James Schlesinger, told a closed Senate hearing that the Soviets
were placing missile sites in Somalia. The testimony leaked. Rumours
followed that Schlesinger was dissatisfied with Kissinger's reluctance to
contest Soviet encroachment and was trying to organise support among the
Joint Chiefs of Staff for a more vigorous policy towards the Soviet
Union.893 Schlesinger was allied with the previously mentioned "New Right"
889 Ibid., p. 50.
890 Ibid., p. 41.
891 Schneidman, op. cit, p. 450.
892 Kissinger, op. cit., p. 440.
893 Schneidman, op. cit, p. 452.
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which wished to "actively confront" the Soviet Union.894 To rebut 
Schlesinger1s allegations, Kissinger needed to prove that he could stand 
up to the Soviets.
Nowhere in Kissinger's memoirs or interviews does he discuss the 
policies of the MPLA, or even evince any familiarity with those policies. 
The MPLA's strong hints that it would aid the ANC and SWAPO, positions 
that Kissinger might logically find objectionable, were never mentioned. 
Nor did Kissinger remark upon the possibility of MPLA nationalisation of 
U.S. investments. As Stockwell later remarked, "[0]ur knowledge of the 
MPLA was nil. Almost no information was produced by the clandestine 
services about MPLA armies, leadership, or objectives".895 The MPLA's 
policies seemed irrelevant to Kissinger, except to the extent that they 
attracted Soviet support.
The irrelevancy of a nationalist movement's Marxism, and the 
relevancy of its susceptibility to "Soviet influence", is nicely 
illustrated by Kissinger's contrasting policy regarding Mozambique. 
FRELIMO's independence declaration and constitution were just as Marxist 
as the MPLA's rhetoric, albeit at times more tactfully presented. Yet 
Kissinger did not pursue a coercion policy in Mozambique. Instead, as he 
himself noted in December 1975, "We accepted in Mozambique a pro-Marxist 
faction that came to power by indigenous means, or perhaps with some 
minimum outside support in the FRELIMO [sic]".896 The fact that FRELIMO 
was on good terms with Moscow's arch-rival, Beijing, reassured Kissinger 
still further.
Although Kissinger's perception that there was no Soviet challenge 
to U.S. power in Mozambique was the dominant reason for his hands-off 
policy, it was probably not the sole reason. The fact that, unlike 
Angola, Mozambique featured no credible alternative to the radical 
contender for power, and thus the opportunity for intervention was 
reduced, also must have been considered. FRELIMO's ability to reach a 
modus vivendi with South Africa in the weeks just before independence was 
also relevant.
The fairly neutral U.S. policy on FRELIMO was reflected in Davis's 
testimony to Congress just before Mozambique's independence in June 1975.
894 Wright, op. cit., p. 59.
895 Stockwell, op. cit., p. 187.
896 Times (London, United Kingdom), 24 December 1975.
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(Whereas Davis's views on Angola did not reflect U.S. policy, his views
on Mozambique generally did.) Davis said:
[W]e are now looking forward to a cooperative relationship with 
the new Mozambique.... Its leaders are already participating in 
efforts to seek a solution to the problem of Rhodesia.... [There 
is] every prospect that Mozambique will regard itself as a 
nonaligned country.... I do not think that one should assume 
automatically that the Government of Mozambique is going to rush 
into extensive arrangements with the Soviet Union.897
The fact that FRELIMO's rise to power in Mozambique was not judged
symbolic of Soviet encroachment, and thus did not require U.S.
intervention, did not, however, imply any support for Easum's co-optation
approach. Davis did not try to establish personal rapport with FRELIMO
leaders and made no effort to assuage FRELIMO's dismay about Easum's
removal. By refusing to contemplate a U.S. contribution to the United
Nations fund being established to help soon-to-be-independent Mozambique
cope with the economic hardship of imposing sanctions on Rhodesia, Davis
and the United States missed an opportunity to reinvigorate the previous
co-optation strategy. Senator Dick Clark identified the crucial issue
when he queried Davis on the United Nations Fund decision,
...[B]ecause of our policies toward FRELIMO in the past... there 
is a natural reluctance on the part of the FRELIMO party to be 
eager to accept aid from the United States. But certainly they are 
going to be interested... in accepting aid through the United 
Nations.898
Clark correctly judged that because of the history of U.S.-FRELIMO 
antipathy, any improvement in relations would have to start with a U.S. 
overture towards the Mozambican party. Davis did not fight for such an 
overture, possibly because he had his hands full trying to forestall U.S. 
covert intervention in Angola.
THE COERCION ATTEMPT (JULY TO NOVEMBER 1975)
In the period between the July intervention decision and the independence 
of Angola in November, U.S. policy was again influenced by domestic 
politics and Eastern bloc actions. For the first time since the 
Portuguese coup, it was also affected by South Africa, which gradually 
became a tacit ally. The net result was that the Angola coercion effort
897 Nathaniel Davis, testimony, U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa, 
op. cit., pp. 51-65.
898 Statement of Senator Dick Clark, U.S. Policy Toward Southern 
Africa, op. cit., pp. 59-60.
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became more vigorous, but not sufficiently energetic to prevent the MPLA 
from declaring itself the government of Angola on 11 November.
Within five weeks of the original aid decision, the CIA pushed for 
an increase in funding. The number of Cuban advisers to the MPLA was 
rising; the MPLA was fighting effectively and retaking territory from the 
FNLA. On 20 August, President Ford authorised expenditure of an 
additional $10.7 million for the purchase of arms and ammunition, and to 
pay the salaries of mercenaries. This brought the total authorised to 
date to $24.7 million.899 For the first time, UNITA was included as a 
beneficiary.
The decision to include UNITA may have been influenced by South 
Africa's August decision to set up training camps in southern Angola both 
for Daniel Chipenda's wing of the FNLA and for UNITA. 900 A South African 
military official present when the decision was made subsequently 
explained:
We had a request from these movements for aid, and we decided to 
expend a relatively small sum initially. The decision was taken in 
an informal setting... not at the centre of the government. It was 
made without a great deal of thought regarding the consequences. 
Our intuitive feeling was that we should have the most friendly 
power possible on that border, but there was no clear-cut policy. 
The opposition by the Department of Foreign Affairs to any change 
in our previous policy of not getting involved beyond our borders, 
combined with the lack of direction from the centre, meant we were 
somewhat ambivalent about the decision initially.901
South Africa's decision that the MPLA would not be a friendly
government was realistic. Shortly after the MPLA opened its office in
Luanda, South Africa's consular officials had officially requested a
meeting with MPLA leaders to discuss the movement's future policy
regarding Pretoria. The MPLA^had turned down the request.902 This action,
combined with the MPLA's public pledge to aid SWAPO and the ANC, all
substantiated South Africa's conclusion.
According to the official involved in the decision, South Africa
was not reacting to Cuban involvement at this point. South Africa was
aware of the presence of Cuban advisers for the MPLA, but was not
899 Stockwell, op. cit., p. 166.
900 Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 269.
901 Source ten, confidential interview by author, Pretoria, South 
Africa, 12 December 1985.
902 Ibid.
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anticipating any major escalation of Cuban involvement, and certainly not 
the intervention of Cuban combat troops.903
The South African decision to become actively involved in Angola 
soon manifested itself in the South African Defence Force's August 9 move 
from the Ruacana Falls just inside the Angolan border, a position they 
had occupied in June 19 7 5 , 904 to the Cunene-Ruacana hydroelectric project 
several miles deeper inside Angola.905
According to Stockwell, the CIA admired South African efficiency, 
welcomed Pretoria's involvement in the war, and considered shipping arms 
to U.S. nationalist allies via the South African-controlled port of 
Walvis Bay. Department of State personnel, in particular Mulcahy, who 
following Davis's resignation again found himself taking a leading role 
in Angola policy, threatened to resign in protest if the United States 
established a formal liaison with South Africa.906 The idea of creating a 
supply route to the nationalists via South Africa was then dropped.
In September, the South African instructors arrived at the UNITA 
and Chipenda/FNLA camps in southern Angola, and South African troops 
moved further into Angola.907 According to the South African military 
source:
We found that our new allies were totally disorganised. They could 
not utilise cash, so we provided arms. They could not use the
arms, so we sent in officers to train them to use the arms. The
training process was too slow, so we handled the weapons 
ourselves. We got pulled in gradually, needing to commit ourselves 
more if the past commitment was not to be wasted.908
In mid-September, Zaire sent additional troops into Angola to aid
the FNLA, and the joint force cautiously advanced on Luanda. Late in the
month, Cuban ships carrying a modest shipment of heavy Cuban arms and a
few hundred Cuban soldiers arrived in Angola and neighbouring Congo-
Brazzaville.909
903 Ibid.
904 Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 268.
905 Ibid., p. 269.
906 Stockwell, op. cit., pp. 193, 196, 197.
907 Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 269.
908 Source ten, interview.
909 Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 273.
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U.S. lack of interest in any alternative to the coercion strategy 
was also illustrated in September and October. According to Stockwell, in 
September Savimbi sent a message to the MPLA expressing interest in a 
peace deal. When the CIA discovered the move, it scolded Savimbi, saying 
that the United States wanted no "soft" allies.910 Similarly, in October 
an MPLA delegation came to Washington to plead the MPLA's potential 
friendliness towards the United States, and was rebuffed.911
In October and early November, all forces engaged in the Angola 
conflict, including the United States, became involved in an intense 
effort to get to Luanda before 11 November. As described in more detail 
in chapter 11, on 14 October Pretoria mounted Operation Zulu, sending a 
major force, including South African troops, north towards key provincial 
capitals and Luanda. Simultaneously, the CIA sent in arms to support a 
Mobutu plan to encourage the secession of Cabinda, and CIA personnel 
began to "coordinate" with the Cabindan independence movement, FLEC.912 On 
5 November, Cuba's Communist Party Central Committee officially 
authorised the dispatch of combat troops to Angola, and on 8 November a 
battalion arrived by plane in Luanda. The Cuban soldiers immediately 
entered battle against the FNLA-Zairean forces approaching the capital, 
using equipment supplied by the Soviet Union. On 11 November, the MPLA 
declared itself the government of Angola.
Why was the United States unable to prevent this from happening? A 
large part of the explanation can be found in the U.S. domestic political 
climate. The intervention was being kept secret from the American people, 
who, due to the Watergate and Vietnam experience, were unlikely to 
approve of the policy. In addition, as the Angola battles escalated, so 
did the congressional investigation into CIA assassinations and secret 
drug experiments on U.S. citizens. This made the incentive to keep the 
Angola operation quiet even greater. Secrecy places certain limits on a 
military operation. For example, the Forty Committee would not authorise 
supply of high-technology equipment to the FNLA and UNITA because this 
would be concrete evidence of U.S. involvement.913 In addition, the United 
States refrained from using the most direct route to get supplies to the
910 Stockwell, op. cit., p. 200.
911 Ibid.
912 Ibid., p. 169.
913 Ibid., p. 188.
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anti-MPLA forces in southern Angola, via the Pretoria-controlled port of 
Walvis Bay in Namibia, due to Mulcahy1s threat to resign in protest. If 
U.S. public opinion had not been concerned about apartheid, such a 
resignation threat would have been ineffectual, and the efficient 
delivery route could have been used.
Although the events following 11 November 1975 are beyond the 
scope of this study, it is noteworthy that the same domestic political 
concerns about South African and CIA "adventurism" that hampered the pre­
independence coercion effort subsequently forced the United States to 
abandon the effort altogether shortly after independence. The mid- 
November revelation of the South African role, and the congressional 
conclusion that the CIA had misled the oversight committees regarding the 
extent of the Angola operation, provoked intense public criticism, and by 
early 1976 the coercion effort was doomed.
SUMMARY
The foregoing chronology shows that U.S. policy on Mozambique and Angola 
in the period between the Portuguese coup and the respective colonies' 
independence ceremonies was most influenced by U.S. relations with the 
Eastern bloc and internal U.S. politics. MPLA and FRELIMO policies only 
had a significant impact upon U.S. policy to the extent that those 
policies attracted or repelled Soviet support. They otherwise played a 
very small role in U.S. decision making.
The critical importance of relations with the Soviet Union is 
illustrated by the different attitudes that Kissinger adopted towards the 
respective nationalist movements. Kissinger believed that the United 
States had to stop the MPLA not primarily because the MPLA was viewed as 
Marxist, pro-ANC, or anti-United States, but because the Soviet Union was 
perceived to have a close relationship with the movement, and the MPLA's 
victory would therefore represent a symbolic Soviet victory. Kissinger 
was less concerned about FRELIMO coming to power in Mozambique not 
because FRELIMO was judged to be less Marxist, but because FRELIMO's more 
arms-length relationship with Moscow and its cordial relations with 
Beijing meant that a FRELIMO victory was not seen to represent a major 
expansion of the Soviet Union's influence.
Domestic factors played a role in both encouraging and limiting 
U.S. pursuit of the coercion policy in Angola. The domestic repercussions 
from the Vietnam war and the Watergate scandal made Kissinger and the CIA 
desire to prove U.S. vigour as a superpower. A coercion strategy served
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that goal, while a co-optation strategy did not. Simultaneously, however, 
the Vietnam and Watergate issues made the U.S. public distrust the 
executive branch and feel uneasy about foreign intervention. The 
congressional investigation of CIA misdeeds, which gathered momentum in 
the final months before Angolan independence, exacerbated that distrust. 
Thus, the coercion strategy was adopted, satisfying Kissinger's desire 
for the United States to demonstrate resolve, but was limited due to fear 
of public reaction.
Domestic factors also played a lesser, but still important, role 
in U.S. policy towards Mozambique. The decision to abandon the tentative 
co-optation effort briefly explored after the Portuguese coup was related 
first to the Department of State staff change, which in turn was related 
to the domestic politics concerning Angola, and subsequently to the 
monopolisation of government attention by that sister colony. Because 
pre-coup FRELIMO-U.S. antipathy meant that FRELIMO was waiting for the 
first overture to come from the United States, Washington's fixation on 
Angola and lack of attention to Mozambique meant that the co-optation 
effort died from neglect.
The U.S. perception of rivalries between and factionalism within 
the respective nationalist movements also influenced policy. The fact 
that there were three credible movements in Angola, and only one in 
Mozambique, meant there was an obvious U.S. intervention opportunity in 
Angola, whereas the opportunity in Mozambique was more limited.
The policies of tacit allies were also significant. South Africa's 
Angola intervention encouraged the United States to escalate the coercion 
strategy, and Pretoria's restrained policy regarding FRELIMO discouraged 
the United States from pursuing such a strategy in Mozambique. The policy 
of South Africa was, in turn, partially influenced by the policies of the 
nationalists. FRELIMO's efforts to reach an understanding with South 
Africa partly accounted for Pretoria's non-intervention policy. Angola's 
confrontational attitude towards South Africa partly accounted for 
Pretoria's hostile reaction.
The attitude of another tacit ally, Zaire, also influenced 
Washington's thinking. Zaire's close ties with an MPLA rival made a U.S. 
coercion strategy in Angola both politically and operationally 
convenient. In contrast, Zaire had no border with and little interest in 
Mozambique.
To recap, during this period Washington's primary interests in 
Angola and Mozambique were: to discourage establishment of
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communist/socialist systems, especially if the leaders of such were 
allied with the Soviet Union; to ensure ongoing access to the Azores base 
(with a lesser but still significant interest in strategically located 
port facilities in Mozambique and Angola); to ensure actions regarding 
the territories placated domestic critics, (who on balance were urging a 
more muscular policy regarding the Soviet Union); to strengthen 
traditional alliances with various actors participating in the Angola and 
Mozambican events (particularly Portugal); and, to protect ties with 
neighbouring African states (particularly Zaire). The interest in 
ensuring access to markets, though a long term consideration, did not 
significantly influence policy at this time. In sum, U.S. interests in 
Mozambique and Angola were primarily related to the manner in which 
events in these territories influenced other regional and global 
interests. U.S. interests in the territories themselves were quite 
modest.
Was there anything the MPLA could have done during this period to 
persuade the United States to abandon the coercion effort? Was there any 
course of action open to FRELIMO that could have either enticed the 
United States to restart the co-optation effort or provoked Washington 
into adopting a coercion strategy?
The answer seems to be that only policy shifts that altered a 
movement's perceived relationship with the Soviet Union, and therefore 
changed the symbolic implication of its victory for U.S. status, would 
have significantly changed U.S. policy. All other changes in MPLA and 
FRELIMO policy would have had only a limited impact upon U.S. strategy.
An MPLA shift to a more arms-length relationship with the 
socialist countries, similar to that of FRELIMO, was perhaps possible 
immediately after the Portuguese coup, when aid from Moscow was still 
suspended. The subsequent U.S., Zairean, Chinese, and South African 
decisions to back the MPLA's rivals, however, ensured that the MPLA would 
quickly mend its fences with the Soviet Union. The MPLA could have simply 
decided not to turn to Moscow. However, decisions taken by other outside 
powers, as described in chapter 11, created a context in which that 
policy was tantamount to suicide. The only policy decision that the MPLA 
could have taken with any hope of influencing U.S. policy, then, would 
probably have led to its destruction. Even if the United States had 
responded to such a hypothetical backing-away from the Eastern bloc by 
ceasing coercive action, it is unlikely that Zaire, China, or South 
Africa would have followed suit. Without help from Havana and Moscow, the
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MPLA would have been extremely vulnerable militarily. An MPLA decision to 
distance itself from the Soviet Union was therefore not a plausible 
option.
Non-suicidal MPLA policy changes, such as a less confrontational 
attitude towards South Africa, might have made Pretoria less enthusiastic 
about intervention, and thereby deprived the United States of a tacit 
ally, but it would not have halted the coercion strategy altogether. 
Firmer guarantees about the security of Western investments, or 
advocation of a mixed economy, would have made the task of the anti­
coercion forces within the U.S. government easier, but also would not 
have had a significant impact on U.S. policy. Only if such MPLA policies 
had caused the Soviet Union to abandon the MPLA would the changes have 
had a significant impact upon U.S. decisions.
Plausible FRELIMO policy changes could have influenced U.S. 
strategy more, but it is unlikely that they could have decisively shifted 
Kissinger's views. If FRELIMO had energetically pursued the United 
States, rather than waiting for Washington to approach it, the movement 
could possibly have elicited support from Davis for continuation of the 
Easum co-optation effort. However, Washington's fixation on Angola would 
still have forced pro-co-optation diplomats to fight an uphill battle. On 
the other hand, if FRELIMO had adopted even more anti-Western policies 
and embraced more anti-capitalist rhetoric, it probably would not have 
prompted the United States to pursue a coercion effort. Only if FRELIMO 
had taken actions that caused it to be firmly identified as a Soviet 
"client" whose rise to power would represent enlargement of Moscow's 
influence might a coercion strategy have been contemplated.
In sum, the main factors shaping U.S. policy towards the MPLA and 
FRELIMO in this period were either beyond the control of the nationalists 
or susceptible to influence only at the price of self-destruction. U.S. 
relations with the Soviet Union and U.S. domestic politics were the 
critical issues, and neither was easily influenced by either movement.
Any plausible policy shift that did not leave the movement vulnerable to 
military elimination would have had only a marginal impact upon U.S. 
policy.
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CHAPTER 14 
EUROPE'S SELECTIVE APPROACH
The European countries responded to the independence processes in a 
variety of ways. Some aided the U.S. coercion policy in Angola and 
ignored Mozambique, while others launched or continued vigorous co­
optation policies in Mozambique and leant towards neutrality in Angola. 
The European countries tended to be less concerned about the situation in 
Angola than was the United States, and when they did aid the coercion 
strategy, they did so in relatively modest ways.
The same factors that influenced U.S. policy (superpower rivalry, 
domestic politics, the policies of tacit allies, and perception of 
nationalist factionalism) affected European decision making. However, 
their relative weight varied. In general, the European governments 
ascribed less importance to superpower rivalry. Also, unlike the 
situation in the United States, domestic politics in Europe were not 
suffering from the twin shocks of foreign humiliation and domestic 
scandal, and consequently were less volatile.
Two additional factors, which played modest roles or were entirely 
irrelevant in U.S. decision making, were quite important for several 
European states. These were: (1) the level of a state's economic and
cultural interests in both the disputed territories and their neighbours, 
and (2) the perception of nationalist policies, especially to the extent 
that they influenced the aforementioned interests.
UNITED KINGDOM
Of Washington's close allies, the United Kingdom's policies diverged most 
from those of the United States in the immediate pre-independence period. 
Britain pursued a vigorous co-optation policy in Mozambique and remained 
largely aloof from the U.S. coercion strategy in Angola.
Britain's Mozambique policy was primarily driven by its interests 
in the states neighbouring that territory and by the desire of the newly 
elected Labour Party to enhance relations with the Commonwealth, which it 
believed the previous Conservative government had neglected. Policy 
regarding the Portuguese territories was therefore conditioned by 
London's interest in obtaining Third World support for a new 
international agenda. The fact that FRELIMO's evolving policies appeared 
not to threaten, and perhaps even to further, British interests in 
neighbouring states was also important, as was Labour's tendency to be
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less concerned about East-West rivalry than either the Conservative Party 
or Washington.
A high-ranking British diplomat aptly summarised the United
Kingdom's attitude in the period immediately after the coup:
We were most concerned about the effect events in the Portuguese 
territories might have upon neighbouring ex-British colonies. We 
have cultural and historical ties with these Anglophone states, as 
well as considerable economic interests. The United States, in 
contrast, worried more about geopolitical and strategic issues 
relating to Soviet influence.914
Of all the territories neighbouring the Lusophone states, Britain 
was most concerned about its rebellious colony of Rhodesia. Whereas prior 
to the Lisbon coup FRELIMO's aid for ZANU and Portugal's efforts to 
hinder ZANU infiltration made an anti-FRELIMO, pro-Portugal policy appear 
logical, the prospect of Mozambican independence under a FRELIMO 
government made such a policy untenable. Even if the domestic situation 
had not led to a Labour victory in early 1974, Britain would have had to 
adjust its policy.
Also, since shortly after Rhodesia's 1965 Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence Britain had maintained a costly naval patrol off the 
Mozambican coast to deter use of the Beira pipeline to ship oil to the 
Rhodesian refinery at Umtali.915 Now that FRELIMO appeared likely to 
control this key transportation route, it was in London's interest to 
explore new collaboration that might increase the effectiveness and 
reduce the cost of efforts to prevent sanctions-busting via Beira.
Thus, as described in chapter 12, shortly after the FRELIMO- 
dominated Transitional Government took office in September 1974, British 
envoys met with FRELIMO representatives in Dar es Salaam.916 Through these 
discussions, and observation of FRELIMO's public statements, Britain 
became aware that FRELIMO's policies did not threaten British interests 
in neighbouring states. It appeared likely that FRELIMO would be 
respectful towards South Africa, enjoy good to excellent relations with 
black-ruled ex-British colonies (Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, and 
Swaziland), and facilitate, within limits, a peaceful solution in 
Rhodesia. FRELIMO's skilful handling of the September 1974 right-wing 
backlash and related unrest also suggested that the movement was able to
914 Rifkind, interview.
915 Meredith, op. cit., p. 58.
916 Rifkind, interview. De Braganga, interview.
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defuse domestic conflict and maintain stability within Mozambique. All 
these elements boded well for Britain's fortunes in neighbouring states. 
Britain also became aware that most Commonwealth states were on excellent 
terms with FRELIMO and would consider aid to the movement proof of a new 
British attitude towards colonialism and minority rule.
Consequently, British policy shifted from exploratory contacts to 
vigorous engagement. In May 1975, Britain's Minister of Overseas 
Development, Judith Hart, met Machel in Dar es Salaam and discussed the 
possibility of the United Kingdom providing major financial assistance to 
help Mozambique cope with the cost of imposing sanctions on Rhodesia.917 
During the same month, Foreign Secretary James Callaghan promised to help 
Mozambique raise assistance elsewhere in the world.918 The increasingly 
warm relationship was then reflected in FRELIMO's decision to invite 
Britain to the 25 June 1975 independence ceremonies, making the United 
Kingdom the only non-Scandinavian Western country invited besides 
Portugal.919
Britain's policy on Angola was more ambivalent, for several 
reasons. The United Kingdom had fewer ties with the states neighbouring 
Angola and thus less incentive to involve itself in Angolan matters. 
Zambia was the only ex-British colony that shared a border with Angola. 
Its government slightly favoured UNITA just before independence, but was 
also on cordial terms with the MPLA. Zambia's main concern was to ensure 
that the Benguela railroad kept operating. Following the closure of the 
southern Africa rail route in 1965 after Rhodesia's Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence and the imposition of international 
sanctions, the Benguela railroad had become a critical route for 
transporting landlocked Zambia's copper exports and manufactured goods 
imports. (The Benguela railroad links with Zambia's rail system and then 
crosses through Zaire to the Angolan coast.) Thus, Britain's main Angola­
relevant interest in Zambia was maintenance of safe transportation, so 
coercion that might exacerbate conflict did not seem advisable.
The other ex-British territory in the vicinity, Botswana, was 
separated from Angola by a thin sliver of Namibian territory and had few
917 Martin and Johnson, op. cit., p. 226.
918 "Sweden ready to help Mozambique", Daily News (Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania), 19 May 1975.
919 "5 nations not invited to Mozambique freedom day", op. cit.
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links with Angola. Most of Botswana's trade travelled over South African 
rail lines.
Furthermore, Britain's international alliances created two 
conflicting pressures on its Angola policy. The Commonwealth, with which 
Britain wanted to improve relations, was divided about the relative 
merits of the MPLA, UNITA, and the FNLA, especially before the South 
African involvement became public. Thus, unlike the situation with regard 
to Mozambique, the United Kingdom was not urged by ex-colonies to aid a 
particular Angolan movement. The Commonwealth also generally opposed 
outside military interference in Angola. This was countered by pressure 
from Washington to assist, or at least not hinder, the U.S. intervention 
effort.
Britain's policy decisions reflected these conflicting pressures. 
As Legum has remarked, Britain "chose to remain neutral as between the 
rivals, although strongly hostile to the Russian, Cuban and South African 
intervention".920 When the United States asked its allies to assist UNITA 
and the FNLA officially, Britain, along with the rest of the allies, 
refused.921 However, London did eventually turn a blind eye to the CIA's 
indirect recruitment of British mercenaries to help the anti-MPLA 
effort.922 The British businessman "Tiny" Rowland, whose company, Lonrho, 
had extensive interests in southern Africa, also provided significant 
assistance to UNITA, including pilots and a plane for Savimbi's use.923
The differences between Britain's policies on FRELIMO and the MPLA 
are instructive. Where Britain had major economic interests in states 
neighbouring a territory in which there was only one major nationalist 
movement, which was well regarded by the Commonwealth, it enquired about 
the policies of the nationalist movement seeking to rule the state. Upon 
finding the nationalists' policies generally not threatening to interests 
in neighbouring states, Britain tried to improve relations. The close 
ties between the nationalist movement and the Eastern bloc were not 
sufficiently disturbing to curtail the co-optation effort. When Britain 
had fewer economic interests in a state's neighbours, the nationalist 
movement in question was using Eastern bloc assistance to fight rivals
920 Legum and Hodges, op. cit. p. 27.
921 Stockwell, op. cit., p. 188.
922 Bridgland, op. cit., p. 177.
923 Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 439, footnote 190.
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backed by a close British ally, and the Commonwealth was divided about 
the nationalists' relative merits, the United Kingdom adopted a passive 
policy. It did not seek to discover if the nationalists' policies were in 
its interests or to co-opt that group, but neither did it offer more than 
token support for the group's rivals. The implications of a Soviet and 
Cuban ally winning a military victory over a U.S. ally were not 
considered sufficiently perilous for the United Kingdom to become 
vigorously involved.
Clearly, both in Mozambique and Angola, East-West issues were less 
relevant to British decisions than they were to U.S. decisions, and 
interests in neighbouring states were more relevant. When the latter 
interests were substantial, nationalist policies were also considered 
highly relevant.
FRANCE
France, like Britain, was more concerned about the impact of Angolan and 
Mozambican independence upon its ex-colonies neighbouring those states 
than it was about developments within the territories themselves. The 
victory of the centrist Giscard d'Estaing in the May 1974 French 
presidential elections caused even greater emphasis to be placed on this 
concern, because he hoped to consolidate the economic, military, 
cultural, and political relations between France and its former 
colonies.924 The Giscard d'Estaing victory also produced greater French 
interest in East-West detente, which the new president believed would 
provide an opportunity for France to carve out a special area of 
influence.925
These considerations led France virtually to ignore Mozambique, as 
it had minimal interests in that territory's neighbouring states, and to 
focus on Angola. France had significant economic and political interests 
in its West African ex-colonies, which would likely be affected by events 
in Angola. France also hoped to develop economic interests in the French- 
speaking ex-Belgian colony of Zaire, which shares a long border with 
Angola.
924 Roy C. Macridis, "French Foreign Policy: The Quest for Rank", in 
Foreign Policy in World Politics: States and Regions, ed. Roy C. 
Macridis (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1989), p. 55.
925 Ibid.
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Unlike the British evaluation of the Marxist nationalists in 
Mozambique, however, France concluded that a victory of Marxist 
nationalists in Angola was not necessarily good for its interests in 
neighbouring states. This conclusion was unrelated to MPLA ideology or 
alliances with the East; it was due instead to MPLA policies on Cabinda 
and Zaire.
The issue of Cabinda (the Angolan enclave sandwiched between Zaire 
and Congo-Brazzaville) was a delicate one. During the nineteenth-century 
competition between European powers for colonial territory in Africa, 
France had laid claim to Cabinda. Portugal challenged the claim and 
occupied the territory in 1883. The rival claims were resolved at the 
Berlin Conference of 1884 to 1885 in favour of Portugal.926 (This was well 
before the oil wealth of Cabinda was known.) As the Angolan independence 
process progressed, Cabindan groups agitated for secession. The MPLA 
consistently opposed secession, while the FNLA and UNITA were less 
categorical on the issue. President Mobutu of Zaire strongly favoured 
secession, influencing the attitude of his FNLA friends. The Congo- 
Brazzaville government similarly favoured secession, though it was much 
more discreet in expressing the view, perhaps in deference to its friends 
in the MPLA.
Although France never outright declared support for Cabindan 
secession, it concluded that such an event would suit French interests. 
First, secession would provide the ex-French colony of Congo-Brazzaville 
with a small state as a neighbour, rather than an extension of the 
Angolan giant, better protecting Congo-Brazzaville1s security. Second, as 
Zaire's President Mobutu favoured the secession plan, and France was 
trying to expand its political and economic influence in this French- 
speaking country, support for secession appeared wise. Third, France 
itself was interested in exploiting Cabinda's oil wealth and this would 
be more easily accomplished if the territory were separate from Angola.927
Completely apart from the Cabinda question, France's desire, in 
Stockwell's words, "to ingratiate itself with Mobutu"928 also militated 
against close French relations with the MPLA, for Mobutu strongly
supported the FNLA movement. French aspirations in Zaire further meant
926 Somerville, op. cit., p. 14.
927 Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 254. See also Stockwell, op. cit., p.
198.
928 Stockwell, op. cit., p. 198.
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that the MPLA's recruitment of the Katanga gendarmes, who had previously- 
fought for the secession of Zaire's mineral-rich Shaba province, also 
distressed Paris. The MPLA's close relations with the Eastern bloc, and 
its own socialist rhetoric, were less worrying to the French than were 
the implications of an MPLA victory for these regional issues.
One element of French policy, however, was directly related to 
Angola, rather than to Angola's neighbours. The French hoped to pull 
Angola into the French "zone of influence" by integrating it into the 
institutions that linked France with its ex-colonies. This desire was 
reflected in France's March 1975 announcement that the future government 
of independent Angola would be invited to attend the regular summits of 
Francophone states.929 As France had allied itself with the FNLA because 
of regional concerns, an FNLA government in Luanda would obviously suit 
this ambition better than an MPLA government.
For all these reasons, France responded more positively than did 
Britain to U.S. requests for assistance in its coercion strategy, but did 
not go so far as actually providing troops. In early 1975, President 
Giscard d'Estaing visited Zaire and reportedly told Mobutu that France 
supported his policy of aiding Cabindan secession. 930 The spring 1975 
emergence of a mysterious Commander Jean da Costa "with French 
connections" as leader of an effort to prevent the MPLA from securing 
control over Cabinda931 prompted additional speculation about French 
intentions in the province. In August 1975, French intelligence directors 
met with the CIA's deputy director to discuss Angola. France subsequently 
provided the FNLA with anti-tank missiles, mortar rounds, and ammunition 
for Mobutu's armoured cars. The equipment was transported by the CIA.932 
France's provision of four missile-firing helicopters to the FNLA in 
December 1975933 and its early 1976 assistance to the CIA's efforts to 
recruit French mercenaries to aid the FNLA, although occurring after the 
time period covered by this thesis, further reflected a French attitude
929 "French woo LM, Luanda", Star (Johannesburg, South Africa), 10 
March 1975.
930 Legum and Hodges, op. cit., p. 27.
931 Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 261.
932 Stockwell, op. cit., pp. 198-199.
933 Ibid.
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towards the Angolan conflict that was already evident in the pre­
independence period.934
The MPLA reacted to the French policy by making life for the 
officials at the French consulate in Luanda "extremely difficult" and 
eventually surrounding the office with troops. The consular staff fled, 
leaving the building to be occupied by MPLA and Cuban soldiers.935
In making decisions about the Angola situation, France first 
considered its interests in neighbouring states, and the interests of its 
allies in those states, rather than the ideological orientations or 
superpower alliances of the Angolan parties themselves. Though these 
latter concerns were relevant, they were not the primary consideration. 
French aid to the FNLA was not motivated primarily by a desire to "fight 
communism" or "stop the spread of Soviet and Cuban influence", but by a 
desire to curry favour with Mobutu and facilitate Cabindan secession. 
France helped the U.S. coercion policy in a small way, but Paris was 
motivated by very different concerns than was Washington.
It is also interesting to note that (as in the case of the United 
Kingdom in its relationship with Mozambique) when France had considerable 
economic interests in the states neighbouring a territory, it paid some 
attention to the specific policies of the nationalist movements in the 
territory and particularly noted the potential impact of those policies 
upon French interests in the neighbouring states. Unlike Britain's 
conclusion regarding FRELIMO, however, France concluded that the MPLA's 
policies were not favourable for French interests in neighbouring states.
WEST GERMANY
West Germany paid little attention to the colonial implications of the 
Portuguese coup and concentrated on the event's repercussions in 
Portugal. Some support for FNLA and UNITA did reportedly originate from 
West Germany, but the amounts involved were not substantial. 936 After the 
failed attempt to improve relations with FRELIMO in 1973, the Mozambican 
situation was virtually ignored.
Several factors accounted for Bonn's relative lack of concern. As 
in the case of the United States, West Germany had few economic or
934 Ibid., p. 231.
935 Mr. Vaysett (political officer at the French embassy), interview 
by author, Luanda, Angola, 17 May 1985.
936 Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 263.
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cultural interests in Mozambique, Angola, or the contiguous territories. 
Only in Angola's southern neighbour of Namibia, which had been a German 
colony prior to World War I, were there such ties, and these were modest.
The nature of Bonn's competition with East Germany had also 
shifted just prior to the Portuguese coup. Whereas in the 1970 to 1973 
period West Germany had been anxious to court Third World support for its 
application to the United Nations, its September 1973 admission to that 
institution made catering to Third World opinion less critical.937 
Furthermore, the involvement of East Germany's close allies, Cuba and the 
Soviet Union, on the side of the MPLA excited West Germany's competitive 
instincts. These considerations, combined with encouragement from the 
United States to slow the "spread of communism" by aiding the FNLA and 
UNITA, made modest aid to the MPLA's rivals appear advisable.
The rivalry with East Germany would have made it difficult for 
Bonn to cultivate relations with the MPLA and FRELIMO once the parties 
took power, even if the West German government had been so disposed. Bonn 
had long insisted on including the "Berlin Clause" in all government-to- 
government aid agreements. This clause required the recipient to 
recognise all of Berlin as a part of West Germany. Predictably, East 
Germany strongly urged those movements and governments with which it had 
cordial relations to reject the Berlin Clause. Thus, even if West Germany 
had wanted to follow the British example and promise Machel aid for the 
future independent state of Mozambique, long-standing policies would have 
required it to do so in terms that made rejection likely.
Bonn's decision to focus on events in Portugal was motivated by 
two factors: economic interests and domestic politics. By the eve of the 
Portuguese coup, West Germany had become the most important supplier of 
imports to Portugal,938 and the tumultuous political events in that 
country would have an impact, albeit modest, on West Germany's trade 
prospects. More important was the close relationship between the ruling 
German Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Portuguese Socialist Party 
(PSP). West German Prime Minister and SDP head Willy Brandt was close to 
the PSP leader, Mario Soares. Indeed, Soares had founded the PSP while in 
West Germany in 1973. The PSP was "centrist" in the Portuguese post-coup 
political context, and the West German SDP provided substantial funds to
937 Henderson, op. cit., p. 238.
938 Ibid.
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help it compete with rivals.939 When Willy Brandt resigned in May 1974, 
his successor, Helmut Schmidt, continued the pro-Soares policy.
West Germany's support for Soares did indirectly influence the 
independence process. By aiding his party, Bonn strengthened the group 
opposing Spinola's early 1974 plan to offer federation rather than 
independence to the African territories. Once the principle of full 
independence was accepted in September 1974, and the Portuguese 
government began to move steadily leftward, West German support for the 
PSP worked against the interests of the pro-MPLA far-left elements in the 
Portuguese government, who were anxious to protect the MPLA's position in 
Luanda.
In sum, West Germany's impact upon the fortunes of the MPLA and 
FRELIMO was minimal in this period. West Germany did not seek to 
resuscitate its earlier contacts with FRELIMO, and, like the United 
States, it was excluded from the Mozambican independence ceremonies. Its 
provision of modest aid to UNITA and the FNLA, and alignment with the 
centrist rival of the MPLA's far-left Portuguese allies, ensured that 
relations with the new Angolan government would be poor. In the West 
German case, as in that of the United States, little attention was paid 
to MPLA or FRELIMO policies, the country had few economic interests in 
the disputed territories or their neighbours, and East-West 
considerations were important in decision making. However, unlike 
Washington, Bonn did not consider a Soviet-Cuban "victory" to be so 
destabilising to the East-West balance as to warrant active military 
intervention.
SCANDINAVIA AND THE NETHERLANDS
The policies of the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands continued 
to diverge significantly from those of the other Western governments in 
the period after the Portuguese coup. Again, the main factor motivating 
their policies was domestic opinion. Their populations' distaste for 
colonialism and racism, and support for the struggle against South 
African apartheid, continued to push the governments to adopt sympathetic 
policies towards both the MPLA and FRELIMO. However, these governments 
were not totally oblivious to the East-West element in the evolving 
situation in Angola.
939 Schneidman, op. cit, pp. 418-419.
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The policy decisions confronting these governments in Mozambique 
were relatively straightforward. Virtually no one except extreme right- 
wing elements in Portugal and South Africa opposed Lisbon's decision to 
hand power over to FRELIMO. Thus, the Scandinavian and Dutch governments 
were able swiftly to begin consultations with FRELIMO for future aid to 
the independent state of Mozambique. Simultaneously, plans were made for 
these states to open embassies in Mozambique immediately after 
independence. FRELIMO appreciation for these offers was reflected in the 
fact that the Scandinavian states and the Netherlands made up five of the 
seven Western countries invited to the independence celebrations.
The decisions confronting the Scandinavian and Dutch governments 
concerning Angola were more complicated. While not as concerned about the 
"spread of communism" as the United States, these countries were worried 
by the presence of Soviet arms and Cuban troops in the Angolan war. In 
addition, they were confused by the shifting positions adopted by their 
other friends in Africa, some of whom periodically supported the MPLA's 
rivals. Although humanitarian aid to the MPLA continued, steps were taken 
to ensure that the assistance was not diverted to military uses. Unlike 
in Mozambique, there were few discussions with the MPLA about future 
development aid, and in fact Swedish development aid to Angola did not 
start until two years after independence.940
Overall, the decisions of the Scandinavian and Dutch governments 
concerning the MPLA and FRELIMO were affected relatively little by East- 
West considerations or economic interests in Mozambique, Angola, and 
their neighbours. Domestic political concern about minority rule and 
colonialism was the main determining factor. However, even in this 
environment, perception of factionalism among the Angolan nationalists 
limited financial generosity towards the MPLA.
SUMMARY
The foregoing discussion shows that while most European countries were 
concerned about the implications of a Soviet and Cuban "victory" in 
Angola, this concern was not sufficiently grave to convince them to adopt 
a vigorous coercion policy. The European governments that did aid the 
U.S. strategy in Angola did so in a relatively modest manner. The 
European country most active in the coercion effort, France, was 
motivated more by concern about the impact of MPLA policies upon its
940 Altan, interview.
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interests in neighbouring states than by cold war worries. When other 
factors did motivate a European state to initiate a new co-optation 
policy, specifically in British policy regarding FRELIMO, the fact that 
the target group was "Marxist" and close to the Eastern bloc was not 
considered an impediment.
The above description also shows that when a European state had 
considerable economic interests in states neighbouring a certain 
territory, it paid more attention to the policies of the nationalists in 
that territory. The United Kingdom had considerable interests in the 
states neighbouring Mozambique, carefully examined FRELIMO's policies, 
and upon discovering that those policies were relatively non-threatening 
to British interests launched a co-optation effort. France had economic 
interests in the states neighbouring Angola, examined the policies of the 
MPLA, and upon discovering that they were not entirely compatible with 
French interests became willing to aid the U.S. coercion strategy, albeit 
in a limited manner.
European policy decisions also showed that a nationalist group's 
factionalism discouraged European states otherwise predisposed to aid 
that group, as demonstrated in the case of the Scandinavian and Dutch 
unease regarding the MPLA. Lack of factionalism coincided with generous 
aid from those long or newly disposed to aid a given group, as in the 
Scandinavian-Dutch and British policies regarding FRELIMO.
Domestic politics were also highly relevant in European decisions. 
Labour1s recent victory in the United Kingdom made Britain anxious to 
improve relations with the Commonwealth and less suspicious than 
previously of socialist nationalists. Giscard d'Estaing's victory in 
France and his wish to improve relations with ex-colonies increased 
French sensitivity to the opinion of those ex-colonies. The West German 
SDP's alliance with Soares was partially responsible for West Germany's 
decision to concentrate on the implications of the coup in Portugal 
rather than in Africa. The high value placed by Dutch and Scandinavian 
domestic politics on anti-colonial issues clearly had a major impact on 
these countries' policies.
Angola and Mozambique were relevant to Britain and France's 
ability to build support for non-cold war aspects of their international 
agendas (strengthening the role of the Commonwealth and the Francophone 
network respectively), while Washington's virtual only agenda was the 
cold war. Policy makers in London and Paris also had more substantive, 
concrete interests in the region than did their Washington counterparts,
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or indeed those in West Germany, Scandinavia and the Netherlands. The two 
Portuguese territories had the ability to influence the stability of 
neighbours in which Britain and France were anxious to maintain or 
enhance commercial access, and France had commercial aspirations in 
Angola itself. More than any other Western countries, Britain and 
France's policies were at least partially conditioned by concrete, 
tangible interests in the region itself, rather than solely driven by 
implications for cold war rivalry and/or domestic politics.
In light of these considerations, how much influence did the MPLA 
and FRELIMO have upon the policies of European countries? In the case of 
FRELIMO-British and MPLA-French relations, the nationalists had 
considerable influence. If FRELIMO had, at this time, adopted overtly 
aggressive policies towards Rhodesia and South Africa, and been on bad 
terms with the governments of Tanzania, Zambia, Swaziland, and Malawi, 
London probably would have concluded that a FRELIMO government would 
damage British interests in neighbouring states. London therefore would 
probably have been less interested in pursuing a co-optation policy. If 
the MPLA had been on excellent terms with Mobutu and been willing to 
consider Cabindan secession, France might have aided the U.S. coercion 
effort in Angola less or not at all.
This suggests that when a European power had major interests in 
the states neighbouring a certain territory, it paid attention to the 
policies of the nationalists in that territory. This, in turn, gave the 
nationalists in said territory some opportunity to influence the 
decisions of the European government in question. As East-West 
considerations were not an overriding factor for most European 
governments, the simple fact that a movement was Marxist or on close 
terms with the Soviet Union was not an automatic barrier to a co-optation 
policy.
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CONCLUSION
There are three types of conclusions that can be drawn from the preceding 
discussions: What happened? Why did the events happen? What might have 
occurred in a counter-factual circumstance (i.e., if certain conditions 
had been different)?
WHAT HAPPENED?
At the time of their foundings, the MPLA displayed moderately low co- 
optability whereas FRELIMO appeared quite open to Western overtures. The 
movements subsequently became less well disposed towards the West. By the 
eve of independence, the co-optability levels of both were very low, 
though the Mozambican movement remained less hostile than its Angolan 
counterpart. The evolution of the movements' attitudes was not consistent 
either over time or with regard to all Western states. After steady 
decline, MPLA co-optability briefly increased from 1970 to 1972, followed 
by a return to the downward trend. FRELIMO's attitude towards the West 
divided around 1970. Relations with the U.S. sharply deteriorated while 
relations with a few European states began to improve slightly.
Western attitudes towards the nationalists followed an irregular 
pattern. At first Washington backed Portugal's anti-nationalist policies, 
but in 1961 the Kennedy administration sharply shifted to co-optation. 
This was soon abandoned and from 1963 to 1974 Washington did not directly 
coerce the nationalists but did increasingly help Portugal do so. In the 
closing months before independence, Washington switched to energetic, 
direct coercion in Angola and semi-hostile neglect in Mozambique.
European governments began to take an interest in the nationalists 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, with the Scandinavian governments and 
the Netherlands first adopting co-optation strategies. In 1973 West 
Germany toyed briefly with and then abandoned a co-optation policy 
towards FRELIMO, while the U.K. vigorously began to pursue a co-optation 
policy towards FRELIMO in the months just before independence. The rest 
of Europe either took little interest in the situation of Portuguese 
Africa or tacitly supported U.S. policies.
WHY DID THE EVENTS HAPPEN?
A range of factors influenced both nationalist and Western behaviour. The 
preceding chapters have detailed the precise dynamics involved in each 
phase. Only the overall trends will be addressed here.
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Factors That Influenced Nationalist Co-optabilitv
Background of the Nationalist Leadership. When, as in the case of 
the MPLA, the leadership of a nationalist movement was highly educated, 
had extensive exposure to Marxist theory, and was racially different from 
the majority of the population in the territory (creating the need for an 
ideologically based tie with the population), it displayed relatively low 
co-optability. When, as in the case of FRELIMO, the leadership generally 
had a low level of education, largely was of the same race as the 
majority of the population, and had formative experiences in states 
featuring capitalism or "bourgeois" socialism, it was at least somewhat 
co-optable.
Source of a Movement's Ideological Orientation. When socialist 
ideology arose primarily from internal developments (such as the need to 
mobilise ethnically diverse masses in the name of nationalism, the desire 
for a framework capable of undermining a rival faction, the need to 
generate grassroots support with a focus on egalitarianism and social 
justice and the appeal of a psychologically empowering philosophy), a 
movement's political principles tended to adjust to changing 
circumstances and hence allow for periods of moderately high co- 
optability. When socialist ideology was derived from academic training 
and examples set by (or pressures exerted by) foreign allies, a movement 
would tend to be less co-optable. FRELIMO displayed the former 
characteristics, the MPLA the latter.
Formation as an Artificial Versus Genuine Front. Formation as a 
relatively genuine front (the FRELIMO experience) required a movement to 
be somewhat flexible in its policies so as to build consensus among 
constituent groups, and this adaptive tradition indirectly enhanced co- 
optability. Formation as an artificial front (the MPLA experience) meant 
that a movement's leadership was not practised in the art of compromise, 
creating a mind-set less conducive to co-optability.
Degree and Nature of Internal Factionalism. A high degree of 
pervasive, ongoing factionalism correlated with low co-optability (MPLA 
case), whereas a lesser level of factionalism correlated with a somewhat 
higher degree of co-optability (FRELIMO case). However, this seemed to be 
more a result of the manner in which the behaviour of outside actors 
interacted with internal factionalism, and the distrust or confidence in 
foreign intentions so generated, than a result of the factionalism per 
se. Therefore, in a different international context, factionalism could 
have a different result.
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Rivalry with Other Nationalist Movements. A high degree of such 
rivalry correlated with low co-optability (MPLA) and a low degree was 
associated with slightly higher co-optability (FRELIMO). However, as in 
the case of internal factionalism, the impact of a given rivalry on co- 
optability was related more to the perceived international alliances of 
the rival, and the message this conveyed regarding Western hostility or 
goodwill, than to the inherent characteristics of rivalry per se. When a 
movement had numerous occasions to fear that the West was allying with a 
rival to engineer the movement's destruction, it was naturally 
distrustful and inclined to solidify ties with the East. When a movement 
had no or only weak opponents, it had less reason to fear Western 
intentions.
Nature and Actions of the Movement's Direct Enemy. The nature of 
the direct enemy was relevant to the extent that it conditioned that 
enemy's actions. When internal splits within the direct enemy were 
resolved in favour of the hawks, and the majority of Western governments 
appeared to acquiesce to or even aid brutal military initiatives, co- 
optability declined. However, the Western governments that opposed the 
direct enemy's actions were viewed positively, and occasionally there was 
a selective increase in co-optability regarding these specific Western 
states. FRELIMO attitudes towards the Scandinavian, Dutch, and British 
governments are examples.
Relationship With Non-Western Allies. When non-Western allies 
conditioned aid on hostility to Western states, co-optability declined at 
least somewhat. The degree of decline varied in direct proportion to the 
dependence of the movement on the ally exerting the pressure. Receipt of 
support from a wide range of non-Western allies decreased the leverage of 
an individual ally, whereas dependence on a narrow range of such allies 
enhanced such leverage. FRELIMO fell into the former category, the MPLA 
into the latter.
Conditions of Armed Struggle. If the conditions of armed struggle 
led a movement to require access to an infiltration route via a pro- 
Western neighbour, co-optability could rise as long as the goal appeared 
achievable. This helps explain the upward shift in MPLA co-optability in 
the 1970 to 1972 period, when it was hoping for access to Angola via pro- 
Western Zaire. Similarly, if a movement had a strong, relatively self- 
reliant military presence within the disputed territory, it was less 
vulnerable to pressure from anti-Western allies. This was the case for 
FRELIMO in the latter years of the war. If a movement was militarily weak
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and had little presence on the ground within the disputed territory (as 
in the case of the MPLA through much of the Angolan struggle), it was 
highly dependent upon outside allies and not in a position to resist if 
those allies pressured in an anti-Western direction. Finally, if a 
movement believed that socialist policies were conducive to maintaining 
peasant support for military operations (as FRELIMO came to believe), its 
co-optability declined.
Attitudes of Regional Powers. Military hostility from, or support 
for a rival by, a regional power tended to strengthen a nationalist 
movement's dependence on foreign allies, and if these were primarily 
anti-Western then co-optability would be reduced. If the movement 
perceived that a hostile regional power was acting in alliance with a 
Western government, co-optability declined even more. On the other hand, 
if a regional power was both positively disposed towards a movement and 
was seen as a Western ally, co-optability was enhanced. The MPLA's co- 
optability was reduced by both mechanisms, for Zairean and South African 
hostility enhanced its need for socialist-country support, and the 
regional powers' perceived alliance with the West exacerbated the 
movement's antipathy towards Western governments. The fact that the 
regional power that adopted a hostile posture towards FRELIMO (the 
government of Rhodesia's Ian Smith) was on bad terms with the West, and 
that a perceived Western ally (South Africa) was cordial towards FRELIMO, 
enhanced that movement's co-optability.
Economic and Geographic Structure of the Disputed Territory. These 
factors were particularly salient at the beginning and end of the 
independence struggle in each territory. When economic and geographic 
circumstances required a movement's leaders to live for periods of time 
in neighbouring capitalist or mixed-economy states, a movement's initial 
co-optability was heightened. When economic and geographic circumstances 
led a movement's leadership to have access to elite education in European 
capitals where Marxist philosophy was part of the normal academic debate, 
co-optability fell. Mozambique's circumstances subjected FRELIMO leaders 
to the former experiences; Angola's subjected the MPLA leadership to the 
latter experiences.
Even more important, in the last phase of the independence 
struggle close economic integration with a pro-Western neighbour that was 
willing and able to "consensually neo-colonise" created a bridge to the 
West and enhanced co-optability. When a movement was aware that the 
economic resources of which it was about to take control required the
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goodwill of that neighbour to render profits, the co-optability-enhancing 
potential of the relationship was particularly strong. This was the case 
in FRELIMO's relations with South Africa, for without that neighbour's 
co-operation much of Mozambique's resources, primarily transport routes 
and labour, would lie idle.
In contrast, when a territory had significant wealth in the form 
of raw commodities in high demand in the international market, and was 
not economically integrated with a pro-Western neighbour, the movement 
was more free to choose its own path. This was the case with the MPLA, 
which felt confident that the high profits associated with extraction of 
oil and diamonds would gain it the capital it required regardless of how 
friendly or hostile it was to Western governments. Poverty and dependence 
correlated with higher co-optability, whereas wealth and economic 
independence correlated with lower co-optability.
Perception of Western Policies. Perception of Western policies, 
though never the sole determinant of nationalist attitudes, nonetheless 
had a consistent and significant impact on co-optability throughout the 
1956 to 1976 period. When a movement perceived that the West was at least 
willing to consider its point of view, co-optability rose. This occurred 
most dramatically, and with respect to both movements, when the Kennedy 
administration briefly pursued a co-optation strategy in the early 1960s. 
It was again evident in the case of the MPLA in the 1970 to 1972 period 
when NATO was perceived as divisible on the issue of supporting 
Portuguese colonialism. The same dynamic occurred with regard to FRELIMO 
in 1974 and 1975, when the British government adopted a co-optation 
policy.
On the other hand, when a movement perceived that the West was 
aiding the direct enemy and/or assisting a rival, co-optability 
inevitably declined. This occurred when the Kennedy administration 
abandoned co-optation and shifted to support for Portugal's colonial 
policies in early 1963, and when subsequent U.S. administrations 
intensified that trend. The most dramatic evidence of perceived Western 
hostility reducing co-optability occurred in late 1974 and early 1975, 
when the MPLA concluded, correctly, that the U.S. was assisting those 
forces seeking to destroy the movement.
The degree of any given increase or decline in co-optability 
following a shift in perceptions of Western policy was always influenced 
by one or more of the ten other factors listed above. However, in every
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time period explored, perception of Western policies had an important 
role.
Factors That Influenced Western Decisions to Pursue Coercion or Co­
optation Policies
Relationship With a Rival Power, and Related Security, Military, 
and Strategic Issues. When relations with a rival power formed the prism 
through which most other matters were judged, and/or when a Western 
government came to believe that its ability to deal with future 
aggression by a rival was jeopardised by friendly relations with the 
movements in question, co-optation was swiftly abandoned. The U.S. 
decision to cut off contacts with the MPLA and FRELIMO as soon as 
Portugal threatened to retaliate by blocking access to the Azores base is 
a case in point. When a Western government had a lesser level of 
preoccupation with relations with the rival, and a broad range of 
interests in the geographic region in question, the
rival/strategic/military factors militated much less strongly against co­
optation. This was the case for much of Europe in the 1970s.
Even when the strategic/military concern was removed (as it was 
once Portugal agreed to the independence of its African colonies and 
ceased using Azores base access to pressure the West), tense relations 
with the rival could still push decision makers towards coercion when a 
nationalist movement's victory was seen to symbolise the rival's triumph. 
Thus, the United States felt driven to coerce the MPLA, which was 
primarily associated with Moscow in the eyes of world opinion, and was 
not driven to coerce FRELIMO, which balanced its ties to the Soviet Union 
with equal or greater links to China. For those European governments less 
obsessed with the cold war, and with a wider variety of interests in the 
region, preventing a Moscow-affiliated group from taking power was a 
lower priority. In fact, the one European country that did actively 
assist the U.S. coercion effort against the MPLA, France, was motivated 
as much by concerns regarding MPLA policies towards French friends in the 
region as by cold war concerns.
Internal Politics. The impact of internal politics on Western 
policies depended in large part upon the state of the previous factor 
discussed, relations with a rival power. When a Western government's 
concerns about relations with a rival power were not overwhelming (as in 
Europe in the 1970s) or when concerns were high but in a non- 
confrontational phase (as in the early months of the Kennedy
293
administration), Western sympathy for the underdog meant that internal 
politics tended to push policies towards co-optation. This effect was 
particularly strong when elements of civil society publicised brutal 
behaviour on the part of the nationalists' repressor (as occurred in 
Scandinavia and the Netherlands in the 1970s, and in Britain after the 
much-publicised December 1972 massacre in Mozambique).
However, when internal politics were closely intertwined with 
apprehension about relations with the rival power (as in the United 
States for the entire period after the Kennedy co-optation experiment and 
particularly in the aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate) and when the 
rival power was believed to benefit from a nationalist victory, internal 
politics pushed policy strongly towards coercion. Leaders simply feared 
being accused of demonstrating insufficient resolve against the rival.
Economic, Cultural, and Historical Ties With the Region. If a 
Western country had a high level of such ties with the region, it tended 
to pay considerable attention to the policies of a given nationalist 
movement when determining whether to adopt a coercion or co-optation 
approach. (See the item below on "Perception of the Nationalists' 
Policies" for further discussion of this issue.) If the nationalists' 
policies favoured the interests generated by such ties, then a co­
optation strategy was more likely to be selected (option A); if they 
threatened such interests, coercion was more likely to be chosen (option 
B). If a nation had low economic, cultural, and historical interests in 
the region, nationalists' policies tended not to be examined for anything 
but their implications regarding competition with the rival world power 
(option C). British relations with FRELIMO were an example of option A, 
French relations with the MPLA an example of option B, and U.S. relations 
with both movements an example of option C.
Policies of Tacit and Open Allies in the Region. When a country in 
the region adopted its own coercion or co-optation strategy, the Western 
countries with which it was openly or tacitly allied tended to do the 
same. This is not to claim that the regional actor determined the policy 
of its Western ally. The policy of an ally in the region simply created a 
context more conducive to one Western policy stance or the other.
In the case of the United States, the coercion policies of open 
ally Zaire and tacit ally South Africa regarding the MPLA created a 
context conducive to a U.S. coercion policy regarding the same movement. 
Coercion became both politically attractive and operationally possible. 
Concerning FRELIMO, the pro-co-optation policies of South Africa
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discouraged U.S. coercion of that movement and, together with the pro- 
FRELIMO stance of other British allies in the region, facilitated 
London's co-optation efforts concerning FRELIMO. The alliances of the 
Scandinavian and Dutch governments with anti-apartheid movements in the 
region obviously encouraged those governments' decisions to adopt co­
optation strategies regarding both the MPLA and FRELIMO.
Perception of Nationalist Divisions. A high level of nationalist 
divisions indirectly facilitated a coercion strategy, for there were 
potential allies available to employ Western-supplied weapons without 
putting Western forces themselves in harm's way. Perception of severe 
nationalist divisions therefore made it relatively easy for a coercion- 
inclined Western power to implement its desired policy. Such divisions 
discouraged co-optation-inclined governments from increasing assistance, 
for it was not always clear who was the most appropriate recipient of the 
largesse.
On the other hand, a low level of nationalist divisions 
discouraged coercion-inclined governments from intervening, for there was 
no local surrogate available. It also encouraged co-optation-inclined 
governments, for the situation presented a straightforward choice 
concerning the recipient.
This factor became particularly relevant in the 1974 to 1975 
period. Intense nationalist divisions in Angola encouraged U.S. coercion 
of the MPLA and discouraged Scandinavian and Dutch aid to that movement. 
The absence of nationalist divisions in Mozambique discouraged U.S. 
coercion, and encouraged British co-optation, of FRELIMO.
Perception of the Nationalists' Policies. As already partly 
explored above, Western perceptions of nationalist policies had an 
inconsistent impact on Western decision making.
For the Western countries that were preoccupied with 
military/strategic/competition-with-rival-power concerns, and had few 
cultural, economic, or historical ties to the region, nationalist 
policies usually were considered only in a very narrow manner.
From the end the Kennedy co-optation experiment in 1963 until the 
Portuguese coup in 1974, Washington paid little regard to the 
nationalists' policies, other than to take account of the fact that they 
were demanding independence from Portugal. It primarily considered the 
fact that Portugal would block access to the Azores base if contact were 
maintained with the MPLA and FRELIMO. In these circumstances, even the 
nationalists' alliance with or distance from the rival power was
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irrelevant. As long as a co-optation policy would jeopardise the Azores, 
co-optation would have been impossible even with an anti-Soviet group.
If the strategic/military question were removed from the equation 
(as occurred once Portugal accepted the inevitability of colonial 
independence), a country with scarce interests in the region immediately 
would focus on competition with the rival power as its only policy 
guideline. If the policies of a nationalist group made its accession to 
power appear to be a symbolic victory for the rival, the group would be 
coerced, regardless of its policies on other matters. This was the case 
in U.S. relations with the MPLA from 1974 to 1975. If a nationalist 
group's policies did not lead it to be perceived as a surrogate of the 
rival, then coercion was not likely to be adopted. This was the case in 
U.S. relations with FRELIMO in the months before independence.
As already mentioned, those Western countries with a wider variety 
of interests in the region tended to consider a broader range of 
nationalist policies when choosing between coercion, neglect, or co­
optation. Britain considered FRELIMO's policies regarding the numerous 
British interests in Mozambique's Anglophone neighbours, found them 
acceptable, and pursued co-optation. France examined the MPLA's policies 
towards various French interests in Angola's neighbours, found them 
wanting, and assisted U.S. coercion. Scandinavia and the Netherlands were 
most concerned about domestic support for the anti-apartheid struggle in 
South Africa, found MPLA and FRELIMO policies on that struggle 
acceptable, and pursued varying levels of co-optation policies concerning 
both movements.
Clarification of Western Interests
In conclusion, Western interests in Mozambique and Angola, were as 
intriguing for what they lacked as for what they contained. There was 
little interest in the territories' natural resources, with the exception 
of some U.S. and French interest in Angola's oil. There was interest in 
strategically located port facilities, but this was neither particularly 
strong nor consistent over time. U.S. interest arose only at the end of 
the period, when it became difficult to sustain domestic support for the 
use of South African ports. There was an interest in the U.S. and France 
in developing access to the Angolan market, but this never became an 
important factor.
Western interests in the two territories, on the whole, were 
derivative and indirect. Washington wished to ensure that the territories
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not enhance Soviet power or prestige, and that policies regarding the 
territories not disrupt trans-Atlantic alliances or access to a 
strategically located base. Furthermore, Washington was concerned about 
the impact of events in Angola on a U.S. open and tacit allies, 
specifically Zaire and the white ruled states. Some European states, most 
particularly the U.K. and France, were even more concerned about the 
impact of Mozambican and Angolan events on neighbours, with commercial 
and transportation issues most obviously attracting attention. The 
Scandinavian and Dutch authorities focussed primarily on the implications 
of Mozambican and Angolan developments on domestic anti-apartheid 
sentiment, and were far less concerned with internal events in the 
individual territories. Britain and France had an interest that 
Mozambican and Angolan trends strengthen the networks each had 
established to influence events in and benefit from links with ex­
colonies, (the Commonwealth in the case of the former and the Francophone 
Summit process in that of the latter). West Germany had an interest in 
ensuring that Mozambican and Angolan events strengthen its ability to 
compete with East Germany.
What all Western states had in common, then, was a relative lack 
of concrete interests in the Portuguese territories themselves. Instead, 
they all were concerned about the manner in which Angolan and Mozambican 
developments would influence other interests. Whether they were driven by 
a cold war fixation, an anti-apartheid concern, or the desire to 
influence events in ex-colonies, the theme remained consistent.
Mozambique and Angola were not a central focus of Western interests. The 
territories' relevance was indirect and derivative, and the nationalists 
only attracted policy attention to the extent they impacted those 
interests.
COUNTERFACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES
What might have occurred if the various actors in the 1956 to 1976 events 
had adopted policies different from those pursued in fact?
If the West Had Pursued Co-optation?
Analysis of the events covered in Parts I through IV shows that 
the West could have gained quite considerably from a co-optation policy 
launched during the 1956 to 1963 period. It would have gained somewhat 
less if such a policy had only been adopted in the 1964 to 1969 period, 
and progressively less if it had only been launched in the 1970 to 1974
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or 1974 to 1975 periods. The longer that policies of neglect or coercion 
were in force, the less was to be gained by a change.
There was also some difference in the reaction a pro-nationalist 
stance would have elicited from each of the movements under study. In 
each historical period, a co-optation strategy would have produced a 
somewhat greater reaction from FRELIMO than from the MPLA, largely 
because the former was less dependent on Eastern bloc support than was 
the latter. And although even a vigorous co-optation strategy would not 
have produced a pro-Western stance in either movement, in each phase 
under study it might well have better protected Western interests than 
the coercion/neglect strategies pursued by most Western states.
If the Nationalists Had Been More Pro-Western?
On the other side, the historical record shows that throughout the 
entire independence effort adoption of a more pro-Western posture would 
have gained the nationalists very little in relations with those 
countries preoccupied with the cold war. As long as the nationalists 
called for independence, Portugal would have threatened to cut off Azores 
access to any Western country that aided them. The fact that even the 
non-socialist FNLA lost most of its Washington largesse until the eve of 
independence illustrates this point. If the nationalists had adopted a 
pro-Western posture all the way through the independence effort, or at 
any stage in the process, they would have gained little from cold war- 
focussed governments.
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